Judgment:- The material facts in this revision petition are not in dispute. Defendants 1 to 3 are usufructuary mortgagees of the plaint schedule property. The fourth defendant is the mortgagor. The fourth defendant sold the same to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.18,000 under a registered sale deed dated 10th February, 1947. Under the sale deed, a sum of Rs. 3500 was reserved with the plaintiff to be paid to the mortgagees. Accordingly, he paid the amount to the mortgagees on 10th April, 1947. The mortgagees though they were in possession during faslis 1355 and 1356 did. not pay to the Zamindar the cist for 1355 and 1356. After the plaintiff took possession of the properties, he paid on 4th September, 1948, a sum of Rs.165-15-9 to the Zamindar being the arrears of cist due in respect of the othi for faslis 1355 and 1356. After paying the amount to the Zamindar, he filed S.C.S. No. 789 of 1951 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Ambasamudram for the recovery of the said amount from defendants 1 to 3. The learned District Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff paid the cist voluntarily and therefore, he would not be entitled to recover the same. The plaintiff has filed the above revision. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that section 69 of the Contract Act directly applies to the facts of this case. Section 69 reads: “A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other”. It is conceded that defendants 1 to 3 were bound by law to pay the cist to the Zamindar. But it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that the plaintiff is not a person interested in the payment of the money. The short question, therefore is what is the connotation of the word ‘interested’ in section 69 of the Act. The cases cited at the bar are not directly in point. But they may be referred to appreciate the contention raised. The short question, therefore is what is the connotation of the word ‘interested’ in section 69 of the Act. The cases cited at the bar are not directly in point. But they may be referred to appreciate the contention raised. Bose, J., defined the word in Banwarilal v. Rajkishore1, as follows: “It is necessary that a person must be interested in the payment of money and wis interest, as the Privy Council case indicates, and as has been held in Mojiram v. Sagarmal2, and Balwantrao v. Tulsa Pandarinath3, must be in order to avert some loss or to protect some interest which would otherwise be lost to the plaintiffs”. The illustration to section 69 of the Contract Act may also usefully be extracted: “B holds land in Bengal, on a lease granted by A, the Zamindar. The revenue payable by A to the Government being in arrear, his land is advertised for sale by the Government. Under the Revenue law, the consequence of such sale will be the annulment of B’s lease. B, to prevent the sale and the consequant annulment of his own lease, pays to the Government the sum due from A. A is bound to make good to B the amount so paid”. Relying upon the observations of Bose, J., and on aforesaid illustration, the learned counsel for the respondents argues that unless there is some threat or the nonpayment of the amount leads to some tangible loss to the person, any payment made by him under any other circumstances is a voluntary payment and, therefore, he is not a person interested in the payment. I am afraid I cannot give such a narrow construction to the word ‘interested’ in section 69 of the Act. It is true that when a person pays an amount which another is bound by law to pay to avert some loss or to protect some interest which would otherwise be lost to him or to avert a sale about to take place, it is a clear case of the said person having an interest in the payment of the money. But the said circumstances are not exhaustive. Curgenven, J., in Krishnan Namboodripad v. Ambu Kurup1, in circumstances similar to those present in the instant case applied the provisions of section 69 of the Act. But the said circumstances are not exhaustive. Curgenven, J., in Krishnan Namboodripad v. Ambu Kurup1, in circumstances similar to those present in the instant case applied the provisions of section 69 of the Act. There as here, the mortgagor paid the land revenue in respect of the mortgaged properties which the mortgagee was bound by law to pay and in such a case the learned Judge held that section 09 of the Indian Contract Act would apply. In Subramania Iyer v. Vengappa Reddi2, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Benson and Krisnnaswami Aiyar, JJ., held that the word ‘interested ‘was wide enough to include the apprehension of any kind of loss or inconvenience or at any rate of any detriment capable of being assessed in money. In the present case, the mortgagee did not pay the tax due for faslis 1355 and 1356. The plaintiff purchased the property in 1947 and took possession of the same. Taxes were not paid by the mortgagee even thereafter, that is, they were in arrears for a period of three years. In those circumstances, when a owner pays the arrears of taxes remaining unpaid for a period of three years, it cannot be said that he has no apprehension that if the arrears were not paid coercive steps might be taken against him and the property. The learned counsel for the respondents says that in view of the Tenants Protection Act, the lands could not be sold till the statutory notice was given and as no statutory notice was given in this case, there could be no apprehension in the minds of the plaintiff. Apart from the facts that this point has not been raised in the Court below, I cannot hold that the fact that statutory notice should be given as a condition precedent for the sale of the property is a ground for holding that a owner would have no apprehension that steps would be taken against him even though admittedly arrears were not paid for three years. Further in this case, the plaintiff as P.W.1 stated that zamin authorities told him that they were going to take steps against him for realising the arrears of rent due. The learned Judge disbelieved the evidence on the ground that he was an interested witness. Further in this case, the plaintiff as P.W.1 stated that zamin authorities told him that they were going to take steps against him for realising the arrears of rent due. The learned Judge disbelieved the evidence on the ground that he was an interested witness. In my view, there is no ground to reject the statement for it was natural and reasonable to expect the zamindar to threaten to take proceedings when arrears due to him were not paid for three years. For all the aforesaid reasons, I hold that when the petitioner paid the arrears of tax due, he was interested to pay that amount within the meaning of section 69 of the Indian Contract Act which the defendants were bound by law to pay. If so, it follows that the order of the lower Court is wrong and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly the order of the lower Court is set aside. The plaintiff will have a decree as prayed for and he will have his costs here and in the Court below. K.S. ------ Petition allowed.