Judgment :- 1. The only question for determination is this second appeal is whether the appellant's contention that under the system of inheritance obtaining among the Vala Community in this area a daughter is entitled to a share equal to that of a son in her father's estate has been established or not. The lower appellate court decided that the sons inherit to the exclusion of the daughters and that is the decision that is challenged before me. 2. The Valans form one of the two important fishing castes of Cochin, the other being the Arayan or Kadalarayan and according to Mr. Padmanabha Menon in his history of Kerala, Volume III P. 468: "While the Valans follow a mixed form of inheritance the Arayans observe Makkathayam. The Valans divide their self-acquired property equally among their nephews or ananthiravans and sons" Mr. Padmanabha Menon was one of the leading lawyers of Cochin and the book was edited and published after his death by another eminent lawyer, the late Mr. T.K. Krishna Menon. There can be no doubt that if a custom as alleged by the appellant obtained in the community it would have found specific mention and I cannot attribute the absence of a reference to such a custom to anything other than the absence of the custom itself. 3. There are references to the rules of inheritance obtaining among the Valans at p.204 of the Cochin State Manual by Mr. C. Achutha Menon, at p. 236 of Volume I of the Cochin Tribes and Castes by Mr. Ananthakrishna Iyer an in Mr. Iyer's Note on Valans in Volume VII of Thurston's Castes and Tribes of Southern India. There is nothing in those passages also which will in any way lend support to the existence of the custom alleged in this case. 4. Ananthakrishna Iyer an in Mr. Iyer's Note on Valans in Volume VII of Thurston's Castes and Tribes of Southern India. There is nothing in those passages also which will in any way lend support to the existence of the custom alleged in this case. 4. I am prepared to assume that the Hindu Law as such is not applicable to the Valans and as a result the standard of proof required to establish a rule of Customary Law in their community "need not come up to the standard required to making out a custom in derogation of a known body of antecedent law postulated to be generally binding such as the Hindu Law or the Mohammadan Law" and that all that is required "is such reasonably clear proof as the court will, in the circumstances of each case, insist upon for proving any other fact". See 25 Cochin 584 and 39 Cochin 19. In other words, as stated in latter case the evidence adduced in support of the custom need not be "subjected to those well known tests which are applied to the case of an alleged custom, contrary to, or in derogation of, the ordinary law, but should be merely as evidence adduced to show what is the rule of the customary law itself" and "in any enquiry into what the customary of law of the parties is we do not start with any bias in favour of a particular view - that daughters are or are not entitled to succeed along with the sons - and see whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to displace it. The enquiry itself is - what is the customary law of the community, and this has to be ascertained, like any other question of fact on the evidence in the case. If the court comes to the conclusion that a certain customary law has been proved, then that is their law which the court must apply to them. If not, then the court will, in the absence of proof of what their law is, apply to them rules of justice, equity and good conscience. This, in fact, is the ratio of the decision in Kochi v. Raman (21 Cochin 1)". 5. If not, then the court will, in the absence of proof of what their law is, apply to them rules of justice, equity and good conscience. This, in fact, is the ratio of the decision in Kochi v. Raman (21 Cochin 1)". 5. The issue relating to the alleged custom is issue No.1 (1): "Has the deceased Kutty's daughter, Pennamma any right in the properties according to the custom of succession among the members of the Vala community?". and the oral evidence adduced is certainly of no assistance of arrive at any definite conclusion. The trial court has stated: "The oral evidence in this case is of no use as the witnesses do not speak to any particular instance in support of either party's case". and the learned District Judge has endorsed that view by saying: "The oral evidence of custom adduced in the case is meagre and shabby". 6. The documentary evidence consists of Ext. VI, a partition deed dated 1.6.1091 and Ext. VIII, an assignment deed dated 21.12.1120. The learned District Judge has dealt with those documents - in my opinion quite correctly - as follows: "The only documents relied on by the defendants are Exts. VI and VIII. Of these Ext. VIII is an assignment of the year 1120 executed by the sons and daughters of a deceased member of the Vala community. The lower court itself has not acted upon the document since it is probable that the alienee might have insisted upon the junction of the daughter also by way of abundant caution. Ext. VI is a partition deed to which one Koma, a member of the Vala community as well as her two sons and two daughters and the children of the daughters are parties. The properties partitioned are their ancestral properties as well as the self-acquired properties of the mother and the sons. While the document states that the properties are divided into 4 shares all the properties are divided equally between the two sons and each son was directed to give Rs. 2,000 for the benefit of the tavazhi of the two daughters. It was further provided that as the mother does not claim her share, she and the father who was also alive had to be maintained by the sons. 2,000 for the benefit of the tavazhi of the two daughters. It was further provided that as the mother does not claim her share, she and the father who was also alive had to be maintained by the sons. The document though marked is not proved by examining any of the parties to the same, who alone could have given relevant evidence as to the circumstances under which it came to be executed. Anyhow it is patent from the document itself that the properties that were dealt with did not belong to the father. It is not possible to find the existence of the custom set up by the defendant on the basis of this single inconclusive document". 7. There is no need, however, to invoke the principles of justice, equity and good conscience as was done in 21 Cochin 1, as I consider the treatises on the subject as conclusive against the appellant and as establishing a rule of inheritance in favour of the sons to the exclusion of the daughters. 8. It follows that this second appeal has to be dismissed and I hereby dismiss the second appeal. In the circumstances of the case, however, I shall direct the parties to bear their respective costs throughout. Dismissed.