Order These are applications for the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the Election Commissioners, constituted under the rules framed under the Village Panchayats Act, 1950, from proceeding to hear and dispose of election petitions filed before them. Writ Petition No. 532 of 1953 is by the returned candidate at an election for the Presidentship of the Panchayat Board of Kurinjipadi in Cuddalore taluk, while Writ Petition No. 628 of 1953 is by the returned candidate at an election for the Presidentship of the Panchayat Board of Jalarpet in North Arcot, and election petitions have been filed challenging the respective elections and these petitions are preferred to obtain the quashing of these proceedings. The Election Tribunals before whom the two election petitions have been filed, have been constituted by the State Government under powers vested in them under the Village Panchayats Act of 1950. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in these two writ petitions is that the local Government have no power to constitute Tribunals for the decision of election disputes under the rule-making power vested in them, and that even if on proper construction of the Village Panchayat Act such a power is found conferred, the conferring of such powers is ultra vires of the State Legislature under the Constitution. Chapter II of Madras Village Panchayats Act of 1950 enacts provisions relating inter alia to the constitution of panchayats. Section 4(1) provides that a panchayat shall be constituted for each village with effect from a date specified in that behalf in the notification issued by the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards. Section 12 makes provision for the preparation of electoral rolls and the qualification for inclusion thereof, and other provisions of the Act in the said Chapter enact provisions for the constitution of the Boards by election, as well as qualifications and disqualifications for persons to stand for election. Section 20 enacts that there shall be a President and a Vice-President for every Panchayat and under section 21 “the President shall be elected by the persons, whose names appear in the electoral roll for the panchayat from amongst themselves.” The Act itself makes no provision for determining the manner of the election, or for the decision of disputes relating to the validity or legality of elections. This is left to be prescribed by rules to be made by the Government under section 112 of the Act. This section enacts:- (1) The Government shall, in addition to the rule-making powers conferred on them by any-other provisions contained in this Act, have power to make rules generally to carry out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Government may make rules; (i) as to all matters relating to electoral rolls or elections, not expressly provided for in this Act, including deposits to be made by candidates standing for election and the conditions under which such deposits may be forfeited, and the conduct of inquiries and the decision of disputes relating to electoral rolls or elections. In exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government by section 112(1) and section 112(2)(i), the Government have framed rules by a Notification, No. 8, dated 4th June, 1951, in relation to the decision of election disputes. These rules provide:- "Rule 1(1).-Save as otherwise provided, no election held under the Act whether of a member, president or vice-president of a panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with these rules to an election commissioner as defined in sub-rule (3) by any candidate or elector against the candidate who has been declared to have been duly elected (hereinafter called the returned candidate) or if there are two or more returned candidates, against all or any such candidates. (2) The election commissioner shall be- (i) except in cases falling under clause (ii), the District Munsif having territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the office of the panchayat is situated, or if there is more than one such District Munsif, the Principal District Munsif; and (ii) where the Government so direct, whether in respect of Panchayats generally or in respect of any class of panchayats or in respect of panchayats in the same district or taluk, officer or officers of the Government as may be designated by the Government in this behalf by name or by virtue of office: provided that an election petition may, on application, be transferred (a) if presented to a District Munsif under clause (i) by the District Judge concerned to another District Munsif within his jurisdiction; (b) if presented to an officer of Government under clause (ii), by the Government to another officer of Government. Where an election petition is transferred to any authority under the foregoing proviso, such authority shall be deemed to be the election commissioner. (3) An election commissioner exercising jurisdiction under these rules shall be deemed to exercise such jurisdiction as a persona designata and not in his capacity as Judge or other officer of Government as the case may be." Rules 2 to 10 relate to the time within which a petition might be presented,-contents of the petition, the parties to be impleaded and the procedure to be followed by the election commissioner in enquiring into the election petitions. Rule 11 sets out the ground upon which an election may be set aside, and rule 12 provides for the orders, which the election commissioner might pass as a result of enquiry. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in these writ petitions is that these rules are ultra vires and are therefore, void and cannot confer jurisdiction upon the election commissioner to enquire into the petitions filed against these petitioners. The grounds upon which this argument is based are two-fold: (1) that on a proper construction of section 112(2)(i) the Government have no power to frame rules relating to the decision of election disputes; and second that even if section 112(2)(i) confers such a power to make rules the same is ultra vires of the State Legislature as being an excessive delegation or abandonment of legislative power. The first contention does not merit serious consideration. The first contention does not merit serious consideration. The language used in section 112 is that ‘rules might be framed as to the decision of disputes relating to elections’. I am unable to perceive that more express language is necessary in order to confer upon Government the power to make a rule for setting up a machinery for the adjudication of disputes relating to elections. In fact counsel, after some argument, did not seriously press this contention, but relied upon the other point raised regarding excessive delegation. The point about excessive delegation is put this way. Under Article 246 of the Constitution, legislative power is vested in the State Legislatures to make laws in relation inter alia to the matters set out in List II. The legislature has to exercise this law-making power itself, and cannot abdicate these functions and enable the executive to legislate. If the Act itself has laid down the policy to be pursued, set out the standards to be observed and indicated the Tribunal to be constituted, the details might be filled up by the rule-making authority But it is argued that to delegate or authorise the executive to exercise unfettered and unrestricted powers in relation to the constitution of a Tribunal particularly a Tribunal outside the ordinary course as a personas designata, clothe it with the necessary powers to decide disputes, and attach finality to its decisions as is stated to have been done here is excessive delegation, and is therefore, ultra vires of the State Legislature. This argument is rested mainly upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the Delhi Laws Act case1, and extensive passages from the judgment of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have been relied upon by the learned counsel tor the petitioners in support of his contention. Before dealing with the precise scope of this decision, it might be useful to examine the exact question, which the Supreme Court had there to consider Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act of 1912 had provided: "The Provincial Government may by notification in the official gazette extend, with such restric tions and modifications as it thinks fit, to the province of Delhi, or any part thereof any enactment which is in force in any part of British India at the date of such notification. Section 2 of the AjmerMerwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, provided that ‘the Central Government, may by notification in the official gazette, extend to the Province of Ajmer-Merwara, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in any other Province at the date of such notification. Section 2 of the Part C States Act, 1947, provided that ‘that Central Government may by notification in the official gazette, extend to any Part C State......or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the notification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any corresponding law......which is for the time being applicable to that Part C. State". It was the validity of these three provisions, which enabled the executive to apply the laws enacted for one area to be operative in another area, with such restrictions and modifications as the executive thinks just, that was the subject-matter of the reference to the Supreme Court. The final decision of the majority of Supreme Court was that section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act of 1912, and section 2 of the Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act of 1947 were wholly intra vires and that the first portion of section 2 of the Part C States Laws Act of 1950 which empowered the Central Government to extend to any Part C State or to any portion of such State with such modification and restrictions as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State is intra vires, while the Court by a majority held the latter portion of this section, which empowered the Central Government to make provision in any enactment extended to Part C State for repeal or amendment of any law, which is for the time being applicable to the Part C State is ultra vires. It will thus be seen that so far as the decision itself is concerned it expressly rejects a contention now put forward on behalf of the petitioners, that to vest in the Government a power to constitute machinery for adjudicating disputes is excessive delegation, for the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of a delegation, which enabled the executive to modify or restrict any enactment undoubtedly a legislative power and in the light of this decision, the rules in the present case would a fortiori be valid. Fazl Ali, J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the majority Judges, after discussing the American and the Australian cases, and the decision of the Privy Council in appeals from Canada, etc., summed up his conclusions on this topic as follows:- "1. The legislature must normally discharge its primary legislative function itself and not through others. 2. Once it is established that it has sovereign.powers within a certain sphere, it must follow as a corollary that it is free to legislate within that sphere in any way which appears to it to be the best way to give effect to its intention and policy in making a particular law, and that it may utilise any outside agency to any extent it finds it inconvenient to do. In other words, it can do everything which is ancillary to and necessary for the full and effective exercise of its power of legislation. 3. It cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and therefore while entrusting power to an outside agency, it must see that such agency, acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature. 4. The doctrine of separation of powers and the judicial interpretation it has received in America ever since the American Constitution was framed, enables the American Courts to check undue and excessive delegation but the Courts of this country are not committed to that doctrine and cannot apply it in the same way as it has been applied in America. Therefore, there are only two main checks in this country on the power of the legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to abdication and self-effacement". Therefore, there are only two main checks in this country on the power of the legislature to delegate, these being its good sense and the principle that it should not cross the line beyond which delegation amounts to abdication and self-effacement". I am clearly of the opinion that the present case falls within proposition No. 2 stated by his Lordship, and that the utilisation of the Government for setting up the machinery for the adjudication of disputes to enable the constitution of the Panchayat Board under the Act is merely a ministerial provision, in respect of which it is competent for the Legislature to employ the executive for making the rules. I am also of the opinion that the legislative practice in India supports the validity of this type of legislation. I examined this question in W.P. No. 56 of 1954, where I held that the rule was intra vires. The matter, however, has been more elaborately argued on the present occasion, and I find that I was justified in the conclusions, which I drew from the previous legislative practice. Section 250 of the District Municipalities Act (Act IV of 1884) ran: "1. The Governor in Council may, from time to time, frame forms for any proceedings of a Municipal Council for which he considers that a form should be provided, and make rules not in-consistent with this Act. (a) with respect to the appointment of Municipal Councillors by election as to the following matters: (i) the qualifications of electors and of the candidates for appointment by election, and the removal and disqualification of Municipal Councillors or candidates; (ii) the division of the Municipality or of a part thereof into wards and the number of Municipal councillors proper for each ward; (iii) the provision, if any, to be made for the special representation of any classes of the community: (iv) the registration of electors: (v) the nomination of candidates, the time of election and the mode of recording votes; and (vi) any other matters regarding the system of representation and election which it may seem expedient to provide for" and rules were framed by the Government setting up machinery of the same type as now in question. The Local Boards’ Act of 1884 (Act V of 1884), section 144, ran in terms exactly similar to section 256 of the Act IV of 1884, and it conferred to the Governor in Council the power to make rules in relation to election matters, and rules were framed under this section, section 144(1)(a) constituting the President of the Local Board as the election authority, in respect of the Union, and in a similar manner in regard to other local authorities. There was similar rule-making power and similar constitution of election tribunals by the executive under section 199(c) of the Local Boards Act of 1920 and section 303(b) of the District Municipalities Act of the same year, Act V of 1920. So far as the City of Madras, however, the Act itself has indicated the tribunal to decide election disputes. In the previous Village Panchayats Act (Act XV of 1920), section 44 (2)(v) has vested the power in the executive to constitute the authority to hear election disputes. As I have pointed out is my judgment in Writ Petition No. 56 of 1954, even under section 291 of the Government of India Act of 1935, the election tribunals to decide the validity of disputes, relating to the elections to the Legislative Assembly and Council of States are constituted under orders in Council issued under that provision. It might also be noted that section 72(a) of the Government of India Act of 1919 provided that provisions may be made by rules under the Act “as the term of office of nominated members of Governors’ Legislative Councils and the man ner of falling casual vacancies occurring by reason of absence of members from India inability to attend to duty, death, acceptance of office, resignation duly accepted or otherwise; the condtions under which and manner in which persons may be nominated as members of Governors’ Leglisative Council. and(c) the qualifications of electors, the constitution of constituencies, and the method of election for Governors’ Legislative Councils including the number of members to be elected by communal and other electorates, and any matters incidental or ancillary thereto; and (d) the qualifications for being and for being nominated or elected a member of any such Council and (e) the final decision of doubts or disputes as to the validity of any election; and (f) the manner in which the rules are to be carried into effect.” It was under the rules framed by virtue of these rule-making powers in Part VII of the Madras Electoral Rules that tribunals were constituted for the hearing of election petitions, and adjudicating upon the matters raised in them. There is thus a body of legislative practice, which is sufficient to sustain the validity of this rule-making power. The juridical basis upon which legislative practice is relied upon to sustain the validity of a law is that the content of legislative power granted by the Constitution should be measured by the manner in which the same has been utilised before the Constitution. In other words, the entry in the legislative list conferring upon the legislature a power in relation to a subject would include, in the light of this legislative practice, a right to legislate in the manner in which it was therefore done. That this is a permissible method of as certaining the scope of intendment of the Constitution and of the legislative power conferred thereby upon the legislatures in India is recognised in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the Delhi Laws Act case1. The point is dealt with by Mahajan J., as he then was, at page 949, etc., where his Lordship accepted the validity of the construction based upon it, but negatived the application of that rule to the facts before him on the ground that no uniform course of practice of the type before their Lordships had been proved in the case. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the rules framed by Government under section 112(2)(i) constituting the tribunals to hear election disputes under the Village Panchayats Act are intra vires and valid. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the rules framed by Government under section 112(2)(i) constituting the tribunals to hear election disputes under the Village Panchayats Act are intra vires and valid. These writ petitions fail and are dismissed with the costs of the second respondent in W.P. No. 532 of 1953 and the first respondent in W.P. No. 628 of 1953, which I fix at Rs. 100 in each case. R.M. ----- Petitions dismissed.