Order:- This appeal has arisen out of the decree and judgment of the learned First Additional City Civil Judge in O.S. No.767 of 1949 on the file of that Court wherein the plaintiff sought to recover a sum of Rs.4,169-1-0 from the defendants. in the following circumstances. One Annamalai Chetty, the uncle of defendants 2 to 4, defendants 1, 5 and One late Ellappa Chetty, did partnership business in the name and style of “T.K. M.A. Rajabather Chetty, Palani Chetty & Co.” Annamalai Chetty died in February, 1935, and, in his place, Parthasarathy Chetty was substituted and the business was continued in the name of “T.K.M.P. Rajabather Chetty, Palani Chetty & Co.” The business was carried on at Vellore and at Madras. The partnership business, however, came to an end, but the accounts were not settled. Parthasarathy Chetty, who took the place of Annamalai Chetty, also died in 1938. Subramania Chetty, son of Annamalai Chetty, filed O.S. No.41 of 1937 on the file of the Sub-Court, Vellore, against his uncle, Parthasarathy Chetty and his sons, defendants 2 to 4 for partition. The partners of the firm referred to above were also made parties to that suit. A preliminary decree in the suit was passed on the 27th November, 1939 and the assets were directed to be looked into by a Commissioner and a final decree was passed on the 12th March, 1945. According to the final decree, the plaintiff in the present suit, defendants 1 to 5 and Ellappa Chetty was directed to pay Subramaniam Chetty, the plaintiff, in the suit, a sum of Rs.3,153-4-9. In O.S. No.41 of 1937, as could be gathered from the judgment in that suit Exhibit B.1, a specific issue was raised in these terms: “As against defendants 13 to 15, has the plaintiff a remedy or is he entitled to have recourse against only first defendant in respect of the partnership they are concerned with?”. On this issue, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the partnership became dissolved by the death of Annamalai Chetty, that those who took over the assets and liabilities of the concern must hold themselves liable to the plaintiff and that those persons were the first defendant, Parthasarathi (represented now by defendants 2 to 4) and defendants 6 and 13 to 15. He further held that, as things were, it could not be said that, because defendants 13 to 15 placed Annamalai’s share in the first defendant’s hands, they were not liable to the person who lawfully represented Annamalai’s estate, the plaintiff, in that suit. The finding on that issue was therefore that the plaintiff could have recourse against defendants 13 to 15 in respect of the partnership they were concerned with. The learned Subordinate Judge also found that it was unnecessary to decide in that suit the liability of defendants 2 to 4, 6 and 13 to 15 inter se in respect of the payment to be made to the plaintiff and the question was left open. It may be noted that the final decree was passed in accordance with- the razinama which was to the following effect: “That defendants 2 to 4 from out of their family properties and defendants 6 and 13 to 15 personally should pay to the plaintiff Rs.3,153-4-9 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the preliminary decree”. This decree was executed by Annamalai Chetty’s son, Subramania Chetty, and the entire sum of Rs.4,710-12-0 as found in the execution petition had to be paid by the plaintiff in the present suit in execution of the said decree on 22nd July, 1946. He, therefore, claimed as against defendants 1 and 5 for themselves and defendants 2 to 4 representing the estate of their father, Parthasarathi, that they were bound to reimburse him to the extent of Rs.3,533-1-0 being 3/4ths of the amount paid by him and interest on it at six per cent. per annum. Defendants 1 to 4 contested the suit. The main ground of attack was that a suit for contribution in respect of the suit item without determination of the rights and liabilities of the plaintiff and the defendants inter se and without duly rendering the accounts was not sustainable and that, as the partnership business had become dissolved long ago, the suit for contribution in respect of one item alone was barred by time. The learned Additional City Civil Judge rejected the contention of the defendants holding that the decision in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari1, had no application to the case for the reason that the contribution claimed by the plaintiff was altogether de hors the partnership and, as such, capable of sustaining the action’ for contribution. The learned Additional City Civil Judge rejected the contention of the defendants holding that the decision in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari1, had no application to the case for the reason that the contribution claimed by the plaintiff was altogether de hors the partnership and, as such, capable of sustaining the action’ for contribution. The learned Additional City Civil Judge relied upon the ruling in Subbarayadu v. Adinarayudu2. He, therefore, held that, under the decree, each partner was bound to pay the whole decree debt and bound to indemnify the other against the payment of more than his share and that the decree which was executed against the plaintiff and in respect of which the amount was recovered was not a partnership transaction. The learned Additional City Civil Judge referred to the decision in Sedgwick v. Daniell1. Finally, the learned Judge held that the suit for contribution was maintainable and decreed the suit against the defendants and directed the amount to be paid in proportion to their shares in the partnership since dissolved. Defendants 1 to 4 have now preferred this appeal. Mr.V.T. Rangaswami Ayyangar for the appellants urged before me that the learned Additional City Civil Judge was not correct in holding that the suit was maintainable for the reason that the contribution was claimed in respect of a liability of the partnership and that such a suit would not lie. The proper procedure, according to him, for the plaintiff would have been to file a suit for dissolution and accounts of the partnership within the time prescribed by the law of limitation. In so far as the plaintiff had failed to do this, it was not open to him to claim contribution in respect of the partnership liability without a suit for dissolution and accounts. In addition to the decision in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari2, Mr. Rangaswami Ayyangar has invited my attention to the decision in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar3. In this decision Horwill, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench, has reviewed at length all the decisions on the point that were then available and cited before the Bench. In addition to the decision in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari2, Mr. Rangaswami Ayyangar has invited my attention to the decision in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar3. In this decision Horwill, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench, has reviewed at length all the decisions on the point that were then available and cited before the Bench. The Bench came to the conclusion that the decision now relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, namely, Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyappa Chettiar4, was not in accordance with the principle laid down in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari2, and that, even in the matter of decree-debt which might have been paid by one of the partners in its entirety, the plaintiff would not be entitled to maintain a suit for contribution against the other partners except by filing a suit for a general account of the partnership which stood dissolved and this, the plaintiff’s could not do for the reason that such a suit had become barred by limitation. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar for the respondents has also invited my attention to a decision by Ramesam, J., in Ellappa v. Swaminatha5, where it has been held: "A partner, who is made to pay the whole of the decree amount for a partnership debt is entitled to maintain a suit for contribution as against other partners". In Kannayya Reddi v. Muthu Reddi6, Pandrang Row, J. has held that: "Where the claim for contribution is not based on the ground that as a partner the defendant is liable to contribute but is based on a joint decree obtained against partners for debt borrowed for purposes of partnership trade in execution of which one partner alone had to pay the entire amount due under the decree, in such a case the law of partnership does not prohibit a claim Sox contribution against the other partners ". In so deciding, Pandrang Row, J., followed the decision in Subbarayudu v. Adinarayadu7and Ellappa v. Swaminatha5. Mr. In so deciding, Pandrang Row, J., followed the decision in Subbarayudu v. Adinarayadu7and Ellappa v. Swaminatha5. Mr. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar has also invited my attention to a passage in Lindley on "Partnership" (Tenth edition), page 654, which is quoted below: "Further if some of a number of partners gave their promissory note for better securing payment of a debt owing by them and their co-partners, and one of the makers of the note was compelled to pay the whole amount of it, he was entitled to sue each of the other makers of the note for his proportion of the sum so paid. For, in the case supposed, the right to contribution arose in respect of a matter not involved in the general account, and did not depend upon the circumstance that the makers of the note were partners. This was decided by the Court of Exchequer in Sedgwick v. Daniell1. However, the decisions did not go the length of allowing one partner who had been compelled to pay the whole of a partnership debt to sue his co-partners at law for contribution, in the absence of special circumstances. But if one of several projectors of a company was compelled to pay a debt owing by them all, he could obtain contribution from them by an action at law, although there were unsettled accounts between him and them". At page 655, numerous instances have been cited by the learned author when; an action for contribution would not lie. On a reading of these passages, the learned counsel for the respondents argue that where one of the partners has been compelled to make payment in respect of a decree debt, it cannot be said to be a partnership transaction calling for a general account of the partnership but that it should be considered to be a debt independent of the partnership. His point is that the liability arose by reason of the decree obtained by the plaintiff in O.S. No.41 of 1937 and that that liability did not arise out of the partnership. The decree itself which was in respect of the assets in the hands of the defendants and which the plaintiff was called upon to discharge was not imposed upon him by the partnership as such but was only by the decree passed against the plaintiff. The decree itself which was in respect of the assets in the hands of the defendants and which the plaintiff was called upon to discharge was not imposed upon him by the partnership as such but was only by the decree passed against the plaintiff. Therefore, his contention is that the decision of Pandrang Row, J., in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyappa Chettiar1and those in Ellappa v. Swaminatha2and Kannayya Reddi v. Muthu Reddi3, would apply to the facts of the present case. From one point of view, it may be stated that the liability which the plaintiff was called upon to discharge arose out of the decree passed against him and the other partners and could be treated as payment in respect of a decree and that it did not arise out of the partnership as such, in which case, it follows that, if the suit has been filed within three years from the date of payment of the decree debt, he will be entitled to recover the same from the other joint judgment-debtors who were bound to pay the said decree-debt, which is the case in the present suit. From another point of view, it may fairly be claimed that the decree itself arose out of the partnership because the plaintiff who obtained the decree in O.S. No.41 of 1937 had sued the present appellants and the respondents only as partners for realizing his share in the partnership business left by his father; and therefore, there is force in the contention that the debt arose out of the partnership transaction and that the razinama decree itself was by the partners who were all made parties to the suit. Therefore, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar urged that the circumstances and facts of this case justify a reference to a Full Bench in order, that the conflicting views might be set at rest in regard to the right of a partner judgment-debtor to claim contribution against his co-partners judgment-debtors when he is compelled to pay the entire decree-debt in execution of the decree obtained by the heir of a deceased partner. Notwithstanding that the entire case-law has been reviewed by the Bench which decided Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar4, as I feel that, the principles laid down in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachari5, do not apply to the facts of the present case and since I am also of the opinion that the facts in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar4; are different from the facts that obtain in the present appeal, it is eminently a fit case which should be decided by a Full Bench of this Court on the questions of law involved herein. I am, therefore in agreement with the suggestions made by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and direct that this matter be placed before’ the learned Chief Justice for orders. In pursuance of the above order of reference, the appeal came on for hearing before the Full Bench. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the first Additional Judge of the City Civil Court. It came on for hearing before Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., and he has referred the appeal for decision by a Full Bench, in view of a conflict between certain Bench decisions of this Court. The facts of the case are not the subject-matter of controversy and the only question is whether the suit, which has been decreed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court is mainatainable. Five persons Annamalai Chetty, Palani Chetty, Rajagopala Chetty, Rajabathar Chetty and Ellappa Chetty, became partners in a mandi business, which was carried on at Vellore under the name and style of ‘T.K.M.A. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co.‘ For the purpose of the business, Annamalai Chetty brought into the partnership funds belonging to the joint family of which he was the manager. Annamalai and one of his brothers, Parthasarathy, appear to have got themselves divided from their other co-partners by a registered partition deed in 1926, though it is stated that the partition was not completed by division by metes and bounds in respect of every item. These two brothers got divided inter se in 1931 or 1933. While the mandi business carried on by Annamalai in partnership was continuing, he died in February, 1935, leaving a widow and an only son Subramania, then a minor. These two brothers got divided inter se in 1931 or 1933. While the mandi business carried on by Annamalai in partnership was continuing, he died in February, 1935, leaving a widow and an only son Subramania, then a minor. On the death of Annamalai, the surviving partners reconstituted the partnership, by taking in Parthasarathy, the divided brother of Annamalai, in the place of the deceased, the name of the business being changed to suit this alteration into T.K. M.P. Rajabather Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co. However, the amounts due to Annamalai either in respect of the moneys he brought in or for his share of the profits were not ascertained and paid over to his legal representatives. The minor son of Annamalai filed a suit, O.S. No.41 of 1937, on the file of the Sub-Court of Vellore for a general partition in the family, impleading the representatives of the various branches and to this suit for partition he impleaded Parthasarathy Chetty as the first defendant, his sons Ramakrishna, Sampath and Ganesan, who were then minors, as defendants 2 to 4. As a part of his family assets consisted of the amounts due from the dissolved firm or T.K.M.A. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetti and Co., which had been taken over by the firm of T.K.M.P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co., he impleaded the other partners of this firm, Rajagopala Chetty, as defendant 6, Palani Chetty, Rajabathar Chetty and Ellappa Chetty as defendants 13 to 15. His claim against these five partners was that when after the death of Annamalai, the first firm became dissolved, the moneys belonging to him were utilised by the new firm, and on this footing he sought as a creditor of the firm the repayment of the moneys, which had been so utilised together with interest or profits. The sons of Parthasarathy were impleaded in order that any decree that might be passed against their father might be executed against their shares in the joint family properties. It might be mentioned that Parthasarathy died on 14th January, 1938, during the pendency of the suit, O.S. No.41 of 1937, and his sons defendants 2 to 4 were entered as his legal representatives. It might be mentioned that Parthasarathy died on 14th January, 1938, during the pendency of the suit, O.S. No.41 of 1937, and his sons defendants 2 to 4 were entered as his legal representatives. The only defence of defendants 6 and 13 to 15 was that the plaintiff must have recourse to Parthasarathy alone who represented Annamalai in the partnership, but that he could have no relief as against them, and this was raised as issue No.10 which reads thus:- "As against defendants 6 and 13 to 15, has the plaintiff a remedy or is he entitled to have recourse against only first defendant in respect of the partnership they are concerned with?" This defence was overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, who decreed the plaintiff’s suit against these defendants also stating, "A partition having been made, Annamalai’s minor son the plaintiff, could not on Annamalai’s death be represented by Parthasarathy, his lawful guardian being his mother. The partnership became dissolved by the death, and those who took over the assets and liabilities of the concern must hold themselves liable to the plaintiff. Those persons were the first defendant Parthasarathy (represented now by defendants 2 to 4) and defendants 6 and 13 to 15“. The learned Subordinate Judge then went into the accounts and made directions about the manner in which the amount due to the plaintiff from the partnership would be fixed. He went on to say, "It is unnecessary to decide in this suit the liability of defendants 2 to 4, 6 and 13 to 15 inter se in respect of the payment to be made to the plaintiff, and the question is left open". This preliminary decree for partition was made on 27th November, 1939. A final decree was passed on 12th March, 1945, and this directed that, "defendants 2 to 4 from out of their family properties and defendants 6 and 13 to 15 personally should pay to the plaintiff Rs.3,153-4-9 with interest at 6 per cent. per annum from the date of the preliminary decree”. The final decree was put in execution by the minor, Subramania against Palani Chetty, the 13th defendant in O.S. No.41 of 1937, and the latter paid into Court the sum of Rs.4,710-12-0 being the full amount of the decree, and thus the decree was satisfied. per annum from the date of the preliminary decree”. The final decree was put in execution by the minor, Subramania against Palani Chetty, the 13th defendant in O.S. No.41 of 1937, and the latter paid into Court the sum of Rs.4,710-12-0 being the full amount of the decree, and thus the decree was satisfied. At this stage it is only necessary to mention that the second firm became dissolved on 14th January, 1938 on the death of the partner, Parthasarathy and that the accounts of this partnership have never been looked into or settled. The present suit in 1949 is by Palani Chetty, the partner who has paid off the decree in O.S.No.41 of 1937, against his co-partners for contribution of their share of this partnership debt. The allegations made in the plaint are that after T.K.M.A. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty firm became dissolved, by the death of Annamalai, a firm of T.K.M.P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co., was started which went on for a period of about one and half years. “The partnership business was stopped and was dissolved. The partners separated and without making any settlement of account”. After reciting the history of the liability which arose in O.S. No.41 of 1937, and the payment of the entirety of this joint and several decree by the plaintiff, he prays for a decree for Rs.4,169-1-0 due to him being 3/4th of the amount paid by him, the balance being his own share of the liability. It only remains to add that Ellappa Chetty, who was a partner in both the firms, died before the present suit, but his legal representatives have not been impleaded as defendants on the ground stated in the plaint that he was only a working partner, who had not invested any money in the business, and that as he had no property, no amount could be realised from his heirs or legal representatives. In the view, however, we are taking about the maintainability of this suit, it is unnecessary to consider the legal consequences of this non-joinder. In the view, however, we are taking about the maintainability of this suit, it is unnecessary to consider the legal consequences of this non-joinder. The defendants raised two contentions: (1) that the plaintiff was in possession of the assets of the partnership, with the aid of which, the joint liability was discharged; and (2) that as a suit for the rendition of the accounts of the dissolved partnership had long ago become barred, the present suit for a sum, which would be an item of such a partnership account, which has never been taken is not maintainable; but they let in no evidence on the first question raised by them. The second contention alone has been the subject-matter of consideration by the Court below. The plea of the defendant regarding the non-maintainability of the suit, which was rested on the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case1, was countered by the plaintiff raising an argument that the item of liability sued on was really distinct from the partnership of T. K. M. P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co. This contention was accepted by the learned Additional City Civil Judge, who decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. From this decree of the learned City Civil Judge, the defendants preferred this appeal to this Court, and the case came on before Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. It was contended before the learned Judge by the learned counsel for the appellants that the item in suit was really a part and parcel of the accounts of the second partnership, and that the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1, was a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The counsel for the respondents, however, argued that the decision of the Privy Council must be confined to suits, where the plaintiff claimed a right to a share is an asset, and could not be extended to cases, where the obligation to share a liability arising subsequent to the dissolution was being enforced; that at any rate where such a liability became embodied in a joint and several decree, as in the present case, the rights inter se between the judgment-debtors should be determined and regulated by section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, and that the rules regulating action between partners should either be held inapplicable to such cases, or held modified so as to effectuate justice being done between them. For this position, he placed reliance on a decision in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar2. Counsel for the appellants relied on a later decision of a Bench of this Court in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar3, as dissenting from the earlier ruling, and holding that the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1, was as much applicable to liabilities as to assets, and that the fact that the liabilities took the form of a joint and several decree against the partners makes no difference to the principle. In view of the conflict between these two decisions, the learned Judge has referred the appeal itself to be heard by a Full Bench. Before us the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the finding of the trial Judge, that the liability put in suit was unconnected with the partnership was incorrect, and that the suit was liable to be dismissed on the rule enunciated in Gopala Chetty’s case1. Counsel for the respondents did not make any serious attempt to sustain the ground upon which the learned City Civil Judge has decreed the suit. But he sought to distinguish Gopala Chetty’s case1, on three grounds: that (1) this decision has no application to suits for contribution by ex-partners; (2) when once a liability of the partners becomes merged in a joint and several decree against all of them, their rights and liabilities inter se were governed not by the partnership in the course of which, the liability came to be incurred, but by the statutory principles enacted in section 43 of the Indian Contract Act. For these two contentions reliance was placed on the judgments of Stone and Pandrang Rao, JJ. For these two contentions reliance was placed on the judgments of Stone and Pandrang Rao, JJ. in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar2. Lastly it was pressed upon us that the rule in Gopala Chetty’s Case1, was based on the earlier decision in England before law and equity were merged by virtue of the Judicature Act of 1873, and that later decisions in England have upheld the maintainability of suits for partial accounting in subsisting partnerships and that in the light of these decisions, we must hold that the present suit was maintainable. It was, therefore, argued that in the light of the modern development of the law, we should not extend Gopala Chetty’s Case1, beyond the facts of that particular case. It would be convenient first to dispose of the ground, upon which the trial Judge has rested his decree in favour of the plaintiff, namely, that the liability, which was the subject-matter of O.S. No.41 of 1937 was something distinct and separate from the assets and liabilities of the firm of T.K.M.P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co. The facts set out earlier, as to the manner in which the liability to the plaintiff in O.S.No. 41 of 1937 arose would make it clear, that it is a liability of the partnership of T.K.M.P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co., since it is the partners of this firm, that were directed by the decree in O.S. No.41 of 1937 to disgorge the moneys, which had got into its assets. If a suit for the taking of the accounts had been filed within the period of limitation in regard to the partnership of T.K.M.P. Rajabathar Chetty, Palani Chetty and Co., it is obvious that this liability to Subramania, the decree-holder in O.S. No. 41 of 1937 would have figured as an item of liability to be discharged by the partnership in the taking of such accounts. The reasoning of the trial Judge on this part of the case, cannot, therefore, be upheld. The first two points made by the learned counsel for the respondents may be dealt with together, as both these are based on the observations of Stone and Pandrang Rao, JJ., in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar1. The reasoning of the trial Judge on this part of the case, cannot, therefore, be upheld. The first two points made by the learned counsel for the respondents may be dealt with together, as both these are based on the observations of Stone and Pandrang Rao, JJ., in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar1. Before, however, examining the decisions of this Court, it will be necessary to ascertain the precise scope and ratio of the decision of the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s Case2, and then to find out how far the propositions put forward by the learned counsel for the respondents are reconcilable with the principles enunciated by their Lordships. In Gopala Chetty’s Case2, the facts were these: There had been a partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant, which had become dissolved in 1910. Its accounts were never looked into nor settled between the partners, with the result that a suit for the taking of such accounts by either of the partners against the other would have become barred by limitation by 1913 under Article 106 of the Indian Limitation Act. While so, the plaintiff brought a suit in 1915, for the recovery of his share of certain outstandings alleged to have been collected by the defendant after the dissolution in 1910. The defendant put in a written statement, in which he denied the receipt of such assets and also pleaded that if the accounts were taken, the plaintiff would be found indebted to the firm and also that the Indian Limitation Act was a bar to the plaintiff’s claim. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., who tried the suit, held in favour of the plaintiff and gave him a declaration that he was entitled to the share of the amounts, claimed by him and ordered an account to be taken, with a view to see whether there was to be any set-off in respect of the sums, which might be due from him to the defendant. The learned Judge also held that though a suit for general partnership account being taken was barred by the Limitation Act, there was still a right in a partner to sue the other partners for his share of the assets, of the partnership, for which the period of limitation would be 6 years and not 3 years from the date of the receipt of the asset. The defendants filed an appeal to the High Court, which was heard by Sir John Wallis, C.J., and Napier, J. These learned Judges affirmed the decision of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., stating that they were not prepared to go behind the earlier decisions of this Court in Sokkanadha Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar3, Thiruvengada Mudaliar v. Sadagopa Mudaliar4and China Mondian v. Narasappa Naidu5, which laid down that the receipts of assets after dissolution gave raise to a fresh cause of action, to enable a partner to file a suit for a. share in such assets, notwithstanding that a general suit for accounts was barred by limitation. The learned Judges also observed that the decision of the House of Lords in Knox v. Gye6, favoured such a view. The defendant appealed to the Privy Council and their Lordships reversed the decision of this Court and held (1) that the receipt of the assets by a quondam partner did not furnish a fresh cause of action; (2) that if a suit for a general account was barred, no suit for a share in individual items, which would be merely items in the partnership accounts, would lie. Their Lordships also explained the observations in Knox v. Gye6, which favoured such a suit as applicable only to a case where the accounts between the partners had been finally adjusted. Their Lordships summed up the principle of law in these terms:- “If a partnership has been dissolved and the accounts have been wound up and each partner has paid what he has to contribute to the debts of the partnership and received his share of the pro-tits, the mutual rights and obligations having been thus all discharged and then it turns out afterwards that there was some item to the credit of the partnership which was either forgotten or treated as valueless by reason of the supposed insolvency of the debtor or for any other cause which item afterwards becomes of value and falls in, it ought to be divided between the partners in proportion to their snares in the original partnership. There is no reason why one should have it more than the other” “If on the other hand, no accounts have been taken and there is no constat that the partners have squared up, then the proper remedy when such an item falls in is to have the accounts of the partnership taken; and if it is too late to have recourse to that remedy, then it is also too late to claim a share in an item as part of the partnership assets, and the plaintiff does not prove, and cannot prove that upon the due taking of the accounts he would be entitled to that share. It might well be the case that one of the reasons why no final balancing of accounts took place was that A owed the partnership so much money that it was anticipated that B would hereafter receive a particular item which would operate substantially to balance the claim.” After laying down these propositions of law, their Lordships went on to consider the Indian decisions, and particularly the decisions of the Madras High Court in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar1and Thiruvengada Mudaliar v. Sadagopa Mudaliar2, and expressed dissent from these two. Such being the decision of the Privy Council, it will be convenient now to consider whether the grounds of distinction already enumerated and urged by the learned counsel for the respondents which are supported by some observations in Chockalinga Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar3, are correct. Before examining this decision in detail, it is necessary to trace the course of the decisions in this Court, both before and after Gopala Chetty’s Case4, to discover the ratio, upon which they are rested. The first decision of this Court, to which it is necessary to refer is that of Muttuswamy Iyer, J., in Subbarayadu v. Adinarayadu5. As the head-note brings out the point in the decision it is sufficient to refer to it: “A and B were partners. A decree was passed against them for the payment of a certain debt, each partner being liable for the whole sum and being bound to indemnify the other against the payment of more than his share. A paid B’s share as well as his own and brought a suit against B for contribution. A decree was passed against them for the payment of a certain debt, each partner being liable for the whole sum and being bound to indemnify the other against the payment of more than his share. A paid B’s share as well as his own and brought a suit against B for contribution. B contended that that A’s claim, being in respect of a partnership transaction ought to be adjusted when the partnership was settled, and that the suit did not lie.” The District Munsif decreed the claim, which was a suit on the small cause side of the Court. In a revision to this Court, His Lordship held that the claim in suit could not be considered as a partnership transaction saying: “It is no doubt a settled rule of law that advances made by one partner to the partnership concern can only result in matters of account and cannot be made the subject of a separate suit. But to this general rule there are exceptions when advances are made by one partner not to the partnership concern, but to the other partner in respect of what he is to contribute to the joint capital as in French v. Styring6.” It is unnecessary to investigate as to whether the learned Judge was right on the facts in holding that the transaction before the Court was not a partnership transaction. But the proposition of law laid down by the learned Judge is not open to exception. If however the learned Judge meant to draw a distinction based upon the existence of a decree as making any difference, it would not appear to rest on any intelligible principle. In this context we might usefully refer to the observations in Sadhu Narayana Aiyangar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar7, a decision of Miller and Sankaran Nair, JJ. There also the question was whether when a partner had been compelled to pay more than his share of a debt due by the partnership, he could maintain a suit for contribution apart from a suit for general account. There also the question was whether when a partner had been compelled to pay more than his share of a debt due by the partnership, he could maintain a suit for contribution apart from a suit for general account. Dealing with the decision in Subbarayadu v. Adinarayadu5, the learned Judges pointed out: “The English cases referred to in Subbarayadu v. Adhinarayadu5, have therefore no application and the facts of itself are not sufficiently clear either in the report or in the printed papers to enable us to say certainly that that case is on all fours with the present case. But if that case is not distinguishable on the facts, we should find some difficulty in following it on the grounds stated in the judgment; for it is not easy to see how the making of a decree against the partners imposes upon them any liability which did not attach to them as partners before the suit.” We respectfully agree with these observations about Subbarayudu v. AdinarayaduK After Subbarayadu v. Adinarayudu1, the next case to be noticed is Sokkanada, Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar2, where the question related, like the one in Gopala Chetty’s case3, to a plaintiff’s claim for a share in the assets received, and not to a claim for contribution as in Subbarayadu v. Adinarayadu1. The learned Judges following Merwanji Hormusji v. Rustomji Burjorji4and the interpretation there of Knox v. Gye5, held ‘that the receipt of assets furnished a fresh cause of action to the other partner which could be put in suit, notwithstanding that a suit for general accounts by the plaintiff was barred under Article 106 of the Limitation Act. In answer to the plea of the defendant that if the accounts were taken, the plaintiff would be found owing to the defendants, the learned Judges said that the defendant might be at liberty to go into the accounts, and if possible defeat the plaintiff’s claim by showing that the net balance was against the plaintiff. This last observation was characterised by Lord Phillimore in Gopala Chetty’s case3, in these terms: “With great deference this reasoning begs the question. How is it to be known that some of the partners would exclusively benefit by the realisation of the assets which come in after dissolution? This last observation was characterised by Lord Phillimore in Gopala Chetty’s case3, in these terms: “With great deference this reasoning begs the question. How is it to be known that some of the partners would exclusively benefit by the realisation of the assets which come in after dissolution? To meet this objection the learned Judges assume that accounts may be taken and that they have done enough tor the ex-partner who is sued in saying that he may have the accounts taken, but if the policy of the law be that after the period of limitation no accounts shall be taken for the excellent reason that materials for taking such accounts may have disappeared, it is not legitimate to say to me person sued, either pay on the footing that accounts have been taken which we know have not been taken and on the footing that all matters have been squared up between you and your partner when we have no knowledge that there has been any such squaring up, or submit to that taking of accounts against which the Legislature has protected you’.” This decision, having been disapproved by the Privy Council, it is not further necessary to consider it. The next decision in order of date is the one already referred and that is in Sadhu Narayana Aiyangar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar6, where the question arose about the maintainability of a suit for contribution by a partner, who had paid more than his share of a decree, jointly and severally passed against the partners. The learned Judges held that the suit would lie, notwithstanding that the suit, as a suit for an account and a share, was clearly barred by limitation. They also held that this was not a case of a transaction outside the partnership. The learned Judge followed the decision in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannidudar2, as authority for the view, that if the defendant was enabled to go into the accounts to show that no amount was payable by them, justice was done to both the properties. This position is set out in these terms: “Justice is done if the defendant is allowed to show that on a settlement of accounts he would not be liable. This position is set out in these terms: “Justice is done if the defendant is allowed to show that on a settlement of accounts he would not be liable. This principle is, we think, applicable and should be applied to the present case; the fact that here the plaintiff has paid a debt, while there the defendant had realized assets, does not affect the principle, nor are we able to distinguish this case on the ground that in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar2and the other cases which support the view there taken the suit was by a representative of a deceased partner. The suit is, therefore, good as a suit for contribution, but the first defendant must be allowed to show, if he can, that on a settlement of accounts the amount payable by him as contribution is wiped out or reduced.” The learned Judges saw no distinction between a suit for a share of the assets as in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar1, and a suit for contribution as in the case before them and following this decision decreed the suit, subject to the defendant going into the accounts. It will thus be seen that the whole basis of the decision, is the correctness of the reasoning in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar2and as this must be taken as overruled by the Privy Council, Sadhu Narayana Aiyangar v. Ramasami Aiyangar6, must likewise be treated as incorrectly decided. We respectfully agree with the observation of the learned Judges here that there is no difference in principle between a plaintiff’s claim to a share of the assets and a suit for contribution towards the liabilities discharged by the plaintiff in excess of his share. The next decisions of this Court are those in Thiruvengada Mudaliar v. Sadagopa Mudaliar1, and China Kondiah v. Narasappa Naidu2. Both these were suits by the plaintiffs, claiming a share of the assets, which had fallen in after the dissolution, but as those are covered by the same principles, as in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar3and as this decision has been overruled by the Privy Council, it is unnecessary to deal with them in any detail. These decisions must also be considered as overruled by the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case4. These exhaust the cases before the decision of the Privy Council. These decisions must also be considered as overruled by the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case4. These exhaust the cases before the decision of the Privy Council. Subsequent to the Privy Council decision, there are two rulings of this Court in Ramaswami v. Muthukaruppan5and Santhanakrishna Naidu v. Chellappa Aiyar6, the one in 1925 and the other in 1927 but these do not call for any detailed consideration on this occasion. The first decision arose out of a suit after dissolution for one item of the partnership account, but filed at a time when a suit for general accounts was not barred. The learned Judges laid down that a suit for partial accounts would be entertained only in exceptional cases and that the case before them did not fall within that exception, but granted to the plaintiff leave to amend his plaint by converting the suit into one for general accounts on payment of the costs incurred by the defendant up to that date. In the second case Krishnan and Odgers, JJ., also held that such a suit did not lie, but refused to permit the plaintiff to amend the suit into one for general accounts. The next decision bearing upon the question now under discussion is that in Arunachalam v. Varu Rowther7. The suit was for contribution from the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff and the defendant having been joint debtors under a decree, the plaintiff had been compelled to pay for the satisfaction and discharge of that decree over and above the amount, payable for his share. The defence raised was that the debt in respect of which the decree was based was a debt due by a partnership in which the plaintiff and defendant were partners and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for contribution, and could, if at all, file a suit only for the taking of the partnership accounts. The judgment of the Court, consisting of Wallace and Srinivasa Iyengar, JJ., was delivered by Srinivasa Iyengar, J., who said: “Prima facie, when there is a decree against two persons jointly and severally, each is liable to contribute equally to discharge the decree, and there is always in such cases an implied contract of indemnity that, if one of them should be compelled to pay up more than his share the other is bound to make good the same. This is, however, on the basis that the obligations of the defendant inter se are determined only by the decree and are not subject to any other rights or obligations. No doubt if it should be established that, having reference to the facts of the particular case, such implied contract as between co-judgment-debtors should be deemed to be displaced, then the legal principle may not be applicable..........Again it was open to the defendant to set up and prove as a fact that the plaintiff discharged the decree not from his own funds but only from partnership moneys and that therefore the very cause of action for the paintiff failed.” “........When both the judgment-debtors are partners in a business and the judgment-debt is a partnership debt the discharge of that debt had been held not to give to the partners so paying off a right to levy contribution from his other partner without reference to the partnership accounts, because on the legal principle that under the contract of the partnership each partner is only the agent of the other and the rights of the partners are not with reference to single item of transactions but to the taking of the entire accounts of the partnership, but such a principle is inapplicable to the case of a debt which is not properly and legally a partnership debt.” The learned Judge then proceeded to find that the debt in question was not a partnership debt. On this finding of fact it was held that the plaintiff’s suit was maintainable. The learned Judge also went on to state that the decisions in Sokkanada Vannimudar v. Sokkanada Vannimudar8and Sadhu Narayana Aiyangar v. Ramaswami Aiyangar9, must be taken to have been overruled by the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case1and that in the case of a dissolved partnership, the only right of a partner was to have the accounts taken, and if that right were barred by the law of limitation, he could have no right to claim any sum, which would be an item in such a suit for accounts. That case is also an authority for the position that if such a right to have the accounts taken could not be exercised at the instance of the plaintiff by reason of Article 106, it could not be exercised at the instance of the defendant. This decision, therefore, renders no assistance to the respondent. That case is also an authority for the position that if such a right to have the accounts taken could not be exercised at the instance of the plaintiff by reason of Article 106, it could not be exercised at the instance of the defendant. This decision, therefore, renders no assistance to the respondent. On the other hand it is clear that the learned Judges would have held the suit before them not maintainable, if the debt was a partnership debt in a real sense. Ellappa Mudaliar v. Swaminatha Mudaliar2was the next occasion when this matter was considered by this Court. It came up before this Court in a revision petition, against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Chingleput, who dismissed the plaintiff’s small cause suit. The plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant, who were partners had dealings with another firm, and that the latter obtained a joint and several decree against the plaintiff and the defendant to the extent of Rs.612-3-0. Execution was taken against the plaintiff alone, and the plaintiff had to pay up the whole decree amount. He, therefore, brought the suit for contribution for half of the decree amount against the defendant. The plea of the defendant was that the plaintiff had discharged the debt out of the assets of the partnership, which he had in his hands, but took no issue nor adduced any evidence in regard to it. He also contended that one Balasubramaniam, not a party to the suit, was also a partner along with the plaintiff and defendant so that the plaintiff if at all was entitled to one 1/3 not 1/2 of the sum against the defendant, and that as the partnership was still subsisting, and had not been dissolved, the suit was not maintainable, the plaintiff’s only remedy being to claim the amount in a suit for the taking of accounts of the partnership. The Subordinate Judge found that the suit transaction was connected with the partnership of the plaintiff and the defendant. He held that the suit was not maintainable, and dismissed the same. Ramesam, J., who heard the revision petition, allowed it on the ground that Subbarayadu v. Adinarayadu3, had decided that a suit of this nature was maintainable. The Subordinate Judge found that the suit transaction was connected with the partnership of the plaintiff and the defendant. He held that the suit was not maintainable, and dismissed the same. Ramesam, J., who heard the revision petition, allowed it on the ground that Subbarayadu v. Adinarayadu3, had decided that a suit of this nature was maintainable. The reason of the rule was stated by the learned Judge thus: “In the present case the decree has been obtained by a stranger in respect of a partnership debt and the plaintiff alone had to pay up the whole of the decree amount. Prima facie, therefore, he is entitled to recover one-third of the decree amount from the defendant.” It will be seen that as the partnership there was subsisting, the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1, had no application to its facts. But it is not possible to sustain the argument that in the case of a subsisting partnership suits for contribution for payment of particular items in excess of their share might be open to the partners. As pointed out by this Court in Santhanakrishna Naidu v. Chellappa Aiyar4: “In fact if the suit for damages alone regarding one item is allowed to be maintainable, then it may be that a partner may be decreed to pay a sum of money whereas when the general accounts are taken and the whole profits ascertained payment may be due to him. It is to avoid such difficulty and to avoid multiplicity of suits it is insisted that a suit between partners should be a suit for general accounts.” Though in the earlier case, the claim was by the members of partnership for damages for breach of a covenant, the principle is equally applicable to suits for the recovery of sums, which would become items in an account of the partnership, if such accounts were taken. The next decision is the one in Chockalingam Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar5. The facts of the case are somewhat complicated. One Avadiappa Chetty, the father of the first plaintiff and the grandfather of the second plaintiff, was the partner in a certain firm, which was dissolved in November, 1908, by the retirement of one partner, Jayangondan, and the accounts were never taken or settled between the partners. The facts of the case are somewhat complicated. One Avadiappa Chetty, the father of the first plaintiff and the grandfather of the second plaintiff, was the partner in a certain firm, which was dissolved in November, 1908, by the retirement of one partner, Jayangondan, and the accounts were never taken or settled between the partners. In February, 1908, this Jayangondan, as agent of another firm, lent 3,000 dollars to the firm, in which he and Avadiappa were partners. The partner of the lending firm, and his sons, instituted a suit in 1912 against the partners of the firm, composed of Avadiappa and Jayangondan, and impleaded to that suit the son and grandson of Avadiappa and obtained a decree in 1919 against the partners personally, and against their sons to the extent of their shares in the joint family estate. The plaintiffs, who were the sons of Avadiappa, were compelled to deposit the entire decree amount in June, 1923, as a result of execution proceedings taken for the attachment and sale of their family house. The plaintiffs then brought a suit against the legal representatives of the other partners for the share of the latter’s liability under the decree. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the firm of which Avadiappa was a partner having been dissolved as early as 1908, without the accounts of that firm being settled, the suit by the plaintiffs, which was virtually a suit for contribution, by a representative of one of the partners against the representatives of the other partners was barred by the rule laid down in Gopala Chetty’s case1. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and it came on in the first instance before Madhavan Nair and Stone, JJ., and as they differed on the question whether the suit lay, it was referred to Pandrang Rao, J., as a third Judge. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and it came on in the first instance before Madhavan Nair and Stone, JJ., and as they differed on the question whether the suit lay, it was referred to Pandrang Rao, J., as a third Judge. The argument addressed to the learned Judges in the first instance is summarised by Madhavan Nair, J., at page 296 thus: “That the present suit is not one for an account or for dissolution by a member of the firm against the firm and that such a suit cannot be instituted by the plaintiffs, who are only members of the family of Avadiappa, one of the partners; that the liability which is sought to be enforced is an amount made payable by the decree, that the debt thus gets transformed into purely a decree debt, and that those who are made responsible to pay it by the decree must contribute towards this in proper proportions”. We are not now concerned with the first point of the suit not being by a partner, and against a partner, for on both sides in that case, the sons and grandsons of the partners had taken the place of the original partners. It is only the second point that is relevant in the present context. It will be seen that two points were made to distinguish the decision of Gopala Chetty’s case1, from the case before the Court. The first was that the Privy Council decision had no application to cases where it was a liability that was sought to be enforced, and that the rule was confined to cases where an asset was sought to be shared; secondly that the debt merging into a decree made a difference in the applicability of the rule. Madhavan Nair, J., repelled both the contentions. He said: “It seems to me that though it has not been decided by the Privy Council the same conclusion should follow if the claim arose with respect to a liability as in the present case.” He also relied upon two unreported decisions of this Court in Appeal No.100 of 1923 and S.A. No.392 of 1925. In both these cases the liability of the partners had ripened into a decree and contribution was sought by the partner, who discharged the entirety of the debt and the suits were held not maintainable. In both these cases the liability of the partners had ripened into a decree and contribution was sought by the partner, who discharged the entirety of the debt and the suits were held not maintainable. Stone, J., however dealt with the matter thus: after referring to the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1, as one where the question related to the sharing of assets the learned Judge proceeded: “And it is said that the same reasoning applies to a case of a liability. Thus, where it appears that the liability arose in 1908 and the firm dissolved in 1908 as the right to an account was barred by 1911 if a partner is made liable by a decree passed in 1919 for the whole of the debt he has no right to claim, from his other partners and co-defendants to the suit, a contribution. I am by no means persuaded that their Lordships of the Privy Council have so decided........I content myself with saying that assuming that case decided all that the Advocate-General says it decides, I still fail to see what it has to do with the right of contribution claimed in this case.” And he then went on to deal with the other point that the plaintiff and the defendants were not the original partners. Dealing with the question about the effect of the liability ripening into a decree the learned Judge said: “..........that the debt of record created by the decree in the suit brought by the creditor relates to a liability that had been in existence ever since the original debt was contracted in 1908 and therefore to a liability that was in existence prior to the dissolution in 1908.........Nor do I consider it necessary to decide in this case whether the principle in Gopala Chetty’ case1, applies to a case of later discovered liabilities as it applies to the case of later discovered assets. It is not necessary in my opinion to decide either point.” Pandrang Rao, J., the third Judge, who heard the case, upheld the view of Stone, J. He held that the rule, which prevented a partner from suing for his share of any particular asset or for contribution in respect of any particular partnership transaction was designed to discourage multiplicity of actions: “It does not however follow that an action for contribution will not lie even in respect of a transaction or debt which does not or cannot form an item in the general partnership because the transaction or debt is not a partnership transaction or debt at all......The reason for the general rule that no action for contribution by a partner against his co-partners will lie applies however only when the contract of partnership subsists and only to cases where the action for contribution is brought by a partner as such against his co-partner as such......Where the partnership relation no longer exists, and where there is no likelihood of any restitution being necessary there is no reason in my opinion to apply the rule prohibiting actions for contribution as between persons who were partners but have ceased to be such.” Having thus held that the rule, which prevented actions for contribution between partners as being confined to cases where the partnership was subsisting, the learned Judge went on to hold that the cause of action in the suit for contribution arose only when the common burden was discharged. In the case before the learned Judge, the right to contribution arose 12 years after a suit for accounts as between the partners became barred, and the partnership relation had come to an end for all purposes. The learned Judge went on to say: “‘If the whole decree had been satisfied by Avadiappa himself in 1923, can it be said that he would have had no right to sue the defendants 1 to 3 for contribution merely because the decree-debt itself was in respect of a partnership debt? In such a suit he would not be agitating any of his right as partner but only his right as a co-judgment-debtor, who has paid off entirely the decree-debt which was binding on the defendants also. I fail to see how his action for contribution could be regarded as an action for contribution by a partner against his co-partners. In such a suit he would not be agitating any of his right as partner but only his right as a co-judgment-debtor, who has paid off entirely the decree-debt which was binding on the defendants also. I fail to see how his action for contribution could be regarded as an action for contribution by a partner against his co-partners. His right would not be based to difficult to see why his right as a partner, and the partnership having come to an end long before, it is difficult to see why his right to contribution as a co-judgment-debtor should be held to be so intimately bound up with the extinct contract of partnership that it could only be exercised along with his. right, to take an account of the partnership.” He then referred to the several cases decided in Madras and distinguished several of them on the ground that the point, which actually arose for decision before, the learned Judge did not arise in them. The learned Judge held, that the decision of the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case1, would equally apply to cases of contribution, but that it would not apply to the case before him, for, Avadiappa himself had not been the plaintiff and secondly his right to contribution was not based on his right as a partner but something, which was independent of the partnership, namely, the payment of a joint decree-debt by one of several co-judgment-debtors, and it was not necessary for the plaintiff to go behind the decree and establish the partnership for the purpose of sustaining his right. He said: “It is the defendants who seek to rely upon their rights as partners as a defence to the action for contribution.” He therefore held that the fact that the liability arose out of a partnership, which had been dissolved but whose accounts had not been taken was no bar to the plaintiff’s suit. He said: “It is the defendants who seek to rely upon their rights as partners as a defence to the action for contribution.” He therefore held that the fact that the liability arose out of a partnership, which had been dissolved but whose accounts had not been taken was no bar to the plaintiff’s suit. The learned Judge finally concluded thus: “After careful consideration I am of the opinion that if the present suit for contribution had been brought by Avadiappa himself it would have been maintainable and that the Privy Council decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1, would not have stood in his way.” The ratio of this decision is, therefore, this: that where the liability of a partnership is merged in a decree, and this is discharged by one of the partners, the suit for contribution is maintainable by such partner against others notwithstanding that a suit for accounts is barred. We cannot agree with this reasoning of the learned Judge. In our judgment the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1is as much a bar to the maintainability of a suit for contribution as to a suit for a share of subsequently recovered assets. To adopt the words of Lord Phillimore, it might well be the case, that one of the reasons why no final balance of accounts took place, was that the partnership owed money to a stranger, and it was anticipated that the partner who actually made the payment would be called upon to do so. In our opinion, it makes no difference whether the debt thus discharged has ripened into a decree or has been discharged before suit. In either event, the liability of the partnership which has been discharged by one of the partners would be an item in the accounts of the partnership, if taken, and if it is too late for the plaintiff to have the accounts taken, it is too late for him either to recover his share of the subsequently obtained asset, or to obtain contribution from his quondam partners in their share of the liability, which he has discharged. We do not consider that section 43 of the Indian Contract Act confers upon the plaintiff the right which he now contends or prevents the defendant from pleading that the relationship between him and the plaintiff is that of partners, and that as the accounts of the dissolved partnership cannot now be taken a suit for one of the items in that account cannot be the subject of claim. It is not correct to say that the existence of the partnership relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is irrelevant for the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties in the present instance. For instance, the learned counsel for the respondent has himself to concede that if the plaintiff had discharged the decree debt with the aid of partnership funds, he certainly could not have a right to sue for contribution. Similarly if the plaintiff had under the partnership agreement, the right to a 3/4th or other share in the partnership assets and liabilities, it could not be contended that he could make any claim for contribution unless he has paid more than such share, and that he cannot insist on paying merely an equal share along with the other partners. These show that it is really on the basis of the partner-relationship that the suit for contribution is founded. We do not also find any substance in the contention that the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case1 is now out of date by reason of the development of the law in England. In the 11th (1950) Edition of Lindley on Partnership, the modern law is thus stated at page 603: “The account which a partner may seek to have taken may be either a general account of the dealings and transactions of the firm, with a view to a winding up of the partnership; or a more limited account, directed to some particular transaction as to which a dispute has arisen. Speaking generally, unless an account has already been taken, whenever a partner either has in his hands money which his partners allege to belong to the firm or is alleged by his partners to owe money to the firm in connection with partnership transactions, such money can only be recovered from him in an action for an account; and in that action it will be open to him to show that money is his or that a larger sum is due to him.” Gopala Chetty’s case1 is cited as authority in the proposition of law stated in the last paragraph. The change in the law is indicated in the paragraph following this on page 604: “It was formerly considered that no account between partners could be taken in equity, save with a view to a dissolution, and a bill praying an account but not a dissolution has been held bad on demurrer. But this rule has been gradually relaxed; for it has been felt that more injustice frequently arose from the refusal of the Court to do less than complete justice, than could have arisen from interfering to no greater extent than was desired by the suitor aggrieved................The old rule, therefore, that a decree for an account between partners will not be made save with a view to the final determination of all questions and cross-claims between them, and to a dissolution of the partnership, must be, regarded as considerably relaxed, although it is still applicable where there is no sufficient reason for departing from it”. The author then proceeds to discuss the cases where accounts have been ordered without dissolution but as these are cases, arising out of the subsisting partnerships, they may be omitted from consideration. We have examined the several decisions in England cited in Lindley, but none of them lend any support to or countenance the contention now put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent that a suit for the recovery of a sum, which would be an item in the partnership accounts, could be instituted after the dissolution of the firm without a suit for general accounts, or if a right to a general account was barred by the Law of Limitation. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this argument of counsel for the respondent. The last decision, which it is necessary to refer is Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar1. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this argument of counsel for the respondent. The last decision, which it is necessary to refer is Meyyappa Chettiar v. Palaniappa Chettiar1. The facts of the case are nearly identical with those of Chockalingam Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar2 and the present case, namely, the discharge of a decree debt due by the partnership by one of the partners and a suit by him for contribution against the other partners for their share. The learned Subordinate Judge had held following Gopala Chetty’s case3that the suit was not maintainable. The argument before the High Court was based upon the decision of Pandrang Rao, J., and Stone, J., in Chockalingam Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar2 . After referring to cases earlier to and later than Gopala Chetty’s case3, Horwill, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench said: “We cannot but conclude, therefore, that the decision in Chockalingam Chettiar v. Meyyappa Chettiar2is not only against the current of recent decisions in this High Court, but also against the principles laid down by the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty’s case3.” In view of what we have stated above, this decision is correct, and in our opinion, it enunciates the rule consistent with the decision in Gopala Chetty’s case3. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.