Judgment.- This Second Appeal and Civil Revision Petition arise out of a Summary Suit No.37 of 1942 filed by one Govindaswami Naidu under section 35 of the Madras Estates Land Act for the grant of a patta and O.S. No.18 of 1942 on the file of the Sub-Court of Tanjore instituted by the Tanjore Palace Devasthanam against the said Govindaswami Naidu for the recovery of a sum of Rs.3,964-4-9 feeing the balance of the amount of the lease granted by the Devasthanam to him. On 5th September, 1941, a lease was granted to Govindaswami Naidu by the Devasthanam for a period of one year of the lands in Arumulipettai village, which are described in the lease deed as iruvaram (or lands in respect of which there is a right to both the warams), of the total extent of about 39 velis or about 260 acres. The grant of this village of Arumulipettai was made in inam by the Rajahs of Tanjore to the Mariamman Temple for performing religious ceremonies in the Pagoda. It is common ground that from the very inception of this grant, it was an absolute grant in freehold and it was not a grant of the melwaram alone. The entire proprietary right in the land was granted. That the grant comprised both the warams has been made clear and recognised in the several proceedings that arose between some of the tenants and the temple. It is therefore clear that the temple held the property in freehold until the Amending Act (XVIII of 1936), which brought the suit village also within the scope of the Madras Estates Land Act. The lands are situated therefore in a village which has become an estate by virtue of the Amending Act, which brought within its ambit the classes of inams defined in section 3(2)(d) of the Act. The question therefore that arises for consideration is whether Govindaswmi Naidu, who may be referred to as the plaintiff, has become entited to a patta from the Devasthanam. The question therefore that arises for consideration is whether Govindaswmi Naidu, who may be referred to as the plaintiff, has become entited to a patta from the Devasthanam. The contention of the plaintiff in the suit for patta is that the lands are ryoti lands in an estate, in which the plaintiff has been let into possession and has acquired permanent occupancy rights under section 6 of the Act, the case of the Devasthanam being that the lands are the absolute properties of the temple and that they are not ryoti lands but private lands and the lands must be deemed to be the domain or home-farm lands of the defendant. The manner in which these lands were enjoyed by the Devasthanams both prior to and after 1936 was by leasing the entire lands to the highest bidder at an auction held by the Devasthanam and the leases were for varying periods. There are several leases some are for 10 years, others are for 5 years, one or two for 20 years and some for 1 year and so on. The lessees are not the same individuals, since the highest bidder was invariably accepted and the lease was granted to him. The plaintiff being the highest bidder for the lease of the year 1941-42, he was granted a lease under Exhibit D-65, dated 5th September, 1941, only for a year It is not claimed that the Devasthanam at any time had the lands personally cultovated by any labourers. As in all cases of trust properties, the Devasthanam has been leasing the lands in the said manner. On these facts, it has to be seen whether the lands are ryoti lands in respect of which the plaintiff could be said to have acquired occupancy rights and is entitled to a patta or whether the Devasthanam could claim these lands as private lands. “Ryoti lands” are defined in section 3(16) of the Madras Estates Land Act as cultivable lands in an estate other than private land but excluding certain categories of lands with which we are not concerned. Prima facie, the suit lands being cultivable lands, unless they are shown to be private lands, they would come within the category of ryoti lands. “Ryoti lands” are defined in section 3(16) of the Madras Estates Land Act as cultivable lands in an estate other than private land but excluding certain categories of lands with which we are not concerned. Prima facie, the suit lands being cultivable lands, unless they are shown to be private lands, they would come within the category of ryoti lands. To entitle the plaintiff to claim occupancy rights, he must be a ryot let into possession by the landholder of ryoti land situated in an estate, when he will have permanent rights of occupancy under section 6 of the Act. A “ryot” is defined in section 3(15) as a person who holds lor the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condition of paying to the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it, and a person who has occupied ryoti land for a continuous period of twelve years shall be deemed to be a ryot lor all the purposes of the Act. But the plaintiff cannot bring himself within that category, his possession being only for a year. “Rent” is defined in section 3(11) as whatever is lawfully payable in money or in kind or in both to a landholder by a ryot for the use or occupation of land for the purpose of agriculture. The suit lands being cultivable lands and not being of the category which are excepted under section 3(16) may be ryoti lands unless they are shown to be private lands. To enable the plaintiff to acquire occupancy rights under section 6, he must be a ryot and must have been let into possession by the landholder of ryoti land. In so far as the suit village is concerned prior to the Amending Act (XVIII of 1936) the landholder, that is the temple, being absolutely entitled to these lands having held the property in freehold, no question of melwaram or kudiwaram could arise in the very nature of the property nor a question whether any of these lands were ryoti lands or private lands. There was no scope for applying the distinction to the suit lands as to whether the melwaram and the kudiwaram were held by different individuals or vested in the temple alone. There could not therefore be any question arising of a separate kudiwaram being held by anyone else excepting the temple. There was no scope for applying the distinction to the suit lands as to whether the melwaram and the kudiwaram were held by different individuals or vested in the temple alone. There could not therefore be any question arising of a separate kudiwaram being held by anyone else excepting the temple. The distinction therefore of a ryoti or private land, a melwaram or kudiwaram, was not capable of being applied to these lands. It is after the Amending Act of 1936 by virtue of which the suit inam village has become an estate that the question of ryoti or private land and the right of occupancy could arise; and consequently the application of the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act could also arise. Now that the plaintiff has come to Court claiming occupancy rights in respect of the entire holding, it becomes necessary to ascertain from an application of the relevant provisions of the Act as to whether he will be so entitled to occupancy rights. Such rights of occupancy could not be granted by him unless it be in respect of ryoti lands and one has therefore to fall back upon the definition of a ryoti land, which brings within its category all cultivable lands other than private lands and lands specifically excluded in section 3 (16). The suit lands are not of the excluded category, but they must be either ryoti or private lands. They could be ryoti only if they are not private lands. It therefore becomes ultimately necessary to find out whether the suit lands could be private lands, as also contended by the temple. Private lands are defined under section 3(10) of the Act. After the amending Act of 1938, the definition also has been enlarged as to bring within it lands which are private lands in a village which became an estate by virtue of the Amending Act (XVIII of 1936). Private lands are defined under section 3(10) of the Act. After the amending Act of 1938, the definition also has been enlarged as to bring within it lands which are private lands in a village which became an estate by virtue of the Amending Act (XVIII of 1936). ‘Private land’ is defined thus: “Section 3(10): ‘Private land'- (a) in the case of an estate within the meaning of sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) or (e) of clause (2), means the domain or home-farm land of the landholder by whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir or pannai, and includes all land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years, immediately before the commencement of this Act; and (b) in the, case of an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) means- (i) the domain or home-farm land of the landholder, by whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir or pannai land; or (ii) land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years immediately before the first day of July, 1908, provided that the landholder has retained the kudiwaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land; or (iii) land which is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years immediately before the first day of November, 1933, provided that the landholder has retained the kudiwaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land; or (iv) land the entire kudiwaram in which was acquired, by the landholder before the first day of November, 1933, for valuable consideration from person owning the kudiwaram but not the melwaram, provided that the landholder has retained the kudiwaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land, and provided further that, where the kudiwaram was acquired at a sale for arrears of rent, the land shall not be deemed to be private land unless it is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by, his own servants or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years since the acquisition of the land and before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.” The present being an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3, the definition given in clause 10(b) alone would apply. That the suit lands cannot come within the sub-clauses, (ii), (iii) and (iv) of clause 10(b) is evident from the facts of the case. It is not suggested on behalf of the temple that either 12 years immediately before 1st July, 1908, the temple by its own servants or by hired labour, with its own or hired stock, cultivated the lands for a continuous period or similarly cultivated it for 12 years prior to 1st April, 1933; nor is it the case of the acquisition of the entire kudiwaram before 1st November, 1933. The temple has consistently been enjoying the suit lands by granting leases in the manner already referred to and there is no case of any private cultivation. It therefore resolves itself into finding as to whether these lands could be the domain or home-farm lands of the landholder, by whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir or pannai as described in sub-clause (b)(i) of clause (10) of section 3. As to what are private lands as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908), has been the subject of a decision of a Full Bench of our High Court in Periannan v. A.S. Amman Koil1. There, the question arose as to whether certain lands in an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(e) are private lands or ryoti lands. The village there was held to be a grant of an under-tenure and therefore an estate falling under section 3(2)(e) of the Act. The majority of the Full Bench prescribed the following, among others, as the tests to be applied in deciding whether a land is a private land or a ryoti land: “(1) If there is no proof of cultivation for a continuous period of 12 years before the commencement of the Act, the land may be proved to be private land by other methods, provided the land was not shown to be once ryoti. Local usage or custom and the letting of the land as private land in leases before 1898 were specifically mentioned in sections 185(1) and 185(2) as relevant evidence, but other evidence is also made expressly admissible under section 185(3); (2) Cultivation of the lands or leasing of the lands under short term leases may be one mode of proof; (3) An intention to cultivate or resume for cultivation is also a test to decide that the land is private land, and such intention may be established by any other means, not necessarily by cultivation and cultivation alone. Absence of evidence of direct cultivation is not fatal to the claim; (4) The essence of private land is the continuous course of conduct on the part of landholder asserting and acting on the footing that he is the absolute owner thereof and the recognition and acceptance by the tenants that the landholder has absolute right in the land; (5) There is no warrant for confining ‘private land ‘to land adjoining or appurtenant to the residence of the landholder, or to land that is kept for the personal enjoyment and use of himself and his establishment.” Applying these tests to the present case, it appears to me that there is no difficulty in holding that the suit lands are private lands. Prior to 1936, there is nothing to show from the course of conduct on the part of the temple that it is not the absolute owner thereof and even after 1936 there is evidence of the same course of conduct that the temple is the absolute owner and the acceptance of it by the successive lessees by bidding at auctions and obtaining leases for periods would show that the lessees recognised the absolute right in the landholder. It is urged, however, that the decision of the Full Bench pertains to a case of lands in an estate falling under section 3(2)(e) and not to the case of a village, which became an estate by virtue of the Amending Act of 1936. It is urged, however, that the decision of the Full Bench pertains to a case of lands in an estate falling under section 3(2)(e) and not to the case of a village, which became an estate by virtue of the Amending Act of 1936. Bui the principles considered and laid down by the Full Bench are of general application in so far as they are laid down to ascertain as to whether the lands in an estate come within the category of the domain or home-farm land of the landholder by whatever designation known such as kambattam, khas, sir, or pannai as the very definition of private land in clause (10) of section 3 does not make any distinction in so far as these categories of lands are concerned as to come within the scope of private land whether they may be situated in an estate within the meaning of sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (e) of clause (2) or sub-clause (d) of clause (2). The decision of the Full Bench is therefore applicable to all cases of lands which come within the category of domain or home-farm land of the landholder. The judgment of Krishnaswami Ayyangar and Somayya, JJ., in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 dealt with a case of lands situated in an estate coming within the definition of section 3(2)(d), in which the learned Judges considered as to what would comprise domain or home-farm land. Somayya, J„ in his judgment, while considering the leases granted by the landholder from time to time observed that: “The leases produced in this case with respect to the suit lands disclose (1) that there was a change in the personnel of the tenants from time to time; (2) that there were changes in the quantum of rent payable; (3) that the tenants were to have only the right to enjoy the produce of the fruit-bearing trees other than iluppai trees; (4) that they had no right to cut any trees whatever; (5) that the right to cut any of the trees and the right to enjoy the produce of the iluppai tree belong to the landholder; and (6) the lands were leased by public auction to the highest bidder in accordance with the scheme prepared by the High Court for the management of the Rajan kattalai which owns the village in question. The cumulative effect of all these circumstances is, in our opinion, sufficient proof that the lands are home-farm or private lands.” The plaintiff got the lease in 1941 under Exhibit D-65 and it was to expire with 15th April, 1952. The lease deed contains several stipulations which would go to show the recognition on the part of the tenant of the absolute right of the temples to the lands which he was taking a lease of. There is a stipulation that he shall not cut the trees, twigs, branches, the green leaves and the tender leaves, etc. The lessee also agrees that in case new trees are planted or in case they grow of their own accord, he will protect them and deliver possession of them. The plaintiff also agrees to carry out repairs to the channels after giving intimation to the lessor and obtaining his permission and to have the cost after scrutiny adjusted to the lease rent. There is a right of re-entry provided. There are several other clauses which are inconsistent with any right in the land remaining in anyone else than in the landholder. The decision in C.M.A.No.311 of 1943 was relied upon by the learned District Judge in coming to the conclusion that the suit lands are private lands and it has also been referred to with approval in the Full Bench decision, where it is observed that the case is an authority on the construction of the definition of private land and establishes that, apart from proof of actual cultivation or an intention to resume cultivation at a distant date, there may be other tests by which the nature and the character of the land could be determined. The decision in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 was, however, not accepted as correctly laying down as to what constitutes private land in a later judgment of this Court in Jagadeesam v. Kuppammal1, where Wadsworth, O.C.J., observed that he must express his respectful disagreement with some of the observations contained in that judgment, though the observations to which exception was taken were not specified. The Full Bench considered the decision in Jagadeesam v. Kuppammal1 and from the judgment of Satyanarayana Rao, J., it is seen that the narrow and restricted definition of domain or home-farm land given in that decision could not be accepted as laying down the correct test and it was held that the unreported decision in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 correctly laid down the test. Wadsworth, O.C.J., observed: “It seems to us that the sub-clause (A)(1) of the definition is intended to cover those lands which come obviously within what would ordinarily be recognised as the domain or home-farm, that is to say, lands appurtenant to the landholder’s residence and kept for his enjoyment and use.” In a later judgment of this Court in A.S. Nos.176 to 178 and 493 of 1946, Subba Rao and Chandra Reddi, JJ., preferred to accept the test as laid down in Jagadeesam v. Kuppammal1, but the Full Bench in Periannan v. A.S. Amman Koil2, by a majority preferred the view taken in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 to that in the other two decisions. Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar, however, seeks to distinguish the case in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 from the present case on the ground that the question in C.M.A. No.311 of 1943 as to whether the lands are private lands arose in respect of a portion of the land in the estate; but in the present case if the tests laid down either in the Full Bench decision or in the said C.M.A. are accepted the entire land would have to be declared as private land and there could be no ryoti land in the estate. But, I am unable to find any provision in the Estates Land Act laying down that lands in a village, which has become an estate under section 3(2)(d) should necessarily comprise ryoti and private lands and that there could be no estate without ryoti land. The village having become an estate by virtue of the legislation introduced by the amendment of 1936, there being no question of two different classes of lands as ryoti and private prior to it, and there being no scope for importing ideas of melvaram and kudivaram, there is nothing which prevents any Court to hold, if the evidence would support it, that the entire lands could be private lands with no ryoti lands in the village. There is nothing inherently impossible that an estate like the present should consist of lands wholly private, apart from the communal and other lands, which are excepted from the category of ryoti lands. The result is that the view of the learned District Judge as to the character of the lands in the estate as private lands in correct. The second appeal and the revision petition fail and are dismissed with costs. Leave granted. K.C. ----- Appeal and petition dismissed.