Chandra Reddy, J.- This appeal raises a question relating to the applicability of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954. Defendants 1 and 3 are the appellants. For an administration action by a Muhammadan heir a decree was passed which inter alia provided that defendants I to 3 personally and on a charge of their share in the plaint B Schedule properties allotted to defendants 1 to 6 should pay to the 1st and 3rd plaintiff and the 7th defendant (originally the 2nd plaintiff) within two years from the date, the sum of Rs.3,178, Rs.7,638 and Rs.7,686 respectively with interest thereon at 5½ per cent. per annum from the date till payment to equalise the value of the share allotted to them. It may be mentioned that this was a compromise decree. In pursuance of the terms of the decree defendants 1 and 3 were put in possession of the share allotted to them under this decree but they failed to pay the owelty due by them to the plaintiffs 1 and 3. To enforce the liability arising under the consent decree, plaintiffs filed execution petition E.P. No.80 of 1953. Pending this execution petition the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954, came into operation. Taking advantage of this the appellants filed E.A. No.39 of 1954 for stay of further proceedings for one year under section 4 of the Act. This was opposed on the ground that as the liability arising under the decree is not a debt within the definition of section 2(b)of the Act, no stay could be granted. This objection prevailed with the lower Court with the result the application for relief under section 4 of the Act was dismissed. Hence this appeal. In support of this appeal it is urged by Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar that the liability, although arising under a compromise decree and in an administration action, is still a debt within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act. It is argued that since it is a sum of money liable to be paid by his clients under a contract for consideration received, it is attracted by the said definition. According to him the appellant is liable to pay this sum in consideration of his having received a share in excess of the one that he is entitled to get under the Muhammadan Law. In support of his contention, Mr. According to him the appellant is liable to pay this sum in consideration of his having received a share in excess of the one that he is entitled to get under the Muhammadan Law. In support of his contention, Mr. Ramachandra Ayyar called in aid Vasantha Rao Sahib Bonsle v. Narayanaswami Ayyar1, where Pandrang Row, J., laid down that the definition of the word ‘debt’ under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is wide enough to include a decree for restitution. This decision is not very helpful in this case, and further it is not necessary for us to express any opinion, on the question whether owelty payable by the appellants is a debt falling under the definition of ‘debt’ or not, in the view we take that the liability of the appellants is excluded by sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act is in the following words: “No suit for the recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt shall be made, and no suit or application for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of a debt shall be instituted or made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue Court before the expiry of a year from the date of -commencement of this Act.” Section 4 provides for stay of all further proceedings in suits and applications of the nature mentioned in section 3 in which relief is claimed against an agriculturist, etc. It is clear from this that it is only in cases falling under section 3 of the Act that a stay of further proceedings can be granted. The point, therefore, for consideration is whether in this case there is any execution application pending which attracts section 4 of the Act. If the other requirements of the Act are complied with section 4 of the Act will certainly be applicable. What section 3 prohibits is the entertainment of a suit or application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt, thus laying emphasis on the nature of the suit. If the other requirements of the Act are complied with section 4 of the Act will certainly be applicable. What section 3 prohibits is the entertainment of a suit or application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt, thus laying emphasis on the nature of the suit. Thus to bar an execution petition under section 3 or to stay such proceedings it is essential that the decrees should have been passed in a suit for the recovery of money. It is the character of the suit that determines the applicability of sections 3 and 4. In this case it cannot be contended with any force that the suit is not for the recovery of a debt. It was an administration action which was in effect a suit for partition. The fact that ultimately the appellants are required to pay a sum of money in adjustment of shares will not convert the suit into one for the recovery of money. It is only the nature of the suit that counts and not the ultimate result thereof. In these -circumstances we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke section 4 of the Act and the judgment of the lower Court dismissing his application is correct. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellants are given time till the 15th July, 1954, for payment of the amount. The execution petition will be kept pending on the file. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.