JUDGMENT :- This appeal has been brought by Musammat Manihar Bibi appellant against the decree of the learned District Judge, Manipur, dated 10-8-1953 in Civil Suit No. 8 of 1952 which has been dismissed by the trial Court. The facts of the case briefly stated are that Mahammad Kasim Mia respondent No. 3 was married to Musammat Manihar Bibi appellant on 5-7-1932 and the latters dower debt was settled at Rs. 10,000/- for which an agreement deed had been executed. This agreement deed was alleged to have been lost during the bombing of Imphal in the last war, and so the appellants mother when in her death bed got another deed dated 10th January 1951, Ex. P/B from the husband whereby the latter gave the disputed property situated in plot No. 164, Maxwell Bazar, along with constructed buildings thereon as consideration for the dower debt and the appellant was given possession over the disputed plot on the same date. The appellant, however, in order to feel secure got a regular sale deed from her husband on 5-7-1952 vide Ex. P/A and this deed was registered on 8-7-1952. The appellant claims to have Jet out the buildings in question vide Ex. P/B and so she claimed to be in possession also. 2. Mahammad Kasini Mia respondent No. 3 had borrowed Rs. 12,000/- from Ganesh Singh and Giga Singh through the pro-note dated 10-7-1949 and this debt remained unpaid. On 5-3-1952 Rakha Singh, son of Ganesh Singh and Mahabir Singh, son of Giga Singh brought suit No. 16 of 1952 in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Manipur on the basis of the aforesaid pro-note and an application for attachment before judgment of the disputed property, was filed on 23rd June 1952. On the same date the learned Sub-Judge demanded cash security from the respondent No. 3 Mahammad Kasim Mia and later on 23rd August 1952 when security was not furnished, an order for attachment before judgment was passed relating to this property and the Suit No. 16 of 1952 was decreed for Rs. 19,759/- on 25th August 1952. It has already been mentioned by me that the sale deed with regard to the property in question was executed by Mohammad Kasim Mia in favour of the present appellant on 5-7-1952 after the application for attachment before judgment had been presented in Court on 23-6-1952. 19,759/- on 25th August 1952. It has already been mentioned by me that the sale deed with regard to the property in question was executed by Mohammad Kasim Mia in favour of the present appellant on 5-7-1952 after the application for attachment before judgment had been presented in Court on 23-6-1952. Musammat Manihar Bibi appellant filed an objection under O. 38, Rules 8 and 10 read with O. 21, R. 58, Civil P.C., on 22-9-1952. This objection was opposed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by means of reply dated 21-11-1952 and the appellants objection was dismissed on the same date. The present appellant then brought Suit No. 8 of 1952 under O. 21, R. 63, Civil Procedure Code on 19-12-1052 praying for declaration that Musammat Manihar Bibi was the owner in possession of the property in question and it was further prayed that the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 be permanently restrained from executing their decree passed in Suit No. 16 of 1952 (Execution Case No. 51 of 1852) and the execution proceedings be stayed until the disposal of the suit. This suit was also dismissed, and so Musammat Manihar Bibi has come in appeal. 3. The respondents - No. 1 and 2 denied that the respondent No. 3 owed any dower debt of Rs. 10,000/- to the appellant and they further denied that the respondent No. 3 had executed any agreement deed at the time of the marriage or on 10-1-1950 and the story about the loss of the agreement deed and the appellants mother imploring her son-in-law to execute the deed dated 10-1-1950, has also been denied. If was further contended that the dower debt of the appellant if any at all had become time-barred and in any case it was not subsisting on 10-3-1950 or on 5-7-1952. According to these two respondents the appellant had throughout been living with the respondent No. 3 in his house and she had never been in possession over the disputed property. It was also contended that the plaint was not duly verified and the court-fee paid was insufficient, but these pleas have not been pressed before me. 4. The first question which is to be examined in this case is whether the appellant has proved that her dower debt amounted to Rs. 10,000/- and it was prompt. It was also contended that the plaint was not duly verified and the court-fee paid was insufficient, but these pleas have not been pressed before me. 4. The first question which is to be examined in this case is whether the appellant has proved that her dower debt amounted to Rs. 10,000/- and it was prompt. Musammat Manihar Bibi did not appear in the witness box nor did she get her statement recorded on commission to prove that her dower debt was settled at Rs. 10,000/- and it was prompt. The f respondent No. 3 made his statement in, Court on 12th June 1953, but he merely stated that he did not admit the decree granted by the Sub Judge, but he did not produce any evidence. He thus failed to depose that the appellants dower debt had been fixed, at Rs. 10,000/-and that it was prompt. If he had made any such statement in Court the present respondents Nos. 1 and 2 would have got an opportunity of cross-examining him on this question. (After going through the evidence of the appellants witnesses His Honour proceeded :) The plaintiffs evidence thus does not establish in the present case that her dower was really settled at Rs. 10,000/- and it was prompt and it subsisted on 10-1-1950 and on 5th/8th July 1952. 5. Mahabir Singh respondent No. 2 appeared in the witness box and he has deposed that Mahammad Kasim Mia admitted the execution of the pronote dated 20-7-1949 and the appellant signed the acknowledgment receipt Ex. D/D on 5th December 1951. This statement M clearly shows that after Mahammad Kasim Mia executed the pro-note dated 20th July 1949 and a registered notice of demand was served on him through the present appellant on 5th December 1951, he tried to execute fictitious, deeds in order to save the property for himself and with this end in view he executed the unregistered and unstamped deed bearing 10th. January 1950, as date of execution and later on when the application for attachment before judgment was filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 on 23-6-1952 he executed the registered sale deed Ex. P/A on 5-7-1952 with this same object. I have already mentioned above that Mahammad Kasim Mia made his statement in the trial Court, but he did not state specifically that the deed Ex. P/A on 5-7-1952 with this same object. I have already mentioned above that Mahammad Kasim Mia made his statement in the trial Court, but he did not state specifically that the deed Ex. P/B had actually been executed by him on 10-1-1950 at the request of appellants mother. It thus becomes established that the deeds Exs. P/B and P/A cannot be deemed to be genuine and valid as it has not been proved in this case that the appellants dower debt was fixed at Rs. 10,000/- and it was prompt. The argument that even the deferred dower becomes prompt if demanded by the wife during, the continuance of the marriage, does not find support from any authority and as it is established from the plaintiffs own witness Obeidulla Mia that her dower was deferred and as Mahammad Kasim Mia is alive and there has been no divorce between the appellant and the respondent No. 3 so far, the plaintiff cannot be deemed to have any subsisting claim regarding her dower on 10-1-1950 or 5-7-1952 and so these deeds must be deemed to be without consideration even if they are held to be genuine for a moment for the sake of argument. 6. The learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 2 contended that if the appellant had been produced in the witness box he could very easily have shown from her cross-examination that her dower debt did not amount to more than Rs. 2/- or Rs. 4/- (Mihir Misil or proper dower) and that she had demanded her dower after her marriage and so the claim for this dower had become time barred long before 10-1-1950. But as the plaintiff did not appear in the witness box it cannot be held with certainty that the plaintiffs dower debt had become time-barred. In any case it is proved in this case that the plaintiff-appellant had no subsisting claim as against the respondent No. 3 on 10-1-1950 and 5-7-1952 and so the deeds Exs. P/B and P/A were without consideration and as these deeds were executed for defeating or defrauding the creditors, the latter will not be affected by them because these deeds would amount to mere sham transactions. P/B and P/A were without consideration and as these deeds were executed for defeating or defrauding the creditors, the latter will not be affected by them because these deeds would amount to mere sham transactions. The question whether the transaction was really a transfer of property or sham or simulated transaction must be decided on the facts land circumstances of each particular case and after taking into consideration the circumstances of this case and the evidence on the record referred to above I come to the definite conclusion that the deeds Exs. P/B and P/A merely incorporate sham transaction. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the decree in suit No. 16 of 1952 is not binding and it is legally inoperative as Rakha Singh and Mahabir Singh had not obtained succession certificates before instituting this suit in Court, but the evidence of Mahabir Singh shows that succession certificate has been obtained later on and as the decree passed in suit No. 16 of 1952, has become final, I do not think that the argument that the decree is void merely because succession certificates had not been obtained prior to institution of suit, has I any force for, in the first place Rakha Singh is the son of Ganesh Singh, original creditor and Mahabir Singh is the son of Giga Singh original creditor and then they obtained succession certificates after instituting suit No. 16 of 1952 and is the decree passed in the suit could not be deemed to be void. 8. The next argument that has been advanced on behalf of the appellant is that the decree dated 25th August 1952 in suit No. 16 01 1952 cannot be deemed to be binding as the pronote on the basis of which this decree was passed had not been registered. As it has not been shown that registration of this pronote was mandatory. I think this argument also cannot be deemed to be of any force. 9. Third contention of the appellant is that the application for attachment before judgment dated 23-6-1952 was allowed ex parte and actual attachment was made on 23-8-1952. But the orders Exs. P/D-1 to P/D-4 show that the defendant Mahammad Kasim Mia was present in court and so this contention is also of no force. 9. Third contention of the appellant is that the application for attachment before judgment dated 23-6-1952 was allowed ex parte and actual attachment was made on 23-8-1952. But the orders Exs. P/D-1 to P/D-4 show that the defendant Mahammad Kasim Mia was present in court and so this contention is also of no force. The learned counsel for the appellant has also urged that the objection under O. 21, B. 58 filed by the present appellant on 22nd September 1952 was rejected on 21-11-1952 when the decree-holders filed their written reply without the appellant being given an opportunity to produce her evidence. The contention of the appellant is that as she had filed her objection without any delay and specially when there was no intention on her part to obstruct the execution proceedings, she should have been allowed to produce her witnesses. I have already shown above that the decree was passed on 21-8-1952 and even though the appellant was living with the respondent No. 3 throughout and the respondent No. 3 used to be present in court, the objection under O. 21, R. 58 Civil Procedure Code, was not filed prior to 21-11-1952 and so the learned Sub Judge rejected it on the ground that it had been deliberately filed at late stage in order to delay execution proceedings. The appellant filed review application vide Exs. D/B and D/A on 5-12-1952, but this application was also rejected. As such there is no force in the contention that the order rejecting objection under O. 21, B. 58, Civil Procedure Code dated 21-11-1952 is not binding on the present appellant. 10. The appellant filed the suit No. 16 of 1952 under O. 21, R. 63, Civil P.C. and it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the present respondents No. 1 and 2 should have brought, a suit under S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act for declaration that the sale deed Ex. F/A was not binding on the ground that a fraudulent transfer has been made through it and such a suit should have been brought on behalf of all the creditors. F/A was not binding on the ground that a fraudulent transfer has been made through it and such a suit should have been brought on behalf of all the creditors. It has been laid down in - Fazal-ul Rahim Khan v. Nawal Kishore, reported in AIR 1952 All 226 (FB) (A) that where there is no other creditor except the one in execution of whose decree the proceedings under O. 21, R. 63 have arisen, the suit for declaration as brought by that creditor could satisfy the requirements of the fourth clause and S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Sami Asari v. Ashagiya Pillai, reported in AIR 1921 Mad 657 (B), it has been laid down that the institution of a suit to avoid fraudulent transfer is not the only mode of avoiding it. It may be made by way of defence in a suit brought to enforce the transfer. Thus in a suit under O. 21, R. 63, Civil P.C. by a defeated claimant on the basis of Appellant transfer made to him by the debtor, the creditor who has attached the property in execution of his decree may plead in defence that the transfer was fraudulent under S. 53, Transfer of Property Act. In Pasoo Devshi v. Anandji Bhula, AIR 1952 Kutch 39 (C), it has been held that when a mortgage is a possessory one, attachment is to be raised to the extent of mortgagees interest in the property and when a mortgage is a simple one, attachment may be continued subject to such mortgage. In the first mentioned case the court has not only to be satisfied about the mortgage, but it has further to be satisfied about possession of the mortgagee on his own account. In the second mentioned case the court is only to be satisfied about the mortgage. Though the question of fraudulent transfer cannot be considered, the question of possession of the claimant on his own account and not on account of the judgment-debtor as his Benamidar or otherwise has to be considered. As such the question raised by the present respondents No. 1 and 2 that the disputed property remained in possession of respondent No. 3 throughout and the deeds Ex. P/A and P/B were fictitious, could properly be gone through by the learned District Judge. In Mt. Akram-un-nissa v. Mt. As such the question raised by the present respondents No. 1 and 2 that the disputed property remained in possession of respondent No. 3 throughout and the deeds Ex. P/A and P/B were fictitious, could properly be gone through by the learned District Judge. In Mt. Akram-un-nissa v. Mt. Mustafa-un-nissa, reported in- AIR 1929 All 238 (D) it has been held that the principles embodied in S. 53, Transfer of Property Act are in accordance with the general principle of justice, equity and good, conscience and as such should be taken as a guide by the courts even in cases when a party bases his title on a transfer by a decree of the court where the provisions of S. 53, Transfer of Property Act, do not apply. The learned District Judge has in the present case held that the deeds Exs. P/B and P/A are not binding on the respondents No. 1 and 2 on the ground that they were sham transactions and he upheld the view of the learned Sub Judge while dismissing the objection under O. 21, R. 58, Civil Procedure Code that these deeds were not binding on the analogy of S. 53, Transfer of Property Act, and so S. 53 was not clearly applied to this case. I think the principles enunciated above could properly be applied to this case and the judgment of the learned District Judge cannot be validly assailed on this ground. 11. The plaintiff appellant no doubt tried prove by the evidence of Abdul Rahman, Obeidulla Mia and Kali Mohan Chatterji witnessed that she was in possession over the disputed property. The patta dated 27th July 1947 Ex. D/C shows that this property was acquired by the respondent No. 3 and as the appellant has throughout been living with respondent No. 3 and no prior rent receipt has been produced by her, it becomes very difficult to infer that she really entered into possession over the disputed property. The rent deed dated 5-7-1952 Ex. P/C was executed when Rakha Singh and Mahabir Singh had already instituted their suit No. 16 of 1952 in court. If the deed Ex. The rent deed dated 5-7-1952 Ex. P/C was executed when Rakha Singh and Mahabir Singh had already instituted their suit No. 16 of 1952 in court. If the deed Ex. P/B was really executed on 10-1-1950 and possession had been delivered to the appellant on that date one would expect the appellant to have obtained at least one or two rent deeds from the tenants during the period from 10-1-1950 to 5-3-1952, but no such deed is forthcoming. As such the learned District Judge was justified in holding that the present appellant was never given possession over the disputed properties and the sham transactions Exs. P/B and P/A were executed in her favour in order to protect the respondent No. 3 from the clutches of the creditors. The rulings reported in the case of Radhakant v. Ramanup Singh, reported in AIR 1950 Pat 166 (E) and - Adilja Ranchorlal v. Oza Mukundalal Swaika, reported in AIR 1952 Sau 63 (F), which lay down that objection under O. 21, R. 58 and O. 38, R. 10, Civil P.C., should be decided on the question of possession and not on the basis of title, cannot help the present appellant in any way, nor will the case of - Faqir Bux v. Thakur Prasad, help the present appellant vide AIR 1941 Oudh 457 (G). In that case the plaintiff had accepted the gift deed in question as genuine, but he had contended that it was ineffective as against him. In the present case the respondents No. 1 and 2 never admitted the execution of any Kabinnama by the respondent No. 3 in favour of the appellant on 5-1-1932 and they further denied execution of the deed Ex. P/B on 10-1-1950. 12. Under the above circumstances, the present appeal has no force and it is dismissed with costs to the respondents No. 1 and 2. Appeal dismissed.