Judgment.- This appeal arises out of a suit instituted for the refund of a sum of Rs.1,236-8-0 by the 1st defendant. One Pulla Reddi executed a simple mortgage for a sum of Rs.5,000 in favour of A. Narasaramiah, who was the eldest brother and manager of the joint family consisting of himself and his brothers Rama Subbiah and Krishnamurthi. Narasaramiah became an insolvent, and the two brothers Rama Subbiah and Krishnamurthi instituted O.S. No. 564 of 1938 in the District Munsif’s Court, Nandyal, on the mortgage for the recovery of their 2/3rds shares of the mortgage debt. A preliminary decree and a final decree were passed and in November, 1941, Rama Subbiah died leaving behind him an undivided son by name Lakshmi Narasayya and his widow, Venkata Subbamma, the and defendant herein. The plaintiff obtained assignment of the interest of Krishnamurthi and Lakshmi Narasayya in the mortgage decree on the 17th November, 1942, and earlier on the 2nd October, 1942, the 1st defendant became the assignee of the 1/6th share of the mortgage decree from the 2nd defendant. Both the assignees took out proceedings for execution. The mortgage property was sold and Rs.6,980 was realised. Both the plaintiff and the 1st defendant took out applications for recognising their assignments, E.A. No. 105 of 1943 being by the plaintiff and E.A. No. 384 of 1943 being by the 1st defendant. On the 8th July, 1944, the plaintiff was recognised as the transferee decree-holder in so far as the shares of Krishnamurthi and Lakshmi Narasayya are concerned and on the same day, the 1st defendant also was recognised as the transferee of the widow’s share in the mortgage decree, and on the 9th September, 1946, a sum of Rs.1,053-5-8 was paid to the 1st defendant as the widow’s 1/6th share in the mortgage decree. The present suit is to recover that sum on the ground that the 2nd defendant had no right to a 1/6th share in the mortgage decree, as the mortgage was in respect of the agricultural lands and the widow was not entitled to a share in the agricultural properties left by her husband, and that therefore the 1st defendant was not entitled to receive the amount. The trial Court decreed the suit, but in appeal the learned Subordinate Judge following the decision of Subba Rao, J., in Veerayamma v. Venkanna1, held that the widow was entitled to a share under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, even if the property mortgaged consists of agricultural property and dismissed the suit holding in favour of the 1st defendant. The plaintiff is now the appellant. The main contention of the appellant is that the decision relied upon by the lower appellate Court has been dissented from by a Bench of this Court in Dhanam v. Varadarajan2, to which I was a party. The Bench has considered all the relevant decisions on the subject and held that before the passing of the Madras Act (XXVI of 1947), a Hindu widow was not entitled to any share in a mortgage on agricultural land, and that even if it were possible to consider a debt as differentiated from the security, still the interest in agricultural lands in the debt does not cease as such. There is therefore no scope for the argument that the debt secured by the mortgage of agricultural property does not amount to an interest in agricultural lands. In view of the Bench decision the plaintiff’s contention has necessarily to be upheld. But Mr. Somasundaram for the 1st defendant urges that in A.S. No.142 of 1945, an unreported decision, it was held that though a widow was not entitled to a partition of the mortgages, because the Central Legislature had no power to legislate with regard to agricultural lands, the widow was entitled to a share in all the sums realised from the mortgagors whether received by way of repayment or as proceeds of the sale of the hyoptheca or otherwise, and that money repaid or realised from the mortgagors cannot be regarded as such agricultural property. The Bench in Dhanam v. Varadarajan1, also referred to this decision; but the principle laid down, however, does not affect the present case, as the question for consideration is whether at the relevant point of time, that is on the date of the assignment, viz., 2nd October, 1942, what was assigned by the 2nd defendant was a share in the mortgage debt or whether it was money realized from the mortgage of agricultural lands. What was assigned was 1/6th share in the mortgage decree as such to the 1st defendant and it is not a case of money realised or the sale proceeds of the property that was the subject-matter of the assignment. What the 2nd defendant claimed to be entitled to a share of which she made an assignment of was an interest in agricultural lands, that being the 1/6th share in the mortgage decree. The same directly comes within the scope of the decision in Dhanam v. Varadarajan1, and the 1st defendant, therefore, was not entitled to any share in the sale proceeds of a property which was assigned and over which the 2nd defendant had no interest or power to transfer. The appeal has therefore to be allowed. A question of limitation was raised, and that is, that the suit was really one for setting aside a decision or order of a civil Court in a proceeding other than a suit and that therefore the one year period of limitation provided for under Article 13 of the Limitation Act would apply and that the suit, having been filed long after one year, is therefore barred by limitation. Mr. Somasundaram fairly conceded that Article 13 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable to an order for payment out, which was a proceeding in an execution in a suit, and not de hors a suit when alone Article 13 could be invoked. The decision in Official Receiver, South Malabar v. Veeraraghavan Pattar2, is an answer to the point raised as to limitation. The Bench in that case agreed with the observations of the learned Judge in Vishnu Bhikaji Padke v. Achut Jagannath Ghate3,viz.: “That the application of the 18th Article is also precluded by the fact that the order for distribution was a step in an execution proceeding and was therefore made in the suit in which the decree was made which was in process of execution. The order of distribution was thus an order in a suit.” The orders to which Article 13 would apply are orders passed not in a suit, that is, in a proceeding which did not. The order of distribution was thus an order in a suit.” The orders to which Article 13 would apply are orders passed not in a suit, that is, in a proceeding which did not. begin with the filing of a plaint, but applications under the Guardians and Wards Act, the Succession Certificate Act and so on, that is, proceedings substantially different from proceedings arising in a suit are what is contemplated under Article 13 of the Limitation Act. It is not the one year period of limitation that would apply to the present case, the case would come under Article 62 or Article 120, and the suit in any event is within time. The result is the appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower Court is set aside and the decree of the trial Court is restored. As regards costs, each party will bear their respective costs in the trial Court and in the Court below but the appellant will have his costs in the second appeal. No leave. K.S. ----- Appeal allowed.