Wanchoo, C.J.—This is a first appeal by defedant Ramdayal. It came up before a Bench of this Court for hearing in August 1953, and two points were decided by judgment dated 7th August, 1953 (a) See 1954 R.L.W. 157 for previous decision and it was ordered that the appeal fixed for hearingh on the remaining points in due courts. It is therefore not necessary for us to recapitulate the case of the parties. The judgment, dated 7th August, 1953 (a) See 1954 R.L.W. 157 for previous decision may be considered part of this judgment which we are delivering today. 2. Briefly put the case of the plaintiff respondent was for recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,000/- from the defendant appellant. The suit was based on a balance of Rs. 3000/- which was said to be due to the plaintiff after settlement of accounts, and a sum of Rs. 7000/- which was further advanced in case. The main defence was that there had been a novation of contract, and therefore the plaintiff could not sue on the basis of the Khata Ex. P.1. This was the only issue which was framed in the trial court. When the case heard by this Court on the previous occasion, a further point was raised, namely, that the suit was premature. The question of novation was decided against the defendant, and though it was held that the suit was premature at the time it was filed, this Court took notice of events which took place after the filling of the suit, and allowed the suit to proceed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant now urges two further points against the decree of the trial court. In the first place, it is contended that the suit is based on a mere acknowledgment, and in view of the decisions of this Court in Kanraj vs. Vijaisingh (1) and Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan (2) it must fail, as a mere acknowledgment cannot be the basis of the suit. In the second place, it is submitted that the acknowledgment in this case not having been stamped as required by Art, 1, schedule I of the Stamp Act is not admissible in evidence. In the second place, it is submitted that the acknowledgment in this case not having been stamped as required by Art, 1, schedule I of the Stamp Act is not admissible in evidence. Learned counsel takes the case out of the decision of this Court in Ratanlal vs. Dandas (3) on the ground that the admissibility of the document was disputed in the trial court, but the trial court did not frame any issue about it and did not decide it. 4. The reply of learned counsel for the plaintiff is two-fold In the first place, it is urged that the entry in this case is not an acknowledgment but is merely acceptance of the correctness of the accounts stated and settled between the parties, and therefore there is no question of any stamp being affixed to such an entry. In the alternative, it is urged that even if it is a mere acknowledgment, the recent case of the Supreme Court in Hiralal vs. Badkulal (4) has in effect overruled the Full Bench decision of this Court in Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan(2) 5. Before we consider the question whether the document in this case is a mere acknowledgment or amounts to acceptance of the account stated and settled we might briefly consider the point whether Hiralals case(4) has overruled the Full Bench decision of this Court in Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan(2). It may be mentioned that in Hiralals case (4) the suit was based on balance of an account stated and adjusted, and it was held by the Supreme Court that the Judicial Commissioners view that an unqualified acknowledgment like the one in that suit and the statement of the account under which the entry had been made were sufficient to furnish a cause of action to the plaintiffs. Reference was then made to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Maniram vs. Seth Rupchand (5) where it was observed that an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay. Thereafter, two Lahore cases, namely Fateh Mohammed vs. Ganga Singh 6) and Khan Chand Dalaram vs. Daya Ram, Amritlal (7) were approved. Reference was then made to the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Maniram vs. Seth Rupchand (5) where it was observed that an unconditional acknowledgment implies a promise to pay. Thereafter, two Lahore cases, namely Fateh Mohammed vs. Ganga Singh 6) and Khan Chand Dalaram vs. Daya Ram, Amritlal (7) were approved. The Supreme Court then observed that the defendant in the case accepted the statement of account contained in the plaintiffs account book, and made it his own by signing it, and it thus amounted to an account stated between them" in the language of Art. 64 Limitation Act. In the end, reference was made to Ghulam Murtaza vs. Mr. Fasiunnissa Bibi (8) in the following words: — In this case "It was held that even if an acknowledgment implies at promise to pay it cannot be made the basis of suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh cause of action. We have examined the decision and we are satisfied that it does not lay down good law." Stress is being laid on these observations for the view that the Supreme Court has held that a mere acknowledgment can be the basis of a suit, and thus has impliedly overruled the Full Bench decision of this Court in Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan (2). It is enough to say that, in the first place, the question before the Supreme Court was not whether a mere acknowledgment, i.e. a bare admission of the balance due, can be the basis of a suit because the suit in Hiralals case (4) was based on accounts stated In the second place, the disapproval of the decision in Ghulam Murtazas case (8) was of that part of it where it was held in that case that even if an acknowledgment implied a. promise to pay, it cannot be made the basis of a suit and treated as giving rise to a fresh cause of action. Looking at Ghulam Murtazas case (8), we find that Sulaiman C.J , with whom Harries J. agreed, approved of the decision in the earlier Allahabad case in Bal Krishna vs. DebiSingh(9); but he went on further to say "that a receipt containing an acknowledgement of a pervious debt may not be a mere acknowledgment, i.e. a bare admission of the existing liability, but it may contain words indicating an implied promise to pay the earlier debt." He then expressed the view that whether the receipt was a mere acknowledgment or more than an acknowledgment and contained words indicating an implied promise to pay, it could not be made the basis of a suit. We are of opinion that it is this part of the decision in Ghulam Murtazas case(8) which has been held by the Supreme Court to be wrong in Hiralals case (4). Our attention was drawn to the approval by the Supreme Court of the two Lahore case(6&7). Of these Kahan Chand-Dula-rams case (7) was one to which article 64 applied, and was based on account stated and settled. It is not clear whether Fateh Mohom-meds case(6) was similar or not as the judgment is very short. But there also it appears that the plaintiff sued on the basis of a balance. It is not clear whether that balance was an account stated and settled as in this case, or was a mere acknowledgment i.e. a bare admission of the liability. We may also add that Manirams case(5) was clearly based on the original cause of action, and the acknowledgment in that case was being used for the purpose of extending the period of limitation. The suit in Manirams case (5) was not based on a mere acknowledgment. There is an observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council based on English Law in that case that an unconditional acknowledgment has always been held to imply promise to pay. But the High Courts in India have generally held that that is not the law in India, and following these decisions, this Court has held in Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan(2) that that was not the law. But the High Courts in India have generally held that that is not the law in India, and following these decisions, this Court has held in Hastimal vs. Shanker Dan(2) that that was not the law. We do not thing that the decision of the Supreme Court in Hiralals case (4) can be said clearly to overrule the view that a mere acknowledgment, as distinguished from an acknowledgment in which there are words from which an implied, promise to pay may be inferred, cannot be the basis of a suit. 6. But the contention of learned counsel for the respondent before us is that this is not a case of mere acknowledgment, but of accounts stated in writing signed by the defendant. A suit of this kind is contemplated in Article 64 of the Limitation Act, and this ease is exactly of the same kind as Hiralals case (4). We have to look at Ex. P-l for that purpose. We find in it an opening balance of Rs. 8,488/4/- on the debit side. Then we find three items totalling to Rs. 5,751/7/6 on the credit side. Then there are two items of interest on the debit side amounting to Rs.273/-3/9 in all. Thereafter a balance is struck showing Rs. 3000/- due from the defendant to the plaintiff. Then there is the signature of the defendant in these words— "Daskhat Ramdayal Gagni Rupia Teen-Hazar Baki." We are of opinion that where a signature like this appears on an account of this kind, the presumption is that the person signing was accepting the correctness of the account and making it his own. Of course, in one sense the signature and these words may amount to an acknowledgment also; but it is a question of fact whether about such an acknowledgment appended at the foot of such an account, it can be said that the intention was to supply evidence of such debt. We are of opinion that where the acknowledgment is of this kind appearing at the foot of such an account, the presumption should be that the intention was to accept the correctness of the account and to make it the account of the person signing it, and not that the intention was to supply evidence of the debt, unless the contrary is proved by clear evidence. We, therefore, hold that what the defendant did by signing this account and saying that Rs. 300/- were due was merely to accept the correctness of the account and to make it as his own. There being no evidence to the contrary it cannot be said that the intention was to supply evidence of the debt. In the view of the matter, there is no question of any stamp being required on an acknowledgment of this kind, and the suit as based on this account for Rs. 3000/- must succeed. So far as the amount of Rs. 7000/- is concerned, that was paid in case, and is evidenced by a stamped receipt, and the plaintiff is entitled to it. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that as it has been held that the suit was premature when it was filed,the court may order parties to bear their own costs. We are of opinion that so far as the trial court is concerned this point was not taken by the defendant there is no reason to deprive the plaintiff respondent of the costs of that court. So far as this Court is concerned, we do think that parties should bear their own costs in this Court. 8. We therefore, dismiss the appeal, but order that parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Costs of the trial court will be borne as ordered by that court.