Judgment This appeal is against the order of the learned District Judge of Tiruchirapalli allowing the petition to set aside the order of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board declaring the suit institution as a temple as defined by section 9(12) of the Act. The case for the respondents-petitioners in the lower Court was that the suit temple was a private place of worship founded by the li-neal ascendants of the petitioners and the second respondent therein. A paid servant was performing the pooja in the temple. The temple was never dedicated to the public and the public did not worship there. It was intended for the members of the family of the respondents who were devotees of Hanumar Koil and who belonged to the Madhva section of the Hindu community. The expenses for the suit temple are said to have been met entirely out of private funds. No offerings or subscriptions have ever been made by or received from the public. The public had also never interfered at any time with the management of the suit temple. When the appellant-Board itself was about to take action in respect of the suit temple on the application filed by the poojari who was a dismissed person the respondents-petitioners in the lower Court filed application before the Board in O.A. No. 156 of 1947 to declare that the suit temple was not a temple as defined in the Act. On 10th December, 1947, the Board passed an order dismissing the said application, O.A. No. 156 of 1947, holding that the institution known as Sri Hanumar Temple, Pudu Agraharam, Srirangam, as a temple under section 9(12) of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. Thereupon the respondents herein filed O.P. No. 105 of 1948 out of which this appeal has arisen. In the said O.P. No. 105 of 1948, the contention of the appellant-Board was that the temple was a public temple where members of the public enter and worship as of right without let or hindrance and that the land on which the temple stood was itself a gift to the forefathers of the respondents by a stranger to the family and that the temple was on a public road and had all the appearances of a public temple. The second respondent to the petition supported the Board and stated that the temple was dedicated to public worship and was not a private property. The second respondent to the petition supported the Board and stated that the temple was dedicated to public worship and was not a private property. He is one of the trustees of the temple who was at loggerheads with the petitioners before the lower Court. The learned District Judge, after taking into consideration the document and the oral evidence let in on behalf of both sides, came to the conclusion that the Hanumar Koil in question was not a temple as defined by section 9(12) of the Act, but that it was only a place of private worship. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board preferred this appeal. The appellant-Board relied upon Exhibits P-1 and P-2 filed before the Board. Exhibit P-1 is said to be a copy of the deed of agreement among Krishna Rao, Ananda Rao and Rama Rao, dated 28th June, 1881. It is said to have been executed to settle the claims of the various properties acquired by the family. In that document, reference is made to Hanumar Temple and parties agreed not to claim the income from the trees planted by them on the Ammamandapam road as usufruct as those trees had been left for charities and the pooja of Sri Hanumar Temple constructed by them. The other document before the Board, Exhibit P-2, is said to be a copy of the will of Rama Rayar executed in favour of Ranga Rayar, his adopted son. This was dated 26th October, 1904. In that it is stated that the deity of Hanumar was installed and pratishta performed by Rama Rayar and his elder brother Krishna Rayar. The mode of management of the charities with the temple has also been prescribed in the said will. The schedule appended to the will gives a description of the temple in question and the trees planted on the road-side as well as the moveable properties of the temple. These two documents were considered by the Board as giving no indication that the deity in the temple was only intended for the worship of the members of the family, Rama Rao and others. The Board held, that simply because the members of the Madhva Brahmin community have got special veneration for Sri Hanumar, it could not be presumed that it was not a place of public religious worship. The Board held, that simply because the members of the Madhva Brahmin community have got special veneration for Sri Hanumar, it could not be presumed that it was not a place of public religious worship. The Board then relied upon the report of the Assistant Commissioner who inspected the locality and made a report giving details of the daily poojas and the free access of the public to the temple and the worship of the public without any let or hindrance in the temple. It is also stated in the report that the trustees themselves were residing far away from the temple. Certain receipts also were produced before the Board to show that the temple was not extempt from property tax, but the Board, held that these receipts were not sufficient to lend support to the contention of the respondents that the institution was not a temple as defined in the Act. On the basis of this, the Board dismissed the petition. The learned counsel for the Board relies upon this order of the Board which is marked as Exhibit A-2 and also on Exhibit A-4 which is a deed of gift, dated 25th April, 1884. This deed of gift is executed by Narayana Rayar, who is a Madhva himself, in respect of a house site in favour of three persons who are stated to be the ancestors of the present trustees. This deed says that the donor makes a gift of the house site belonging to him mentioned in a previous cancelled gift and situated in the 42nd Lot, Alvarthottam, Sitapuram Village, Melurmaganam, Srirangam sub-district, Tiruchirapalli District, which is situated on the west of the road leading to Ammamandapam. The measurement of this land is said to be 32 human feet and 162½ feet worth about Rs. 500 and it is gifted for the purpose of building a temple, to instal the Hanumar deity therein and to conduct pooja, etc. It also recites that the temple had already been constructed on the aforesaid site and the Hanumar deity had been installed and the pooja had actually been conducted. So, the gift is executed in respect of the aforesaid site. It also recites that the temple had already been constructed on the aforesaid site and the Hanumar deity had been installed and the pooja had actually been conducted. So, the gift is executed in respect of the aforesaid site. The point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant-Board in respect of this document is that the site on which the temple has been built having been given by a stranger by way of gift, it must be considered to be intended for the benefit of the entire public and not for the personal or private use of the trustees in whose favour the gift has beer executed. As against this the contention of the respondents-the contesting trustees is that the donor of the site was a relation of the ten trustees and that he was not a stranger to the family and there was nothing strange or unusual that a relation of the family of the then trustees should have made a gift of a bit of land for the purpose of a temple to be constructed by the members of the family for their family worship. Merely because, it was not possible for the present trustees to say how exacty the donor of the site on which the temple has been constructed is related, it would not derogate from the true nature or character of the gift which was for a private temple to be constructed by the other members of the family. The evidence of P.W. 7 is to the effect that the donor was a distant relative of the family but not an agnate and he could not say how he was related. So far as this point is concerned, there is no evidence to prove that this Narayana Rao was a stranger to the family. On the other hand, the contents of the gift-deed, Exhibit A-4, taken as a whole and read along with the evidence of P.W. 7 leave the impression that the donor could not have been a stranger but must have been a relation of the ancestors of the present trustees interested in the establishment of a temple for the benefit of the family. The next point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the building of the temple conforms to the ordinary type of a temple and that it is not part of a dwelling house and therefore, could not be construed to be a temple intended for the private worship of the members of the family. It is also urged that, in so far as the temple is outside the dwelling house and has been treated as an independent entity ever since 1884 and the pooja therein has been conducted by a paid archaka, these incidents would be consistent only with a public temple and not with a private family temple. Referring to the decision in The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board v. Deivanai Ammal1, the learned counsel has sought to distinguish the observations in that decision from the facts that obtain in the present case. I do not think that it is possible for me to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant-Board in this matter. The mere fact that the temple appears like the ordinary public temple or that a paid archaka has been in charge of the temple for the performance of the poojas and other ceremonies would not be sufficient to make the temple a public temple. Something more has to be established to make it a public temple. In the next place, the learned counsel contended that the presumption in respect of temples is that they are always public temples until and unless the contrary is proved. He relied upon Keman Nair v. Achuthan Nair1, wherein it is stated that private temples are unknown and that in order to establish a temple to be a private one, the onus is heavily upon the party claiming the temple to be a private one to show that it is not a public temple. The decisions in Babu Bhagwati Din v. Girhar Saroop2 and Bhavanam Nagi Reddi v. The Board of Commissioners for the Hindu Religious Endowments3, were relied upon by the learned counsel to show that unless the onus, which lay upon the party who agitates against the temple being a place of public religious worship, was discharged, the presumption would always be that the temple, from its appearance, architectural features and the nature of the poojas and ceremonies, etc., is a public institution and not a private one. This would ordinarily be the case but for the fact that the law has laid down that, in order that a temple should be declared to be a public one, the requirements of section 9(12) should be complied with. The burden, therefore, under this section, lies heavily upon the party who claims the temple to be a pbulic one to prove the requirements of the definition of a public temple as given in section 9 (12) of the Act. The question then is as to whether the appellant-Board has proved on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence, that the temple is used as a place of public religious worship and that it has been dedicated for the purpose of the Hindu community, or any section thereof, or, in the alternative, that the temple has been used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of public religious worship. When the section lays down that these requirements have to be satisfied in order to declare the temple a public one, there is no use relying upon some presumptions in regard to the public character of a temple on the general dictum that there can be no private ownership of temples. The decision in Musammal Konala Lachmi v. Mahant Bahadur Prasad4, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant will have to be considered in relation to the facts of each case, and as has been laid down in more than one decision, it will not be proper, nor will it be possible to lay down any hard and fast rule that could be uniformly applied to every case of a temple. So long as section 9(12) stands, we have to adhere to the language of that section and find out as to how far the temple falls within the scope of the definition as given in that section. The learned counsel, however, has invited my attention to the decision in A.K.T.K.M. Narayanan Nambudripad v. Board of Commissioner for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras5, in which Varadachariar, J., observed that public dedication may be a matter of inference from circumstances, and the user of the temple as of right may also be established from the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel, however, has invited my attention to the decision in A.K.T.K.M. Narayanan Nambudripad v. Board of Commissioner for the Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras5, in which Varadachariar, J., observed that public dedication may be a matter of inference from circumstances, and the user of the temple as of right may also be established from the circumstances of the case. Even so, the decision in P. Sitaramanujachari v. K. Velamma6, has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention, that, in the present case, dedication of a temple to the Hindu community can be inferred easily from the facts. On a reading of the documentary and oral evidence, I must observe that it is very difficult to infer either the fact of dedication or the fact of user of the temple as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof in the present case. Exhibit A-5 has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant to show that the sale-deed in favour of the then trustees as early as the 14th June, 1884, speaks of the trustees as mere managers of the Hanumar Temple on the road and that this description of these trustees as mere managers or Dharmakarthas would not entitle them to claim the temple as their private place of worship. I do not think that there is much substance in this contention. The terms managers or “trustees” or “dharmakarthas” are used loosely in documents which are not written by legally-trained persons. So nothing much turns upon the description of the claim only under Exhibit A-5 namely, the vendees as mere managers. In the Tamil language, the term “dharmakarthas” would be equivalent to trustees. Great, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on Exhibits A-6, A-7, A-8 which are respectively the plaint and the Razinama in O.S. No. 436 of 1898 on the file of the District Munsiff’s Court, Srirangam and the will of Karur Rama Rayar, dated 11th November, 1909. The plaint was filed by the sons of Ananda Rao against their paternal uncles. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, Exhibit A-6 and averments statements in Exibit A-7 are made to the effect that Rs. 1,000 was set apart by the grandfather as an endowment for the temple, that a sum of Rs. The plaint was filed by the sons of Ananda Rao against their paternal uncles. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, Exhibit A-6 and averments statements in Exibit A-7 are made to the effect that Rs. 1,000 was set apart by the grandfather as an endowment for the temple, that a sum of Rs. 700 was agreed to be paid by 1st defendant to the temple. It is argued that these averments in the plaint are consistent only with the temple being a public one, that only the rights of management of that temple vested in the trustees and that they did not go to show that it was a private temple. Further, the prayer for settlement of a scheme in the plaint also was destructive of the theory that it was a family temple intended for worship of the members of the family. Exhibit A-7, the Razinama, however, provides for the management of the temple by turns in rotation by the members of the family. A reading of these two exhibits and the relevant portions thereof does not convince me that they establish the public nature of the temple in question. The suit itself was filed out of a quarrel that had arisen between the rival claimants and the mere prayer for a scheme for the management of the temple need not necessarily be inconsistent with the private character of the temple. The Razinama itself goes to prove that future management of the temple was settled on the basis of the temple being a private institution and not a public temple. There was no association of any member of the public for the management of the temple under the Razinama decree which would have been the case if the public was really entitled to worship in the temple as of right if the parties treated it as a public temple. It is well known that schemes are in existence in respect of private institutions, charitable or religious, as the case may be. The mere fact that certain endowments were set apart for this temple would not also make the temple assume the character of being a place of public worship open to the Hindu community as of right. It is well known that schemes are in existence in respect of private institutions, charitable or religious, as the case may be. The mere fact that certain endowments were set apart for this temple would not also make the temple assume the character of being a place of public worship open to the Hindu community as of right. The next important point which has been urged by the learned counsel for appllant is that in 1932 the house property tax was cancelled in respect of the temple on the ground that it was a place of public religious worship. This is borne out by Exhibit B-3, but that evidence is that, apart from the cancellation of the tax, for one period, during the rest of the period, the Municipality has claimed property tax from the entire property of which the temple forms a part. This document does not really carry the case of the appellant any farther, in the face of the evidence that is on record. Another point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the stone idol of a very large size, viz., 3½ feet high is installed in the temple in question and the bigness of the idol is not consistent with the theory that it is a private temple. For, it is urged that in private temples idols are not so big, nor are they made of stone, as is the case with the idol in the temple in question. It is urged that the stone idol of such a huge size is consistent only with the temple being a public temple dedicated for worship by the Hindu community or any section thereof. The decision in Subramania Ayyar v. Pujari Lakshmana Gounder1, has been relied upon in support of this contention by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is difficult for me to say, in the circumstances of this temple, and in the abesence of the very relevant factors, viz., dedication of the temple as a place of public religious worship for the benefit of the Hindu community, or any section thereof, that the mere fact that a big idol finds itself installed in the temple would go to make the temple a place of public religious worship. There must be clear evidence that the temple has either been dedicated to the Hindu community as a place of religious worship or that it has been used by the Hindu community as of right as a place of religious worship. As already observed, in the face of the unsatisfactory evidence, documentary and oral, on this point it will not be proper to assume from the mere fact that there was a stone idol of a big size installed in the temple, that the temple is a public temple. Another fact has also been pressed into service by the learned counsel for the appellant and that is the coming in and staying of the heads of the Madhva community in the property adjacent to the temple and also that public marriages and devasams have been held within the precincts of the temple. There is evidence further that swamiars are permitted to come and stay in the precincts of the temple and whenever they do so, permission is either asked for or presumed to be given by the trustees. So also the evidence is to the effect that, when marriages or devasams take place, they take place with the permission of the temple authorities namely, the trustees or by the standing authorisation given to the pujari to permit these things to take place and receive some remuneration, therefor, in order to augment his own resources. There is no evidence to the contra. If such be the case, it will not really be sufficient to say that the temple assumes the character of a public temple. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has invited my attention to the judgments of Govinda Menon, J., and Mack, J., in C.M.A. No. 166 of 1951, dated 15th April, 19541 and C.M.A.No. 486 of 1951, dated 4th March, 1954, both of them unreported. These two judgments have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents to show that, in respect of far stronger circumstances than those which obtain in the present case, the learned Judges refused to declare the temple involved in these two cases to be public temples. These two judgments have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents to show that, in respect of far stronger circumstances than those which obtain in the present case, the learned Judges refused to declare the temple involved in these two cases to be public temples. I have gone through these judgments and I am inclined to agree, with respect, with the principles laid down in the judgment of Govinda Menon and Mack, JJ., in C.M.A. No. 166 of 19511 and I am of the opinion that, applying those principles to the facts of the present case, it will be only straining too much to declare the present temple as a public temple dedicated to the Hindu community as a place of public religious worship and used by the Hindu community as of right. I think that, in view of the present section, viz., 9(12) of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the material placed before the learned District Judge was not quite sufficient nor satisfactory to declare the temple as a public temple. I am inclined to hold that the judgment of the learned District Judge was correct and the respondents were rightly entitled to a declaration from the learned District Judge that the temple in question was not a public one but was a private family temple intended for the benefit of their family. Some point is sought to be made out of the fact that the trustees have not been residing in the vicinity of the temple. But that fact is not really material, for it is not shown that the persons who are still managing the property have once for all abandoned their intention and idea to return to their family house or to worship in the family temple. There is no cogent or acceptable evidence to prove that the temple now remains abandoned by the members of the founders’ family. On the other hand, the evidence is that the temple is being managed by the members of the family as its lawful and validly appointed trustees. Therefore, there is not much point in this contention that some of the members of the family have gone and settled elsewhere for the last ten or twelve years away from the temple. On the other hand, the evidence is that the temple is being managed by the members of the family as its lawful and validly appointed trustees. Therefore, there is not much point in this contention that some of the members of the family have gone and settled elsewhere for the last ten or twelve years away from the temple. There is, on the contrary, no evidence whatsoever to prove that the temple has been resorted to by the Hindu community as of right as urged by the Board. On the other hand, whatever have been occasions at which some members of the Hindu public are said to have worshipped in the temple, they appear to have done so, with the permission or initiative of one or the other trustees of the temple and not that these people who went there, went as of right. It must also be noted that there has been no collection of any offerings to the temple as such in connection with any of the certmonies. A poojari may be a paid poojari employed in any public or private temple by the trustees thereof. The evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the Board even including the discontented trustee, who is figuring as respondent 2, in the lower Court, does not seem to be convincing enough to enable the Court to declare this temple as a public one. In these circumstances, the appeal is dismissed and the lower Court’s order is upheld. The respondents will be entitled to their costs from the appellant. R.M.----- Appeal dismissed.