Judgment :- RAJAGOPALAN, J. The assessee was assessed to general sales tax for the assessment year 1948-49 on a turnover of Rs. 3, 56, 525-9-8. The order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who was the assessing officer, was dated 15th June, 1949, and a copy of it was served on the assessee on 20th June, 1949. Under the Sales Tax Act before it was amended in 1951, the assessee had right to prefer an appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer within thirty days from the date of the service of the assessment order on the assessee. The assessee, however, filed the appeal on 12th August, 1949. There was no power then to condone any delay. The Commercial Tax Officer rejected the appeal as barred by time, and that order was dated 19th August, 1949. Thereupon the assessee preferred a revision petition to the Board of Revenue, because before the amendment of the Act in 1951, there was no right of appeal against the order of the Commercial Tax Officer. It was the amending Act of 1951 that enacted the present Section 12A, constituting the Appellate Tribunal with powers of entertaining appeals. The Board did not pass any orders on the petition filed by the assessee, but after the amending Act of 1951 had been passed under Section 19 of the General Sales Tax Act as it was amended, the Board transferred the petition to the Appellate Tribunal for disposal as if it had been an appeal preferred to the Appellate Tribunal itself. In his application to the Board the assessee prayed that not only the order of the Commercial Tax Officer rejecting the appeal should be revised, but also that the order of assessment of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer should be revised. But this prayer to revise the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, having been preferred more than six months from the date of the order, could not be granted on that application. But this prayer to revise the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, having been preferred more than six months from the date of the order, could not be granted on that application. So the application to the Board was for the review of the order of the Commercial Tax Officer, on appeal, and under Section 19 of the Act it was as an appeal against the order of the Commercial Tax Officer that it had to be viewed by the Appellate Tribunal.The Appellate Tribunal pointed out that the Commercial Tax Officer rightly rejected the appeal as filed beyond the period of limitation allowed by the law as it stood then; but the Tribunal added : "But in view of the large turnover and the legal implications involved, he (the Commercial Tax Officer) could have taken up the matter suo motu in revision. It is unnecessary for us to go into the merits of the case at this stage. We therefore direct the Commercial Tax Officer, North Madras, to take up this matter suo motu in revision and dispose of it on merits after giving a hearing to the appellants, i.e., the assessee." * It is against this order that the Government have preferred this revision petition. The learned Government Pleader contended that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction at all direct the Commercial Tax Officer to take up in revision suo motu any order passed by a subordinate of his. It is really necessary to decide his question in these proceedings. Though the Appellate Tribunal used the word "direct" in asking the Commercial Tax Officer to take up the matter suo motu it is fairly obvious reading the order of the Appellate Tribunal as a whole, that it was only advisory. The order appealed against, i.e., the order on appeal of the Commercial Tax Office, was not set aside, and it should be remembered that the Commercial Tax Officer, himself rejected the appeal so that the real order of assessment stood, and that was not set aside either specifically or even impliedly by the order of the Appellate Tribunal. What the Appellate Tribunal stated, after pointing out that the rejection of the appeal was right, was that the Commercial Tax Officer could exercise his plenary powers of revision in considering the case of the assessee. What the Appellate Tribunal stated, after pointing out that the rejection of the appeal was right, was that the Commercial Tax Officer could exercise his plenary powers of revision in considering the case of the assessee. In view of that Appellate Tribunal itself did not go into the merits of the assessee's claims. We do not think that the Appellate Tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction in giving such a direction which really amounts to an advice in the circumstances of this case. When a Tribunal comes across something which it itself has no jurisdiction to investigate to remedy anything obviously unjust, it is nothing unusual for a such a Tribunal to draw the attention of the authority which has got the powers of revisional jurisdiction or other jurisdiction to take up the question. It is not a question of a mandate issued by the Tribunal to the Commercial Tax Officer, exercising the powers specifically vested in the Tribunal by the Act or any section thereof. Apparently the Tribunal was of opinion that there was an unjust assessment, which assessment it was itself powerless to correct, seeking that power within the confines of the sections of the Act, but it was a matter for further investigation by the departmental authorities who had then power to do so. Viewed in that light there is nothing to which objection can be taken. Certainly there is no error of law which this Court is called upon to correct at this stage. It is represented to us that, despite the order of the Appellate Tribunal which was on 31st March, 1952, nothing was done by the department. Possibly they thought filing this petition to revise that order absolved them of the duty to investigate further on the lines indicated by the Appellate Tribunal. Instructions of this kind issued either by the Appellate Tribunal or by this Court, when anything needing correction comes to its notice should be respected by the departmental authorities and we trust that it is in that light the whole problem will be viewed by the departmental authorities. The petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.(Counsel's fee Rs. 250 to enable the Assistant Government Pleader to certify for this amount). Petition dismissed.