Judgment Sinha, J. 1. This is an appeal under Sec. 47, Civil P.C. by one judgment-debtor. 2. The facts of the case, shortly put, are that there were three brothers, Mahipal Singh, Mohan Singh and Bishun Singh. Respondent 1 is widow of Mahipal, who it appears died sometime after 1937. We do not get this date, but learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has admitted that Mahipal died after 1937. Respondent 1 brought a suit, as she was entitled to, under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 (18 of 1937), for partition of the joint family properties. There were two defendants to the action, namely, the appellant and Bishun Singh, respondent 2. The suit was ultimately compromised on 22-1-1943. By the compromise, respondent 1, namely, the widow of Mahipal, gave up her right of partition, and it was agreed that the defendants to the suit would give her, by way of maintenance, 16 baskets of paddy (each basket containing 11/2 kaths of paddy) every year in the month of Aghan, and, if the paddy was not paid, as agreed upon, the plaintiff, namely, respondent 1, would be entitled to realise the same from the person and property (Jat wo jaidad) of the defendants or the price thereof at the rate of Rs. 3/- per kath. It appears, later on, a suit was also brought by the appellant and respondent 2 for setting aside this compromise decree, but the suit was dismissed. 3. Respondent 1 has filed execution for realisation of her maintenance which had fallen into arrears because of -non-payment of the instalments as agreed upon between the parties by the compromise. Several objections were raised by the appellant, but we are, in the present appeal, concerned only with two of them, namely, (1) whether the arrears of maintenance could be realised by execution or a separate suit is necessary for the same, and (2) the question of maintenance being outside the scope of the partition suit, the compromise in regard to maintenance was beyond the scope of that suit and as such no effect could be given to the compromise. The learned Munsif, in the first instance held, as he was bound to, that the compromise decree was valid and binding upon the applicants, namely, the appellant and respondent 2. The learned Munsif, in the first instance held, as he was bound to, that the compromise decree was valid and binding upon the applicants, namely, the appellant and respondent 2. He, however, felt doubt as to whether the decree in the partition suit could be executed, and he held that a fresh suit, on the basis of the compromise decree, was necessary. On appeal, the learned Judicial Commissioner has held that no separate suit was necessary and that the decree itself could be executed. 4. Mr. Saran, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has submitted that a separate, suit was necessary and that the decree in the partition suit could not be executed, and he referred to the decision of this Court in -- Sah Radha Krishna V/s. Mt. Bcchni Debi, AIR 1937 Pat 654 (A). This decision, in my opinion, does not help him. As the placitum runs, it was held in this case that, where a decree for maintenance has the effect or a decree for sale, no further action would be necessary and the decree-holder may proceed to execution. It was further held that, where a charge was created by the decree, it would be necessary to bring an action to enforce the charge by way of sale of the property. In my opinion, in the present case, no charge was created and, therefore, it was not necessary to bring a fresh suit to enforce that charge. As I have already , given the terms of the compromise decree, in my opinion, the decree is plain enough to show that respondent 1 gave up her right to partition of the properties and in lieu thereof she was given a certain amount of maintenance per year. The decree further said, that if the amount of maintenance was not paid year after, year as mentioned, respondent 1 would be entitled to realise the same from the perse and property of the defendants to that action, is unfortunate that parties, who once enter into compromise try to back out of it on some ground or the other. Specially, when it is a case where maintenance is agreed to be paid to a widow, she is harassed in all possible ways even after a compromise has been properly and validly entered into, and the case in hand is one of those cases. A Division Bench of this Court in -- Mt. Specially, when it is a case where maintenance is agreed to be paid to a widow, she is harassed in all possible ways even after a compromise has been properly and validly entered into, and the case in hand is one of those cases. A Division Bench of this Court in -- Mt. Bilas Devi V/s. Bansidhar Sahu, AIR 1951 Pat 459 (B), after considering a number of cases of the several High Courts and the Privy Council, approvingly referred to a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in -- Ashutosh Banerjee V/s. Lakhimoni Debya, 19 Cal 139 (C), where it was held that a decree declaring the future maintenance of a person entitled to maintenance and making it payable at certain given intervals is executable and it is not necessary to institute a suit each time there has been a default. In my opinion, therefore; there is no substance in the first contention raised by Mr. Saran. 5. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is equally devoid of any substance. It is contended that the question of maintenance was not the subject-matter of the partition suit, and, therefore, any compromise in regard to maintenance was beyond the scope of that suit. This contention cannot be allowed to be raised now after the defendants, namely, the appellant and respondent 2, having brought a suit for setting aside the compromise, have failed in that suit. It must be taken that the compromise was a good compromise. 6. No other point was raised in this case. I am, in the circumstances, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal must fail, and it is dismissed with costs. Choudhary, J. 7 I agree.