Judgment: — This is an appeal against the judgment of the District Judge, Nellore, setting aside an order of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board dismissing an application filed by the 1st respondent for a declaration that the appellants are not the hereditary trustees of the temples of Sri Agastheeswaraswami and Kari Krishna Perumal at Irakam village in Nellore district. The facts relevant for the purpose of the inquiry may be shortly stated. In the year 1928, the Hindu Religious Endowments Board initiated proceedings for framing schemes for the better management of the abovementioned temples. Pending this inquiry the father of one of the appellants filed O. A. No. 301 of 1930, for declaring the abovementioned temples as ‘excepted ‘ones within the meaning of section 9 of Act II of 1927. After holding the necessary inquiry the Board came to the conclusion that the temples were “excepted temples” for the reason that the trustees thereof were hereditary. On the basis of this a scheme was framed wherein it was provided that the general management of the institutions should be carried on by a Vicharana mandali of 5 trustees representing these families specifically. There was litigation in respect of these institutions. It is not necessary to refer to it in detail ; suffice it to say that the Court proceeded on the assumption that the trusteeship of these institutions vested hereditarily in the appellants’ families. While matters stood thus, in or about 1948, the 1st respondent purporting to be person interested in the management of the institution invoked the jurisdiction of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board under section 84(1)(b) of Act X of 1946, for the declaration mentioned above. The Board rejected this application summarily on the ground that there was a final adjudication in the matter and that therefore the petitioner was precluded from opening the question once more. Against this order the 1st respondent filed a petition before the District Court and the Court being of opinion that the matter should not have been rejected summarily but should have been gone into on the merits, set aside the order, giving liberty to the respondent to move the Board further. Against this order the 1st respondent filed a petition before the District Court and the Court being of opinion that the matter should not have been rejected summarily but should have been gone into on the merits, set aside the order, giving liberty to the respondent to move the Board further. On another application filed by the respondent the Board came to the conclusion that as the matter was already decided, viz., as the families in question were hereditary trustees, it was not open to the petitioner to re-open the matter, and in that view the petition was again dismissed. It is that order that was the subject-matter of an inquiry before the District Court giving rise to this appeal. The District Judge allowed the petition of the 1st respondent holding that the Board would have ordinarily to decide whether succession has been hereditary or whether such succession has been specifically provided for in an application under section 84(1) for a declaration that the temple is an ‘excepted’ one. As in this case the Board had not stated that the trusteeship had vested in the families of the present appellants hereditarily there was no final adjudication in the matter which precluded the ist respondent from raising the dispute once again. According to the learned District Judge the finding of the Board that the trusteeship of the institutions vested all along did not amount to a finding that it vested hereditarily in the families. In that view of the matter he went into the question whether the claim of the present appellants for the hereditary trusteeship has been established or not and arrived at the decision that the fact that the representatives of the appellants’ families held the office of trustees for about 60 years would not prove their right to be hereditary trustees. In this appeal against the decision of the District Judge the above points are canvassed by Mr. Seshachalapathi, the learned counsel for the appellants and I think I must give effect to the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellants. The reasoning of the District Judge that the finding of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board in. O.A.No 301 of 1930 does not amount to an adjudication that the trusteeship vested hereditarily in the families of the appellants, to say the least, is fallacious. The reasoning of the District Judge that the finding of the Hindu Religious Endowments Board in. O.A.No 301 of 1930 does not amount to an adjudication that the trusteeship vested hereditarily in the families of the appellants, to say the least, is fallacious. No doubt the expression “hereditary” was not used, but the conclusion of the Board that it vested all along in the families of the present appellants and that therefore the temple should be declared to be an ‘excepted’ one could only mean that the trusteeship vested hereditarily in the families of these appellants. The learned Judge overlooked the fact that the decision of the Board that the temple was an ‘excepted’ one could only be based either on the finding that the trusteeship of these institutions was hereditary or that the rule of succession was provided for for that office. It was nobody’s case that succession to this office was specially provided for by the founder and the relief asked for by the predecessor of one of the appellants was on the footing that the trusteeship devolved upon the members of the family by succession from generation to generation. After all there is no charm in the use of the word ‘hereditary’ and the fact that the word ‘hereditarily’ was not used would not take away the force of the finding. Further, as already mentioned above, even in subsequent litigation the Courts proceeded on the assumption that the members of these families had been hereditary trustees of these institutions. It may also be incidentally remarked that the question whether the trustees are hereditary or not may be raised even in proceedings under section 84(1)(b)(xi) or under section 62 or any other proceedings. It is not necessary that it should be adjudicated in independent proceedings. That being so, in my opinion, the finding of the Board that the trusteeship of these temples has vested all along, in other words ‘hereditarily’ is final and conclusive and it cannot be re-opened. Even otherwise it appears to me that the order of the District Judge is unsustainable. There is ample evidence on record to show that the members of these families have held the office of trustees for at least three generations. Even otherwise it appears to me that the order of the District Judge is unsustainable. There is ample evidence on record to show that the members of these families have held the office of trustees for at least three generations. No doubt the earliest record of this dates back only to 1892, but there is no evidence to show-that any member of the public outside these families has held the office of trustee of these institutions. There can be no hard and fast rule as to the length of time that is required to establish the hereditary nature of trusteeship. In A.S. No. 61 of 19321, the Madras High Court has held that the trusteeship was hereditary in a family where it was proved that for four generations the office was held by the family. In Ganapathy v. Sitharama2, a Bench of the Madras High Court has held that the holding of the office of karnam for three generations was sufficient to establish the claim to the office. I must therefore hold that even assuming that the question of the nature of the trusteeship was left at large, the right of the appellants to be the hereditary trustees of these temples has been made out. Mr. Rajeswara Rao urged that it is the continued mismanagement of the institutions that impelled his clients to move the Board to adjudicate upon the nature of the trusteeship of the temples. If that was his desire, the remedy selected by him is not the proper one. It is open to him to move the proper authorities for necessary action. In these circumstances the order of the District Judge is set aside and that of the Board restored and the appeal is allowed with costs — one set to be divided between the fourth respondent and the appellants. D.L.N. ------------- Appeal allowed.