Judgment This is a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal against an order of remand passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirapalli. The first defendant is the appellant in this Court. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. One Subramania and his brother Srinivasa were the original owners of the property, the subject-matter of this litigation, which is R.S. No. 137/2, of an extent of 2 acres and 10 cents. Subramania had a son who is the plaintiff in this action; and the sons of Srinivasa are defendants 2 and 3. Subramania and Srinivasa had executed a usufructuary mortgage on the 13th of December, 1916, in favour of one Arumugha. While the mortgage was subsisting and the usufructuary mortgagee was in possession, Subramania and Srinivasa were adjudicated insolvents on the 2nd of May, 1919, in I.P. No. 4 of 1919. Subsequent to the adjudication the present plaintiff, the son of Subramania, filed a suit for partition of the joint family properties impleading to that suit as defendants the present defendants 2 and 3, several of the alienees of the family properties, Arumugha, the usufructuary mortgagee, as well as the Official Receiver in whom the share of Subramania and Srinivasa had vested by reason of the adjudication. The suit did not go to trial but was compromised and a preliminary consent decree was passed in the action. So far as the suit against the Official Receiver was concerned, it was withdrawn, while provision was made for the discharge of the debt due to Arumugha. A final decree was passed in the action and properties were divided by metes and bounds and possession of the respective shares was delivered to the present plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3. Arumugha was not satisfied with the provision made for him under the compromise decree, and he accordingly filed O.S. No. 145 of 1927 to set aside the compromise decree in O.S. No. 30 of 1922. But this suit also was compromised with the result that the amount due to him was ascertained and he was satisfied with this decree. Subsequent thereto, the Official Receiver sold the property that vested in him being the shares of Subramania and Srinivasa in R.S. No. 137/2 to the present appellant who is the first defendant in the action. This purchase was in 1930 and was subject to the usufructuary mortgage in favour of Arumugha. Subsequent thereto, the Official Receiver sold the property that vested in him being the shares of Subramania and Srinivasa in R.S. No. 137/2 to the present appellant who is the first defendant in the action. This purchase was in 1930 and was subject to the usufructuary mortgage in favour of Arumugha. Some years after the purchase from the Official Receiver, the first defendant redeemed Arumugha’s mortgage in or about 1942 and entered into possession of the property. The present suit is, as stated before, by Subramania’s son, as plaintiff, for the recovery of his one-third share of the suit property after discharge of his one-third share of Arumugha’s mortgage which had been discharged by the first defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 claim to be put in possession of their one-third share of the suit property offering to pay their one-third share of Arumugha’s debt. The first defendant who got into possession of the entire property raised certain technical defences which were mainly two; the first was that by reason of the sale by the Official Receiver in 1930 already referred to not merely the share of Subramania and Srinivasa but also their right to sell their son’s shares for the discharge of their debts also passed to the purchaser by reason of which he claimed to be entitled to the full extent of the property and not merely to a third. The second defence was that the suit as framed being one for redemption was not maintainable because it was not a case of a mortgagee purchasing a portion of the mortgage, but a case of a purchaser of the equity of redemption of a portion of the mortgaged property redeeming the entire mortgage in which event he contended that the proper frame of the suit was one for partition with adjustments of the equities between the parties The trial Court overruled these contentions and granted to the plaintiff the right of redemption which he claimed. The first defendant, the appellant here, preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court and the learned Judge rejected his first contention as regards the. The first defendant, the appellant here, preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court and the learned Judge rejected his first contention as regards the. quantum of the interest which vested in him but upheld his other plea as to the nature of the suit which the plaintiff had to bring in order to obtain the rights to which he was entitled but he held that in substance the plaintiff had prayed for the proper reliefs though the wording of the plaint might be defective. He accordingly remanded the suit to the trial Court for the purpose of enabling the plaint to be amended so as to claim relief for partition with the adjustments of equities and he directed each party to bear his own costs up to the date of his judgment. The first defendant has filed this appeal against the order of remand. The main contention that has been urged before me is that the order of remand was incompetent because though the learned Subordinate Judge had power to direct an amendment of the plaint himself, he had no power to direct the trial Court to permit an amendment or to carry out an amendment. I do not agree that this is a correct position in law. A plaint could, under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, be amended at any stage and undoubtedly a suit after remand continues to be a suit within the meaning of Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. I do not therefore see any point in the objection raised that the learned Subordinate Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in directing an amendment to be effected by the trial Court instead of granting it himself. The second point that is raised is that the proper course for the learned Subordinate Judge, once he accepted the technical objection raised by the first defendant, was to direct or allow the plaintiff to file a fresh suit for the relief which he claimed and not to convert one suit into a suit of a different nature by the amendment which he has directed the trial court to make. Here also it is a matter entirely for the discretion of the Court and if the lower appellate Court thought that multiplicity of proceedings could be avoided by the course which he took, I do not feel called upon to interfere, but, apart from this, there can be no doubt at all that the relief which the plaintiff claimed in the suit was really partition. He wanted his share of the suit property agreeing to pay his portion of the debt due to Arumugha which the first defendant had discharged. In the circumstances, if owing to a mistake or ignorance of law he framed the suit as one purely for redemption he ought not to be penalised by being driven to a different suit. I therefore agree that the course adopted by the leared Subordinate Judge was the only proper one to take in the circumstances. Mr. Subramania Pillai, the learned counsel for the appellant, made some attempt to argue that the entirety of the property in R.S. No. 137/2 vested in him by reason of the purchase from the Official Receiver, but I did not understand him to be very serious in this argument having regard to the several decisions of this Court as well as the Judicial Committee in regard to what passes at a sale by the Official Receiver after a partition in a joint family. There are no other points in the appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs of the first respondent. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.