Rajamannar, C.J.- This is an appeal from an order of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., on an application filed by the appellant in C.S. No. 121 of 1943 on the Original Side of this Court. The application was to direct the respondent, the Madras Hindu Religious Endowmwnts Board, not to levy any contribution, etc., on the suit trust. The suit itself has been filed to get rid of two schemes framed by the Board with reference to certain specific endowments set apart for religious and charitable purposes by the appellant’s family. That suit was disposed of on 13th December, 1943, by Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J., who framed a scheme in place of the two schemes framed by the Board. We are not concerned with the terms of that scheme, as none of them is in question. It is in this suit which had been finally disposed of in 1943 that in July, 1951, the above application was filed by the plaintiff in the suit. The application was opposed inter alia on the ground that it was not maintainable. Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., held on the merits against the applicant and he affirmed the right of the Board to levy contribution. Apart from the objection on the merits to the levy of contribution, another objection was raised by the plaintiff-appellant based upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in The Sirur Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment Board1, which held that section 76 of Madras Act XIX of 1951 which conferred power on the Commissioner of Religious Endowments to levy contribution was ultra vires the State Legislature. The learned Judge considered that that decision did not apply to a temple or a specific endowment, as it dealt with a mutt. In his opinion, that decision should be confined to the particular mutt concerned in that case and to other mutts of a similar nature. In the result, the learned Judge dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. With great respect to the learned Judge, we think he was wrong in thinking that that decision did not cover the case before him. That decision has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court, vide Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sirur Mutt1. In the result, the learned Judge dismissed the application. Hence this appeal. With great respect to the learned Judge, we think he was wrong in thinking that that decision did not cover the case before him. That decision has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court, vide Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sirur Mutt1. Section 76 has been declared by that Court to be ultra vires, on a ground which will as much apply to a temple as to a mutt or other kind of religious endowment. It is obvious that the effect of the Supreme Court decision is to deprive the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments of the power conferred by section 76 to levy contribution. This position is conceded by the learned Advocate-General. The learned Advocate-General, however, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the original application itself. Though this objection was taken in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, it was evidently not pressed because the learned Judge was inclined to dismiss the application on the merits. We see considerable force in this objection. The scheme framed by this Court in C.S. No. 121 of 1943 did not even contain the usual liberty clause. Indeed the learned Judge refused to include one such. Whether such a clause was present or not, we have no doubt whatever that an application like the one that the applicant made cannot be made in a suit which had been finally disposed of. The right of the Endowments Board to levy contribution depends upon the statutory right conferred by section 76 of the Act. There is nothing in the scheme, and it is really outside the province of any scheme to say that the Board is or is not entitled to levy contribution. We, therefore, do not agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the application can be deemed to be for the construction or interpretation of the scheme, or of any of its clauses. We have made it clear that because of the judgment of the Supreme Court the Commissioner will not be entitled to levy any contribution. We are sure that a statutory officer like the Commissioner would not disregard the decision of the highest Court in the land. We have made it clear that because of the judgment of the Supreme Court the Commissioner will not be entitled to levy any contribution. We are sure that a statutory officer like the Commissioner would not disregard the decision of the highest Court in the land. While we say this, we cannot but uphold the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate-General that the application itself was not maintainable. Upholding this objection, we dismiss this appeal. Having regard to the fact that this objection was not evidently pressed before the learned Judge and also because we have made observations in favour of the appellant on the merits, we think that there should be no order as to costs. K.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.