Govinda Menon, J This is an appeal by the second defendant, the son of the first defendant, against the decree of the lower Court directing the sale of his one-eighth share. Mr.S.Tyagaraja Ayyar for the appellant contends that since the second defendant was not made a party to Execution Petition No.308 of 1937, the sale of his share is null and void. We find that it was after the filing of Execution Petition No.308 of 1937 that the decree in Original Suit No.55 of 1936 was passed on 10th July, 1937, by which the order on the claim petition was set aside and the attachment of the second defendant’s share was restored. As the first defendant was the kartha of the family, he must be deemed to have represented the second defendant also in Execution Petition No.308 of 1937. It cannot be said that even though the second defendant was not eo nomine a party to this execution petition, he was not represented in the petition, because his father, the manager of the joint family, was on record. The other argument of the learned counsel is that the decree in Original Suit No.55 of 1936 cannot be held to have restored what was disallowed on the claim petition ; because it is only a party against whom an order is made that may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims in the property in dispute and since Original Suit No.55 of 1936 was by the sixth defendant, the order on the claim petition must be deemed to have become conclusive and therefore the attachment of his one-eighth share must be deemed to have been disallowed long ago. We are unable to accept this contention because in the decree in Original Suit No.55 of 1936, it is clearly stated that what was disallowed on the second defendant’s claim had been restored as a result of the suit. Mr.Tyagaraja Ayyar then raised the question of limitation which the learned Judge has decided under issue No.7. This raises a rather interesting question where the applicability of Article 120 has to be considered. The sale certificate Exhibit A-1 is dated 6th May, 1938, whereas the sale took place on 13th October, 1937. Mr.Tyagaraja Ayyar then raised the question of limitation which the learned Judge has decided under issue No.7. This raises a rather interesting question where the applicability of Article 120 has to be considered. The sale certificate Exhibit A-1 is dated 6th May, 1938, whereas the sale took place on 13th October, 1937. The present suit was instituted on 30th July, 1947, i.e., more than three months before the expiry of ten years from the date of sale but within a few more months of the termination of that period from the issuing of the sale certificate. The arguments of the learned counsel is that where the rights in joint family property of a coparcener is sold in Court-auction, or is alienated by him voluntarily, what the purchaser gets is an “equity” to work out his remedies by filing a suit for partition and getting the share of the vendor, or judgment-debtor-coparcener, allotted to him. Until such an event takes place, what has been acquired by the purchaser is what is legally termed an equity or an inchoate right which cannot be tangibly exercised or utilized. Such a purchaser does not become a coparcener with the remaining members of the family ; nor is he entitled to be in joint possession of the properties as a tenant-in-common can be under an ordinary co-ownership of property. He is also not entitled to claim mesne profits from the other coparceners until and unless after a suit for partition, or by consensus of opinion among the remaining members, the seller’s or judgment-debtor-coparcener’s share in the property is specifically allotted to him. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that any particular article prescribing a period of limitation in the schedule to the Limitation Act can be said to apply to a suit by a purchaser except the residuary Article 120. Observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh and others1, are relied upon. At page 188 of the report their Lordships say: “All that he (the purchaser) purchased at the execution sale was the undivided interest of the coparceners in the joint property. He did not acquire title to any defined share in the property and was not entitled to joint possession from the date of his purchase. At page 188 of the report their Lordships say: “All that he (the purchaser) purchased at the execution sale was the undivided interest of the coparceners in the joint property. He did not acquire title to any defined share in the property and was not entitled to joint possession from the date of his purchase. He could work out his rights only by a suit for partition and his right to possession would date from the period when a specific allotment was made in his favour. In our opinion this is the right view to take and Mr.Daphtary who appeared in support of the appeals could not satisfy us that in law his client was entitled to joint possession on and from the date of purchase.” This case did not deal directly with any question of limitation but the rights of a purchaser are enumerated and clarified by their Lordships in detail. There can be no doubt, in view of these observations as well as the settled principles of Hindu law, that a purchaser cannot be inducted into joint possession with the erstwhile coparcener whose rights have been sold and purchased by him. (See also Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu2, and Nanjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali3. But does that by itself attract the operation of Article 120 of the Limitation Act or is there any other provision of the Limitation Act which specifically can be made applicable to a state of circumstances like this? In the decision reported in Shevantibai v. Janardan4, the facts were: two out of three undivided members of a joint Hindu family mortgaged their share in the joint property in 1879. In 1882 one of them sold his share to the mortgagee. The vendor-coparcener died in 1896 and the other mortgagor in 1898, both without leaving any male issue. In 1937 the successor-in-title of the mortgagee filed a suit for partition of the joint family property and to have allotted to him a share purchased by the mortgagee from one of the coparceners and also sought to enforce the mortgage. On those facts it was held that neither Article 144 nor Article 142 applied, but only the residuary Article 120 applied and that the suit was therefore barred by limitation. On those facts it was held that neither Article 144 nor Article 142 applied, but only the residuary Article 120 applied and that the suit was therefore barred by limitation. But the emphasis is laid both by Beaumont, C.J., and Wadia J., on the starting point of limitation being the date of death, of the alienating coparcener; and since that took place in 1896, there can be no question of enforcing any right of possession which he possessed. Wadia, J., at page 334 of the report refers to this question in the following terms:- “The other question is whether the suit to enforce partition is barred by limitation. I do not think the case falls within Article 127 because that clearly refers to a claim made by the plaintiff as a member of the coparcenary and the words ‘when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff’ refer to the plaintiff as the member of the coparcenery and not to the purchaser from that member. I do not think that the case falls within Articles 136, 137 and 138 either. Nor does it fall within Article 142 though the allegation in paragraph 10 of the plaint seem to point to it. Article 144 also does not apply. Both these articles are articles applicable to suits for possession and it is admitted that an alienee of the undivided interest of a Hindu coparcener is not entitled to possession. It cannot be said that the possession of any person is adverse to that of a person who is not entitled to any possession at all. The only other article therefore is the residuary Article 120 and that gives six years as the period of limitation from the time the cause of action arose. The cause of action in this case at the latest would arise from the death of the vendor when he lost his right to possession by reason of his death...........” The circumstances of the present case are not similar to what came up for discussion before the Bombay Bench. At the time of the sale 13th October, 1937, the first and second defendants, as members of an undivided joint Hindu family, were in joint possession of the family properties with other members of the family and their right to possession ceased to be effective only from the date of sale. At the time of the sale 13th October, 1937, the first and second defendants, as members of an undivided joint Hindu family, were in joint possession of the family properties with other members of the family and their right to possession ceased to be effective only from the date of sale. In such a case, though the terminus a quo arose from that date, does it necessarily mean that Article 120 ought to be applied ? Recently our learned brother Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., had to consider the same point in Second Appeals Nos.1655 of 1949 and 2781 of 1949, which arose from the judgment of one of us (Ramaswami, J., as District Judge of Chingleput) and before him the Bombay decision was cited. Our learned brother was of opinion that the matter is an important one and has referred both the second appeals for decision by a Bench. In the very nature of things, we cannot have those appeals posted before us for decision, but as the same point has been raised and discussed at great length before us, we propose to express our opinion about the applicability of the Bombay decision to cases where the cause of action arose by the sale of the interest of a member of a joint Hindu family either in Court-auction or by private treaty. As has already been remarked the raison d’etre of the Bombay case is based upon the date of death of the alienating coparcener and the learned Judges were therefore of opinion that none of the articles of the Limitation Act, except Article 120 would apply. We agree with them that Article 127 has no relevancy whatever because it can apply only to a member of a joint family excluded from participation in the joint family property and who seeks to enforce a right to share in it. The period of limitation in such a case is twelve years from the date when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff. Article 127 is thus inapplicable to cases of outsiders. Therefore the view of the Bombay Judges that a purchaser from a coparcener is not affected by that article is in our opinion correct. But the question is whether any of the articles in the fasciculus of Articles 136, 137 and 138 can be attracted. Article 127 is thus inapplicable to cases of outsiders. Therefore the view of the Bombay Judges that a purchaser from a coparcener is not affected by that article is in our opinion correct. But the question is whether any of the articles in the fasciculus of Articles 136, 137 and 138 can be attracted. Article 136 contemplates a case where the vendor was out of possession on the date of sale. In the present case, the judgment-debtor’s vendors were in joint possession and therefore we cannot use Article 136. Article 137 is intended to be utilized in cases where there is a suit by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of sale. The starting point of the period of limitation therefore is when the judgment-debtor was first entitled to possession. Like Article 136, this article also is inapplicable. But the third article, Article 138, is, in our opinion, the one which has relevancy. It contemplates a suit by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was in possession at the date of sale. As we have already remarked, defendants and 2 were in joint possession of the properties on 13th October, 1937, when the sale took place and therefore when a suit is filed within twelve years from the date when the sale becomes absolute, it is in time. Whether joint possession of a coparcener is “possession” as contemplated in Article 138 has next to be considered. A Bench of this Court in a case reported in Bhogavalli Venkayya v. Bhogavalli Ramakrishnamma1, had to consider the meaning of the word “possession” in Article 136, and the learned Judges Abdur Rahim and Ayling, JJ., came to the conclusion that the word “possession” in Article 136 includes possession which a member of a joint Hindu family is presumed to have in the family property until excluded therefrom ; and therefore when a suit is brought by a purchaser from a member of a joint Hindu family, who is alleged to have been out of possession at the time of sale, Article 136 applies. As authority for this proposition Ram Lakhi v. Durga Charan Sen2, and Muttusami v. Ramakrishna3, are cited. As authority for this proposition Ram Lakhi v. Durga Charan Sen2, and Muttusami v. Ramakrishna3, are cited. In both these decisions, there is the assumption that every member of a joint Hindu family is in possession of the entire joint family property along with others and the learned Judges were of opinion that possession contemplated in Article 136 can be said to be the possession of such a joint family member. If the possession referred to in Article 136 can be that of a member of a joint Hindu family having joint possession, we fail to see why, when the Act deals with possession of judgment-debtors and alienating coparceners, as in Articles 137 and 138, a different meaning should be given to the word “possession” in Articles 137 and 138. We are therefore definitely of opinion that the word “possession” in Article 138 should be deemed to take in the possession which an undivided member of a joint Hindu family has in the joint family properties. This view of ours finds support in the recent edition (seventh edition) of Mitra’s “Law of Limitation and Prescription,” at page 751 where the authors say that a suit by an auction-purchaser of the share of a member of a joint family, for partition and possession, would come either under Article 137 or Article 144. That Article 138 would apply to a case where the judgment-debtor was in possession at the date of sale is clear from the observations of Best, J., in Arumuga v. Chockalingam,4 though the decision is that it would not apply to a purchaser from a Court-auction-purchaser. There are observations of a similar nature in Pullayya v. Ramayya5 , though in that case it was held that since the execution purchaser would be barred, an assignee from him would equally be barred. Horwill, J., was of opinion that Article 137 would apply to a case of a purchaser from a purchaser in Court-auction. See Venkataswami Naicker v. Navaneethakrishna Chettiar6. It is unnecessary in the present case to go so far because the plaintiff here is the purchaser himself. There is no escape from the plain words of Article 138 unless we hold that the word “possession” should be understood as possession of a single individual and not that of the members of a joint Hindu family. It is unnecessary in the present case to go so far because the plaintiff here is the purchaser himself. There is no escape from the plain words of Article 138 unless we hold that the word “possession” should be understood as possession of a single individual and not that of the members of a joint Hindu family. As we are in agreement with the learned Judges who defined that word in Bhogavalli Venkayya v. Bhogavalli Ramakrishnamma1, there is absolutely no room for doubt that “possession” of a member of a joint Hindu family is not the “possession” contemplated in Article 138. Our attention was also invited to the observations in Harikrishna Chowdary v. Venkata Lakshmi Narayana7. We do not think that that decision has any application to the facts of the present case. Though the learned Subordinate Judge has not given any reasons for coming to the conclusion that the suit brought within a period of twelve years is in time, for the reasons above stated we are in agreement with his conclusion and this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.