RAM LABHAYA J. : This is first miscellaneous appeal from the order of Mr. B. C. Dutta, Subordinate Judge, Silchar, dated 14-9-1951. By this order, the application for execution of the decree-holder was dismissed and execution sale that had taken place was also set aside. The decree-holder has appealed. (2) Pacts leading to this appeal may be briefly stated. The decree-holder (appellant) got his decree from the court of the Subordinate Judge at Sylhet now in Pakistan on 7-8-1945. He got a non-satisfaction certificate of the decree under O. 21, R. 6, Civil P. C. and commenced executing his decree at Silchar. His execution case No. 9 of 1946 was dismissed on 3-7-1948. Before the dis­missal of the execution case, some property had been attached. A proclamation of sale was also issued. There was an objection to the attachment The claim was disallowed on 3-7-1948. It was on this date the execution was also dismissed. On 6-9-1948, the decree-holder put in a second application for execution. This application was dismissed on the ground that in the meanwhile, the court as Silchar to which the decree had been transferred for execution had certified to the Court which passed the decree the fact of its failure to execute the same. The decree-holder then brought a fresh non-satisfaction certificate under O. 21, R. 6, Civil P. C. from the Court at Sylhet and applied for execution of the decree on 15-11-1948. In execution of this decree, the same pro­perty was attached and it was put to sale. The judgment-debtors applied for setting aside the sale. In the petition, it was stated that the peti­tion was under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P. C. It was al­leged that there were irregularities in conducting the sale and that substantial injury had been caused to the judgment-debtors. The petition also contained the objection that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclu­sion that there was no material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. He was also not satisfied that the judgment-debtors had sustained any substantial injury but he found that he had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. Having come to this conclusion, he set aside the sale as being void ab initio and dismissed the application also. He was also not satisfied that the judgment-debtors had sustained any substantial injury but he found that he had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. Having come to this conclusion, he set aside the sale as being void ab initio and dismissed the application also. (3) The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the correctness of the order on the follow­ing two grounds: (1) that the executing Court had jurisdiction to execute the decree and (2) that in any case, the objection that it had no jurisdiction could only be raised by the party aggrieved in a re­gular suit. This objection could not have been de­termined in the execution proceeding by reason of the fact that the auction purchaser, a stranger to the proceeding had acquired some interest in the property by sale. (4) So far as the first contention is concerned, the argument of the learned counsel is that the executing Court retained its jurisdiction notwith­standing the fact that it had certified to the Court at Sylhet under S. 41, Civil P. C. its failure to execute the decree. The learned counsel argues that this certification under S. 41 was after 15-8-1947. The Court at Silchar had no jurisdic­tion to certify the result of the execution proceed­ing to the Court at Sylhet. At that time, Sylhet District being in foreign territory, S. 41 had no application. He proceeds to observe that similarly the second certificate that was issued by the Sylhet Court was without jurisdiction. Both acts of the two Courts at Silchar and Sylhet had no validity in law. They are without jurisdiction. They should be ignored. The third application leading to this appeal should be treated as an application virtually or for all practical purposes as in continuation of the first application. He also challenged the validity of the order dismissing the second application on 3-7-1948. In regard to this order, his contention is that it is illegal and was passed on a misapprehension of the correct legal position. (5) This contention, in my opinion, cannot pre­vail. It is almost completely answered by the provision contained in the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947. In regard to this order, his contention is that it is illegal and was passed on a misapprehension of the correct legal position. (5) This contention, in my opinion, cannot pre­vail. It is almost completely answered by the provision contained in the Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947. Section 4 of the Order provides that notwithstanding the creation of certain new Provinces and transfer of certain territories from the Province of Assam to the Pro­vince of East Bengal by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, all proceedings pending immediately before the appointed day in any civil or criminal court (other than a High Court) in the Province of Bengal, the Punjab or Assam shall be continued in that Court as if the said Act had not been passed and that Court shall continue to have for the purposes of the said proceedings all the juris­diction and powers which it had immediately before the appointed day. The rest of the provi­sions contained in this section need not be repro­duced. The effect of cl. (1) of S. 4 is that where a proceeding was pending in any Court, civil or cri­minal before the appointed day, that proceeding can continue and the Court in which it was pend­ing can proceed with it as if the Indian Indepen­dence Act had not been passed. For the purpose of the continuity of the pending proceedings there­fore, ' the fact of division of India under the Independence Act is to be ignored. But the sav­ing is only in favour of the pending proceedings. Now it is true that the first execution in this case (No. 9 of 1946) was pending on 15-8-1947. This proceeding could continue notwithstanding the partition. It remained unaffected by the division of the country into two dominions. It was ul­timately dismissed on 3-7-1948. Now this order of dismissal was within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court had the power to dispose of the case and therefore it could dismiss it. So far Mr. Choudhuri has no objection to the course the pro­ceeding has taken. He has argued that certification under S. 41 was an act which was outside the jurisdiction of the Court at Silchar. But here, he receives no support from the provisions contained in S. 4, Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947. In fact, the provision of S. 4 (1) answers the con­tention. He has argued that certification under S. 41 was an act which was outside the jurisdiction of the Court at Silchar. But here, he receives no support from the provisions contained in S. 4, Indian Independence (Legal Proceedings) Order, 1947. In fact, the provision of S. 4 (1) answers the con­tention. So far as the pending proceeding is con­cerned, the Court at Silchar could exercise all the powers as though there had been no partition. If all these powers could be exercised, the Court had the power to certify the result of the proceeding to the Court at Sylhet under S. 41. For the purposes of this pending proceeding, S. 41, Civil P. C. remained in operation. The result of the execu­tion proceeding at Silchar thus was validly certified to the Court at Sylhet, After this certification, the decree-holder applied for execution a second time. This application was refused on the ground that the result of the previous application had been certified to the Court at Sylhet which had passed the decree under Section 41, Civil Procedure Code. This was the correct view of the matter. The decree-holder did not appeal from that order. That order has become final against him. He has also sub­mitted to it by his conduct. He went to the Court at Sylhet and brought a second certificate in order to be able to take execution afresh. This certi­ficate of non-satisfaction that he brought in 1948 from the Court at Sylhet had no validity. At that time, the Court at Sylhet which was the foreign Court could not utilise the provision of the Civil Procedure Code for sending a non-satisfaction cer­tificate to the Court at Silchar. On this certificate no fresh execution could be taken. The fresh exe­cution that was started on the second non-satis­faction certificate was commenced on 15-11-1948. This could not be treated as pending proceeding for the purpose of the Indian Independence Order. The Court thus had no jurisdiction to commence executing the decree on the basis of this certificate. The view receives support from the decision re­ported in - '(Dominion of India v. Hiralal Bothra', AIR 1950 Cal 12 (A). This could not be treated as pending proceeding for the purpose of the Indian Independence Order. The Court thus had no jurisdiction to commence executing the decree on the basis of this certificate. The view receives support from the decision re­ported in - '(Dominion of India v. Hiralal Bothra', AIR 1950 Cal 12 (A). In this case, the decree had been passed by the Court which after the appointed day had fallen within the terri­tories of Pakistan and on the application of the decree-holder made after the appointed day, a certificate of non-satisfaction together with the copy of the decree was sent by the said Court to the Court of the Small Causes, Calcutta in which an application for execution of the decree so transferred was made by the decree-holder. It was held that the Court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to execute the decree in rela­tion to which no proceeding was pending before the said Court on 15-8-1947 and that the judg­ment on the basis of which the decree was passed was a "foreign judgment" within the meaning of S. 13, Civil P. C. The principle of the decision covers this case. An execution proceeding was no doubt pending in the Court at Silchar on 15th August but that had terminated. What happened therefore was that after the appointed day, a certificate was brought from a Court in Pakistan to a Court in India in order that the decree may be executed in this country. This is not possible as the pending pro­ceeding had terminated. The result of that termi­nation was that the Court at Silchar lost all juris­diction to execute the decree. The certificate sent under S. 41 divested the transferee Court of the jurisdiction in the matter. Once that jurisdiction was lost, it could not be recreated by any ac« on the part of a Court in Pakistan which passed the decree even though an earlier execution pro­ceeding already disposed of was pending on the appointed day at Silchar. The learned Subordi­nate Judge was right in his conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. (6) The second contention of Mr. The learned Subordi­nate Judge was right in his conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. (6) The second contention of Mr. Choudhuri is that this objection as to jurisdiction could not have been raised or urged in a proceeding under O. 21, R. 90, Civil P. C. The sale under O. 21, R. 90, may be set aside on the ground of material irregularity or fraud provided substantial injury could be shown to have been caused to the judg­ment-debtor. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to execute the decree or not is, he argues, not a matter which is within the purview of O. 21, R. 90, In an application under O. 21, R. 90, all that the court has to see is whether there are irregula­rities or fraud which vitiate the sale by reason of substantial loss having been caused to the judg­ment-debtor. But the judgment-debtors in this case also pleaded that the Court had no jurisdiction at all to execute the decree. The objection was in­cluded in the application under O. 21, R. 90. There is nothing in law to prevent the judgment-debtor from raising that objection. But as urged by Mr. Choudhuri, the objection surely would be outside the scope of O. 21, R. 90. The next question is whether this objection could be treated as coming within the scope of S. 47, Civil P. C. Clause (1) of S. 47, Civil P. C. provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was pass­ed or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree,, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The effect of the section is that question between the parties and their representatives which relates to execu­tion, discharge or satisfaction of the decree come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the executing Court. A separate suit for the determination of these matters is not permissible. It is clear that the assumption of the section is that the exe­cuting Court has inherent jurisdiction in these matters. The section makes this jurisdiction ex­clusive, but it comes into play only when the executing Court has jurisdiction to execute the de­cree. It shall alone decide all questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the de­cree. It is clear that the assumption of the section is that the exe­cuting Court has inherent jurisdiction in these matters. The section makes this jurisdiction ex­clusive, but it comes into play only when the executing Court has jurisdiction to execute the de­cree. It shall alone decide all questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the de­cree. When an objection is raised to the jurisdic­tion of the executing Court, it could not be re­garded as a matter falling within the scope of S. 47. (7) Every Court has the power to determine ob­jections raised to its jurisdiction. If a defendant or a judgment-debtor raises any objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has not only the power but is under obligation to decide that matter. The executing Court therefore had to de­termine this objection whether it had jurisdiction or not. The sale had taken place, but it had not been confirmed. If it had no jurisdiction in the matter, the only reasonable course for it was to decline to confirm it. Confirmation of sale without jurisdiction would have been a nullity. It is ob­vious therefore that even though the objection as to the want of jurisdiction is neither covered by O. 21, R. 90 nor by S. 47, it was still an objection that the Court had to determine. It certainly could have been raised at any stage of the proceeding before the confirmation of the sale, and the mere fact that it was put in or included in the appli­cation under O. 21, R. 90 was no reason for the Court to decline to determine it. This would not create any impediment in the way of the Court: determining this matter. Mr. Choudhuri, the learned counsel for the appellant has given one reason why the matter should not have been determined by the execut­ing Court in execution. He points out that if the decree-holder had been the auction purchaser, pro­bably there would have been no difficulty, but by reason of the fact that a stranger auction-pur­chaser had acquired some rights in the property, he not being a party to the suit or the decree, a suit was necessary for the determination of the matter. He has relied on - 'Harindra Nath v. Bhola Nath Sahu', AIR 1937 All 407 (B), in sup­port of his contention. This is a Division Bench decision. He has relied on - 'Harindra Nath v. Bhola Nath Sahu', AIR 1937 All 407 (B), in sup­port of his contention. This is a Division Bench decision. In this case, the objection was not that the Court had no jurisdiction. The application was for setting aside the sale on the ground that it was a nullity. It was held that when the sale is held by the civil Court and the decree-holder him­self is the auction-purchaser and the sale is a nullity, an objection to its validity or an applica­tion to set it aside on that ground either by the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder falls within the scope of S. 47, Civil P. C., and a separate suit to set aside the sale is barred. But Mr. Choudhuri has relied on a dictum made obiter to the effect that where a person other than the decree-holder is the auction purchaser and the sale is a nullity, the sale can be set aside only on a suit being instituted for the purpose and the executing Court cannot set aside the sale on the ground that it is null and void. The remarks relied on do not support his contention. They have got no application to the facts of this case for the obvious reason that in this case, the objection was not to the jurisdiction of the Court. The objec­tion was only to the legality or the validity of the sale. The case does not support the proposition that even if the Court executing the decree has got no inherent jurisdiction, the objection cannot be raised merely because a stranger auction pur­chaser may be affected. It is immaterial if a third party auction-purchaser is affected by the deter­mination of the question relating to the jurisdiction of the Court. Assuming that the question in the case before us is a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree as it was in the Allahabad case, even then, the Court would have had the power to decide it notwithstanding the fact that the sale had been held and that the auction-purchaser was a stranger. Assuming that the question in the case before us is a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree as it was in the Allahabad case, even then, the Court would have had the power to decide it notwithstanding the fact that the sale had been held and that the auction-purchaser was a stranger. In - 'Prosunno Kumar v. Kali Das', 19 Gal 683 (PC) (C), their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: "Where questions are raised between the parties to a decree relating to its execution, discharge or satisfaction, the fact that the purchaser at a judicial sale, who is no party to the decree of which the execution is in question, is in­terested and concerned in the result has never been held to prevent the application of S. 244, Civil P. C." The recent authorities which support this view are, - 'Sarat Chandra Gayan v. Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. Ltd', AIR 1946 Cal 45 (D); 'Shabbir Bandi v. Mohammad Hashim', AIR 1944 Oudh 43 (E); 'Bhagwat Narain Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Bhagat', AIR 1942 Pat 244 (P); and 'Jainulabdin v. Krishna Chettiar', AIR 1921 Mad 420 (G). (8) There is another reason why I am finding it difficult to subscribe to the proposition laid down in - 'AIR 1937 All 407 (B). It had been assum­ed in that case that a stranger auction-purchaser was not a representative of any of the parties to the decree. If he is a representative of any of the parties to the decree, there may be absolutely no difficulty in applying S. 47. Mr. Choudhuri con­tended relying on - 'Narasinhbhat v. Bandu Krishna', AIR 1918 Bom 231 (H), that the auction-purchaser would not be regarded as the represen­tative of the judgment-debtor. The point is one on which there is an acute divergence of judicial opi­nion. The consensus of authority however seems to be in favour of the view that the auction-pur­chaser is a representative of the judgment-debtor. For reasons given above, it is not necessary for me to give a definite decision on this point. The con­flict need not be resolved. If however, it had been necessary, I would have been inclined to take the view that the auction-purchaser is a representative of the judgment-debtor. It is the judgment-debtor's property that is sold. He is the purchaser, he pays the consideration. The con­flict need not be resolved. If however, it had been necessary, I would have been inclined to take the view that the auction-purchaser is a representative of the judgment-debtor. It is the judgment-debtor's property that is sold. He is the purchaser, he pays the consideration. That consideration is utilis­ed for the benefit of the judgment-debtor. It goes towards the satisfaction of the decree against him. He gets the excess if any. As a transferee, he steps into the shoes of the judgment-debtor. But as I have said above, it is not necessary to pro­nounce finally on this point for the purpose of this case, I have held above that by reason of the fact that the question of jurisdiction is a matter which the Court is bound to decide thej judgment-debtor cannot be driven to the necessity! of instituting a suit merely because the auction-i purchaser may be affected by the decision of the question. The auction-purchaser was a party to the objection proceeding and a binding decision could have been given by the executing Court on the question of jurisdiction raised by the judg­ment-debtor. (9) The auction-purchaser in this case has not appealed. The decision against him has become final. He is not interested in the objection which the decree-holder is now raising in his own in­terest. For the reasons given above, the second contention also must be repelled. The appeal there­fore must fail and is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. (10) DEKA J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.