Judgment.- This is a Civil Revision Petition which is sought to be preferred against the order made by the learned Additional District Munsif of Coimbatore in E.A. No.142 of 1954, in E.P. No.503 of 1953, in O.S. No.1116 of 1952. The short facts are:On the foot that he is an agriculturist and that the decree had been obtained against him for rent, the petitioner before me filed an application for being given the benefits of section 4(i) of the Madras Act V of 1954. This application was resisted by the decree-holder on the ground that the applicant was not an agriculturist and secondly that the decree was for rent payable for a vacant site and therefore the provisions of Act V of 1954 were not applicable. The learned District Munsif upheld these contentions and dismissed the petition and hence this Civil Revision Petition. In Revision I am of the same opinion as the learned District Munsif and here are my reasons. In order to attract the operation of Act V of 1954 of 1954 two conditions must concur viz., that the applicant must first be an agriculturist within the meaning of Act V of 1954 and secondly, the debt on the foot of which he claims the benefit under the Act must be a debt as defined in Act V of 1954. Point (a).-In order to find out the scope of the terms “agriculturist” and debt“, we must have regard to the title and preamble of the Act which are intrinsic aids in the interpretation of this statute. Every Act of legislature commences with a title which consists of the introductory words”The Act followed by words briefly describing its objects “The title forms part of the Act and a very important part of the Act and it is legitimate to use it for the purpose of interpreting the Act as a whole and ascertaining its scope. It may tend to show the object of the legislature. Therefore, where an Act uses ambiguous language, one is entitled to look at the title of the Act in order to assist in the interpretation of the Act and thereby give to the doubtful language in the body of the Act a meaning consistent rather than at variance with the clear title of the Act. Therefore, where an Act uses ambiguous language, one is entitled to look at the title of the Act in order to assist in the interpretation of the Act and thereby give to the doubtful language in the body of the Act a meaning consistent rather than at variance with the clear title of the Act. But if the language of the Act is plain we cannot refuse to give effect to it generally because it happened to go beyond the matters mentioned in the title and limit the construction of any particular section because of the title of the Act. Hurrochandra Roy Chowdri v. Shoorodhonce Debia1; Collector of Noakhali v. Paxwell2; Uda Begam v. Imamuddin3; Khedu Mahto v. Budhun Mahto4; Empress of India v. Sarmukh Singh5; Cally Churn Mullick v. Bhuggo Kutty Churn Mulick6, Debendra Marain Roy v. Jogendra Narain Deb7. Modern Acts contain besides the ordinary title what are called”Short titles“under section 28 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897). Thus, short titles which are given for the convenience of citation being numbered as sections of the Act are part of the Act. In this case the title is”to provide temporary relief to indebted agriculturists and therefore the scope of the Act is limited to agriculturists; secondly, who are indebted; and thirdly, for affording temporary relief for a limited period. Then turning to the preamble of the Act it runs as follows: “Whereas, after successive years of drought, by the bounty of Nature there has been adequate rainfall this year and agriculturists are applying themselves with assiduity to the cultivation of crops; And whereas agriculturists have borrowed or added to their debts during the years of drought ana may, it treed for a time from the pressure of creditors, be enabled to rehabilitate themsevles; And whereas it is in the interests of the general public that at the present time, agriculturists be spared the distractions and expenditure involved in litigation launched by their creditors, in order that the maximum possible advantage may result to the State in the matter of production of food crops”. The preamble of a statute is a prefactory statement at its beginning following the title and preceding the enacting clauses explaining or declaring the reasons and motives for, and the object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute. The preamble of a statute is a prefactory statement at its beginning following the title and preceding the enacting clauses explaining or declaring the reasons and motives for, and the object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute. It is the introductory part of the statute which states the reasons and intent of the law. It serves to portray the intent of the framers and the mischiefs to be remedied. It affords in general a key to the construction of the statute or an Act, a clue to discover the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act and often helps to the solution of doubtful points. The terms of the preamble may be resorted to in two classes of cases. The first class of cases is where the text of the Statute is susceptible to different constructions and the second class of cases is where it is clear that the legislature intended that the very general language used in the enactment must have some limitation to be put upon it. Bhola Prasad v. Emperor1 and the following Madras decisions, Arulai v. Antonimuthu2; Ranga Reddi v. Dasaratharami Reddi3; Krishnan Chettiar v. Manikkammal4; Kesavalu v. Corporation of Madras5; Parameswara v. Valia Mannadiar6; Kannammal v. Kanakasabhai7; Secretary of State for India v. Maharajah of Bobbili8; Thayarammal v. Junas Ckettiar9, and the Indian Publications which are as good as the standard English and American Text Books of K.S. Banerji Tagore Law Lectures, Interpretation of Deeds, Wills and Statutes in British India; A.N. Ghose and S.C. Ghosh on the Interpretation of Statutes; P. Narasimham on the Interpretation of Indian Statutes (M.L.J. Publication); Swarup-The Interpretation of Indian Statutes. But whilst the preamble of an Act may be consulted whenever the enacting part is open to doubt, it cannot either restrict or extend the enacting part when the latter is free from doubt; Ganesh Krishnaji v. Krishnaji10, Per Scott, J., on the authority of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, pages 45-49. We very often find that the subsequent provisions of a Statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble: Nga Hoong and others v. The Queen11. The enacting words of a statute may be carried beyond the preamble if words be found in the former strong enough for the purpose: Chinna Aiyan v. Mahomed Fakiruddin Sahib12. We very often find that the subsequent provisions of a Statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble: Nga Hoong and others v. The Queen11. The enacting words of a statute may be carried beyond the preamble if words be found in the former strong enough for the purpose: Chinna Aiyan v. Mahomed Fakiruddin Sahib12. It is an undoubted rule of construction that where the language of the enacting sections of a statute is clear, the terms of a preamble cannot be called in aid to restrict their operation, or to cut them down. The purpose for which a preamble is framed to a statute is to indicate what in general terms was the object of the Legislature in passing the Act, but it may well happen that these general terms will not indicate or cover all the mischiefs which in the enacting portions of the Act itself are found to be provided for: Queen Empress v. Indarjit13. It is not allowable to cut down the express provisions of a law by consideration of the supposed intention of the Legislature in passing it: Vithu v. Govinda14. If the preamble provides for a wider mischief than the Bill in its sections enacts, we are not to give those sections a wider scope than their language properly interpreted justifies: Kadir Bakhsh v. Bhawani Prasad15. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. There is no necessity to explain that which requires no explanation. The office of the Judge is jus dicere and not jus dare, to interpret the law and not to make law. The preamble in this case can be looked into for both the purposes set out above. The term “agriculturist” has been defined in the Act under section 2 as meaning a person who owns an interest in land, and who, by reason of such interest, is in possession of such land or is in receipt of the rents or profits thereof and shall include a lessee; but shall not include a registered partnership firm or an income-tax assessee. The term “land” has been defined later as meaning land used for agriculture or horticulture, not being land appurtenant to a residential building. The term “agriculture” has been the subject of a considerable body of judicial decisions revealing considerable divergencies. The word is susceptible of a wider and a narrower interpretation. Different statutes contain different definitions of the word. The term “land” has been defined later as meaning land used for agriculture or horticulture, not being land appurtenant to a residential building. The term “agriculture” has been the subject of a considerable body of judicial decisions revealing considerable divergencies. The word is susceptible of a wider and a narrower interpretation. Different statutes contain different definitions of the word. In several of the English Statutes, e.g., Agricultural Holdings Act, Agricultural Rates Act and other similar Acts, the Legislature has chosen to enlarge the meaning of the term “agriculture” as it thought fit. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon the definition of “agriculture” is given as including “horticulture, forestry and the use of land for any purposes of husbandry, etc”. In several English statutes “agriculture” was defined so as to include the use of land as meadow or pasture land or orchard or osier or woodland or for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments, etc. The Oxford Dictionary gives the definition of “agriculture” as the science and art of cultivating the soil, including the allied pursuits of gathering in the crops and rearing live stock, tillage, husbandry, farming (in the widest sense)“. In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary”agriculture“is defined as the cultivation of soil lor food products or any other useful or valuable growths of the field or garden. According to Webster’s Dictionary”agriculture“means”the act or science of cultivating the ground including harvesting of crops and rearing and management of live-stock, tillage, husbandry, farming in the broadest sense, the science and art of the production of plants and animals useful to men including to a variable extent the preparation of these products for man’s use“. In this broad use, it includes farming, horticulture and forestry together with such subjects as butter and cheese-making, sugar making, etc.” (Webster: New International Dictionary). In Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan1, which was a case under section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., stated that the primary meaning of agriculture is the cultivation of the ground and in its general sense it is the cultivation of the ground for the purpose of procuring vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast including gardening or horticulture and the raising or feeding of cattle and other stock. The learned Judge considered that its less general and more ordinary signification is the cultivation with the plough and in large areas in order to raise food for man and beast; that horticulture which denotes the cultivation of gardens or orchards, is a species of agriculture in its primary and more general sense; the word “agriculture” is used in the Transfer of Property Act in its more general sense as comprehending the raising of vegetables fruits and other garden products as food for man and beast. It was held that a lease of land for the cultivation of betel is an “agricultural lease” within the meaning of section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. In Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddy2, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., said that the ordinary meaning of ‘agriculture’ is the raising of annual or periodical grain crops through the operations of ploughing, sowing, etc., and thought that it was only by a special definition that agriculture can be made to include ‘horticulture’ It was held that a person holding land for purposes of pasturage does not hold it for purposes of agriculture under the Estates Land Act. This view was adorned by Sir John Wallis, C.J. and Phillips, J., in Maharajah of Venkatagiri v. Rami Reddi3. in Seshayya Garu v. Raja of Pethapuram4, Sadasiva Ayyar, J., again reiterated his views expressed in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddy2. In Pavadai Pathan v. Ramaswamin Chetti5, Spencer, J., criticised the above views of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., and Sadasiva Ayyar, J., as being too narrow, Ramesam, J., was of the opinion that agriculture connotes the raising of useful or valuable products which derive nutriment from the soil with the aid of human skill and labour; and thus it will include horticulture arboriculture and sylviculture in cases where the growth of trees is effected by the expenditure of human care and attention in such operations as those of ploughing sowing, planting, manuring, watering, protecting, etc. Ramesam, J., who sat with Spencer, J., alter referring to the wide meaning of the expression given in English dictionaries and in English statutes expressed that to give a narrower interpretation to the term and to confine it to the raising of products used as food for man or beast will exclude all cultivation of fibrous plants used for dyeing purposes, such as indigo, etc., and all timber trees and flowering plants. It was held in this decision that as the rearing of casuarina plantation requires some preparation of the ground and subsequent care by watering the plants, a lease of land granted for growing casuarina trees is an agricultural lease within the meaning of section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, In a latter case Chandrasekhara Bharati Swamigal v. Doraiswami Naidu1, under the Madras Estates Land Act, the views of Spencer, J. and Ramesam, J., in turn came to be criticised by Reilly and Anantakrishna Ayyar, JJ. Reilly, J. considered that to use the definition of a word in one Act, and to apply it, as the definition of that word in another Act, specially when the second Act is in force in another country and under different conditions is a very dangerous course. Further it was observed that ‘agriculture’ cannot be defined by the nature of the products cultivated, but by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on and the cultivation of casuarina or the planting of timber or firewood trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years forming plantations of woods or forests would be opposed to the idea of agriculture. So far as the Estates Land Act is concerned, it was considered that there are several indications in the Act that the growing of timber and fuel trees was not regarded as an agricultural purpose. The indications pointed out by Redly, J., are (1) that the definition of ‘agriculture’ in the Act which has expressly chosen to extend the meaning of the word to horticulture has not chosen to extend the meaning in any other direction such as sylviculture and arboriculture in the sense of growing a large plantation or wood or timber or fuel trees is a strong indication that the growing of timber or fuel trees is not an agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Estates Land Act. In Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishna Anjaneya Subramanyam2 Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., had to consider whether a mango garden was an agricultural land for construing the relevant entries in Lists II and III of Schedule VII of the Constitution Act. In Sarojini Devi v. Sri Krishna Anjaneya Subramanyam2 Wadsworth and Patanjali Sastri, JJ., had to consider whether a mango garden was an agricultural land for construing the relevant entries in Lists II and III of Schedule VII of the Constitution Act. They held that for the purposes of the relevant entries in Lists II and III, Schedule VII, the expression ‘agricultural lands’ must be taken to include lands which are used, or are capable of being used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other purposes of husbandry, and that in the case before them a mango grove is an agricultural land in respect of which the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, does not operate to regulate succession. In cases coming under the Income-tax Act also a wide meaning has been usually given to the word, though the extended meaning is considered as not including ‘husbandry.‘In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Burma v. Kohne Dairy, Raneoon3, the conception of husbandry was applied to agriculture where dairy produce of cattle exclusively or mainly pastured on land was held to be an agricultural purpose and the sale of milk an agricultural income. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Zamindar of Singampatti4, income from forests was considered to be agricultural income. This view however did not find favour with the Calcutta High Court in Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua5, In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v. Manavedan Tirumalpad6 it was held that a person who merely takes a contract in forests for the purpose of felling trees and selling timber is not to be regarded as deriving agricultural income. The recent decision of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax1, has to some extent paved the way to evolve a clearer definition of the expression. The recent decision of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income-tax1, has to some extent paved the way to evolve a clearer definition of the expression. In the above case, Lord Simonds observed: “It is sufficient for the purpose of the present appeal to say (1) that in their opinion no assistance is to be got from the meaning ascribed to the word ‘agriculture ‘in other statutes and (2) that, though it must always be difficult to draw the line, yet unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land, some expenditure of skill and labour upon it, it cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Income-tax Act.” This Court had also held that the word ‘agriculture’ implied something which is achieved with the aid of human agency: see Yuvaraja of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income-tax2, and this decision was approved by the Privy Council. Following the Privy Council decision this Court held in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sundara Mudaliar3, that irrespective of the nature of the produce or product of the land, whatever is grown on land aided by human labour and effort, whatever does not grow wild or spontaneously on the soil without human labour or effort would be an agricultural product. The Madras Debt Conciliation Act (XI of 1936) contains a definition of the word ‘agriculture’. It is as follows: “agriculture includes horticulture, the use of land for any purpose of husbandry inclusive of the keeping or breeding of livestock, poultry or bees, sericulture and the’ growing of fruits, vegetables and the like.” This definition is wider than the definition in section 61 of the English Small Holding and Allotment Act, 1908(8) Edward 7 Ch. 36. In Madras, the General Sales Tax Act, section 2 says that agricultural or horticultural produce shall not be deemed to include tea. The word ‘agriculture ‘denotes the raising of valuable or useful products, deriving nutriment or sustenance from the soil with the aid of human labour or skill. Irrespective of the nature of the produce or product of the land, whatever is grown aided by human labour and effort, whatever does not grow spontaneously on the soil without human labour or, effort, would be an agricultural product and the process of producing it would be agriculture within the meaning of that expression. Irrespective of the nature of the produce or product of the land, whatever is grown aided by human labour and effort, whatever does not grow spontaneously on the soil without human labour or, effort, would be an agricultural product and the process of producing it would be agriculture within the meaning of that expression. Applying this test, tea will be an agricultural produce, but the Legislature in the definition of ‘agriculture’ excludes it by the use of the words ‘shall not be deemed to include tea. But for the exception of tea from the definition, the expression ‘agriculture’ would include growing of tea as it would include ‘horticulture’ and sylviculture where human care and attention are expended on the growth of plants or trees. Grass grown in this manner will be agricultural produce. Betal leaves which will fall within the definition of goods may also come under the term ‘agricultural produce’ mentioned in section 2(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. The following have been held to be agricultural products:- Betel leaves-Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan4; Cardamom-Kadirselsami Naicker v. Sutan Ahmed5; Cocoanut-Venkayya v. Ramaswami6; Narayana v. Subrarnaniam7; Milk-Venkataswami Naidu v. Commissioner of Income-tax8, Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Kokine Dairy Co.9; Mango-Sarojini Devi v. Subrarnaniam10; Producer’s Co-operative Distributing Society, Ltd., v. Commissioner of Taxation11. The above does not, however, represent an exhaustive list. The use of the word ‘horticulture’ in juxtaposition with the word ‘agriculture’ cannot be construed to mean, that the word ‘agriculture’ is used in a narrow sense. The decisions of the Court under the Madras Estates Land Act in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddy1 and Sesshayya v. Raja of Pithapur2, cannot be pressed into service in contruing the Madras General Sales Tax Act as in those cases the report of the Select Committee omitting the words ‘sylviculture’ and pasturing from the bill was taken to show that the legislature contemplated only a restricted interpretation of the word. (For an interesting and lucid discussion, see N.R. Raghavachariar: Sales Tax in Madras (a Law Weekly Publication, page 46, etc.). (For an interesting and lucid discussion, see N.R. Raghavachariar: Sales Tax in Madras (a Law Weekly Publication, page 46, etc.). Applying these principles laid down in these judicial decisions to the scope of the definitions under consideration and construing them along with the title and the preamble, we are able to deduce that the terms ‘agriculture and horticulture are intended to cover the raising of food products and garden products for man and beast and cannot be extended any further. Having defined ‘agriculture’, and turning to the word ‘debt’ it has been defined as meaning any sum of money which a person is liable to pay under a contract (express or implied) for consideration received and including rent in cash or kind which a person is liable to pay or deliver in respect of the lawful use and occupation of land. In other words, the debt must relate to contracts relating to the lawful use and occupation of land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes viz raising of food and garden products for man and beast. This definition will exclude vacant sites which are not used for agriculture or horticulture. In the result, the learned District Munsif found that the two conditions contemplated for the attracting of application of the Madras Act (V of 1954) Were not existent in this case. The learned District Munsif found as a question of fact that this petitioner is not an agriculturist and that finding of fact is binding on me. Secondly, he found that the decree obtained for rent for use of a vacant site is not a decree for debt in respect of lawful use and occupation of land used for agriculture or horticulture. Therefore, no point of law arises and this Revision Petition is dismissed. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.