DEKA J.: These are the two Rules issued at the instance of Banwarilal Mour, an assessee under the Assam Sales Tax Act on two applications under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. His case is that he bought the interest in a firm known as J. N. Sarma on 27-4-1948 and applied for getting himself registered as a dealer under S. 9, Assam Sales Tax Act, (hereinafter called the Act) on 28-1-50 and got the certificate provided under the Act on 1-2-50. A notice for assessment was re­ceived by him on 14-6-50 and he submitted his return on 10-10-50 for his business from 1-2-1950-to 31-3-1950 and secured an adjournment for show­ing his accounts till 26-6-1950. He was further directed by an order of the Department dated 14-8-50 to submit his return with effect from the date of purchase of the interest in the business, i.e., from 27-4-48 and not from 1-2-50 from which date he applied for registration certificate. The said return was submitted on 28-8-50 but no assessment was made separately on that return. On 21-3-5S the assessee-petitioner received a notice from the Department asking him to submit his return on 8-4-53 for the subsequent period not covered by his return i.e., from 1-4-50 to 30-9-52. On that date, the assessee applied for a further adjournment for submission of the return on the ground of his alleged illness and did not take steps to ascertain whether an adjournment was actually granted but a Demand Notice was served on him on 22-5-53 which showed that he had been assessed at a sum of Rs. 782/- for the period covered by 1-2-50 to 30-9-52 and for the earlier period i.e., from 27-4-48-to 31-1-50 at Rs. 329-5-6 and that the assessment order was passed on 11-4-53 under S. 17(4) of the Act. After receipt of this Demand Notice, the assessee applied on 15-6-53 for a review of the orders of assessment but that application was re­jected summarily on 6-7-53. (2) Civil Rule No. 121 of 1953 is in connection1 with the assessment of Rs. 329 odd from 27-4-1948 to 31-1-1950 and Civil Rule No. 122 of 1953 is in connection with the assessment of Rs. 782/- for the subsequent period up to 30-9-1952. (2) Civil Rule No. 121 of 1953 is in connection1 with the assessment of Rs. 329 odd from 27-4-1948 to 31-1-1950 and Civil Rule No. 122 of 1953 is in connection with the assessment of Rs. 782/- for the subsequent period up to 30-9-1952. The case of the petitioner is that after the receipt of this Demand Notice, the petitioner was provided with an uncertified copy of the order of assessment but with a view to prefer an appeal against the orders of assessment the petitioner applied for certified copies of such orders with Re. I/- court-fee stamp as authentication fees but without any folio as was advertised through a Press Note No. 222 of 11-7-1952. The office of the Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati directed the party to file folios as required under the rules and if the party wanted to obviate the same, he was directed to obtain an order to this effect from a competent authority. The assessee moved the Commissioner of Taxes for taking his case out of the requirements as indicated in the Press Note but the Commissioner refused to do so and intimated to him that no such accommodation was possible. Another of the assessee's grievance was that he applied for the inspection of the record dealing with the file of J. N. Sarma and his assessment record including the order passed in the review ap­plication but that prayer too was turned down and the party was intimated that he could obtain certi­fied copies of the papers in his own record only. The petitioner on 17-6-53 filed an application for revision under S. 31 of the Act before the Com­missioner of Taxes but without any certified copy and the fees as provided under R. 74 of the Assam Sales Tax Rules, 1947 which provided that upon a petition for revision of an order of assessment, 5 per cent, of the amount of tax in dispute subject to a minimum of Re. I/- and to a maximum of Rs. 100/- should be paid. This application for re­vision was summarily dismissed on 29-6-53 as not in form because it was neither accompanied by the certified copies of the order objected to nor by the requisite fee as required by R. 35 read with R. 74 as indicated above. I/- and to a maximum of Rs. 100/- should be paid. This application for re­vision was summarily dismissed on 29-6-53 as not in form because it was neither accompanied by the certified copies of the order objected to nor by the requisite fee as required by R. 35 read with R. 74 as indicated above. The objections of the petitioner can therefore be divided under the following heads: (1) That he was not liable to assessment of taxes for the period from 17-4-48 to 31-1-50; (2) that there being no rules properly made for supply of folios for copies of judgment or orders of assess­ment, the refusal on the part of the Department to supply him copies of the order of assessment was illegal; (3) that the application for revision was illegally rejected inasmuch as the certified copies were wrongly refused to the party and that he was under no legal obligation to pay fees amounting to 5 per cent, of the assessed tax as required under R. 74 and (4) that R. 74 was ultra vires the Pro­vincial Government, and as such, inoperative. There was a further complaint that the inspection of the record was illegally refused. (3) The main ground covering the two matters before us is the validity of the R. 74 framed under the Assam Sales Tax Rules. These rules were framed under S. 52 Assam S. T. Act of 1947, by the Assam Government after having previously publish­ed them under the provisions of the Act. Clause (1) of S. 52 is to the effect that the Provincial Govern­ment may make rules for carrying out the purpose of this Act and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may in parti­cular prescribe the fees if any, for petitions, certi­ficates and other matters. It is conceded that R. 74 particularly relating to the Court fees payable in connection with an appeal or revision was based under the provisions of item (i) of S. 52 and the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner is that this sub-section relating to the prescribing of fees was not within the legal competence of the Provincial Government. The basis for this conten­tion is that there are two items in the List Number 2 or the Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act of 1935. The basis for this conten­tion is that there are two items in the List Number 2 or the Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India Act of 1935. Item 48 relates to taxes on the sale of goods and item No. 54 of the same list relates to fees in respect of any of the matters in this list, but not including fees taken in any Court. It has therefore been urged that the question of fee being a separate item, it was a subject for legislation by the Provincial Government itself and it could not have been left to the discretion of the Provincial Government to assess or fix, which act amounted either to the delegation of the power of legislation or surrendering the power of legislation which belonged exclusively to the Provincial Legis­lature. Once we find that the Provincial Govern­ment was not properly authorised by legislature to fix the fees even in case of an appeal or ' revision, Rule 74 must be conceded to be ultra vires and therefore the rejection of the application for revision for non-payment of court-fees would be illegal and would come within the operation of an illegality patent on the face of the record. (4) The learned Advocate has further contended that by the exercise of the rule-making power, the fees for revision could not be fixed though other things could have been done and in support of his argument he relies on - In re Art. 143, Consti­tution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc.', AIR 1951 SC 332 (A). What the learned Advocate con­tends is that the legislature cannot abdicate its legislative functions and therefore while entrusting power to an outside agency, it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case is in reference to Art. 143 of the Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act with regard to extension of certain laws. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case is in reference to Art. 143 of the Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act with regard to extension of certain laws. No­body as a matter of fact disputes the principle of law that the legislature could not abdicate its legis­lative functions or could allow any other subordinate authority independently to act as a parallel legislature but in this case, what the learned Advo­cate-General contends is that the power to fix a fee for an appeal or revision is only an ancillary power enjoined under an Act and it does not require the legislature to fix the fees in these respects by a separate legislation. (5) Section 52 of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 empowers the Provincial Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and S. 52, sub-section (2) runs as follows: "Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may, in particular prescribe- XXX X (i) the fees, if any, for petitions, certificates and other matters." And Rule 74 had laid down the fees for revision in terms of those provisions of S. 52(2)(i) of the Sales Tax Act. Mr. Lahiri contends that the pur­pose of the Sales Tax Act is to earn additional revenue by imposing certain tax on the sale of goods and it might or might not provide for an appeal or revision against an order of assessment. Even when the Act provides for the power of appeal or revision, it might have allowed these reliefs without imposing any fee or it might have made provisions for certain fees for these reliefs. There­fore the imposition of fee for an appeal or revision, Mr. Lahiri urges, cannot be said to be the main purpose of the Act but it is only ancillary to the certain provisions of the Act. The Government being empowered to frame rules on this behalf as pro­vided under S. 52(2)(i), the imposition of fee under R. 74 cannot be said to be ultra vires the Provincial Legislature nor can it be said that the Government acted as parallel legislature in the matter of pre­scribing the fees for appeals or revisions. Mr. The Government being empowered to frame rules on this behalf as pro­vided under S. 52(2)(i), the imposition of fee under R. 74 cannot be said to be ultra vires the Provincial Legislature nor can it be said that the Government acted as parallel legislature in the matter of pre­scribing the fees for appeals or revisions. Mr. Lahiri further draws our attention to the provisions of S. 3(2)(j) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 where it lays down that the Government without prejudice to the gene­rality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) might provide by rules for any incidental or supple­mentary matters, such as the charging of fees etc. for licenses and permits and the like. The purpose of showing this instance is that this provision of fixing a fee under the Assam Sales Tax Act is also of a similar nature and it cannot be said to be an act outside the scope of the Assam Sales Tax itself. In support of this contention, he further relied on - 'Powell v. Apollo Candle Co. Ltd.', (1885) 10 AC 282 (B), where it was held that a Colonial Legislature is not a delegate of the Imperial Legis­lature and that it is restricted in the area of its powers, but within that area it is unrestricted. It was further held in that case that the Customs Regu­lation Act of 1879, Section 133, was within the plenary powers of legislation and that the duties levied by an Order in Council issued under that section were really levied by an authority of the Legislature and not of the Executive. Mr. Lahiri contends that similarly the imposition of the fee for the appeal or revision was not an executive act as such but was provided by the legislature and the executive only carried out its command. In 'Biswanath Rajnikanta Roy, Firm v. Chunilal Kanailal, Finn', AIR 1952 Assam 69 (C), a special Bench case of this Court held that a legislature has power to enact a law delegating a power or powers to an outside agency and that exercise of such power cannot be regarded as delegated power to legislate but it is a power subsidiary to the enforcement of the Act which has been duly enacted by the legislature. (6) In the case of - 'V. M. Syed Mohamed and Co. (6) In the case of - 'V. M. Syed Mohamed and Co. v. State of Madras', AIR 1953 Mad 105 (D), cited by Mr. Lahiri, a similar point was agitated namely,-that the rules framed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Act 9 of 1939) are ultra vires and the contention that the framing of the rules by the Government to carry out the provi­sions of this Act amounted to abdication and self-effacement of the Provincial Legislature. The Supreme Court case of Delhi Laws Act was con­sidered thoroughly in that matter and it was held by the learned Judges, Rajamannar C. J. presiding, that the rules framed under the Madras General Sales Tax Act were intra vires and what the legis­lature did was merely to authorise the rule-making authorities to carry out the policies enunciated in the statute and to fill up the details and far from effecting self-effacement, the Legislature retained complete control over the legislation and it fell far short of allowing independent authority to act parallel to the legislature. Similar is the case in the matter of the rules framed by the Assam Gov­ernment under the Assam Sales Tax Act and we fully agree with the views enunciated by the Madras High Court on the point. (7) Mr. Lahiri placed reliance on two more cases, - 'Bhushan Lal v. The State', AIR 1952 All 866 (E) and - - 'Mohammad Anzar Husnain v. State of Bihar', AIR 1952 Pat 220 (F), relating to Essential Supplies Act and authorisation under Ss. 3 and 4 of the said Act but in view of the cases directly on the point decided by the Madras High Court and the view expressed by this Court in AIR 1952 Assam 69 (C), we do not think we need go into those decisions at all. (8) We hold accordingly that the power to frame rules was admittedly given to the Provincial Gov­ernment and the exercise of such power by the State Government in the matter of framing rules by imposition of certain fees for appeal or revision cannot be said to be ultra vires and in this view, the petitioner's contention to this effect must fail. We are further of opinion that the act of imposi­tion of these fees for ancillary or incidental pur­poses for carrying out the provisions of the Act does not come under Item No. 54 of List 2, as contended on behalf of the petitioner. (9) Once we hold that the revision petition was incompetent because of the petitioner not paying sufficient Court fees prescribed under the rules, he cannot ask for remedies in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution without seeking the remedies provided under the Act under which the tax had been assessed. A similar view has been taken in the case of - 'Kandhari Oil Mills v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner', AIR 1953 Punj 245 (G), where several cases of the Punjab High Court were considered along with the Privy Council case re­ported in - 'Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Gov­ernor-General in Council', AIR 1947 PC 78 (H), which was a case under the Income-tax Act, and it was held therein by their Lordships of the Privy Council that jurisdiction to question assessment otherwise than by use of the machinery expressly provided by the Act would appear to be inconsis­tent with the statutory obligation under S. 45 to pay the tax arising by virtue of the assessment. There also the 'ultra vires' nature of certain provi­sions of the Income-tax Act was raised. (10) Mr. Lahiri further contended that there was nothing in the circumstances of the case which entitled the High Court to exercise its power under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Apart from the con­tention that the petitioner could not approach this Court for relief under Art. 226 without exhausting the remedies under the Assam Sales Tax Act, there is 110 irregularity or illegality on the basis of which this Court can interfere. Apart from the con­tention that the petitioner could not approach this Court for relief under Art. 226 without exhausting the remedies under the Assam Sales Tax Act, there is 110 irregularity or illegality on the basis of which this Court can interfere. In support of his conten­tion, he relies on the Supreme Court case of - 'Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumba-konam', AIR 1952 SC 192 (I), where the Supreme Court held as follows: "Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 of the Constitution are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However, extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and exa­mine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the orders to be made." A similar view as to the jurisdiction of the High Court was taken in the Supreme Court case of - 'Messrs. Parry and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Em­ployees Association, Madras', AIR 1952 SC 179 (J). In the case of - 'Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi', AIR 1952 SC 319 (K), the Supreme Court held that "a writ of certiorari cannot be granted to quash the decision of an inferior Court within its jurisdiction on the ground that the decision is wrong. Before such a writ is issued, it must be shown that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in viola­tion of the principles of natural justice.......... Before such a writ is issued, it must be shown that the authority which passed the order acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it or in viola­tion of the principles of natural justice.......... But once it is held that the Court has jurisdiction but while exercising it, it made a mistake, the wronged party can only take the course prescrib­ed by law for setting matters right inasmuch as a Court has jurisdiction to decide rightly as well as wrongly." (11) The facts of this case are entirely covered by the principles enunciated in the above case by the Supreme Court and even assuming that there were certain defects in procedure as contended by the petitioner, tile proper course should have been to have them set right by the Commissioner of Taxes and not to seek relief in this Court without doing what was possible for them to do under the Act. It was admitted by the petitioner that they have not paid the 5 per cent, of the amount of tax in dispute in the petition for revision as provided under R. 74 nor a certified copy of the appellate order as provided under R. 34 of the Assam Sales Tax Act Rules. Rule 35 of the Rules provides that the petition for revision should be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against and by the fee prescribed in R. 74 and R. 36 pro­vides that the petition for revision may be sum­marily rejected where the requirements of Rr. 34 and 35 were not complied with on presentation of the petition. It being abundantly clear that the requirements of R. 35 were not complied with and as such, the order of the Commissioner of Taxes dated 29-6-53 rejecting the revision petition was amply justified. (12) We need not examine in this case whether a folio was necessary or not because these are details on which the Commissioner of Taxes would have been the competent authority to give proper rulings and only in such cases where no remedies were available by way of an appeal or revision a petition under Article 226 could have been ordinarily enter­tained. There was no excuse on the face of it for not obtaining certified copies as required by the Department, In the circumstances of the case, we are not going to express any opinion as to whether folios should be filed or not. (13) The learned Advocate for the petitioner makes certain complaint that he was not allowed an inspection of the record. It does not appear to us that really any injustice had been caused by the refusal of such inspection though it is desirable that the Department should have given inspection of that part of the record at least of which they were prepared to issue copies. (14) There is no substance in the case sought to be made by the petitioner that he was not liable to pay sales tax of his business after he had ac­quired charge thereof from his predecessor-in-interest till a certificate under the Assam Sales Tax Act was issued to him. This contention has no basis, the responsibility being upon him to inform the Department under S. 48 of the Act about the devolution of interest on him within the time pre­scribed by rules and his liability to pay the tax starts from the date he took over charge of the business on his own behalf - as provided under S. 9 of the Act. His contention that he had to pay tax only from 1-2-50 has no legs to stand upon. I (15) The learned Superintendent of Taxes exer­cised his powers as provided under S. 17(4) of the Act and we are not satisfied that there was any failure of the principle of natural justice in the matter of proceeding to assess the petitioner with­out granting him any further adjournment as pray­ed for. None of the grounds pressed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner appears to us to be of any substance and the case seems to be fought only in a spirit of vindictiveness. There is no scope for exercise of our powers under Art. 227 either. We accordingly discharge the Rules with consoli­dated costs and assess Rs. 100/- as hearing fee. The same judgment to cover both the Rules. RAM LABHAYA J.: (16) These petitions (Nos. 121 and 122 of 1953) arise from two assessment orders passed under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, dated 11-4-1953. Peti­tions for cancellation of these orders were reject­ed. We accordingly discharge the Rules with consoli­dated costs and assess Rs. 100/- as hearing fee. The same judgment to cover both the Rules. RAM LABHAYA J.: (16) These petitions (Nos. 121 and 122 of 1953) arise from two assessment orders passed under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, dated 11-4-1953. Peti­tions for cancellation of these orders were reject­ed. A composite revision petition against the two assessment orders which covered half-yearly periods commencing from 27-4-1948 and ending on 30-9-1952 was put in under S. 31 of the Assam Sales Tax Act. The final stage in the proceeding was reached when this revision petition was reject­ed by the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, sum­marily under R. 35 of the Assam Sales Tax Rules, 1947. The summary rejection was on the ground that the petition did not comply with the rules. It was not duly stamped and that it was not ac­companied by the certified copies of the orders which were assailed. (17) The petitioner's case is that the assessment proceedings which culminated in the rejection of his revision petition were vitiated by obvious illega­lities and therefore they are liable to be quashed. (18) Before going into the question whether the subordinate authorities under the Assam Sales Tax Act contravened any provisions of the law, it has to be seen whether the order of the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam is liable to be reversed or quash­ed. If this petition of revision has been correctly disposed of, there may not be any basis for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. (19) It is conceded that the petition of revision was deficiently stamped if Rule 74 was valid and binding. The learned counsel for the petitioner has however contended that S. 52, cl. (1) of the Assam Sales Tax Act was ultra vires the legislature, and therefore Rule 74 which was framed in pursuance of powers conferred by S. 52 could not be valid. My learned brother has examined this contention at great length. I entirely agree with the view that he has taken of the matter. The learned counsel has challenged the validity of cl. (1) of S. 52 of the Act which provides that the Provincial Government may subject to the condition of previous publica­tion, make rules for the fees, if any, for petitions, certificates and other matters. I entirely agree with the view that he has taken of the matter. The learned counsel has challenged the validity of cl. (1) of S. 52 of the Act which provides that the Provincial Government may subject to the condition of previous publica­tion, make rules for the fees, if any, for petitions, certificates and other matters. His contention is that investing the Provincial Government with powers to determine what fees may be charged on petitions, if any, amounted to such delegation of legislative functions as was not permissible to the legislature. He points out that imposition of fees on petitions like appeals and revisions is an inde­pendent judicial function. In support of his con­tention he relies on entry 54 in List No. 2 of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. This entry deals with fees in respect of any of the matters in the list but not including fees taken in any court. As it deals with fees in respect of any of the matters in the list as a separate item in the sphere of the legislative power of the Pro­vincial Legislature, it could not at all be the sub­ject-matter of delegation. His contention is answered by a recent decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1953 Mad 105 (D). In this case, the contention was that the legislature had under entry No. 48 power to tax every seller or the purchaser. The determina­tion to tax either the one or the other was a legis­lative act and could be performed only by the legislature. The determination of the question could not be delegated to the Administration. Sec­tion 15(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act did not itself impose the tax on the purchaser but had left it to the rules to determine on which point in the series of sales by successive dealers the tax was to be levied. In rules 4 and 16, the liability to pay the tax was thrown on the purchaser. The contention was examined threadbare. The English and American authorities bearing on the point were examined. The decision reported in AIR 1951 SC 332 (A) was also considered. The Judgment embodies a comprehensive survey of the relevant case law. The conclusion arrived at was that the legislature had merely authorised the rule-making authorities to carry out the policies enunciated in the statute. The English and American authorities bearing on the point were examined. The decision reported in AIR 1951 SC 332 (A) was also considered. The Judgment embodies a comprehensive survey of the relevant case law. The conclusion arrived at was that the legislature had merely authorised the rule-making authorities to carry out the policies enunciated in the statute. It will be observed that the liability to levy tax was left to be determined by the rules. The Assam Sales Tax Act does not leave any such power to the Provincial Government. It has mere­ly authorised the fixation of fees if any for petitions etc., with a view to carrying out the purposes of the Act. The main purpose of the Assam Sales Tax Act is the taxation of sales of goods with a view to adding to the revenues of Assam. The Act con­tained provisions for appeal, revision and reference and authorised the rule-making authorities to determine the fees chargeable if any on petitions, certificates and other matters. The matter is purely ancillary and consequential and the mere fact that the imposition of fees forms the subject-matter of item No. 54 in List 2 of the Government of India 'Act, 1935 does not disentitle the legislature to leave its determination to the rule-making authority when the main purpose of the legislation is the imposi­tion of tax on the sales of goods, just as entry No. 48 in the Madras case was no bar to the legis­lature leaving it to the rule-making authority to determine who should bear sales tax. The function left to the Provincial Government was the filling in of details. The policy was outlined. The legisla­ture has not effaced itself, even that the rules were not subject to 'Q' approval as in the Madras case. There has been no abandonment of its functions; nor can it be said that a parallel legislature has been created. In relation to the Act itself, the question what if any fees be charged on petitions of appeal and revision could not be regarded as such a legislative function which could not be left to the Provincial Government. There can therefore be no doubt that S. 52(i) of the Assam Sales Tax Act was not ultra vires the legislature and it was open to the Provincial Government to fix fees to be levied on appeals and revision petitions. There can therefore be no doubt that S. 52(i) of the Assam Sales Tax Act was not ultra vires the legislature and it was open to the Provincial Government to fix fees to be levied on appeals and revision petitions. (20) Compliance with the provisions of R. 74 was therefore necessary. The petition of revision in these circumstances must be found to have been deficiently stamped and was liable to rejection. It is not necessary in these circumstances to consider whether the petitioner had valid reasons for not filing certified copies of the orders he felt aggriev­ed from for even if the failure to file certified copies was not a good reason for rejecting the peti­tion, it could be rejected on the sole ground that it was not duly stamped. The order summarily rejecting the revision petition therefore is not open to objection in law. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for us to examine whether there were any irregularities or illegalities in the proceedings culminating in the final order by which the revision petition was rejected. The petitioner did not file any appeal. His revision petition could not be en­tertained by reason of its being deficiently stamped. He failed to get redress by remedies provided in the Assam Sales Tax Act by reason of his own de­fault. He had opportunities of putting forward his grievances before the Commissioner under the Act by filing a valid petition. Not having done so, he may not now be permitted to put forward in this proceeding contentions which he could have properly raised before the authorities under the Sales Tax Act. Pleas and contentions which are open to him now are those which could not have been urged before the Taxing authorities. The con­tention that R. 74 of the Rules framed under S. 52 (2) of the Act was ultra vires was such a conten­tion. This has not prevailed. In omitting to stamp the petition as required by R. 74, the petitioner was taking a risk and if his view of the law has not prevailed, he has only to thank himself for his failure to get relief. The High Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of every step in the im­pugned proceeding and decide for itself what view should have prevailed or what order ought to have been made. The High Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of every step in the im­pugned proceeding and decide for itself what view should have prevailed or what order ought to have been made. (Vide AIR 1952 SC 192 (I)). The authorities under the Sales Tax Act had admittedly jurisdiction to go into these matters. If they com­mitted mistakes in the exercise of their jurisdiction the petitioner could have had recourse to the reme­dies prescribed by the Act for setting matters right. He has failed to do so. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 may not in these circumstances be permitted to be in­voked vide - 'Major Soap Co. Ltd. v. Asst. Commr. of Commercial Taxes, Calcutta', AIR 1953 Cal 712 (L). The petitioner has not made out any case for the exercise of this jurisdiction. These petitions therefore must fail. Petitions dismissed.