Judgment :- 1. The petitioner and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were three of the applicants before the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, for permits to run buses between Moovattupuzha and Thodupuzha in the Kottayam District. The Regional Transport Authority granted a permit to the petitioner, another to the 2nd respondent and rejected all the other applications. 2. The 3rd respondent and the other applicants whose prayers were rejected appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board and the said Board by its order dated 11.4.1953 confirmed the permit granted to the petitioner, cancelled the permit given to the 2nd respondent and granted a permit to the 3rd respondent instead. The 2nd respondent and the applicants whose petitions were rejected by both the Regional Transport Authority and the Central Road Traffic Board appealed to the 1st respondent, the Government of Travancore Cochin. 3. By their order dated 24.7.1953 the Government confirmed the grant of permits to the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, granted a permit to the 2nd respondent as well, and thus raised the total number of permit holders for the route from two to three. One of the unsuccessful appellants before the 1st respondent, Hassan Rowther, filed O.P. No. 100 of 1953 before this court and obtained a writ of certiorari quashing the order of 24.7.1953 with incidental directions for a re-hearing and fresh disposal of his petition. 4. In pursuance of the order in O.P. No. 100 of 1953 the 1st respondent re-heard the appeal and passed an order on 23.10.1953 on the lines of the earlier order of 24.7.1953, that is confirming the grant of a permit each to the petitioner and the 3rd respondent and granting a permit to the 2nd respondent as well. 5. The petitioner was served with a notice of the re-hearing on 3.10.1953 and his contentions were heard before the order of 23.10.1953 was passed even though he was not given any such notice prior to the order of 24.7.1953. His main contention was that the appeal to the Government being from an order of the Central Road Traffic Board in appeal had no legislative warrant and should not hence be entertained. The same contention has been urged before us and we may state immediately that our conclusion is that the contention is justified and that this petition should be allowed. 6. The same contention has been urged before us and we may state immediately that our conclusion is that the contention is justified and that this petition should be allowed. 6. Before dealing with the question, however, we shall dispose of the three preliminary objections to the sustainability of the petition urged by the State and 2nd respondent, namely: (1) that there has been an inordinate delay in the filing of the petition; (2) that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the petition as the permit granted to him remains unaffected; and (3) that he is precluded from questioning the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent in the light of the principle laid down in 55 Bombay Law Reporter 922. There is no merit in any of the three objections. The point of time material for considering the existence or otherwise of any latches on the part of the petitioner cannot possibly be the date of the order which was quashed by the judgment in O.P. No. 100 of 1953 but only 23.10.1953, the date of the order passed by the 1st respondent after the re-hearing of the appeal. The petitioner received copy of that order only 5 days later, on 28.10.1953 (paragraph 8 of his affidavit) and this petition has been filed within a week thereafter, on 4.11.1953. 7. The petitioner's short answer to the second objection is that if the State had no right to hear and decide an appeal from an appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board, the grant of a permit by the State to the 2nd respondent will have no legislative backing whatsoever and it should follow that he has a right to prevent any competition by the 2nd respondent under the colour of a permit granted by an authority which was not competent to grant the same. 8. All that the Bombay High Court decided in 55 Bombay Law Reporter 922 was that no question relating to the jurisdiction of a tribunal whose Order was being challenged will be allowed to be raised before the High Court on a petition for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution unless the objection had been taken before the Tribunal itself. This is not a case where the objection to jurisdiction has not been taken at the earlier stage but one where it was specifically raised by the petitioner and negatived by the 1st respondent. 9. As stated before there is no merit in any of the three objections and we hold that the petitioner is entitled to file the petition and that it is not liable to be dismissed either on the ground of delay or on the basis of 55 Bombay Law Reporter 922. 10. S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) which deals with appeals reads as follows: "Any person (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the Provincial or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or (b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or (c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit, or (d) aggrieved by the refusal of the Provincial or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit or by any condition attached to such counter-signature, or (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or (f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, for a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto, or (g) being the holder of a licence who is aggrieved by the refusal of a Regional Transport Authority to grant an authorisation to drive a public service vehicle," may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard; and it is clear from the wording of the section that it contemplates only one appeal and no more. As stated by the Nagpur High Court in A.I.R. 1953 Nagpur 150: "S. 64 provides for a right of appeal by the aggrieved party from certain orders of the Provincial or Regional Transport Authority specified in the section, but it speaks of only one appeal and no second appeal," and "it is manifest that there is no right of second appeal provided by the statute and that there is no appeal against the appellate orders of the Appellate Authority". In that case the State Government had declined to entertain a second appeal and that decision was endorsed by the High Court. "It must, therefore, be held that the State Government were perfectly right in holding that the appeal presented to them by the petitioner was wholly untenable". 11. R. 156(2) of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, as it stood on the date of the Government's order did not also make any provision for a second appeal. "From every original order passed by the Central Board an appeal shall lie to the Government within thirty days of the communication of such order". The word "original" in the sub-rule, however, was deleted after the date of the order of the Central Road Traffic Board but prior to the filing of the appeal by the 2nd respondent by the Notification of the Government in the Department of Public Works and Communications, No. T4-8649/51/PWC dated the 22nd April 1953. If our construction of S. 64 is correct, any rule that provides for a further appeal to the Government from an appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board, will be ultra vires of that section and as our conclusion is that a second appeal from an appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board is not contemplated by S. 64 it is unnecessary for us to consider whether it is the original rule as contended by the petitioner or the amended rule as contended by the State and the 2nd respondent that applies to the present case. 12. It was suggested to us that we should not construe the order of 24.10.1953 as an order in appeal from an appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board but should treat it as an order in appeal from an original order of that Board. It is impossible to accede to the suggestion. 12. It was suggested to us that we should not construe the order of 24.10.1953 as an order in appeal from an appellate order of the Central Road Traffic Board but should treat it as an order in appeal from an original order of that Board. It is impossible to accede to the suggestion. The order of the Central Road Traffic Board was certainly an order passed in appeal from an original order of the Regional Transport Authority and it will not be any the less an appellate order because it modified the order from which the appeal arose. 13. All that remains is to notice a curious contention urged by the learned Government Pleader regarding the force of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. S. 133(3) of the Act provides: "All rules made under this Act by the Central Government or by any State Government shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Central or State Legislature, as the case may be as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications as Parliament or such Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid," and the argument was that this provisions makes a rule framed in compliance with it as valid as a section of the Act and if any rule so framed is not in consonance with any existing section of the Act it must be deemed to be an amendment of that section itslef. This argument must be based on a serious misconception of the scope and ambit of the rule making power. Whatever the efficacy of S. 133 may be in ensuring popular control over delegated legislation, it cannot possibly transmit a rule framed under the Act into the status of a section enacted by the Legislature and the validity or otherwise of the rule must as usual depend on its being intra vires of the Act under which it is framed. 14. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be allowed and we allow it with costs, Advocate's fee Rs. 200/-. The 3rd respondent will suffer his costs. The costs due to the petitioner including Advocate's fee will be paid in equal shares by the 1st and 2nd respondents. Allowed.