Judgment. — This second appeal is filed against the decree and- judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Srikakulam confirming those of the District Munsiff’s Court, Sompeta, in O.S.No.11 of 1949. The subject-matter of the suit is of the extent of 2 acres 10 cents of Government zeroiti dry lands described in the plaint schedule. It was originally owned by one Priya Chelamayya and others. They executed a mortgage deed in respect of the suit property in favour of Burala Yerrayya, the father of the 3rd defendant. Burala Yerrayya filed O.S. No. 52 of 1938 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Sompeta, and obtained a preliminary decree therein. A final decree followed. In execution of the final decree, the plaint schedule items were brought to sale and they were purchased by the 1st defendant on 23rd March, 1942, for a sum of Rs. 325. The said sale was confirmed on 15th June, 1942. On 10th November, 1942, he took delivery of possession. The plaintiff, who was the purchaser of the plaint schedule items from the mortgagors, and who was also impleaded as a defendant in O.S.No. 52 of 1938, filed an application on 21st April, 1942, for setting aside the ex parte decree. The ex parte decree was set aside on 31st August, 1944. Thereafter he filed O.S. No. 11 of 1949 on 14th December, 1948, for possession of the said items on the ground that by reason of the setting aside of the ex parte decree and also by reason of the subsequent adjustment of the suit claim, the defendants did not acquire any valid title to the said items. The learned District Munsif and on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge rejected his claim and dismissed suit. Hence the second appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Dikshithulu, contends that there is an essential distinction between an ex parte decree and a decree on merits and, therefore, the decisions holding that the title of a third party purchaser in execution of a decree is not affected by the reversal of the decree, will not apply to a case of purchase in execution of an ex parte decree. To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to consider the principle on which the said cases based their decisions. To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to consider the principle on which the said cases based their decisions. In Seth Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh1, the Judicial Committee had to consider the case of the effect of an adjustment of a decree under Order 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, on the sale held in execution of the decree in favour of a third party. Their Lordships held that the third party was protected and the sale could not be set aside. The reasoning of their decision is found at page 429 of the Report. It runs thus: “When once a sale has been effected, a third party interested intervenes, and there is nothing in this rule to suggest that it is to be disregarded, the only means by which the judgment-debtor can get rid of a sale, which has been duly carried out, are those embodied in rule 89, viz., by depositing in Court the amount for the recovery of which the property was sold, together with 5 per cent, on the purchase money which goes to the purchaser as statutory compensation, and this remedy can only be pursued within 30 days of the sale.” “Their Lordships make no reference to cases under rule 91 which has no application to the present case.” This principle was followed by Madhavan Nair, J., in Sorimuthu Pillay v.Muthukrishna Pillay2, where the learned Judge ruled that, under Order 21,rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure where no application is made under rules 89, 90 or 91 to set aside a valid sale, the Court is bound to confirm the sale an3 cannot refuse to do so on the ground that there was no subsisting decree at the time of confirmation or on any other ground. This judgment was accepted and followed bv Wadsworth, J., in Ambujammal v. Thangavelu Chettiar3. There, as in the earlier case, at the time the sale was sought to be confirmed, the decree in execution whereof the property was brought to sale was reversed by the Appellate Court. This judgment was accepted and followed bv Wadsworth, J., in Ambujammal v. Thangavelu Chettiar3. There, as in the earlier case, at the time the sale was sought to be confirmed, the decree in execution whereof the property was brought to sale was reversed by the Appellate Court. Wads-worth, J., points out at page 196: “There is no provision in the code for the cancellation of a sale merely because of the cancellation of the decree and though it is in accordance with justice that a person who has succeeded in appeal should get from the opposite party such restitution as is possible, there is no principle of justice whereby an innocent third party who has purchased in valid auction held by the Court should be deprived of his property, merely because the decree under which the sale was held has been cancelled in appeal.” It is true, as contended by Mr. Dikshithulu that in all the aforesaid cases, the decree was on merits and that it was reversed by the Appellate Court. But the principle accepted by the three said decisions is that there is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code for setting aside a sale on the ground that the decree has been cancelled. I cannot find any reason or justification for not applying the said principle to a case of a sale in favour of third party held in execution of an ex parte decree. Whether a decree is an ex parte decree or a decree on merits, it is a valid decree till it is set aside or modified in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It cannot be suggested and indeed it is not suggested that an ex parte decree is void and a nullity and, therefore, it can be ignored. Further, for setting aside a sale held in execution of an ex parte decree, just like in execution of a decree on merits, the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the same remedies. The judgment-debtor if he seeks to set aside the sale, must proceed either under Order 21, rule 89 or under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code. The only distinction which the learned counsel is able to point out is that in the case of setting aside an ex parte decree, it may be that section 144, Civil Procedure Code may not be applicable. The only distinction which the learned counsel is able to point out is that in the case of setting aside an ex parte decree, it may be that section 144, Civil Procedure Code may not be applicable. But, if section 144, Civil Procedure Code, is not applicable and if a case for restitution is made out the Court has ample power under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, to order restitution against the decree-holder. But so far as the third party is concerned, that circumstance cannot conceivably make any difference in the principle accepted by the decisions. I therefore hold, agreeing with the Courts below that the first respondent, who is a third party purchaser, is protected and the sale in his favour cannot be avoided by the judgment-debtor. No other point arises in the appeal. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------------- Appeal dismissed.