Judgment: — The first defendant is the appellant. The only question that arises for consideration is as to the true construction of the will executed by Mani-kyam on 3rd January, 1913 and marked as Exhibit A-3. There is no doubt that the properties devised under the will belonged to Manikyam absolutely, as found by both the Courts below. According to the case of the plaintiff the properties were bequeathed absolutely in favour of Manikyam’s sister’s sons, i.e., the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff’s deceased husband, and that as her husband died in 1914, she became entitled to his interest in the suit property. The first defendant (appellant) mainly contested the suit. The District Munsiff of Rajahmundry held that sections 105 and 107 of the Indian Succession Act, did not apply as the will was executed by a Hindu and that the plaintiff acquired an interest under the terms of the will Exhibit A-3. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry differed from the District Munsiff and held that sections 105 and 107 of the Indian Succession Act applied also to Hindu wills. But on a true and proper contruction of the will, he confirmed the judgment of the District Munsiff and held that as the heir-at-law of Satyanara-yana, the plaintiff was entitled to a half share under the terms of Exhibit A-3. The second appeal is brought by the first defendant as against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry. As already stated, the sole question that arises for consideration is, as to whether by the death of Satyanarayana in 1914, that is during the lifetime of the testatrix, his interest lapsed and the plaintiff acquired no interest whatsoever. I have carefully perused the terms of the will and I agree with the Subordinate Judge that the testatrix clearly intended that her nephews, Krishna Murty, and Satyanarayana, or their santhathi should take the properties equally. As regards movable property the testatrix stated in clear terms in paragraph 3 that after her lifetime, her sister’s sons, Krishna Murty and Satyanarayana, and their descendants according to their father’s branch should take the said properties equally. In clause (4) she directed that her nephews or their descendants, should give a sum of Rs. 1,000 to the persons specified therein. In clause (4) she directed that her nephews or their descendants, should give a sum of Rs. 1,000 to the persons specified therein. In clause (5) she provided that if the persons specified in clause (4) did not survive her, the amount should be taken by her two nephews or their descendants according to their father’s branch equally. Clause (6) relating to immovable property runs in the following terms: — “It has been provided that the said Grandhi Krishna Murty Garu, and Satyanarayana Garu and their descendants shall after my lifetime take even the entire immovable property that I may purchase from my money or acquire in any other manner, subsequent to this will, along with immovable property mentioned in this will in the aforesaid manner, with all powers of disposition by way of gift, sale, etc. and they shall enjoy the same happily from their sons to grandsons and so on in succession”. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant is that an absolute estate was given to the nephews, Krishna Murty and Satyanarayana, and that as Satyanarayana died during the lifetime of the testatrix the bequest in his favour lapsed and that the first defendant as the husband’s heir of Manikyam was entitled to his share as on intestacy. It is well established that in construing a will, all the clauses have to be read together and the intention of the testator or testatrix should be ascertained. Clauses(3) to (5) make it abundantly clear that if any of the nephews should predecease the testatrix, the descendants should take the place of the deceased. In each of the clauses it is stated that the descendants, according to their father’s branch, should take the properties equally or in other words, the testatrix was anxious that the nephews or if they should die during her lifetime, their santhathi should take the property. Reference was made to the terms of sections 97 and 105 which run in the following terms: — Section 97. — “Where property is bequeathed to a person, and words are added which describe a class of persons but do not denote them as direct objects of a disitnct and independent gift, such person is entitled to the whole interest of the testator therein, unless a contrary intention appears by the will”. Section 105(1). — “Where property is bequeathed to a person, and words are added which describe a class of persons but do not denote them as direct objects of a disitnct and independent gift, such person is entitled to the whole interest of the testator therein, unless a contrary intention appears by the will”. Section 105(1). — “If the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator’s property, unless it appears by the will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. (2) In order to entitle the representatives of the legatee to receive the legacy it must be proved that he survived the testator”. The argument of the learned advocate for the appellant is that the use of the expression “their descendants” in clause(6) merely defines the nature and character of the estate taken by Krishna Murty and Satyanarayana and that applying the rule of construction laid down in section 97 to the will, the ianthathi acquired no interest whatsoever as the santhathi was not a direct object of a distinct and independent gift. So according to the learned advocate, under the terms of section 105, Satyanarayana having predeceased the testatrix, the plaintiff, his widow, acquired no right whatsoever in the suit properties. But if I am right in my construction of the will that the testatrix intended that the nephew or his santhathi should take the property, there is no lapse whatsoever so as to attract the terms of section 105(1) of the Indian Succession Act. The second part of section 105 (1): “Unless it appears by the will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person” directly applied to the facts of the case. The testatrix herself provided that in the event of the legatee Satyanarayana dying during her lifetime, his santhathi should take it. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether the rule of construction laid down in section 97 of the Succession Act applies to Hindu wills or not as held by Horwill, J., in Damodara Moothan v. Ammu Amma1. The testatrix herself provided that in the event of the legatee Satyanarayana dying during her lifetime, his santhathi should take it. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether the rule of construction laid down in section 97 of the Succession Act applies to Hindu wills or not as held by Horwill, J., in Damodara Moothan v. Ammu Amma1. I however agree with the observations of the learned Judge: “This section does not apply directly to wills by Hindus; but it lays down a general principle of interpretation of wills which could equally be applied to a will by a Hindu, though if the clear intention of the testator appeared otherwise, the section should not be applied”. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Krishnadas Tulasidas v. Dwarkadas Kalindas2, does not in any way affect this question. Wadia, J., rightly held that it is always the intention of the testator, as expressed or implied in the language of the will, which must be given effect to and that intention must be collected with reasonable certainty from the whole will. He construed the will in question as conferring interest, in the sons and daughter of Tulasidas along with him, or in other words, he held that the sons and daughter of Tulasidas were direct objects of a distinct and independent gift as contemplated under section 97. I do not, however, agree with the observations of the learned Judge that section 97 embodies an artificial rule of contruction of wills, taken from the English Law and that rule of construction ought not to be applied to wills made by Hindus. In the view taken by me I do not agree with the observations of the learned Judge as to the scope and effect of illustration (II) to section 105. The next argument of the learned advocate for the appellant is that the expression “santhathi” in clauses (3) to (6) of the will, will not and cannot by any stretch of language take in the plaintiff, the widow of Satyanarayana, and that the suit is consequently not maintainable. I quite agree with the learned advocate that the etymological meaning of “santhathi” is “issue of the body”. The expression “Santhathi Paramparia” used as a word of limitation to define the estate taken by a person has, however, come to acquire the larger significance of “heirs”. I quite agree with the learned advocate that the etymological meaning of “santhathi” is “issue of the body”. The expression “Santhathi Paramparia” used as a word of limitation to define the estate taken by a person has, however, come to acquire the larger significance of “heirs”. In Raja of Ramnad v. Sundara Pandiaswami Thevar1, Seshagiri Ayyar, J., held that the words ‘‘Santhathi Paramparia” may convey a heritable estate from generation to generation and that “no authority has been quoted for the proposition that the word ”santhathi“is to be restricted to the lineal descendants”. Ramesam, J., in delivering the Judgment of the Bench decision in Guruvajammah v. Rangaswamy Mudaliar2, observed as follows:— “Even assuming that the ”santhathi“in the first sentence was to be construed as limited to issue, it is not clear that, the sentence is intended to describe the devolution of the trusteeship. It merely lays down the manner in which the trust was to be conducted and reference is made to some of the persons who are likely to conduct it. But, even if it were otherwise, I do not think that”santhathi“should be construed in its narrow sense. It is true that its etymological meaning is”issue of the body“. But it is also true that when used as a word of limitation to define the estate taken by a person, it has come to acquire the larger significance of” heirs “............” Adopting those observations, I hold that the expression “santhathi” in the present case should not be construed in its narrow or etymological sense but should be construed as meaning “heirs”. In this view the Second Appeal fails and is consequently dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------------- Appeal dismissed.