JUDGMENT : Respondent Ganeshilal, son of Munnalal, sued appellant Motilal Ramgopal for ejectment and arrears of rent etc., in respect of the premises in dispute. This was in Civil Suit No.34 of 1947 filed in the Court of District Judge, Mhow Cantonment. 2. On 10-7-1947, parties arrived at a compromise and a decree was passed by the court in terms of the compromise but without setting out the terms in 'extenso' in the decree. Under the terms of the compromise, it was provided that the defendant should vacate the suit premises on 'Asoj Sudi 10' Samvat Year 2004 (Dashera)'. It was also provided that the plaintiff should lease to the defendant the corner land in the Garden No.104 which had been previously leased by the plaintiff to the Seth Dulichand at Rs.10 p.m. and that in case the plaintiff failed to execute the lease within one week from 'Dashera' then the defendant was not bound to vacate the premises in question. Defendant too was required to get the lease executed within one week from 'Dashera' and on his failure to do so inspite of plaintiff's notice he was liable to be ejected. The details of the new lease to be created were also provided for. 3. On 16-2-1948 plaintiff-decree-holder applied for execution of the decree for ejectment on the allegation that the defendant failed to get the fresh lease for another land executed in spite of notice. 4. This was opposed by the judgment-debtor who attributed default to the decree-holder in the execution of the lease in respect of the corner plot as provided under the terms of the compromise. 5. The trial court after recording evidence, which consisted of the statements of the parties and that of one Saiyadali, came to the conclusion that the decree-holder's allegation regarding the judgment-debtor's failure to have the lease of the corner plot in spite of his notice was not worthy of belief. He therefore refused to execute the decree. 6. Aggrieved by this decision the decree-holder preferred an appeal to the District Court. The appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court holding that the evidence of the judgment-debtor and that of his witness Saiyadali was not worthy of credit while the statement of the decree-holder was so. He found that the decree-holder was prepared to implement the terms of the compromise while the judgment-debtor was not so. The appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court holding that the evidence of the judgment-debtor and that of his witness Saiyadali was not worthy of credit while the statement of the decree-holder was so. He found that the decree-holder was prepared to implement the terms of the compromise while the judgment-debtor was not so. Reference in this connection was made, besides the oral evidence, to the notices exchanged between the parties Ex. D/2 and D/1. He therefore, held that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to continue in possession of the premises in question. Execution was therefore ordered to proceed. 7. This is a second appeal preferred by the judgment-debtor. 8. Mr. Dubey, who appeared for the appellant, contended: Firstly that on fair and reasonable construction of the terms of the compromise notice contemplated under it was a written notice and not an oral one. Secondly that the finding regarding the oral notice arrived at by the lower appellate court was not in accordance with law and was erroneous. Thirdly it was contended that inasmuch as the decree did not incorporate the entire terms of the compromise it was bad in law and not executable and relied in this connection upon the decisions reported in - 'Attar Chand Kapur and Sons v. Chandu Lal', AIR 1929 Lah 291 (A); and - 'Sat Narain v. Chandra Mohan'. AIR 1940 Oudh 27 (B). 9. None of these contentions in my opinion is entitled to prevail. 10. As regards the first contention it was advanced for the first time before me at the time of argument. The terms of compromise did not specifically indicate whether the notice was to be an oral one or in writing. Decree-holder in his notice Ex. D/2 dated 25-11-1947 referred to an oral notice. In the reply that was sent Ex. D/1 on behalf of the judgment-debtor it was not suggested that oral notice was not contemplated. In the proceedings of execution the decree-holder took up the same position that he gave verbal notices. The judgment-debtor did not suggest that written notice was intended. Parties went to trial on that point. Evidence was recorded bearing on the question of verbal notice. In the grounds of appeal preferred in both the courts this position was not taken. In the proceedings of execution the decree-holder took up the same position that he gave verbal notices. The judgment-debtor did not suggest that written notice was intended. Parties went to trial on that point. Evidence was recorded bearing on the question of verbal notice. In the grounds of appeal preferred in both the courts this position was not taken. It is, therefore, too late to urge that the entire evidence was misdirected as no oral notice was contemplated under the agreement. 11. Coming next to the second point the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court, which is a final court as regards conclusions of fact, cannot be interfered with in second appeal more particularly as there is evidence to support that finding. Had there been no evidence at all in support of the decree-holder's assertion, matter would have been different. 12. As regards the last contention this too is not tenable. The decree no doubt would have done well in incorporating the entire compromise instead of stating thus, "It is ordered and decreed in terms of the compromise filed by the parties on 10-7-1947 and is attached herewith". But this cannot render the decree bad in law. The decree as it is worded makes the terms of compromise in the application dated 10-7-1947 as the part of it and we will have to be hyper-technical in holding that such a decree is inexecutable. 13. The cases cited by Mr. Dubey in this connection can be distinguished. 14. In AIR 1929 Lahore 291 (A), parties arrived at an oral compromise with terms of reciprocal obligation. The court recorded their statements and passed a decree incorporating defendant's obligations and not those of plaintiff. Such a decree was held to be not executable on the ground that no decree or a part of a compromise can be executable. 15. In AIR 1940 Oudh 27 (B), the court held that where the trial court in its order ordered the compromise to be made a part of its order but in the operative part included only a portion of it, the part left but cannot be enforced in execution. 16. Such is not the case in this case. Here the Court ordered the entire compromise to be made a part of its decree and passed no inconsistent order in the operative part of the decree. 17. 16. Such is not the case in this case. Here the Court ordered the entire compromise to be made a part of its decree and passed no inconsistent order in the operative part of the decree. 17. For all these reasons the appeal is not entitled to succeed on the points raised before me. 18. Lastly it was urged by Mr. Dubey that Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan applies to Mhow Cantonment and the judgment-debtor is therefore protected. 19. In order to appreciate the point certain facts regarding what is now Mhow Cantonment will be necessary to be mentioned. 20. Prior to 9-8-1947 Mhow was a Cantonment town and subject to provisions of "Cantonment Act of 1924". It ceased to be a Cantonment town by reason of the Notification No.2019 (Political) published in the Gazette Extraordinary of Government of India dated 12-8-1947. On 14-8-47, this area was retroceded to Holkar State to whom it initially belonged and thereafter Holker State Laws were applied to the area. 21. After the formation of Madhya Bharat, the same law continued except in the cases where fresh enactments were made. Thus Mhow Cantonment area became subject to laws of Madhya Bharat. 22. On 11-1-1950, Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan received the assent of Raj Pramukh. It was published in the Gazette of Madhya Bharat on 25-1-1950. On 26-1-1950 Constitution of India came into force. 23. Article 372 (1) of the Constitution provided that all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution should continue in force therein untill altered or repealed or amended by a competent authority. Explanation (1) of Article 372 provided as follows: "The expression ''Law in force" in this Article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of the Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular area". 24. Thus, when the Constitution came into force Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan was made by the Madhya Bharat Legislature although it was to come into force on 9-2-1950. This Act was applied to Mhow on 9-2-1950 by Madhya Bharat Government Notification. Thus the Act applied to the area of Mhow Cantonment and was properly extended to it. 24. Thus, when the Constitution came into force Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan was made by the Madhya Bharat Legislature although it was to come into force on 9-2-1950. This Act was applied to Mhow on 9-2-1950 by Madhya Bharat Government Notification. Thus the Act applied to the area of Mhow Cantonment and was properly extended to it. This view was taken by this Court as will appear from the decision reported in -'Mulla Tyebali v. Dwarka Harkishan', AIR 1953 Madh. B.5 (C). On 8-7-1950 however Mhow was again declared a Cantonment under Cantonment Act of 1924. And what we are to consider is whether by reason of this event the Act ceased to be in force. 25. Mr. Dubey contends that the Act continues to be in force as no other legislation on the subject was made by the Parliament which alone had the legislative capacity in this regard under Entry No.3 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. 26. However the Advocate General who appeared as 'amicus curiae' contended that the Act ceased to be in force on 30-6-1951. 27. His line of reasoning is that under S.2 Cl. 4 of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan the Act was to remain in force till 30-6-1951 although power to extend the operation of the Act for a period of two years more was conferred upon the Madhya Bharat Government and although such a power was exercised by the Government of Madhya Bharat by extending the operation of the Act by two years under its Notification No.66(8) J.J. 51 dated 26-3-1951 published in the Gazette of Madhya Bharat dated 31-3-1951 yet such an extension was inapplicable to Mhow Cantonment owing to its being declared as cantonment under Cantonment Act 1924. He urged that Madhya Bharat Legislature on 26-3-1951 or earlier after 8-7-1950 had no legislative capacity with respect to the subject matter of the Act which is covered by Entry No.3 of List No.1 of Schedule VII and therefore the Government of Madhya Bharat which is required to act under the Act to carry out its purpose can have no such competence. He also urged that the Government of Madhya Bharat in such a case will be acting in pursuance of an authority delegated to it by the legislature of Madhya Bharat. 28. He also urged that the Government of Madhya Bharat in such a case will be acting in pursuance of an authority delegated to it by the legislature of Madhya Bharat. 28. Authorities particularly those reported in - 'Biswanath v. Chunilal', AIR 1952 Assam 69 (FB) (D) and - 'State of Bombay v. Hemen Shantlal Alreja', AIR 1952 Bom 16 (E), seem to indicate that power conferred upon the executive Government to extend the operation of an Act is not a delegated power of Legislation but is merely subsidiary to the enforcement of the Act Therefore the contention of the Advocate General that the order of Madhya Bharat Government extending the duration of the Act by two years in the case of Mhow Cantonment is bad because it amounts to a delegated legislation cannot prevail. 29. It was a conditional Legislation when made. Power was given to Executive Government to determine whether it was desirable to extend the operation of the Act having regard to the local situation of a place. As long as the Act was in force, it could be legitimately exercised by the Executive Government. Power was therefore properly exercised by the State Government when it issued the notification dated 26-3-1951. Indian Parliament if it thought fit could have repealed the Act or made other legislation but until this is done or the former Act is spent up this Act was entitled to hold the field. But even this period of two years envisaged by the Act expired on 30-6-1953 and the Act came to an end. The appellant therefore cannot take his stand on the basis of the Act. 30. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.