Order.-In 1945 the petitioner filed I.P. No. 13 of 1945 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore under section 74 of the Provincial Insolvency Act praying that he be adjudged an insolvent. On 26th September, 1945, an order to that effect was formally made. In January, 1946, a creditor filed a petition to review the earlier order adjudicating the petitioner under the summary procedure. After hearing the parties the learned Subordinate Judge passed an order Exhibit P-9 vacating the earlier order for the summary administration of the estate and directing the Official Receiver to administer the estate in the usual manner. The insolvent, however, did not produce his books of account before the Official Receiver. After the lapse of some considerable time a complaint was laid in the Court of the First Class Magistrate of Erode by the Subordinate Judge under sections 69 and 70 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In due course the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. His appeal to the learned District Judge having failed, he has come to this Court. Mr. Kailasam, the learned advocate for the petitioner, argued that the learned Subordinate Judge has not complied with the requirements of section 70 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and that by reason of his omission to do so, the entire proceedings are bad. Section 70 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is in these terms: ‘Where the Court is satisfied, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in section 69, and appearing to have been committed by the insolvent, the Court may record a finding to that effect and make a complaint of the offence in writing to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and such Magistrate shall deal with such complaint in the manner laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898". Mr. Kailasam did not claim that a preliminary enquiry on the part of the Court is obligatory; that clearly is a matter in the discretion of the Court. Mr. Kailasam did not claim that a preliminary enquiry on the part of the Court is obligatory; that clearly is a matter in the discretion of the Court. The objection taken before me is that the learned Subordinate Judge before filing the complaint did not, in the language of the Act, record a finding to the effect "that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in section 69, and appearing to have been committed by the insolvent." Now, this objection of Mr. Kailasam appears to me to be correct only in a very narrow and technical sense. What happened in the present case was this. The Official Receiver himself wanted to prosecute the insolvent and with that object he held a preliminary enquiry. He then found that he had no jurisdiction to make a complaint. So he made a report to the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge took exception to the procedure that had been adopted by the Official Receiver and referred the matter to the District Judge for orders. The District Judge replied stating the obvious legal position: "It is the Insolvency Court which has to take necessary action under section 70 of the Provincial Insolvency Act." When that letter was received by the Subordinate Judge, the office put up a note suggesting that no prosecution was necessary in view of the fact that a long interval of time had elapsed. The office note expressed a doubt whether a prosecution launched after so many years would be successful. On that the learned Subordinate Judge passed an order which runs as follows: "The Official Receiver should have obtained the previous permission of this Court. He should avoid such irregularities in future. Send a complaint to the First Class Magistrate, Erode." The last part of this order very definitely shows that the learned Subordinate Judge applied his mind to the question and decided that there was ground for enquiry into the offence which at that stage the insolvent appeared to have committed. No doubt, all ground for argument could have been avoided if the learned Subordinate Judge had in so many words stated that there was ground for inquiring into the offence which the insolvent appeared to have committed. No doubt, all ground for argument could have been avoided if the learned Subordinate Judge had in so many words stated that there was ground for inquiring into the offence which the insolvent appeared to have committed. But in the context in which it was made the direction of the Subordinate Judge to send a complaint to the First Class Magistrate is tantamount to the requisite finding. One other observation I may make. I am by no means sure, regard being bad to the language of section 70, that it is obligatory on the Court to record such a finding. If the section had read " Where the Court is satisfied......... the Court after recording a finding to that effect may make a complaint of the offence in writing" the Court would have been under an obligation to record a finding before laying a complaint. The words actually used are: "The Court may record a finding to that effect and make a complaint." The word ‘may’ applies both to ‘record’ and ‘to make.‘ On the words of the statute, it would certainly be legitimate to say that the recording of a finding is optional. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue this matter further since, as I have already explained, the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is tantamount to the requisite finding. In the result, this petition is dismissed. K.C. ----- Petition dismissed.