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1954 DIGILAW 326 (MAD)

Karri Ammadamma v. The State of Andhra

1954-08-05

CHANDRA REDDI

body1954
Order. — This is a petition against the order of the District Magistrate, East Godavari, confirming that of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Rahahmundry, ordering the confiscation of a cycle-rikshaw. . The petitioner is the owner of a cycle-rikshaw. It appears on 7th January, 1954, at about 5-30 p.m., a man called Bodapati Somayya was found riding a cycle-rikshaw concealing two black motor-tubes containing two and half gallons of arrack inside the seat hole of the rickshaw covered with the cushion seat. He was found guilty on his own admission and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five weeks under section 4(1)(a) of the Madras Prohibition Act. The Magistrate ordered the confiscation of the cycle-rickshaw under section 13 of the Madras Prohibition Act (Act X of 1937). Claiming to be the owner of this rickshaw, which was hired by the accused in that case, and alleging that she had no knowledge of the purpose for which the rickshaw was going to be put when it was hired out, the petitioner filed a petition before the Magistrate for return of it. The petition was dismissed. On appeal the order of the Sub-Magistrate was confirmed by the District Magistrate, East Godavari. The learned appellate Magistrate thought that section 13 of the Madras Prohibition Act was mandatory and did not leave any discretion to the Magistrate concerned in the matter of confiscation and that it did not require the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether the owner knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle was likely to be used for carrying arrack. This Revision Petition is filed against this order and the view of the District Magistrate is canvassed. In order to see whether the opinion of the Magistrate is correct or not, it is necessary to refer to the terms of section 13 and section 14 sub-section(1) which are as follows: — “13. In any case in which an offence has been committed against this Act, the liquor, drug, materials, still, utensil, implement, or apparatus in respect or by means of which the offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation along with the receptacles, packages, coverings, animals, vessels, carts or other vehicles used to hold or carry the same.” “14. In any case in which an offence has been committed against this Act, the liquor, drug, materials, still, utensil, implement, or apparatus in respect or by means of which the offence has been committed shall be liable to confiscation along with the receptacles, packages, coverings, animals, vessels, carts or other vehicles used to hold or carry the same.” “14. (1) When the offender is convicted or when the person charged with an offence against this Act is acquitted, but the Court decides that anything is liable to confiscation, such confiscation may be ordered by the Court.” Reading sections 13 and 14(1) together, I think it is not obligatory on the part of a Magistrate to confiscate a vehicle used to carry the liquor, drug, etc. While section 13 confers a power upon the Magistrate to confiscate section 14 provides for passing an order of confiscation. The expression shall be liable to confiscation ‘in section 13 only means ‘is liable to be confiscated’. Under section 14 the Magistrate has to consider whether confiscation should be ordered or not. Under that section it is only when it is established that the owner of the vehicle had knowledge or had reason to believe that it was going to be used for the purpose of committing an offence, the Magistrate could direct it to be confiscated. It is a different matter if the person committing an offence against the Act is the owner of the vehicle in which case no question of knowledge arises. The situation is not the same if the offender is not the owner of the vehicle. It would not be proper pass an order of confiscation in such circumstances without proof that the owner had knowledge or had reason to believe that the vehicle was going to be put to such a use. Interpreting an analogous provision of law, that is, section 11 of the Opium Act (Act X of 1878), Mr. Justice Horwill laid down in Chakrapam Chetty & Sons v. Emperor1 that before an order of confiscation could be passed, the Court has to satisfy itself that the owner of the vehicle who had not committed the offence, knew or had reason to believe that his vehicle was likely to be used for such a purpose. To the same effect is the decision of Mr. To the same effect is the decision of Mr. Justice Somasundaram in Crl.M.P. No. 2286 of 1949 in which the question arose whether an order confiscating the vehicle under section 14 of the Madras Prohibition Act could be passed without proof of requisite knowledge on the part of the owner. On this discussion it follows that the order of the Courts below is erroneous and thev have to investigate whether the petitioner had known or reason to believe that her vehicle was going to be used for the purpose of committing an offence. However, having regard to the time that had lapsed and to the trivial nature of the offence, I think it is not necessary to send the matter back to the trial Court. I would direct the return of the cycle-rickshaw to the petitioner, who is the owner thereof. In the result, the revision case is allowed. D.L.N. -------- Revision allowed.