Judgment. — This Second Appeal raises an interesting question pertaining to the subject of adoption under Hindu Law. The relevant facts may be briefly stated: Kancheti Satyanarayana married one Venkayamma as his first wife. She died in the year 1939 without any male issue. Thereafter, in 1940, he married Sitaramamma as his second wife. She also died issueless. On 17th December, 1942, after the death of his two wives, Satyanarayana took the plaintiff Ramakrishnayya in adoption. Venkayamma, i.e. the first wife of Satyanarayana was the daughter of one Mandadi Appayya. He died in 1932 possessed of the plaint schedule properties situated at Kattamuru, leaving behind him his two daughters Venkayamma and Sitaramamma, who inherited his estate as limited owners under Hindu Law. Sitaramamma died in 1937 and Venkayamma as already stated, died in the year 1939, leaving behind her, her only daughter Tirupathamma. The plaintiff, claiming to be the grandson of Mandadi Appayya through his daughter Venkayamma filed O.S.No.6 of 1947 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur, for recovering possession of the properties of Appayya. The first defendant’s father Hanumavya is the brother of Appayya. On the death of Ven-Kayamma, Hanumayya filed O.S.No. 666 of 1941 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Guntur, against Satyanarayana and Narasayya,the husbands of Venkayamma and Sitaramamma, claiming possession of the suit properties and obtained a decree therein. Defendants 1 to 7 were alleged to be in possession of the suit properties. Defendants 2 to 7 were ex parte. The 1st defendant pleaded that the adoption of the 1st defendant was not true or valid. He averred that the plaintiff was not the daughter’s son of Appayya. He stated that, even if he was the daughter’s son of Appayya, by reason of his adoption by Satyanarayana, the adoption made on 17th December, 1942 could not relate back to the date of Venkayamma’s death, and therefore, could not divest the estate that devolved on Appayya’s heirs on the death of Venkayamma in the year 1939. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the adoption was true that by reason of the adoption, the senior widow Venkayamma should be deemed to be the adoptive mother of the plaintiff and that the adoption would relate back to the date of Venkayamma’s death. On those findings, he gave a decree to the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the adoption was true that by reason of the adoption, the senior widow Venkayamma should be deemed to be the adoptive mother of the plaintiff and that the adoption would relate back to the date of Venkayamma’s death. On those findings, he gave a decree to the plaintiff. The first defendant preferred an appeal against that decree to the Court of the District Judge of Guntur being A.S. No. 392 of 1948. The learned District Judge held that the plaintiff was the adopted son of Satyanarayana and his second wife Sitaramamma and that he was the step-son of Venkayamma. In that view, he held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to succeed to the estate of Appayya. On the second question raised, he held, following the decision in Subrahmamam v. Muthiah Chettiar1, that if Venkayamma was the adoptive mother, the adoption would date back to her death, in which case the estate which devolved on the first defendant would be divested. But, in view of the finding on the first question, he dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the above appeal. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellant contended that when a widower takes a boy in adoption after the death of his two wives, the adoption must be deemed to have been made to the first wife, dharmapatni. In the alternative, he would argue that the adoption must be deemed to have been made to both the wives. If either of his arguments were accepted, it would follow that the plaintiff would be the next heir to Appayya, being his daughter’s son. Mr. Sita-pathirao, learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the second wife would be the adoptive mother. His contention may be briefly stated thus. When the first wife died, a right to partake in religious rites or join the husband to take a boy in adoption came to an end and her mantle was taken over by her successor. Her capacity to be the adoptive mother came to an end. Even if the question was approached from the other end, i.e. the date of adoption, the second wife was the wife alive at the nearest point of time and, therefore, should be preferred. Her capacity to be the adoptive mother came to an end. Even if the question was approached from the other end, i.e. the date of adoption, the second wife was the wife alive at the nearest point of time and, therefore, should be preferred. This argument based upon the replacement of the first wife by the second wife and the relative distances between the date of adoption and the death of the wives appears to be artificial. But if the question is probed a little, a reasonable justification may be found in it. I shall examine it at a later stage. Learned Counsel for the respondents also raised the point that the decision in Subrahmanyam v. Muthiah Chettiar1, is no longer good law and must be deemed to have been superseded by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shnnivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango2. I shall take the second question first. Subramaniam v. Muthiah Chettiar1 is a decision of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Mockett and Kuppuswami Ayyar, JJ. There, a Nattukottai Chettiar woman died leaving no children. She left behind her stridhanam properties, which had been presented to her by her parents and their relations. On her death without issue, according to the custom prevailing in the Nattukottai Chettiar community, these properties reverted to the parent’s family and became vested in her nearest relation. After her death, her husband adopted a son, who claimed those properties. The learned Judges held that by the fact of adoption, he became not merely the son of his adoptive father but also that of his adoptive father’s deceased wife and that the adoption related back to the date of her death, which had the effect of divesting the estate vested in her relation on her parents side. This judgment, if it laid down the correct law, would certainly support the respondents in regard to the second contention raised in the case. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinise the decision with some care to ascertain whether the principles accepted by the learned Judges are sound in law. The reason for the conclusion is stated by Mockett, J. after referring to a passage in the judgment of Madhavan Nair, J. in Sundaramma v. Venkatu Subba. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinise the decision with some care to ascertain whether the principles accepted by the learned Judges are sound in law. The reason for the conclusion is stated by Mockett, J. after referring to a passage in the judgment of Madhavan Nair, J. in Sundaramma v. Venkatu Subba. Ayyar1, as follows at page 647: — “There is therefore authority binding upon me which goes some way towards the«olution of this case. It seems to me to amount clearly to this, namely, that an adopted son does become the son both of his adoptive father and his adoptive father’s deceased wife. When dealing with fictions I cannot see why decisions arising out of fiction should not be carried to their logical conclusion”. The other learned Judge Kuppuswami Ayyar, J. summarises the argument at page 664 as follows: — “It was contended for the plaintiffs that the adoption of the appellant by his father after the death of Deivanai would not divest the property which had devolved on or reverted to the first plaintiff by the custom of reverter referred to above, as this is a case of adoption to a woman alter her death, and hence the adoption need not be given effect to as if the adoption had taken place in the life time of Deivanai herself”. At page 668, the learned Judge gives the following extract from the judgment of Madhavan Nair, J. in Sundaramma v. Venkatasubba Ayyar1. As his adoption puts the adopted son in the place of a legitimate son as regards the rights of inheritance in the family of the adopter, he must be considered to be the heir to any rights arising alter the adoption from his father’s wife’s position in his adoptive family, though she was not alive at the time of the adoption. To give full effect to the fiction of adoption and to assimilate the fact to an imitation of nature, the adopted boy should have a mother. I do not think it is impossible to conceive the deceased wife as the fictional mother of the adopted child”. To give full effect to the fiction of adoption and to assimilate the fact to an imitation of nature, the adopted boy should have a mother. I do not think it is impossible to conceive the deceased wife as the fictional mother of the adopted child”. Then the learned Judge proceeded to state his conclusion: “Applying the principles of the above-cited ruling, it has to be held that the adoption of the second defendant by the 1st defendant must be given effect to as if the appellant was taken in adoption in the life-time of Deivanai and that he will divest all intermediate estates which had vested before his adoption subsequent to the death of Deivanai either by inheritance or by the application of the custom of reverter”. It would be seen from the above extracts from the judgments of the two learned Judges that the only question they considered was whether the deceased wife of a person would be the mother of his adopted son. After having decided that she would be, the learned Judges took it for granted that the adoption would relate back to the date of the death of the wife. They did not appreciate the distinction between the two classes of cases, namely, adoption by a wife to her husband after his death and adoption by the husband after the death of his wife. The principle underlying the proposition that the adoption by a widow relates back to the death her husband has been clearly restated by the Supreme Court in Shrinivas Krishna-rao Kongo v. Narayan Devji Kongo2. The question there was whether an adopted son was entitled to divest the estate of a collateral which had devolved by inheritance prior to his adoption. Their Lordships held that it did not divest and that the relation back of the adopted son was only quoad the estate of the adoptive father. At page 636, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. who delivered the judgment, stated the position thus: — “Considering the question on principle, the ground on which an adopted son is held entitled to take in defeasance of the rights acquired prior to his adoption is that in the eye of law his adoption relates back, by a lcgeal fiction to the date of the death of his adoptive father, he being put in the position of a posthumous son”. At page 637, His Lordship elaborates the position thus: — “The point for determination now is whether this doctrine of relation back can be applied when the claim made by the adopted son relates not to the estate of his adoptive father but of a collateral. The theory on which this doctrine is based is that there should be no hiatus in the continuity of the line of the adoptive father. That by its very nature, can apply only to him and not to his collaterals”. At page 638, the learned Judge summarises as follows: — “The law was thus well settled that when succession to the properties of a person other than:an adoptive father was involved, the principle applicable was not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritence once vested could not be divested”. At page 642, the same idea was expressed in a different language. “It is not in consonance with the principles well-established in Indian jurisprudence that an inheritance could not be in abeyance and that the relation back of the right of the adopted son is only quoad the estate of the adoptive father”. It will be seen from the aforesaid passages that the rule of relation back applies only to the estate of an adoptive father on the analogy that the adopted son is in the position of a posthumous son. Though the judgment of the Supreme Court in terms does not over-rule the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, it clearly lays down the principle which, in my view, cannot be applied directly or by analogy to the estate of the mother. The decision in Subramanian v. Muthiah Chettiar1, if I may say so with respect, is contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of adoption. It is the right of a father to take a boy in adoption. The mother may be associated with him in the ceremonies but her consent is immaterial and, according to Sastras, no particular place is designated or rites prescribed to her in the ceremony of adoption. It is the right of a father to take a boy in adoption. The mother may be associated with him in the ceremonies but her consent is immaterial and, according to Sastras, no particular place is designated or rites prescribed to her in the ceremony of adoption. In Sownthara Pandiyan Avyengar v. Periaveeru Tkevan2, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the adopted son of a Hindu, whose only wife had died before the adoption becomes the son of that wife, so as to inherit as such to the relations in her father’s family: At page 783, Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J. pointed out that section(1) placitum 22 of Dattaka Mimamsa laid down that the adoption was complete by the mere act of adoption by the husband and that by virtue of superiority of the husband, by his mere act of adoption, the filiation was complete. Madhavan Nair, J. in Sundaramma v. Venkata Subba Ayyar3 expressed the same idea at page 950 thus: “It is undisputed that adoption can be made by the husband without the consent of his wife. It may be made even against her wishes; for association with the husband in the act of adoption is a religious formality, which does not show any legal significance. The ceremonial of adoption utterly ignores the wife, who need not be present and to whom no part is assigned it she is present. When the adoption is made whether with or without her consent, the wife becomes the adoptive mother of the child, by the mere fact of adoption”. If the adoption, therefore, is to the husband and the husband himself takes the boy in adoption during his life-time, no question of relating back could conceivably arise. The application of the principle of the converse case, namely, the fiction of a posthumous son in the case of adoption by a widow after the death of her husband to a case of adoption by the father himself is incongruous. It would lead to many anomalies. Where a husband dies and later his widow takes a boy in adoption, fictionally it is approximated to the case of a boy conceived during the husband’s life-time but born subsequently. If we reverse the process, it would not only lead to grave anomalies but also to unnatural results. It would lead to many anomalies. Where a husband dies and later his widow takes a boy in adoption, fictionally it is approximated to the case of a boy conceived during the husband’s life-time but born subsequently. If we reverse the process, it would not only lead to grave anomalies but also to unnatural results. The husband cannot even fictionally give birth to a child conceived by the wife during her life time. This is carrying the fiction to an illogical extent. It would also lead to the position of having two dates for the adoption. For succession to the estate of the father, the date of adoption would be the actual date of adoption by the father and for the purpose of succession to the estate of the mother the date of her death. The more powerful reason to reject the contention is that the Supreme Court in so many terms laid down the limits of the fiction and it is not permissible to extend it. The Supreme Court held that the fiction of a posthumous son as the basis for relation back cannot obviously be applied to the estate of a mother. The Advocate-General argued that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court would equally apply to converse case. If religious motive is dominant in the adoption, it is said that it is equally necessary to keep unbroken the maternal line as the paternal line without a hiatus and if, in the latter case, the hiatus is bridged over by fiction, there is no reason why it should not be done in the former case. The simple answer is that the decided cases did not recognise that extension nor is it necessary to extend the scope of the fiction to unreasonable limits. Without doing so, the adopted son can always offer oblations to his maternal relations. If a father in his own right is competent to make a valid adoption the question of relation back to a later date cannot obviously arise. I would, therefore, hold that the date of adoption unlike in the case of an adoption by the mother after the death of her husband is the actual date when the adoption takes place. In that view, the adoption of the plaintiff does not divest the estate of Appayya, which devolved on the first defendant on the date of the death of Venkayamma. In that view, the adoption of the plaintiff does not divest the estate of Appayya, which devolved on the first defendant on the date of the death of Venkayamma. This finding is enough to dispose of the appeal. But, as the first question was argued at some length, I think it is right that I should express my view on that question also. The question briefly stated is this: When a person after the death of his two wives takes a boy in adoption, which wife would be the adoptive mother of the adopted son and whether both of them could be considered as adoptive mothers. Before considering the point raised, it will be convenient to consider the law on the subject for this process will enable us to evolve a principle to meet the new situation consistent with settled law. The Judicial Committee in Annapurni Nachiar v. Forbes1, ruled that it is competent to a person to associate any one of his several wives in the act of adoption and that thereupon that wife becomes the mother of the adopted boy and is entitled to succeed to him on his death in preference to the others, who stand to him in the relation of step-mothers only. At page 258 their Lordships observed: Again it seems not to be doubted that a man may authorise a single one of several wives to adopt after his death, or that she would on adoption stand in the place of the natural mother. If he can do that, it would be very capricious to deny him the power of selecting a single wife to join with him in his life-time in adopting a boy, with the same effect on her relations with the boy. It is true that some rules of Hindu Law, resting perhaps on religious tenets or ancient customs, appear to be quite arbitrary..............It certainly is a reasonable law that the head of a family should be able to take action likely to prevent disputes between his widows relative to adoption and the consequences of it ". Shephard and Best, JJ. in Annapurni Nachiar v. Collector of Tinnevelly2, held that the junior wife having taken part in the adoption was entitled to the impartible estate in preference to her co-wife. Shephard and Best, JJ. in Annapurni Nachiar v. Collector of Tinnevelly2, held that the junior wife having taken part in the adoption was entitled to the impartible estate in preference to her co-wife. Where a man dies leaving several widows, the preferential right to adopt with the consent of sapindas vests with the senior among them and an adoption made by the junior widow without the consent of the senior widow without even consulting her is invalid (see Kakerla Chukkamma v.. Kakerla Ponnammal3). So too, it has been held in Raja Venkatappa Nayanim Bahadur v. Rangarao4, that an adoption made by a junior widow of a deceased Hindu purporting to be made with the consent of the sapindas but without consulting the senior widow is invalid. The adopted son of a Hindu whose only wife had died before the adoption, becomes the son of that wife so as to inherit as such to the relations (in her father’s family). See Sundaramma v. Venkatasubba Ayyar5. This view was considered and accepted by the Full Bench in Sownthara Pandiyan Ayyengar v.Periaveeru Thevar1. Where a Hindu died leaving two widows to both of whom he gave a joint authority to adopt, an adoption made by them jointly is not invalid. Though the son adopted would in law be the son only of the senior widow, who alone has the preferential right to adopt, the junior widow being considered only as his step-mother (see Tiruvengalarn v. Butchayya2). It is not necessary to multiply cases. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid decisions that it is the undoubted right of a husband to take a boy in adoption, though the son adopted becomes the son of the mother. This position follows from the text of Nanda Pandita in Dattaka Mimamsa, part I, verse 22 which reads: “In consequence of the superiority of the husband by his mere act of adoption, the affiliation of the adopted, as son of the wife is complete in the same manner as her property in any other thing accepted by the husband.” This text has been accepted and followed by the decisions of the Madras High Court. See Sundaramma v. Venkatasubba Ayyar3 and Sowntharapandian Ayyangar v. Periaveeru TJievan1. But the husband can select one or the other of his wives irrespective of any question of seniority and give her the status of an adoptive mother. See Sundaramma v. Venkatasubba Ayyar3 and Sowntharapandian Ayyangar v. Periaveeru TJievan1. But the husband can select one or the other of his wives irrespective of any question of seniority and give her the status of an adoptive mother. This he can do during his lifetime expressly or by necessary implication. By associating the selected wife with him during the adoption ceremony he can show his preference to her. So too, he can authorise one or the other of his wives to take a boy in adoption after his lifetime. If he gives the power to adopt to all his widows, the Dharmapatni or the eldest of the widows is designated by the Courts as the adoptive mother on the ground that it must have been the presumed intention of the deceased. So far there is no dispute. But the question in the present case is what would be the legal position if all the wives predeceased the husband ? The learned Advocate-General contends that the same rule of preference which applied in the case of widows should be invoked even in the case of predeceased wives. It is therefore, necessary to consider in some detail those cases where there was a competition between two or more widows to ascertain on what principle that conflict was resolved. In Kakerla Chukkamma v. Kakerla Punnamma4, a man died leaving several widows. The junior widow took a boy in adoption with the consent of the sapindas. The senior widow sued for a declaration that the adoption was not valid. The learned Judge held that the adoption was invalid. Their Lordships stated the reasons for their conclusion as follows at page 74: — “Has she got the same preferential right in the performance of religious duties ? In Colebrooke’s Digest of Hindu Law, Book IV, chapter 1, sloka 51, it is said that the first is the wife married from a sense of duty, and it is she ‘whom acts of duty concern, which the commentator states, means ‘who officiates in acts of religion and so forth’. A sloka of Yagnavalkya is quoted as showing that if there are several wives of the same class, acts of religion are lawfully performed ‘by no other than the eldest’. A sloka of Yagnavalkya is quoted as showing that if there are several wives of the same class, acts of religion are lawfully performed ‘by no other than the eldest’. Clauses 48 and 49 and the commentator Vignaneswara is cited as saying that in such a case the husband shall not employ another in business relating to religious duties and that the first married one must be preferred in all matters relating to acts of religion, even though, according to Vishnu, there may be younger wives who are dearer to him. Certain exceptions are referred to in sloka 50. It will be observed that this is the very ground on which her preferential right to manage the property left by the deceased husband is recognised by Strange in the passage cited above and extracted in the judgment in the Tanjore case (Jijqyiamba Bayi Saiba v. Kamakshi Bayi5). A fortiori her preferencial right to perform acts of religion should be recognised and it is not denied that adoption is an act of religion,” The learned Judges therefore attribute the right of the elder widow to take a boy in adoption to a preferential right to perform acts of religion. If there are two or more wives the eldest of the wives alive will have preferential right to perform acts of religion. In Rajah Venkatappa Nayanim v. Ranga Rao6, a junior widow took a boy in adoption with the consent of the sapindas without consulting the senior widow. The learned Judges held that the adoption was invalid. At page 774 the learned Judges pointed out the basis of the rule of preference thus: "The preferential right of the senior wife as regards religious acts is in my opinion clearly established. The Mitakshara, Book 1, chapter III, verse 88, which has been specially translated for us, first cites the text of Yagnavalkya ‘ when there is a wife of an equal class present, never do acts of religion with any other. When there is more than one wife of the same class as yourself in matters of religion never employ any but the eldest’. On this Vignaneswara comments as follows: ‘When there is a wife of equal class never do acts of religion with wives of any other class. When there is more than one wife of the same class as yourself in matters of religion never employ any but the eldest’. On this Vignaneswara comments as follows: ‘When there is a wife of equal class never do acts of religion with wives of any other class. When there are several wives of the same class in matters of religion do not pass over the eldest wife and do not employ either the second or the third (lit. the middle or the youngest one).‘ See also Cole-brook, volume 2, Digest, pages 124 to 126. The senior widow’s preferential right of adoption is expressly recognised in Steele’s Law and Custom of Hindu Cases, page 48, which embodies the results of an enquiry held in the year 1831 as to the Hindu customs and usages prevailing in the Deccan." In regard to the meaning of the word ‘ pathni’ on which much stress was laid during the arguments, Wallis, C.J., says: — " As regards the meaning of pathni, it appears from the passages in the Mitakshara and Viramitrodaya referred to in Janokinath Mukhopadhya v. Mathuranath Mukhopadhya1, that the celebrated grammarian Panini considered that the word had been formed by affixing the particle ni to pati (husband) to signify one who partakes in the holy sacrifices. Fanciful, as this may be, it was of course ac-cep ed on Panini’s authority by the commentators and Vignaneswara after referring to it states that all the wives were to be regarded as pathnis and as such entitled to share in the inheritance........Admitting however that the junior wives are pathnis in the sense of being capable of partaking in sacrificial acts, it still remains true on the express authority of the Mitakshara already cited, that the senior wife has the preferential right, as regards religious acts, and this appears to me to be a sufficient foundation for her preferential right as to adoption." From the aforesaid passages, it is manifest that preferential treatment is not based upon the fact that the junior wives cannot exercise religious acts along with the husband but on the fact that the eldest of the wives has preferential right to" perform the said acts. It may also be noted that the eldest of the surviving widows may not be eldest of the wives, for it is conceivable that the eldest of the wives might have died either before the death of the husband or before the date of adoption. In Thiruvengalam v. Butchayya2, a Hindu died leaving two wives to both of whom he gave general authority to adopt. Both of them jointly took a boy in adoption. It was held that the adoption was valid but the son adopted will in law be the son only of the senior widow. This conclusion was again arrived at on the principle that the senior widow had a preferential right to adopt. Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., gave his reasons for preferring the senior widow at page 380 as follows: — " We may also in this connection refer to the text of Kathyayana where the first and senior wife is said to be the dharmapatni. That is to say, the wife wed for the purpose of performing religious rites and duties and the second and succeeding wives spoken of as merely for the purpose of love or lust. Again, in the chapter treating of Vivaha Samskara, it is stated in the commentary that after the sacrificial fire is created along with one wife, the wives afterwards taken do not acquire equal rights with the first wife in respect of the oblations, unless both the wives together again officiate in creating a new sacrificial fire. In the Shastras are to be found scattered about many texts which give prominence to and recognise the superiority of the first wife or the dharmapatni. There is also a well-established rule that when the husband dies sonless, the funeral ceremonies should be performed only by the first and senior wife. Again, as in the making of dattahomam, only one person can at a time perform the homam it cannot be performed by both or on behalf of both simultaneously. Hence also it is deducible that, though both may be present and participate in the performance of the homam, it is shastricaliy performed only by the senior and deemed to have been performed only by her." The learned Judge is not here considering the case where the first wife is dead and the surviving wives are only the second and the third. The above passage can legitimately be applied to the case of a second wife, who is the elder of the surviving two. It is only authority for the position that the eldest of the surviving wives, even though the eldest is not the first, wife, has a preferential right to take a boy in adoption. It is, therefore, apparent that the rule of preference based on seniority and the senior wife’s superior right to take part in religious duties can obviously apply only to widows or wives who are alive. When there is competition between two or more wives or two or more widows, the eldest of them is preferred, not on the ground that she is the first wife, but on the ground that she is the eldest of the competing wives. All the wives are pat/mis and are eligible to take part in religious duties along with the husband, but the eldest is preferred to the others. The preferential right of one of the wives to take part in religious duties along with her husband has been the subject of a learned article found in (1948) 2 M.L.J. 17, Journal. After considering the texts of Yagnavalkya, Katyayana, Vishnu and others, the learned author summarises as follows: The foregoing citations show: “(i) Every wife married in the approved form is ceremonially competent and can take part in acts of dharma ; (ii) When there are many wives of the same class, other things being equal, the senior wife has precedence and is to be associated in acts of religion ; (iii) Where such a wife is dead or becomes disqualified, the next senior wife should be selected; and (iv) These rules regulate precedence as between living wives.” The aforesaid rules clearly indicate that the arbitrary rules of preferring the dharmapathni or the eldest wife irrespective of the fact whether she is alive or not is not supported by the shastras. There is no basis, therefore, for the arguments that the first wife, though dead, being the dharmapathni, has a preferential right to be the mother of the adopted boy in a competition between her and the surviving wives. This rule of preference cannot be applied to wives some of them dead and some of them alive or to deceased wives. We must look elsewhere for a workable rule ‘of preference. This rule of preference cannot be applied to wives some of them dead and some of them alive or to deceased wives. We must look elsewhere for a workable rule ‘of preference. In Sowntharapandian Ayyangar v. Periaveeru Thevan1, Anantakrishna Ayyar, J., incidentally throws some light on the question to be decided. At page 789, the learned Judge said: “In the case of plurality of wives, several tests have been indicated to find out the intention of the husband as to which of the wives should be the mother of the adopted son. In the absence of any indication by the husband himself, just as associating one wife with him in the act of adoption or otherwise declaring who is to be the mother, it may be that the senior-most wife — dharmapathni — might be held to be the moth. If some wives be dead but others living, other circumstances might have to be considered. We have not to decide those cases on the present occasion.” In the view of the learned Judge, the intention of the husband is paramount and it can be gathered from the circumstances of each case. This question may be approached from two standpoints, (i) the intention of the deceased may be gathered from the facts of each case and (ii) the presumed intention of the adoptive father in stated circumstances. The first, though it appears to be more logical, will lead to unexpected results and unnecessary complications. It will keep the law uncertain and will be a fruitful source of litigation. The other principle, if clearly and definitely laid own, affords a workable rule for stated situations. I would prefer to adopt the latter, but, in adopting it, I must find out some rule, which is in consonance with considerations of authority, usage, convenience and commonsense. Let us take the case of a husband whose first wife died and who married again. He takes a boy in adoption. Ordinarily, he takes the boy in adoption along with his second wife. The public consensus of opinion expects him to do so and he also conforms to it unless he is a highly eccentric man. Even if he does not the law designates the second wife as the mother. If the second wife dies and he then takes a boy in adoption, would his intention be otherwise ? The public consensus of opinion expects him to do so and he also conforms to it unless he is a highly eccentric man. Even if he does not the law designates the second wife as the mother. If the second wife dies and he then takes a boy in adoption, would his intention be otherwise ? Would he take a boy in adoption to the wife who died earlier ignoring the second wife ? Ordinarily, he would not. Again if he died authorising his wife to adopt a boy, would it indicate that the deceased wife should be the adoptive mother of the boy. Certainly he would not. Even from the standpoint of religious rites, the first wife cannot be said to be superior. Whatever might be said in the case of two wives, both of them alive, when the elder dies the second wife gets into her place and during her lifetime discharges her religious obligations. No question of preferential rights to perform religious obligations would arise after the death of the first wife. Even from commonsense point of view, the same result follows. The husband lives with his first wife and she dies without a child. He marries again. When the second wife is alive, he always looks for a progeny through her. If he has no natural son through her, he takes a boy in adoption along with her. He no longer thinks of adopting a boy to his deceased wife. His natural desire to have progeny by his second wife is substituted by adoption along with her. Is it reasonable to attribute to him at first an intention to have a natural son by his second wife and in case of failure of natural progeny yet to have an adopted son along with her and revert back to the first wife immediately she dies ? In my view, it is unreasonable to do so. Where therefore a father has not expressed his intention of nominating one or the other of the dead wives, I have no hesitation in holding that the presumed intention of the father is to treat the second wife as the mother of the adopted son. It is then contended that both the deceased wives should be held to be the mothers of the adopted son. If this argument be accepted, it will lead to anomalies and confusion in matters of succession. It is then contended that both the deceased wives should be held to be the mothers of the adopted son. If this argument be accepted, it will lead to anomalies and confusion in matters of succession. Further, it would offend the principle, viz., that the adopted son must be made to assimilate to nature as far as possible. It is inconceivable in the case of a natural son that he has two mothers through whom he can claim to succeed to two different lines of maternal ancestors. That is why the decided cases have recognised that where there are several wives, the husband is at liberty to designate one, who shall take the place of the mother and that by this means the anomaly of having several mothers to the adopted son may be avoided. See Annapurni Nachiar v. Collector of Tinnevelly1. In Tiruvengalam v. Butchayya2, where a Hindu died leaving two widows to both of whom he gave general authority to adopt, it was held that though the adoption made by them jointly was valid, the adopted son would in law be the son only of the senior widow. The reason for that conclusion was stated by Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., at page 379 as follows: — “If it be merely regarded as;a fiction, there must be no difficulty whatever in a person bearing the same relationship to two or more persons. However, it seems to us that, having regard to the genius of the Hindu Law and what may be regarded as the custom and consciousness of the community at large at any rate in South India, it will be more in accordance with the reason of the thing, the principle applicable and observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee to regard the adoption in this case as having been made by and to the senior widow Pullamma, though with the concurrence of the other widow.” The learned Advocate-General’s attempt to cull out a different principle from the observations of the Judicial Committee in Annapurna Nachiar v. Forbes3, by some process of inferential reasoning does not appeal to me. There, when Mr. There, when Mr. Mayne relied upon certain sacred texts in support of his contention that good effects produced by the son of one wife enured to the benefit of the other wives, they Tepefied it by stating that the texts would not show that the wife, who received in adoption and another who did not, stand on an equal footing as regards inheritance to the adopted boy. From that, it is argued that for other purposes they stand on an equal footing. I do not think decisions can be pressed into service in support of propositions which they do not expressly lay down. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the second wife of the two predeceased wives was the adoptive mother of the plaintiff. It follows that the judgment of the lower court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Leave granted. D.L.N. ------- Appeal dismissed