Judgment.— This second appeal is preferred by the 1st defendant against the decree and judgment of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tenali confirming those of the District Munsif, Tenali, in O. S. No. 61 of 1945, a suit filed by the respondent for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage bond dated 18th November, 1876. Plaintiff’s case may be briefly stated:—One Abdul Wahab Sahib owned a plot of about 7 acres covered by D. Nos. 1176, 1178, 1179 and 1282 of Kolakalur village. Item 1 of the plaint schedule is the southern portion of D. Nos. 1176, 1178 and 1179 of the extent of 3 acres. Item 2 is one acre in D. No. 1282. The said Abdul Wahab Sahib on 18th November, 1876, executed a usufructuary mortgage of the said two items in favour of Mukkamala Lakshminarasu. Under the document, a sum of Rs. 200 was borrowed. The said sum carried interest at 12 per cent, per annum. It was agreed that the principal and interest due under the bond were to be discharged by crediting Rs. 12 every year towards the debt. The said Abdul Wahab Sahib filed O.S. No. 132 of 1894 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Guntur, against the mortgagee for redeeming the mortgage and for possession. When the suit was dismissed, he preferred an appeal and withdrew the same. During the pendency of that litigation, Abdul Wahab Sahib transferred his right, title and interest in the said property along with his other property by a registered deed dated 10th June, 1865, to Venkatakrishnayya, the father of plaintiffs 1 to 4 and the patei’nal grandfather of plaintiffs 5 to 11. The mortgagee Lakshminarasu sub-mortgaged the property by a deed dated 8th April, 1886 and died 30 years ago. His brother late Anantaramayya succeeded to his property. The 4th defendant is the grandson of Anantaramayya and claims the mortgagee’s rights in item 2. The mortgagee’s interest in item 1 devolved on the two sons of Anantaramayya, Mohanarayudu and Mangayya. The 1st defendant purchased the right, title and interest of the mortgagee in item 1 in a Court-sale held in execution of a money decree obtained by him against the representatives of Anantaramayya. Defendants 2 and 3 are his lessees. On those allegations, the aforesaid suit was filed for redemption of the suit mortgage bond and for recovery of future profits. Defendants 2 and 3 are his lessees. On those allegations, the aforesaid suit was filed for redemption of the suit mortgage bond and for recovery of future profits. The 1st defendant did not admit the allegations in the plaint but put the plaintiffs to the proof of the truth, consideration and validity of the mortgage deed. He also pleaded that, in accordance with the terms of the deed, the debt has not been discharged. He further averred that the sale executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib in favour ‘of Venkatakrishnayya was not given effect to and the Same was duly rescinded after the dismissal of the appeal filed by him. The 4th defendant supported the 1st defendant. He pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and that the judgment in O.S.No.132 of 1894 operated as res judicata. The learned District Munsiff and on appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the mortgage deed was executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib in favour of Lakshminarasu and that the sale deed was duly executed by him in favour of Venkata Krishnayya, the father of plaintiffs 1 to 4 and grandfather of plaintiffs 5 to 11. They also held that the mortgage debt had been wiped off from the rents of the property. In the result, the suit was decreed. The 1st defendant preferred the above appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the mortgage deed executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib in favour of Lakshminarasu and the sale deed executed by him in favour of Venkatakrishnayya were not duly proved. He further argued that, under the terms of the mortgage deed, the mortgage was not discharged. Exhibit P-1 dated 18th November, 1876, is a certified copy of the mortgage bond executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib in favour of Lakshminarasu. The original of the document was not produced. Before the trial commenced, the plaintiffs issued a notice under Order 12, rule 3, Civil Procedure Code, requiring defendants within 48 hours to admit that the aforesaid mortgage deed and the sale defed were copies of the originals. On the petition, the vakil for the 1st defendant made an endorsement to the effect that the genuineness of the copies was admitted. Mr. On the petition, the vakil for the 1st defendant made an endorsement to the effect that the genuineness of the copies was admitted. Mr. Ramanarasu argued that his client only admitted the genuineness of the copy as a’ copy of the copy kept in the Registrar’s office and that it did not amount to an admission that it was a true copy of the original and therefore the plaintiffs had to make out a case for the admission of the copy as secondary evidence, of the original. In any view, he would say that the said admission did not absolve the plaintiff from proving the execution of the mortgage deed. The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and the Registration Act may now be read: — - " Section 65 (Evidence Act): — Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases: (a) When the original is shown or appears, to be in the possession or power ; of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it. (b) When the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest. * * * * * * (e) When the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74. (f) When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence. ****** Section 74: The following documents are public documents: * * * * * * 2. Public records kept in any State of private documents. Section 57(5) (Registration Act). All copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the Registering Officer, and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document. In my view, secondary evidence of the contents of Exhibit P-1 is admissible both under section 65(b) as well under section 65(e). The 1st defendant admitted the genuineness of the certified copy. In my view, secondary evidence of the contents of Exhibit P-1 is admissible both under section 65(b) as well under section 65(e). The 1st defendant admitted the genuineness of the certified copy. That is an admission — learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute this position of the existence, condition or contents of its original, i.e., the copy of the mortgage document maintained in the Registrar’s Office. If so much was granted, section 57(5) of the Registration Act makes the said copy admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document itself. A combined reading of the provisions of section 65(b) of the Evidence Act and section 57(5) of the Registration Act may be put thus. By reason of the admission made by the 1st defendant of genuineness of the certified copy within the meaning of section 65 (b) of the Evidence Act, the certified copy became admissible in evidence as secondary evidence under section 65. By reason of section 57(5) of the Registration Act, the said copy becomes admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document itself. I would also hold that the certified copy is also admissible under section 65(e) and (f) of the Evidence Act. Secondary evidence may be given, if the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74. The definition of a public document under section 74 takes in public records kept in any State of private documents. The Registrar’s Office certainly keeps a public record of all sale deeds registered in that office. Section 76 enables an officer having the custody of a public document to give a certified copy. The certified copy is therefore admissible in evidence both under section 65 (e) and (f) of the Evidence Act. The certified copy therefore is secondary evidence of the public record of the mortgage deed kept in the Registrar’s Office. Again by invoking section 57(5) the said copy becomes admissible, for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document itself. I would therefore hold that the certified copy is admissible in evidence. But this will not dispense with the proof of the execution of Exhibit P-1. Again by invoking section 57(5) the said copy becomes admissible, for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document itself. I would therefore hold that the certified copy is admissible in evidence. But this will not dispense with the proof of the execution of Exhibit P-1. It may be mentioned that the mortgage deed was executed prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act and there was no provision of law at the time of the execution of the mortgage that the morgage deed should be attested and therefore the special rules of proof in regard to documents required by law to be attested does not apply. It would be enough to prove that the document was executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib in favour of Lakshminarasu. This is a document of 1876. The mortgagor, mortgagee and all persons connected with its execution are no more. In the case of old documents when all the witnesses who can speak of their personal knowledge to the execution of the document, passed away, it is idle to insist that the document cannot be proved otherwise than by those, who had witnessed its execution. In such circumstances, the document could be proved by circumstantial evidence. In this case both the Courts found that there is enough evidence to establish the fact of execution. The certified copy contains an endorsement to the effect that it was presented by the mortgagor Abdul Wahab Sahib himself for registration and that Abdul Wahab Sahib acknowledged before the Registrar his execution of the instrument and signed before the Registrar in token thereof. Three identifying witnesses also signed before the Registrar. The endorsement may not be sufficient to prove the attestation of the witnesses for, it ex facie does not disclose that either the executant admitted signing before them or that they put their signatures in his presence. See Surendra Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Behari Singh1. But as I have already said, this document having been executed before the Transfer of Property Act, it is not necessary that it should have been attested by witnesses. The endorsement therefore indicates beyond any reasonable doubt that the executant admitted the execution of the document before the Registrar. Subsequently in 1894, mortagor filed O.S.No.132 of 1894 for redemption of the mortgage. Exhibit P-2 is the register of civil suits. The endorsement therefore indicates beyond any reasonable doubt that the executant admitted the execution of the document before the Registrar. Subsequently in 1894, mortagor filed O.S.No.132 of 1894 for redemption of the mortgage. Exhibit P-2 is the register of civil suits. It shows that Abdul Wahab Sahib filed the said suit for redemption against Lakshminarasu. The same document discloses that he filed an appeal against the decree of the first Court, being Appeal No. 1229 of 1895 and that he withdrew it. This conduct of Adbul Wahab Sahib in his lifetime shows that he executed the mortgage. Otherwise, no reason is suggested why he should have filed a suit for redemption of mortgage which he did not execute. The mortgagee Lakshminarasu sub-mortgaged the properties in favour of one Talluru Venkatarayudu under Exhibit P-4, dated 8th April, 1886. In Exhibit P-4 the mortgagee admits that he was in possession under the mortgage executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib. The 4th defendant, who is the daughter’s son of Lakshiminarasu and is also in possession of item 2 does not deny the mortgage deed in the written statement. The said documents show that from the date of the execution of the mortgage deed, the mortgagor, the mortgagee and his representatives always treated the mortgage deed as one duly executed by Abdul Wahab Sahib. From the aforesaid documentary evidence both the Courts came to the conclusion that the execution was proved. I cannot say that the finding was based upon irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. The finding is one of fact and no grounds have been made out for interference. Coming to sale, deed Exhibit P-3, I must hold for the reasons stated by me in regard to Exhibit P-1 that Exhibit P-3 was rightly admitted as secondary evidence. In regard to Exhibit P-3 in the ordinary course, the plaintiffs must be in possession of the original. P.W.1 deposes that his father Venkatakrishnayya died during his minority, that he learnt that the suit property was sold to his father and that he attempted to find out if there were any documents relating to this property but he found none and then he obtained copies of the same. In cross-examination he further adds that he could not trace the original of the sale deed Exhibit P-3 and that it is not correct to say that the document was suppressed. In cross-examination he further adds that he could not trace the original of the sale deed Exhibit P-3 and that it is not correct to say that the document was suppressed. This evidence has been accepted by the Courts below. Having gone through the evidence, I hold that they were justified in doing so. If the evidence is accepted, it follows that the original was lost within the meaning of section 65(c) of the Evidence Act, and, therefore secondary evidence to its contents is clearly admissible. It is clear from Exhibits P-7 to P-10, the proceedings in O.S. No. 1388 of 1930 that this document was lost even in the year 1913. Exhibit P-3 is of the year 1895 and both Abdul Wahab Sahib the vendor and Venkatakrishnayya the vendee are no more. There is nobody alive who could prove the document by direct evidence. We must therefore fall upon circumstantial evidence even in this case. Exhibit P-3, certified copy of the sale deed, contains a registration endorsement. It shows that Abdul Wahab Sahib admitted execution and signed before the Sub-Registrar. There are also the signatures of the identifying witnesses. It shows that soon after its execution the vendor admitted its execution. The proceedings in O.S. No. 1388 of 1913 also throw some light on the question of execution of the document. Ven-katakrishnayya’s father-in-law filed the said suit for redemption of a mortgage in respect of a portion of the property covered by Exhibit P-3. He filed that suit on the basis that he was the owner and Venkatakrishnayya was only his benamidar. Exhibits P-7 and P-8 are copies of the written statements filed by the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant in that suit. Exhibit P-7 is a written statement filed by the mortgagee’s son. He did not deny the execution of the sale but only denied that it was benami for the plaintiff therein. The 4th defendant even in his written statement does not say that the sale deed was not executed in favour of plaintiff’s father. On the said facts and circumstances, both Courts held that the execution of the sale-deed was proved. I cannot say there is no evidence to support that finding. I therefore accept that finding. The 4th defendant even in his written statement does not say that the sale deed was not executed in favour of plaintiff’s father. On the said facts and circumstances, both Courts held that the execution of the sale-deed was proved. I cannot say there is no evidence to support that finding. I therefore accept that finding. It was then contended that on a true construction of the mortgage deed, it should be held that the debt was still outstanding and therefore the suit for redemption was not maintainable. Under Exhibit P-1 the usufructuary mortgage, the following provision was made in regard to the mode of the discharge of the debt: “In all 4 acres 20 cents are mortgaged to you for which the fixed amount of cist is Rs. 14-8-0 (rupees fourteen and annas eight only). Out of this you shall pay a quit rent of Rs. 2-8-0 (rupees two and annas eight only) payable by us annually to the Government without reference to us and yourself adjust the balance of Rs. 12 per year on the 30th of Makha Bahulam of every year commencing from Fasli 1287 till the entire principal and interest of this deed are discharged.” If under this document an amount of Rs. 12 per year was appropriated towards the principal, it is conceded that the debt was discharged. But it was contended that the said amount of Rs. 12 per year should have been appropriated towards interest and that, if so appropriated, the debt would be outstanding. Under the document Rs. 200 was advanced and the interest payable thereon was 1 percent, per mensem. So the interest payable on Rs. 200 was Rs. 24 per year. If the kist of Rs. 12 fixed should be appropriated towards interest, the document would never be discharged for the sum of Rs. 12 would not be sufficient even for paying off the interest. That that could not have been their intention is manifest from the recital that the balance of Rs. 12 should be adjusted towards the debt till the entire principal and interest are discharged. The parties contemplated that the debt should be discharged only by adjusting Rs. 12 every year towards the debt. An interpretation, which would be contrary to the dominant intention of the parties should not be accepted unless the words compel the Court to do so. 12 should be adjusted towards the debt till the entire principal and interest are discharged. The parties contemplated that the debt should be discharged only by adjusting Rs. 12 every year towards the debt. An interpretation, which would be contrary to the dominant intention of the parties should not be accepted unless the words compel the Court to do so. Here when the document does not say whether the balance of Rs. 12 should be appropriated towards the principal or interest the aforesaid recital clearly indicates that the intention of the parties was that it should be appropriated only towards the principal. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkatadri Apparao v. Parthasarathi Apparao1. Their Lordships pointed out that upon taking an account of principal and interest due, the ordinary rule as to payment; by the debtor unappropriated either to principal or interest, is that they are first to be applied to the discharge of interest. The decision in Sreenivasachari v. Krishna Chetty2, followed the said Judgment. It is true that the aforesaid two decisions laid down that in the absence of any specific appropriation by the debtor and when he pays money towards principal and interest, the payment must be deemed towards interest as such but this presumed intention of the debtor cannot obviously be invoked in a case like this where the intention of the parties is made clear by the express recitals in the document itself. I would therefore, agree with the Courts below that it was agreed between the parties that the balance of Rs. 12 per year should be appropriated only towards the principal. If so, it is admitted that the debt was discharged. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------ Appeal dismissed.