Judgment.- Defendant is the appellant. The question of law raised in the second appeal is a simple one. It relates to the admissibility of an unregistered document styled as a gift deed executed by Kamalamma in favour of the defendant in 1930. The trial Court rejected it as being inadmissible for want of Registration. The lower appellate Court, while holding that it was admissible only for proving the nature and character of possession, held that its probative value was practically nil: but that document was not marked in evidence even for that limited purpose. The main contention of the learned advocate for the appellant was that, under Muhammadan Law, a reg1stered deed is not necessary to effect a gift, that the gift deed was admissible in evidence, even though it was unreg1stered and that in any event, it ought to have been marked in evidence and relied on for the collateral purpose of proving the nature and character of possession. For the purpose of appreciating the contentions, it is necessary to set out a few relevant facts as found by Courts below. The defendant’s mother was the owner of an extent of acres 1.98 in S. N. 28/2. She had two sons, the defendant herein and Pedda Budde Saheb. She executed a mortgage deed dated 19th May, 1936, marked as Exhibit A-2 in favour of Seshayya for the expenses incurred in G.C. No. 12 of 1936 on the file of the Taluk Magistrate, Koilguntla. The criminal case was filed against the defendant and his brother. The property that was mortgaged under Exhibit A-2 by Kamalamma was sold by her to the plaintiff-respondent under Exhibit A-1 dated 16th August, 1939, for the sum of Rs. 300. The certified extract of No.14 account of Chintakunta village for fasli 1352, marked as Exhibit A-7, shows that the patta had been transferred in favour of the plaintiff. Exhibit A-3 was a lease deed executed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant’s brother Pedda Budde Saheb.- It is also in evidence that half the extent purchased by the plaintiff under Exhibit A-1 was sold to Pedda Budde Saheb. The evidence referred to supra clearly establishes that the plaintiff acquired title by reason of the purchase under Exhibit A-1 and was in possession leasing out the suit property to the defendant’s brother. The evidence referred to supra clearly establishes that the plaintiff acquired title by reason of the purchase under Exhibit A-1 and was in possession leasing out the suit property to the defendant’s brother. The case of the defendant is that, 9 years prior to the sale in favour of the plaintiff, he acquired title to the suit property under a gift deed executed by his mother. The document that was tendered in evidence but not marked by the Court below was read out to me in full and I find that the recitals therein clearly show that possession was delivered to the defendant under the document and that an immediate interest was sought to be created in him to be enjoyed from generation to generation. The last clause no doubt provided that the mother would execute a reg1stered gift deed whenever called upon to do so by her son, the donee. Even though there is no proof that the document is a genuine one I assume, for the purpose of deciding the question of law, that it was duly executed by Kamalamma. While excluding the deed of gift as being inadmissible in evidence for want of Registration, the District Munsiff of Nandyal permitted the defendant to examine witnesses in support of his case as to his mother having gifted away the suit property to him. The Courts below rightly held that if a valid gift was made, according to rules of Muhammadan Law in favour of the defendant, it was unlikely that she would have asserted title to the suit property and executed a mortgage deed in 1936 in favour of Seshayya for the expenses incurred by the defendant and his brother in defending the criminal case in C.C. No. 12 of 1936 on the file of the Taluk Magistrate, Koilguntla, and a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in 1939 for discharging the mortgage debt. The lease deed executed by the defendant’s brother was properly relied on to negative the case of the defendant that he was in possession as a donee. The c1st receipts Exhibits B-1 to B-8, though produced by the defendant, were rightly rejected as not proving that he paid cist in respect of the suit land. The c1st receipts stood in the name of Budde Saheb and not in the name of Chinna Budde Saheb, the defendant. The c1st receipts Exhibits B-1 to B-8, though produced by the defendant, were rightly rejected as not proving that he paid cist in respect of the suit land. The c1st receipts stood in the name of Budde Saheb and not in the name of Chinna Budde Saheb, the defendant. As pointed out by the District Munsif in paragraph 9, the amount of c1st paid was not uniform. From the facts above stated, I am of opinion that the Courts below arrived at the correct conclusion that the defendant did not prove that there was a valid gift in his favour and that he continued in possession as a donee ever since. It is true that in order to create a valid gift of moveable or immoveable property, writing is not essential under Muhammadan Law. The provisions of section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to Mahomedan gifts - vide section 129. The three essentials of a gift under Muhammadan Law are: (1) a declaration of gift by the donor, (2) an acceptance express or implied by or on behalf of the donee, and (3) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. The Registration of a deed of gift does not cure want of delivery of possession - vide Vahazulla Saheb v. Boyapati Nagayya1 and Mirza Sadik Hussain Khan v. Nawab Saiyed Hashim Alikhan2. But if a gift is reduced to writing, it requires to be reg1stered under section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act which runs in the following terms:. “The following documents shall be reg1stered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a District in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which Act No. 16 of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871 or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 or this Act came or comes into force, namely: (a) Instruments of gift of immoveable property..........” Even if by virtue of the terms of section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act, a deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan does not require to comply with the provisions of section 123, still it requires to be reg1stered under section 17(1)(a) when the gift relates to immoveable property. Though no authority is necessary to be cited in support of this proposition, reference may be made to the decision reported in Moula Buksh v. Hafiud-Din3, wherein Shadilal, C.J., observed as follows: “In view of the clear and unequivocal terms of the deed we have no hesitation in holding that it is a transfer of immoveable property made without consideration. It is beyond dispute that under clause(a) of section 17(1) of the Indian Registration Act, every instrument of gift of immoveable property requires compulsory Registration irrespective of the value of the property conveyed by the instrument.” The learned advocate for the appellant relied upon the decision reported in Nasib Ali v. Wajed Ali4, as supporting his contention that under Muhammadan Law, such a deed did not require Registration. A careful reading of the decision shows that no such proposition is laid down therein. What is stated by Suhrawardy, J., in delivering the judgment of the Bench is that there might be a completed gift under Muhammadan Law without a deed being executed and that a document which recites the completed transaction of gift does not require to be in writing reg1stered. At page 198, the proposition is correctly stated by him in the following terms: “Under section 17 of the Registration Act an instrument of gift must be reg1stered. By the expression instrument of gift of immoveable property I understand an instrument or deed which creates, makes or completes the gift, thereby transferring the ownership of the property from the executant to the person in whose favour it is executed. In order to affect the immoveable property, the document must be a document of transfer and if it is a document of transfer it must be reg1stered under the provisions of the Registration Act. The present document does not affect immoveable property. It does not transfer the immoveable property from the donor to the donee. It only affords evidence of the fact that the donor has observed the formalities under the Muhammadan Law in making the gift to the donee. I am prepared to go so far as to hold that a document like the present one is not compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan. I am prepared to go so far as to hold that a document like the present one is not compulsorily registrable under the Registration Act, or the Registration Act does not apply to a so-called deed of gift executed by a Mahomedan. But for purposes of the present case it is not necessary to go so far because I hold that this document is only a piece of evidence, and conceding that it should have been registered, the effect of its non-Registration is to make it inadmissible, in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act.” If as found by the learned Judges the document was only a record of a completed transaction of gift and did not not transfer the ownership of the property under the terms thereof, it did not fall under section 17, clause 1 (a) of the Registration Act and did not require to be reg1stered. The legal position is neatly summed up in Mulla’s Registration Act (5th edition) at page 86. In the light of the principle stated above, I proceed to examine the terms of the document, which was excluded from evidence by the Courts below. The document states that the donor transferred the ownership of the property to the donee and that he might enjoy it from generation to generation and that possession was delivered under the document. So it really effected an immediate transfer of ownership and was not a record of a past gift made according to rules of Muhammadan Law. The document, therefore, falls directly under the terms of section 17(1)(a) and is inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act. The last clause providing for execution of a reg1stered deed of gift whenever called upon by the donee has to be read along with the earlier clauses under which an immediate transfer is effected. It is therefore not possible to ignore the earlier clauses and rely only on the last clause and construe the deed of gift as merely an agreement to make a gift or as conferring a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create an interest in immoveable property. It is therefore not possible to ignore the earlier clauses and rely only on the last clause and construe the deed of gift as merely an agreement to make a gift or as conferring a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create an interest in immoveable property. In the Supreme Court case reported in Kasinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishwesuiar Karvi1, Bose, J., observes as follows: “We agree with Sir Dinsha Mullah at page 86 of the 5th Edition of his Indian Registration Act that: ‘If the document itself creates an interest in immoveable property, the fact that it contemplates the execution of another document will not exempt it from Registration under this clause ‘. As we have seen, this document of itself limits or extinguishes certain interests in the mortgage property. The operative words are reasonably clear. Consequently, the document is not one which merely confers a right to obtain another document. It confers the right only in certain contingencies, namely, if you so wish ‘or ‘if necessity may arise ‘. Its purport is to effect an immediate alteration in the terms of the two bonds and because of that alteration to effect an immediate extinguishment and limitation. Clause (10) merely confers an additional right, namely, the right to obtain another document ‘if you so ‘wish ‘or ‘if necessity may arise’. Therefore, the document in question i not one which merely creates a right to obtain another.” I follow the above Supreme Court decision. It is not possible for me to hold that the last clause in the document exempts it from Registration. The decision of the Privy Council in Raiangam Aiyar v. Rajangam Aiyar2, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. The Judicial Committee construed the Memorandum of Agreement as not creating or declaring an interest in immoveable property but as merely creating a right to obtain another document and that it was hot consequently affected by the provisions of section 17 of the Registration Act. I have very carefully perused the terms of the document and I agree with the Courts below that the document is, in substance, a gift deed and is inadmissible in evidence for want of Registration. The next argument by the learned advocate for the appellant was that the document was at least admissible in evidence to show that he was in possession in 1930. The next argument by the learned advocate for the appellant was that the document was at least admissible in evidence to show that he was in possession in 1930. The decision of the Privy Council reported in Varada Pillay v. Jeevarthnammal3, directly supports this contention. Viscount Cave held at page 251 that, “although the petitions of 1895 and the change of names made in the reg1ster in consequence of those petitions are not admissible to prove a gift, they may nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thenceforth held by Duraiswamy.” But as already pointed out, it is not open to the defendant to contend that he was in possession under the deed of gift. Admittedly, he was not in possession for a period of 12 years from 1930 so as to acquire title by adverse possession. The documents already referred to show that the property was dealt with by the mother under the mortgage deed as also the sale deed, Exhibits A-2 and A-1, and that the plaintiff was in possession at least from 1939. The document rejected by the Court below, if admitted, would only show that he was in possession in 1930. But, that, by itself, does not establish his case that a valid gift was made in his favour. In the view taken by me as to the nature of the unreg1stered document, oral evidence of the defendant’s witnesses as to the gift would be inadmissible under the terms of section 91 of the Evidence Act. But as the Courts below (which erroneously admitted the oral evidence) have, however, disbelieved the defendant’s case it is unnecessary for me to discuss this aspect any further. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------ Appeal dismissed. No leave.