ORDER This is a Civil Revision against the order passed by learned District Judge, Manipur, in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1951 on 17-11-1951 and also against the supplementary order passed by him on 5-5-1952 by which the decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Manipur, in suit No. 211 of 1950 on 22-6-1951 was set aside and the claim of the plaintiffs-opposite parties for holding Haroaba (worship by dancing before the Lai deity) separately by taking the deity to a new place, was allowed. 2. It appears from the pleadings of the parties that the plaintiffs-opposite parties are the representatives of the Thongthak of Keinou village, while the defendants-applicants are the representatives of the Thongkha party of the same village. According to the plaintiffs-opposite parties their village deity Nangthel Leima was used to be kept at a place (Harabung) which was not sufficiently spacious for holding the worship, and so they bought another piece of land for the purpose of worshipping and they obtained permission from the Pandit Loisang to hold Haraoba separately by means of the permission Ex. P/A in the month of Sajibu (April) after the defendants-applicants finished their Haraoba in the month of Lamda (March-April). According to the plaintiffs the defendants extended the period of their Haraoba up to the date fixed by the Pandits for the beginning of the Haraoba by the plaintiffs and so the latter approached the District Magistrate, Manipur, to attach the Lai (deity), but the District Magistrate ordered the parties to go to the Civil Court and so the suit No. 211 of 1950 was instituted in the Court of the Munsiff, Manipur. 3. The defendants-applicants contended that there was never any agreement amongst the inhabitants of the village Keinou regarding holding of the Haraoba by the plaintiffs and for carrying away the deity to the place of the plaintiffs. It was further contended that the plaintiffs attempts to hold Haraoba separately was against the custom of the village and also against the principles of public endowment. It was also contended that the permission Ex. P/A was cancelled by the Maharaja of Manipur who is said to be the final authority in this religious matter. Number of other pleas were also raised but they were not pressed. It was also contended that the permission Ex. P/A was cancelled by the Maharaja of Manipur who is said to be the final authority in this religious matter. Number of other pleas were also raised but they were not pressed. The plaintiffs had examined Ahongsang-bam Tomba, Moirangthem Ibochaoba, Khumallam-toam Mani and Wangkhem Jnaneswar witnesses, while the defendants had examined Thaunaujam Palo, Nameirakpam Dinachandra, Yumnam Chaoyaima and Yumnam Chaoba witnesses. 4. The learned counsel of the plaintiffs-opposite parties has contended that the present application in revision cannot be considered on merits as it is time barred. The learned District Judge decided the appeal on 12-11-1951 and it was conceded before me that after adding the number of days taken in obtaining copies of the judgment the period of 90 days elapsed on 3-3-1952, but the present application in revision was filed in this Court on 20-6-1952, i.e., after a lapse of 3 months and 17 days. It appears that the present applicants at first filed a second appeal No. 2 of 1952 on 29-5-1952, but as the suit was valued at Rs. 100/- only, and as under S. 29, Manipur State Courts Act, no second appeal lies in such cases it was prayed that the appeal No, 2 of 1952 be treated as a revision, but this prayer was not allowed and so on 20-6-1952 the appeal No. 2 of 1952 was withdrawn and the present application in revision was instituted. The learned Advocate for the applicants has claimed benefit of Ss. 5 and 14, Indian Limitation Act, and it has also been contended that in any case the present application in revision would be governed by Art. 181, Limitation Act, as no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing applications in revision; and as the present applicants filed a second appeal under an honest mistaken belief that a second appeal could be filed, and as they prosecuted it with due diligence, I think the present applicants should properly be allowed the benefit of Ss. 5 and 14, Limitation Act, even if it be held for a moment that an application in revision should also be brought within the 90 days (which is to be the period of limitation prescribed for filing a second appeal). 5 and 14, Limitation Act, even if it be held for a moment that an application in revision should also be brought within the 90 days (which is to be the period of limitation prescribed for filing a second appeal). The ruling of - Dinanath v. Munshi Ram, AIR 1953 Punj 298 (A) which lays down that where the mistake of partys legal adviser as to jurisdictional value and court-fee was such that if the legal adviser had only taken the trouble of looking up any elementary book on Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, he would have discovered it, no question of bona fide mistake or good faith can arise and time cannot be extended under S. 5, Limitation Act, has no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case the provisions of the Manipur State Courts Act were somehow overlooked and it cannot be said that simply because the fact that the present suit was valued at Rs. 100/- only and not more, was not taken notice of by the lawyer who filed the second appeal No. 2 of 1952, the present petitioners were guilty of gross negligence. As it appears that in the present case very important questions of law were not properly decided by the learned District Judge who reversed the Judgment of the learned Munsiff, I think the present applicants should properly be allowed benefit of S. 14, Limitation Act. I, therefore, hold that the present application in revision is not time barred. 5. It has been strenuously argued by the learned Advocate for the applicants that the learned District Judge by allowing this appeal passed an infructuous decree as he had not ordered that the deity be removed to the new place where the plaintiffs proposed to celebrate their Haraoba and the order dated 5-5-1952 was passed by him during the time when second appeal No. 2 of 1952 was pending in this Court. According to the present applicants the order dated 5-5-1952 was absolutely without jurisdiction and reliance was placed on - Parmanand Das Gossain v. Kripasindhu Roy, 14 Cal WN 584 at p. 586 (B) in which it has been clearly laid down that S. 148, Civil P.C., does not authorise the first Court to modify the decree or extend the time allowed by it for execution of a Kabuliyat after an appeal had been preferred from that decree and the only Court which can pass such order after an appeal has been preferred is the Appellate Court. The judgment dated 12-11-1951 clearly shows that the following order was passed in appeal by the learned District Judge : "I now order that decree be passed in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants against the defendants-respondents declaring that the Parwana Ex. P/A in the records of the District Magistrates Miscellaneous case No. 1 of 1951 issued by the Pandit Loisang Pana and Moiba shall be obeyed i.e. Thongkha will perform Haraoba in Lamdan in the existing Harungbung and Thongthak in the new Harungbung. Auspicious date will be fixed by the parties concerned in consultation with the Pandit every year." This order did not in any way contain any direction regarding removal of the deity to the new place, and it was against this order that the second appeal No. 2 of 1952 was brought by the present applicants in this Court long before the order for removal of the deity was passed by the learned District Judge on 5-5-1952. As such the order passed in first appeal No. 54 of 1951 dated 5-5-1952 would not be legally operative, as such orders; could only be passed by the Appellate Court. 6. Section 9, Civil P.C., lays down that "the Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 6. Section 9, Civil P.C., lays down that "the Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation : A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies." The suits in which the principal question relates to religious rites or ceremonies are not suits of a civil nature vide -Rama v. Shivram, 6 Bom 116 (C); - Vasudev v. Vamnaji, 5 Bom 80 (D) and - Lokenath Misra v. Dasarathi Tewari, 32 Cal 1072 (E). It has been laid down in - Radhakrishna Das v. Radharaman Swami, AIR 1949 Orissa 1 (F) that a suit by a worshipper, not based on any right to the property in the idol, or to an office, against its custodians to locate it in a particular temple instead of in another, there being no allegation that the plaintiff is prevented from worshipping the idol at the latter temple, is not cognizable by the Civil Court. I think this ruling is clearly applicable to the facts of the present revision as in this case the plaintiffs did not allege that they were prevented from worshipping the idol at the place where it had been kept for a considerable long time in accordance with the custom of the village. As such it becomes clear that the decree passed by the learned District Judge was bound to be infructuous. 7. The plaint of the suit No. 211 of 1950 however discloses that there was a prayer for bringing out the image of the goddess Ningthel Leima Khuleima in the Harungbung newly arranged and so the suit as prayed in the Court of the Munsiff, was cognizable by the civil Courts, but the decree passed by the learned District Judge in appeal on 12-11-1951 was infructuous. 8. The plaintiffs relied on permission Ex. P/A, Exs. P/B to P/D to show that they were permitted by the Pandit Achouba and this permission was binding on the entire people of the village, but it appears from the document Ex. 8. The plaintiffs relied on permission Ex. P/A, Exs. P/B to P/D to show that they were permitted by the Pandit Achouba and this permission was binding on the entire people of the village, but it appears from the document Ex. D/A that the Maharaja of Manipur passed contrary orders later on and the Pandit who had given the permission Ex. P/A was dismissed. T. C. Hudson in his book on Meitheis (Manipuris), 1908 Edition, at page 107 writes as follows : "But the great characteristics of the rites of the pre-Hindu system is the management of these rites by the Maiba (oracle), Paiba, or in some cases by the Raja who is, in fact, regarded not only as a living deity, but as the head of the old State religion and the secular head of the whole people including Ningtheuji or royal clan". 9. Manus Smriti, discourse 7, volume III part 2, translated by Dr. Ganganath Jha in verse 13 lays down : "For this reason (that the King is a great divinity in human form) no one should transgress that favourable decree which the king should ordain in favour of his favourites or that unfavourable decree that he should ordain against those in his disfavour". The Manipur Merger Agreement vide page 232 of the White Paper on the Indian States also lays down in Article II that His Highness the Maharaja shall continue to enjoy all personal rights, privileges, dignity and authority for religious observance of customs, usages, rites and ceremonies and institutions in charge of him in the State, which he would have enjoyed had this agreement not been made. The plaintiff No. 1 has admitted in his statement that no permission has been given to the plaintiff to remove the idol, and Moirangthem Ibochaoba P.W. 2 has clearly admitted that His Highness has got option to change the order of, the Pandit Loisang and the Pandit Maiba who are under the Maharaja. As such it becomes clear that the order Ex. D/A which was passed later on by the Maharaja will be binding on the parties and the order of the learned District Judge dated 5-5-1952 cannot be operative and the present plaintiffs-opposite parties cannot remove the idol to a new place. 10. As such it becomes clear that the order Ex. D/A which was passed later on by the Maharaja will be binding on the parties and the order of the learned District Judge dated 5-5-1952 cannot be operative and the present plaintiffs-opposite parties cannot remove the idol to a new place. 10. The learned District Judge has not given any cogent reason why Haraobung should be allowed to be changed to another place as it is established from evidence on the record that the land acquired by the plaintiffs is not revenue free; and as income of the idol is very limited, it would not be in the interest of the idol to allow waste and unhealthy competition as it would involve needless extra-expenditure in holding Haraoba at two places in one year. The question whether the deity should be removed against the order of the Maharaja who continues to enjoy his old powers on religious matters even after the integration must also be answered against the plaintiffs-opposite parties under the circumstances mentioned above, and as the plaintiffs could not be allowed adjudication merely on some religious rites in the present case, I think the present suit could not legally succeed. The question whether, the conflict in dates of two Haraobungs should be permitted or not, would not arise at all when, according to the custom of the village and also according to the orders of the religious head i.e., the Maharaja of Manipur that the deity could not be removed and two Haraobungs would not be permitted during the course of one year in this village. The holding of two Haraobas would not be justified considering the income of the deity and other circumstances, mentioned above and so I think the decree passed by the learned District Judge cannot be legally sustained. 11. I, therefore, allow this application in revision and I set aside the order which has been passed by the Learned District Judge and the plaintiffs suit stands dismissed with costs in all the Courts. Revision allowed.