Judgment. — The main question in this second appeal is whether section 21 of the Madras Act III of 1895 is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The facts either found or admitted may be briefly stated. The plaintiff is one of the hereditary nirugantis under the Patha Cuddapah tank situated in the Patha Cuddapah village and is the owner of i/8th share in the niruganti mirasi. A niruganti attends to the watering of the various lands under the ayacut and receives remuneration from the ryots for doing the service. When the plaintiff’s father died, he was a minor. In the year 1912, when the plaintiff was a minor, his mother executed a sale-deed in respect of the plaintiff’s properties in favour of the defendant’s father to discharge the debts due to him. Under that sale-deed, the plaintiff’s 1/8th share in the aforesaid niruganti right was also conveyed. Notwithstanding the sale, the plaintiff has been performing the service either directly or through his agents. In 1946, the defendant unlawfully obstructed the plaintiff from discharging his duty as a niruganti. The plaintiff filed O.S. No. 261 of 1946 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Cuddapah, for restraining the defendant by a permanent injunction from interfering with the performance of the service and from receiving the remuneration in respect of this service. The defendant, in his written statement, admitted that the niruganti service pertains to a village office but claims to have acquired title to it by. adverse possession. He further averred that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted by the provisions of Madras Act III of 1895. The learned District Munsif held that the office is not one governed by section 4 of Madras Act III of 1895. Even if the Act applied, he expressed the view that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court. But he found on the evidence that the defendant and his father were getting the service performed through deputies ever since 1912, and that, therefore, the plaintiff’s right to the office was extinguished by adverse possession. On those findings, he dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Judge agreed with the first Court that the suit was not barred by section, 21 of Madras Act III of 1895. On those findings, he dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Judge agreed with the first Court that the suit was not barred by section, 21 of Madras Act III of 1895. But he differed from the first Court on the other question, and held that the plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the office and that he was only obstructed a month prior to the filing of the suit. In the result, he set aside the decree of the first Court and decreed the suit. The defendant preferred the above appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyangar contended that section 21 is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. He also argued that the finding of the learned Judge on the question of possession is wrong. The first question turns upon the provisions of sections 13 and 21 of Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act (Act III of 1895). The material part of the relevant provisions may be abstracted: “Section 13. — Any person may sue before the Collector for any of the village offices specified in section 3 or for recovery of the emoluments of any such office on the ground that he is entitled under sub-section 2 or 3 of section 10 of the Madras Proprietary Estates’ Village Service Act, 1894, or under sub-section 2 or 3 of section to or sub-section 2 or 3 of section 11 or section 12 of this Act as the case may be to hold such office and enjoy such emoluments * * *.” “Section 21. — No Civil Court shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any claim to succeed to any of the offices specified in section 3 or any question as to the rate or amount of the emoluments of any such office or except as provided in proviso (II) to sub-section (i) of section 13, any claim to recover the emoluments of any such office.” It has been held that notwithstanding the apparent generality of the language of section 21 of the Madras Act III of 1895, it takes away the jurisdiction of Civil Courts only in those cases in which jurisdiction is conferred on Revenue Courts by section 13. See Seetharam Maidu v. Ramu Naidu1. The short question, therefore, is whether the present suit could have been filed in a Revenue Court under section 13(1) of the Act. See Seetharam Maidu v. Ramu Naidu1. The short question, therefore, is whether the present suit could have been filed in a Revenue Court under section 13(1) of the Act. To put it differently, is the plaintiff suing for any of the village offices specified in section 3 or for the recovery of the emoluments of any such office? The plaintiff is not ex facie seeking to recover the office or the emoluments attached to the office. He alleges in the plaint that he is the hereditary niruganti, that his mother has illegally alienated that office, and that notwithstanding that alienation, he has continued to hold that office. On those allegations, it is not necessary for him either to ask for the recovery of the office, or to ask for the recovery of the emoluments attached to that office. He would be entitled to an injunction if his allegations are true. The defendant does not deny that he is the office-holder. He does not also deny that the alienation was void. His entire defence is that he acquired right by adverse possession. To put it shortly, this is a suit by an office-holder asking for an injunction against a trespasser from interfering with his possession. I cannot see how such a suit can be described as one for recovery of the office or for the recovery of the emoluments attached to that office. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that by a trick of the pleadings a suit for the recovery of the office and its emoluments has been made to appear as one for a permanent injunction. In support of his argument, he relied upon the decision of Somayya, J., in Narasimha Rao v. Venkataramana Rao2. There the plaintiff claimed right of succession under the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act and alleged that the defendant was appointed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in violation of his right. He filed a suit in a Civil Court for declaration of the invalidity of the defendant’s appointment. The learned Judge rightly pointed out on those facts that, as the Revenue Divisional Officer appointed another in violation of his right, the plaintiff’s obvious remedy was to sue in a Revenue Court for recovery of the office from the person, who was wrongly appointed. The learned Judge rightly pointed out on those facts that, as the Revenue Divisional Officer appointed another in violation of his right, the plaintiff’s obvious remedy was to sue in a Revenue Court for recovery of the office from the person, who was wrongly appointed. At page 441 the learned Judge pointed out: “By a mere trick in pleading and framing the relief as one for a declaration of the invalidity of the defendant’s appointment, the plaintiff is really trying to get behind the plain provisions of sections 13 and 21 of the Act.” Further, in exercise of his discretion, the learned Judge refused to give a mere declaratory relief, as the relief of declaration was unnecessary and as he could get the necessary relief in a Revenue Court. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the plaintiff in that case should have filed the suit in a Revenue Court for recovery of his office from the person, who was illegally appointed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. But can it be said in the instant case that the relief asked for by the plaintiff in the Civil Court is either unnecessary or that he could get the same relief in the Revenue Court ? As I have already indicated, there is no dispute as regards the title of the plaintiff to the office. It is also common case that the alienation was bad. A plaintiff with a legal title and in possession of the office, cannot file a suit for recovery of the office in a Revenue Court, nor can he ask for recovery of the emoluments from third parties. It is not even suggested that the owners of the land, getting the benefit of his service, ever refused to pay him his emoluments. The only relief, viz., the relief of injunction, which he wants to safeguard his title and possession against a trespasser cannot be asked under section 13 and can only be asked in a Civil Court. The decision of Somayya, J., therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. I would, therefore, hold that the present suit is not barred by the provisions of section 21 of Act III of 1895. Nor can I find any merits in the second contention either. The learned Judge considered the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced on either side. He believed the evidence of P.Ws. I would, therefore, hold that the present suit is not barred by the provisions of section 21 of Act III of 1895. Nor can I find any merits in the second contention either. The learned Judge considered the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, adduced on either side. He believed the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4. P.W. 1 deposed that, notwithstanding the alienation, he continued to perform the functions of the office and to receive the remuneration. P.Ws. 3 and 4, who carried on the niruganti work during his absence also spoke to the fact that they did the work for and on behalf of P.W. 1. On the other hand, the defendant’s witnesses deposed that the services have been performed on behalf of the defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses in preference to that of the defendant’s witnesses and he has given his reasons for doing so. He held that the plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the office and the emoluments attached to that office. The finding is one of fact and there are no grounds for interference in second appeal. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------- Appeal dismissed.