Rajamannar, C.J.-These writ petitions are based on similar facts and raise common questions of law. It is convenient to take W.P. No. 146 of 1954 first. The petitioner is the proprietor of the Ettayapuram Zammdari in Tirunelveli district. He is also the proprietor of another zamindari estate known as Vallanadi sub-division in the Mathurai district. In the Fort St. George Gazette dated 12th December, 1950, a notification was published to the effect that the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Madras Act XXVI of 1948), except certain sections mentioned therein, shall come into force in respect of the said zamindari on 3rd January, 1951. A day previous to the notified dated, the petitioner filed an application in this Court (C.M.P. No. 13388. of 1950) for the issue of a writ of mandamus restraining the State of Madras from taking over possession of the said estate on the strength of the above notification and also another application for the issue of an interim injunction pending the disposal of the main application. This Court granted an interim injunction, but the main application itself, along with other similar applications in which the validity of Madras Act (XXVI of 1948) was challenged, was heard and dismissed by this Court on 22nd August, 1952. Thereupon, the petitioner as well as other proprietors preferred appeals to the Supreme Court of India. The appeals were heard by the Supreme Court and were dismissed on or about 5th February, 1954. The Government then intimated to the petitioner that on the strength of the notification published in the Gazette of 12th December, 1950, they would be taking over possession of the said estate on 5th March, 1954. One day prior to the specified date, i.e., on 4th March, 1954, the petitioner filed the present petition for the issue of a writ in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the State of Madras to forbear from taking over possession of the petitioner’s estate of Vallanadi in pursuance of the notification published in the Gazette of 12th December, 1950. The grounds on which the petitioner objects to the Government taking over possession of his estate in spite of the dismissal of his previous petition by the High Court and by the Supreme Court are stated thus in the affidavit filed by the authorised agent of the petitioner in support of the application: By Madras Act (I of 1950), a new provision, section 54-A, was added to Madras Act (XXVI of 1948), which provided that the Government shall estimate roughly the amount of compensation payable in respect of the estate and deposit one-half of that amount within six months from the notified date in the office of the Tribunal, as advance payment on account of compensation. Further, under section 50 of the said Act (Act XXVI of 1948), the Government were bound to make interim payments in respect of every fasli year after the notified date and before the compensation is finally determined. The amount of each interim payment is the whole of the estimated basic annual sum until the advance compensation is deposited, and thereafter one-half of such basic annual sum until final compensation is paid. The Government, however, did not deposit the advance compensation within six months after the notified date, nor did they make the interim payments provided under section 50 of the Act. The Government, therefore, have failed to comply with their statutory obligations under sections 50 and 54-A of the Act. The payment of compensation is an essential condition to be satisfied before the State could acquire title to the property under the Act. The mere fact that the Government were prevented by an order of interim injunction passed by this Court from taking possession of the estate cannot be a justification for the Government failing to comply with their statutory obligations under sections 50 and 54-A. Having failed to carry out the said obligations, it was not open to the Government to take possession of the estate on the strength of the original notification. The following are the material parts of the aforesaid section:- "50. The following are the material parts of the aforesaid section:- "50. (2) After the notified date and before the compensation has been finally determined and paid in pursuance of this Act, interim payments shall be made by the Government every fasli year, to the principal landholder and to the other persons referred to in section 44, sub-section (1), as follows: (3) In respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, they shall together be entitled to such amount as the Government may on a rough calculation determine to be the basic annual sum referred to in section 26 less the rents, if any, collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of that fasli year. (4) In respect of each subsequent fasli year, they shall together be entitled to the amount estimated under sub-section (3) to be the basic annual sum, unless data for the better calculation thereof have since become available, in which case the amount to be paid shall be revised by the Government with reference to such data. 54-A. (1) In the case of every estate not governed by section 38, the Government shall estimate roughly the amount of the compensation payable in respect of the estate and deposit one-half of that amount within six months from the notified date in the office of the Tribunal, as advance payment on account of compensation. (2) From the amount to be deposited under sub-section (1), the Government shall be entitled to deduct- (a) one half of all moneys referred to in the proviso to section 41(1); and (b) one-half of the basic annual sum referred to in sub-section (3) of section 50, if the deposit in pursuance of this section is made in the fasli year in which the estate is notified but after the interim payment in respect of that fasli year has been deposited under section 50." Mr. Vedantachari, learned counsel for the petitioners, founded his entire argument on the non-compliance by the Government with the provisions of sections 50 and 54-A of Madras Act (XXVI of 1948), but he presented alternative legal positions regarding the effect of such non-compliance. One position was that payment of the amounts specified in these two sections is a condition precedent to the vesting of the title to the estate in the Government. One position was that payment of the amounts specified in these two sections is a condition precedent to the vesting of the title to the estate in the Government. Another position was that though the title might vest in the Government on and from the notified date, on non-compliance with the provisions of the above two sections, the Government is divested of the estate, and there is a re-vesting in the proprietor. But it became apparent early in the argument that it was impossible for Mr. Vedantachari to maintain the first position that it was a condition precedent. Section 3 lays down that with effect on and from the notified date, the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances. He conceded, as he had to concede, that but for the order of the interim injunction passed by this Court the Government could have taken possession of the estate on the notified date, viz., 3rd January, 1951, though the payments specified in the two sections 50 and 54-A had not been made. He, therefore, fell back on the second position and con tended that the vesting in the Government did not become complete or indefeasible until and unless the Government complied with the provisions of sections 50 and 54-A. If they did not, the estate could no longer be deemed to vest in the Government, and if for any reason, the Government had not taken possession meanwhile, they would not be entitled to take possession after they had committed default in complying with the provisions of sections 50 and 54-A. Learned counsel could not point out any provision of the Act which expressly supported him. His argument was that it was implicit in the general scheme of the Act, read in the light of the Constitution, in particular, Article 31(2). As that Article insists on the provision for compensation for the property taken possession of and either fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which, and the manner in . His argument was that it was implicit in the general scheme of the Act, read in the light of the Constitution, in particular, Article 31(2). As that Article insists on the provision for compensation for the property taken possession of and either fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which, and the manner in . which, the compensation is to be determined and given, and as in accordance with this clause of Article 31, the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act has made provision for compensation and the fixing of the amount of the compensation, learned counsel contended that unless the Government complies with the requirements of such provisions embodied in the Act, the Government could not acquire any title or right to possession. In our opinion, this argument proceeds on a fallacious assumption. The relevancy of the provisions of Article 31(2) is confined to a consideration of the validity of the enactment itself. The petitioner is concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court from impeaching the validity of the Act on the ground that it contravenes Article 31(2) of the Constitution. A non-compliance with any of the provisions of an Act, which is a valid Act, cannot obviously render the Act itself invalid. If the. Act is valid, and if one of the sections of the Act says that on and from the notified date the estate stands transferred to the Government and vests in them, that result must follow. If there is non-compliance by the Government with any of the provisions of the Act, that is, if the Government fail to carry out any of the obligations imposed on them by the Act, then the only remedy for the aggrieved party is to seek to enforce such obligations. If money is payable but the money is not paid, there are ways and means of making the Government pay what they are obliged to pay. But it does not follow that because money is not paid, as required by one of the sections of the Act, the effect of the main section of the Act, namely, section 3, is nullified. Mr. Vedantachari sought support for his contention in American Law. He cited the following passage from Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 3, pages 124-125:- "If compensation is not made within a reasonable time, it has been held that he may have his property back. Mr. Vedantachari sought support for his contention in American Law. He cited the following passage from Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 3, pages 124-125:- "If compensation is not made within a reasonable time, it has been held that he may have his property back. Some Courts say that he has a lien for his compensation, others that the title passes subject to a condition subsequent, others that the title does not pass at all until payment, a fourth view is that equity will order a reconveyance." It is dangerous to apply the propositions stated above to the present case unless one is certain that the statutes concerned in the American cases cited as authority are in pari materia with Madras Act (XXVI of 1948). The same author, at page 126, says:- "When property is taken for public use by the United States Government and the public faith and credit has been expressly or impliedly pledged, it is not necessary that payment be made in advance of taking possession. Even a mere statutory right to bring suit against the United States in the Court of Claims is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a taking of property by eminent domain." And again, at page 128:- "Similarly, when property is taken by a State and provision is made for payment out of the State treasury, the Constitution is satisfied. This is so even though the State cannot be sued, and, if the legislature should rescind the provision for payment, leaving the owner without a remedy because, it is held, such a breach of public faith is not a reasonable possibility. As a State may always raise funds by taxation, inability to pay will not be presumed." The decision in each case must ultimately turn on the language of the particular statute concerned. We are unable to derive any assistance from the two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relied upon by Mr. Vedantachari. As a State may always raise funds by taxation, inability to pay will not be presumed." The decision in each case must ultimately turn on the language of the particular statute concerned. We are unable to derive any assistance from the two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relied upon by Mr. Vedantachari. In Kennedy v. Indianapolis1, the decision turned on the construction of the following provision in the Constitution of the State of Indiana: "That no man’s particular services demanded, or property taken or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without a just compensation being made therefor." It was held that both on principle and authority, the proper construction of that provision was to hold that though the right to enter on and use the property is complete as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, the title does not pass from the owner without his consent until just compensation has been paid to him. Reference was made to earlier decisions of State Courts in which it had been held that actual payment was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State. We have already mentioned the fact that learned counsel was compelled to concede that under Madras Act (XXVI of 1948) actual payment is not a condition precedent to the vesting under section 3. The decision turned entirely on the language of the Article in the Constitution of Indiana which it may be remarked is radically different from that to be found in Article 31(2) of our Constitution. The legal principle which was enunciated in The Cherokee-Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co.2, is unexceptionable, but it does not help the petitioners. It was held that the constitutional guarantee that private property cannot be taken "for public use without just compensation" is fulfilled if provision is made for compensation which is sure and adequate. An Act which forbade the construction of a railway until full compensation be made to the owner of the lands and in case of an appeal for the payment into Court of double the amount of the award before entering on the land, was held to be a certain and adequate provision for compensation. An Act which forbade the construction of a railway until full compensation be made to the owner of the lands and in case of an appeal for the payment into Court of double the amount of the award before entering on the land, was held to be a certain and adequate provision for compensation. The decision of the Court that title does not pass until compensation is actually made to the owner depended entirely on the language of the relevant provisions. One such provision was that before the construction of the railway full compensation shall be made to the occupants of the property occupied. The following passage from Rottschaefer’s book on Constitutional Law cited by the learned Advocate-General summarises the American law on the point with clarity:- "The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the taking of property for a public use shall be either preceded or accompanied by payment of the just compensation to which the owner is entitled. Nor need that compensation be even determined prior to, or at the time when the public enters into possession of the property taken by it. It requires only that the law in existence at the time when the property is taken make adequate provision for ascertainment and payment of fair compensation within a reasonable time after the taking. A statute that provides for enforcing the duty to ascertain and pay just compensation by judicial proceedings satisfies the demands of the Constitution, as does one that pledges the public faith and credit to a reasonbly prompt determination and payment of such compensation and makes adequate provision for enforcing that pledge. The same principles are generally employed to determine whether State constitutional provisions applying to this matter have been satisfied There are, however, some cases in which these latter are construed to require prepayment where the property is taken by a private corporation. The constitutions of some of the States contain provisions requiring prepayment in all cases.“(Page 722.) There is nothing in American law which helps Mr. Vedantachari La this case. The scheme of Act (XXVI of 1948) is clear, under section 3, with effect on and from the notified date, the entire estate notified stands transferred to the Government and vests in them free of all encumbrances. This vesting is not conditional. Vedantachari La this case. The scheme of Act (XXVI of 1948) is clear, under section 3, with effect on and from the notified date, the entire estate notified stands transferred to the Government and vests in them free of all encumbrances. This vesting is not conditional. As a result of the notification and the taking over of the estate by the Government, the landholder undoubtedly becomes entitled to certain payments of money, in- terim and final. The Government do not deny the right of the landholder to such payments. Omission to make the payments in time may enable the landholder to demand and enforce them. But the omission by itself will not have the effect of cancelling the notification or of re-vesting the estate in the landholder. This conclusion of ours is sufficient to dispose of these applications But a great deal of time was occupied in the discussion of a matter which did not directly arise out of the application made by the petitioner but arose out of two counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the Government. In the first affidavit after putting forward a construction of the material provisions of the Act which we have accepted above, the Government naturally desired to explain the omission to make the payments within the time contemplated by the Act. Paragraph 4 was in these terms:- “Further, the provisions of the Madras Act (XXX of 1947) have been applied to this estate from fasli 1357 and the rents reduced in accordance with the said Act. The Government are collecting the reduced rents and paying them over to the petitioner from the said date after deducting the collection charges. Under section 50 of the Act, after the notified date and before the compensation is finally determined and paid in pursuance of this Act, interim payments shall be made to the landholder every fasli year. In respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, the petitioner will be entitled to the basic annual sum less the rents collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of that fasli year. As regards each subsequent fasli year, the petitioner will be entitled to the estimated basic annual sum. In respect of the fasli year in which the estate is notified, the petitioner will be entitled to the basic annual sum less the rents collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of that fasli year. As regards each subsequent fasli year, the petitioner will be entitled to the estimated basic annual sum. The petitioner has been paid the rents collected for the period subsequent to the notified date and these sums will have to be adjusted at the time the advance compensation is made.” The Government also relied upon two orders issued by them under section 68 of the Act, to which we shall refer presently. A supplemental affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government a few days before arguments were concluded. ln this affidavit the Government prayed that the following paragraph may be substituted in the place of paragraph 4 of their original counter-affidavit:- “According to sub-section (3) of section 50 of Act (XXVI of 1948) as amended by Act (I of 1950), in respect of the fasli year in which an estate is notified the principal landholder and other persons referred to in section 44, sub-section (1), shall together be entitled to such amount as the Government may, on a rough calculation determine to be the basic annual sum referred to under section 26 if the deposit in pursuance of section 54-A has not been already made and to an amount equal to one-half of the basic annual sum as so calculated, if the deposit aforesaid has been already made. The rents, if any, collected before the notified date by the landholder from the ryots in respect of that fasli year shall be deducted. With reference to sub-section (4) of section 50 of Act (XXVI of 1948) as amended by Act (I of 1950), for each subsequent fasli they will be entitled only to the estimated one-half of the basic annual sum. Basic annual sum in full will not be paid to landholders as mentioned in para. 4 of the counter-affidavit, but only half of the basic annual sum will be paid to them. Basic annual sum in full will not be paid to landholders as mentioned in para. 4 of the counter-affidavit, but only half of the basic annual sum will be paid to them. The petitioner’s estates were notified to be taken over under Act (XXVI of 1948) on 3rd January, 1951, i.e., in fasli 1360 and all the estates except the estate of Gandunanaickanur have not yet been taken over in view of the injunction order of the High Court. With reference to the orders of the Government in G.O. No. 3377 Revenue, dated 23rd December, 1952, the interim payment in respect of the petitioner’s estates will be deposited under section 50 of the Act only for the fash year in which the estates will be actually taken over, and the succeeding fasli years. In respect of the fasli years which intervene the fasli year in which the estates were notified and the fasli year in which the estates will be actually taken over, the Government will have to collect reduced rents under section 3(4) of Act (XXX of 1947) and pay to the landholder the amount so collected. The rent so collected and paid to the landholder is not liable to be adjusted towards the interim payment and the advance compensation which may be deposited for his estate." We really see no room for any controversy. In our opinion, the last sentence in paragraph 4 of the supplemental affidavit of the Government is misleading. The correct position is this: As a result of the interim orders of this Court and the Supreme Court, the Government refrained from taking possession of the estate on the notified date. They therefore did not make the interim payments under sections 50 and 54-A. The provisions of Madras Act (XXX of 1947) (Rent Reduction Act) however apply to the estate. Under that Act, the Government were entitled and bound to collect the reduced rents and pay them over to the landholder after making necessary deductions. The amount so paid will, of course have to be adjusted against the payment to which the landholder was entitled under sections 50 and 54-A of the Act. The landholder on the one hand will not be entitled to the payments under sections 50 and 54-A of the Act as well as to the rents collected by the Government under the provisons of Madras Act (XXX of 1947). The landholder on the one hand will not be entitled to the payments under sections 50 and 54-A of the Act as well as to the rents collected by the Government under the provisons of Madras Act (XXX of 1947). Equally, the Government will not be entitled to deny the landholder the right to both the moneys collected under Madras Act (XXX of 1947) and the moneys payable under sections 50 and 54-A of Madras Act (XXVI of 1948). This indication of the true position of affairs we consider sufficient. The learned Advocate-General referred us to two orders of Government purported to be issued under section 68 of Act (XXVI of 1948). By G.O. 533, dated 5th March, 1951, the Government directed that in the case of every estate in respect of which the High Court had ordered stay of all proceedings under Act (XXVI of 1948) or restrained the Government from taking over the estate as a result of which the estate had not been taken possession of by the Government, the period during which the said order of the High Court remained in force shall be excluded in calculating the period of six months within which advance compensation under section 54-A(1) of the said Act shall be deposited in the office of the Tribunal. By G.O. 3377, dated 23rd December, 1952, the Government further directed in respect of such estates that interim payments under section 50 of the said Act shall be made to the principal landholder and others only for the fasli year in which the estate was actually taken over and the succeeding fasli years. It is not necessary for us to decide whether these orders were within the scope of the powers conferred on the Government by section 68 of the Act. Irrespective of these orders, we have indicated above the legal rights and obligations of the landholder and the Government respectively. The application (146 of 1954) is dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 250. The same points arise in the other writ petitions, which are also dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. R.M. ----- Application and petitions dismissed.