JUDGMENT: This second appeal arises out of a suit by the present appellants for possession of a portion of a house in Bhopal in the occupation of the respondent. The suit as also the first appeal failed. The suit was brought by one Ahmad Raza Khan who died during its pendency and was continued by his legal representatives, the widow, four sons and a daughter. 2. Their case was that the whole house was owned by the deceased Ahmad Raza Khan who had permitted his brother, the respondent, to occupy a portion (now in suit) without rent in view of his relationship and the respondent did not vacate it in spite of several demands, the last being by the notice dated 21-11-50. The respondent denied the title of Ahmad Raza Khan and alleged that it was purchased with their father's money. He also denied the alleged permission to him by Ahmad Raza Khan to occupy the portion and his occupation thereunder. According to him, he has been in possession of a portion of the house for over 50 years in his own right as an heir to his father and at any rate Ahmad Raza Khan had lost his title, if any, owing to the adverse possession of the respondent for over the statutory period. It was also said that the suit was barred by time as Ahmad Raza Khan or the appellants were never in possession within the statutory period. 3. Both the Courts below held that the house really belonged to the father of the respondent and Ahmad Raza Khan (the late Ali Raza Khan) and not to Ahmad Raza Khan and that the alleged license was not proved. It was also held that the suit was barred by time as Ahmad Raza Khan was not in possession within 12 years next before the suit and the defendant was in adverse possession for over the statutory period. The suit and the plaintiffs' appeal accordingly failed. 4. In appeal the finding regarding title to the house was challenged on the ground that there was no plea that Ahmad Raza Khan was a benamidar and the finding regarding the suit being barred is challenged on the ground that no adverse possession of the defendant was proved. 5. The suit and the plaintiffs' appeal accordingly failed. 4. In appeal the finding regarding title to the house was challenged on the ground that there was no plea that Ahmad Raza Khan was a benamidar and the finding regarding the suit being barred is challenged on the ground that no adverse possession of the defendant was proved. 5. The first contention in the matter of title is not correct as, in his written statement, the defendant-respondent has definitely alleged that the consideration for the purchase of the house was paid by the late Ali Raza Khan and the lower appellate Court's conclusion on the evidence being a finding of fact is not open to challenge in the second appeal. 6. Regarding the next contention, which raises a question of law, it must appear that the allegations in the plaint itself point to the fact that Ahmad Raza Khan "discontinued" his possession, and the respondent came in possession, of the portion in suit. The plaint does not state when this occurred nor does it state when for the first time the plaintiffs' father Ahmad Raza Khan asked the defendant-respondent to vacate and the latter did not do so. It is from that point of time that there was dispossession, in law, of Ahmad Raza Khan. The Article of the Indian Limitation Act that governs this suit is, therefore, Art.142. The argument that there was no plea in this behalf is also incorrect, in view of the contention in para (4) of the written statement where it is definitely alleged that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the portion for over the statutory period, as rightly pointed out by the lower appellate Court. 7. The decision in - 'Gangoobai v. Soni', 1942 Nag LJ 99 (A) lays down as follows: "Whenever there is an allegation of original possession which the plaintiff lost by dispossession, the suit must fall under Art.142, Limitation Act. There is a difference between dispossession and discontinuance of possession. There is dispossession where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession. There is discontinuance of possession where the person in possession goes out and is followed into possession by other persons. There is a difference between dispossession and discontinuance of possession. There is dispossession where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession. There is discontinuance of possession where the person in possession goes out and is followed into possession by other persons. If a plaintiff sues for possession on the allegation that the defendant came into possession under a license from the plaintiff and the defendant denies the same, the suit will be governed by Art.142 and not by Art.144, Limitation Act, as the plaintiff will be deemed to have discontinued possession within the meaning of the former Article. The plaintiff in such a case must prove that the defendant's permissive possession began within 12 years of the suit." The learned Judge relied on - 'Mohima Chunder v. Mohesh Chunder', 18 Cal 473 (PC) (B) and - 'Manisingh Mandhata v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad', AIR 1918 PC 180 (C). The result of these decisions is that a plaintiff out of possession must prove his subsisting title to the property in question. This has been pointed out in - 'Premeswar Das v. Madhab Chandra Das', AIR 1950 Assam 55 (D) and also in - 'Rosmat Ali v. Bigaru Mandal', AIR 1950 Assam 57(E). 8. In the circumstances, it is Art.142, Limitation Act, that governs the suit and if the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were in possession of the portion within the 12 years next before the suit, their suit must fail. 9. The plaintiffs could prove their possession either actual or constructive and if they had proved the license, the plaintiffs could have been held to be at least in constructive possession. That, however, has not been proved as is found by the lower appellate Court which again is a finding of fact. 10. There is no evidence of the fact of the alleged license while there is evidence accepted by both the Courts below that the respondent has been in occupation of the portion of the house for the whole of the period of his life-time and asserted his right more than 12 years before the suit, i.e., dispossessed in law Ahmad Raza Khan or the plaintiffs. The claim was thus rightly held to be barred by time. 11. The claim was thus rightly held to be barred by time. 11. There is thus no force in the appeal which fails and is dismissed with costs and the appellants are ordered to pay the costs of the respondent. The decree of the lower appellate Court, dismissing the suit together with the order for costs in that appeal as also in the suit, is confirmed. Counsel's fees in this Court will be up to the maximum if certified in time. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal dismissed.