Order. — This is a petition for directions to pay some amount to the petitioner herein in the following circumstances: The petitioner who is a minor, represented by his natural father, filed a suit for possession of certain properties, as the adopted son of one Govindayya Chowdari. The suit was contested, inter alia, on the ground that the plaintiff was not validly adopted by the first wife of Govindayya. The trial Court accepting the case of the plaintiff gave a decree for possession of about acre 80.00 of land and mesne profits for the years 1949 and 1950 and also from the date of adoption up to the actual delivery of possession of the properties. The defeated defendants preferred an appeal to this Court against the Decree and Judgment of the trial Court. Pending appeal, they obtained an interim stay of execution of the decree. After notice the parties agreed to certain terms and the following is the relevant portion of the order passed by the Court based on that agreement: “The remuneration for the Commissioner will be fixed by the lower Court. The plaintiff will draw the costs w.thout security. Out of the amount deposited by the Commissioner each year (in accordance with the directions contained in paragraph 4) the respondent will be paid at the rate of Rs. 250 a month on or before 15th April. As for the expenses of the appeal, a cheque for Rs. 3,000 will be issued to the advocate for the respondent after the first deposit is made and the balance will be ordered on application made to this Court. Expedite printing.” This order was passed on 2nd February, 1953 and ever since the petitioner is being paid a sum of Rs. 250 a month for his maintenance and the other amounts mentioned in paragraph 9 have also been received by him. In pursuance of this order, a Commissioner was appointed for the ascertainment of mesne profits. It appears, after an elaborate enquiry, he found that a sum of Rs. 73,800 was due to the plaintiff by way of mesne profits. Both sides have filed objections to this, report. The plaintiff claiming that he has to get at least another Rs 50,000 and the defendants contending that the plaintiff will not be entitled to more than Rs. 40,000. This has necessitated an enquiry into this matter by the lower Court. 73,800 was due to the plaintiff by way of mesne profits. Both sides have filed objections to this, report. The plaintiff claiming that he has to get at least another Rs 50,000 and the defendants contending that the plaintiff will not be entitled to more than Rs. 40,000. This has necessitated an enquiry into this matter by the lower Court. It is to pay the counsel for the plaintiff, in connection with this enquiry, that the present application has been filed. This application is vehemently opposed by Mr. Ramachandrarao on the grounds first that, without furnishing security for the amount to be paid to the petitioner, no order could be passed and for this position Order 32, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, is called in aid. This argument has to be repelled as a reference to that provision makes it manifest that it has no application to the present case. Order 32, rule 6, Civil Procedure Code, is in the following terms: — “(1) A next friend or guardian for the suit shall not, without the leave of the Court, receive any money or other movable property on behalf of a minor either (a) by way of compromise before the decree or order or (b) under a decree or order in favour of the minor. (2) Where the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known to the Court to receive the money or other movable property, the Court shall, if it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such directions as will, in its opinion, sufficiently protect the property from waste and ensure its proper application.” It is seen that this provision of law is designed to safeguard the interest of the minor and as a protection against the guardian frittering away the moneys got on behalf of the minor under a decree and it is not designed to protect the interest of the opposite side. It follows that it is not necessary that the minor’s guardian should be called upon to furnish security for any amount that may be directed to be paid to him, to pay to the counsel, for the prosecution of the enquiry before the District Judge. It follows that it is not necessary that the minor’s guardian should be called upon to furnish security for any amount that may be directed to be paid to him, to pay to the counsel, for the prosecution of the enquiry before the District Judge. It was next urged by Mr. Ramachandrarao that the order on the stay petition was passed by consent of parties and it could not be varied or modified without the consent of his client. I do not think that the order covers the present situation. Provision was made only for payment of costs of appeal including the fee of the advocate and some amount for maintenance of the petitioner. It has no reference for payment of the fee to the counsel, conducting the enquiry, either before the Commissioner or before the lower Court, into the quantum of mesne profits. It is true that if the consent order governs this application also, it may be necessary to allege and prove mistake or fraud or such other factors, as would invalidate an agreement between the parties. In one sense the failure to provide for this contingency may be said to be due to a mistake; but the petition for the directions is not based on a mistake, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider, whether the consent order was vitiated by any such mistake. In the view I have taken, it is not neces-sary to consider under what circumstances the consent order could be varied or modified. This leads me to the point, whether every order passed under Order 41, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, is final and conclusive, leaving no power in Court to vary, under any circumstances. The Advocate-General placed before me a number of decisions of the Federal Court, of the Supreme Court and the Privy Council — Kuppuswamy Rao v. The King1; Mohamed Amin Brothers, Ltd. and others v. Dominion of India2; Asrumathi Debi v. Rupendra Deb3 and Abdul Rahaman v. Kassim and Sons4. It is not necessary for me to refer to any of them, as they do not throw any light on the point for determination here. It is not necessary for me to refer to any of them, as they do not throw any light on the point for determination here. The question that was debated in those decisions was whether an order was a final order, either within the meaning of section 205 of the Government of India Act or under section 109, Civil Procedure Code, so as to enable the parties concerned to obtain a certificate for leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court or to the Privy Council. The point for decision in this case is, whether an order passed in the interlocutory application has the incidence of finality and conclusiveness. Mr. Ramachandra Rao, counsel for the respondents, placed before me a Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Parthasarathy Apparao v. Venkatadri Apparao5. What was decided there, inter alia, was that a judgment recording the findings on some point, after hearing objections on both sides, is binding upon the successor and could not be re-opened. What happened there was this. The High Court remanded a suit to the Subordinate Judge, Bezwada, with directions to restore it to take necessary accounts between the parties and to pass a final decree. In pursuance of this, the Subordinate Judge framed some points for determination, received statements of accounts, heard objections, took evidence and gave his findings on these points. After he was transferred, an application was filed before his successor to re-open the matter and this was allowed. In a petition, for revising the order of the succeeding Judge, the High Court ruled that this order under Revision was without jurisdiction as the one passed by the previous Subordinate Judge was final and conclusive, as between the parties. The reason for the learned Judges coming to the conclusion was that an adjudication, once given by the Court on the earlier occasion, on the rights of parties, and in spite of the fact, that it was not a final judgment, must be regarded as a final and a conclusive one. This decision is therefore no authority for the contention put forward on behalf of the respondents. Nor does the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari6 afford any assistance in deciding this case. This decision is therefore no authority for the contention put forward on behalf of the respondents. Nor does the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari6 afford any assistance in deciding this case. All that was laid down by their Lordships was that an interlocutory judgment in a suit was as binding upon the parties in every proceeding in that suit, as a final judgment in a suit. One of the questions; that arose for decision before the Judicial Committee was, whether an order passed in execution awarding mesne profits, was binding upon the parties or not, and this was answered by their Lordships in the affirmative. Thus none of these decisions touches the point for determination in this case. In this context, I may r6fer to a passage in Daniell’s Chancery Practice (8th edition), volume 1, page 710, which was relied on by the learned Advocate-General: “Even with the consent of the parties to a judgment it cannot be set aside except on the above grounds, and in no case will it be set aside when the rights of third parties have intervened or would be adversely affected. The above observation relate only to final orders, since interlocutory orders remain in the control of the Judge and can be varied by him as occasion requires.” This passage was relied on by Justice Rangnekar of the Bombay High Court in r usuf v. Abdullabhoy Lalji7, cited by the Advocate-General. The question that arose in that case was, whether an interlocutory order, made by the consent of the parties in a suit, could be set aside by an application in the same suit, on proper grounds, or whether, a suit had to be filed to vacate that order. The learned Judge expressed the opinion that an application was sufficient for that purpose and that a suit was not necessary. Therefore the principle enunciated in that case cannot govern the present case. But in the same volume, there is another ruling of the same learned Judge at page 368 in Yusuf v. Abdullabhoy Lalji1. The point for decision in that case was, whether an order made in chambers on the original side of the High Court, could be reviewed, if the ends of justice require it, although it did not fall within the terms of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code. The point for decision in that case was, whether an order made in chambers on the original side of the High Court, could be reviewed, if the ends of justice require it, although it did not fall within the terms of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judge thought that, having regard to the interpretation placed by the Privy Council in Chajju Ram v. Neki2, the review could not be granted under Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, but still he had jurisdiction, in order to secure the ends of justice, to reconsider his order under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion, the principle enunciated in this case applies to the present case. It looks to me that the order passed under Order 41, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, staying the execution of the decree is not a final one but a tentative one. It does not decide the rights of any parties, but is merely one giving some interim relief to parties. If finality should attach to such an order, there will be hardship to the parties concerned in several cases. My opinion gains support from a passage in Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code (12th edition) at page 1191: “The Court making an order under this rule may cancel or vary it at any time.” The basis of this statement is Amir Hasan v. Ahmed3. It is no doubt true the last mentioned case related to the interpretation of Order 47 and the learned Judges expressed the opinion that an order obtained ex parte could be reviewed under Order 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, though it did not come under the first three categories but would fall within the expression “or for any other sufficient reason”. This decision cannot be regarded as authoritative so far as the interpretation placed by that Court on the expression “or for any other sufficient reason”, having regard to Chajju Ram v. Neki2. In spite of this Mulla has relied upon this for his statement at page 1191*. To the same effect is the passage in Sarkar’s Law of Civil Procedure (Third edition) at page 871. The learned commentator has relied on Amir Hassan v. Ahmad3. It looks to me that this statement could be supported, on the basis of section 151, Civil Procedure Code. To the same effect is the passage in Sarkar’s Law of Civil Procedure (Third edition) at page 871. The learned commentator has relied on Amir Hassan v. Ahmad3. It looks to me that this statement could be supported, on the basis of section 151, Civil Procedure Code. That section gives recognition to the well-established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, so long as it does not come into conflict with the other provisions of the Code. Failure to pass an appropriate order in certain cases causes a great hardship to the parties. For instance in this case as a result of the order of stay the petitioner cannot get a decree for mesne profits which, according to the Commissioner, would come to more than Rs. 70,000 and realise the same by executing the decree; nor can he draw out any part of the sum of more than Rs. 20,000 to his credit in Court deposit which he could utilise for the purpose of this litigation. Any order which refuses relief to the petitioner will result in his inability to proceed further with the enquiry in Court. The suit was admittedly filed in forma pauperis and the petitioner would be deprived of the only available means to conduct the inquiry in the lower Court if this Court does not pass an order putting him in possession of some funds. For all these reasons I do not think that the order of Somasundaram, J., should be regarded as a final one that could not be varied in any respect that would operate as an obstacle, in the way of directing the lower Court to permit the petitioner to draw out any portion of the sum in Court deposit. That order itself directed the inquiry into the mesne profits and what was stayed was only the passing of the final decree and the petitioner certainly requires some money to proceed with this enquiry. In my considered opinion this Court has ample power under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, to grant a relief of the nature asked for in this petition and to do substantial justice between the parties. In my considered opinion this Court has ample power under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, to grant a relief of the nature asked for in this petition and to do substantial justice between the parties. I therefore hold that I could entertain this petition and direct the lower Court to permit the guardian of the petitioner to draw out some portion of the amount. I think it is sufficient if I direct payment of Rs. 750 to the counsel for the petitioner in connection with this enquiry. This amount will be paid direct to the advocate instead of the amount being paid to the guardian of the petitioner and he, in turn, handing it over to the advocate. There will be no order as to costs. D.L.N. -------- Petition allowed.