Judgment: — This is a plaintiff’s Second Appeal against the Decree and Judgment of the Court of the District Judge of Nellore setting aside that of the District Munsif, Kanigiri, in O.S. No. 128 of 1947, a suit filed by the appellant for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 604-12-0 from the defendants. The plaintiff’s case is that the defendant took from the plaintiff Rs. 502-8-0 to pay to butchers and Rs. 10 for his own expenses on 4th April, 1944 and signed an entry in the plaintiff’s account-book in token of the same. The defendant denied that he took any money from the plaintiff and charged the plaintiff with fabrication of accounts to support a false claim. The learned District Munsif, on a consideration of the entire evidence, held in favour of the plaintiff. The learned District Judge differed from him and dismissed the suit. Hence the appeal. The finding is one of fact. While conceding that, the learned counsel for the appellant argues that the said finding is vitiated by two circumstances. (1) The learned Judge has not correctly appreciated the scope of Expert’s evidence and (2) The Judge acted illegally in relying upon previous decisions, where the plaintiff’s suits on promissory notes were dismissed, in order to evaluate the character of the plaintiff. The learned Judge commented on the manner of approach of the learned District Munsif in regard to the Expert’s evidence. He pointed out that the learned District Munsif was wrong in substituting the Expert’s decision to his own and that he should have exercised his own mind in coming to the conclusion whether the Expert’s opinion was correct or not. He observed: “The lower Court overlooked the fact the opinion of the Expert is only a piece of evidence, which has to be examined and appraised like any other evidence that might be adduced in the case and that it is the opinion of the Judge that is after all the decision in the case. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to use its own eyes in deciding whether certain handwritings placed before it are similar or not, utilising of course the opinion of the Expert and the evidence, which he gave in support of it, as a guide but subjecting it to close and searching scrutiny.......” The observations are, to my mind, unexceptionable. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to use its own eyes in deciding whether certain handwritings placed before it are similar or not, utilising of course the opinion of the Expert and the evidence, which he gave in support of it, as a guide but subjecting it to close and searching scrutiny.......” The observations are, to my mind, unexceptionable. The Judge does not lay down anything illegal when he points out that it is the duty of a Munsif to come to a conclusion on a question of a fact on a consideration of the entire evidence including that of the Expert. Another passage of the learned Judge is also strongly commented upon. The passage is “Moreover, it is a wrong way of approaching the Expert’s evidence. It is the Expert’s evidence that has to be corroborated by the other evidence in the case and not vice versa”. This statement may not be accurate. The expert’s evidence is only a piece of evidence. A Judge of fact will have to consider that evidence along with the other pieces of evidence. Which is the main evidence and which is the corroborative one depends upon the facts of each case. But this general statement does not really affect the conclusion of the learned Judge, as he has considered the entire evidence along with the expert’s evidence. Nor are there merits in the second point either. The learned Judge discredi-. ted the evidence of the plaintiff on the ground that he filed similar suits with false claims and that they were all dismissed and also on the ground that his name figures in the K.D. list maintained by the Police. To put it differently, the learned Judge relied upon the bad antecedents of the plaintiff to discredit him. It is argued that the learned Judge contravened the provisions of section 52 of the Evidence Act. Section 52 says: “In civil cases the fact that the character of any person concerned is such as to render probable or improbable any conduct imputed to him is irrelevant, except in so far as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant.” This section deals with the relevancy of character evidence in civil cases. The character of a party to a civil suit cannot be relevant to the decision of an issue arising in that suit. The character of a party to a civil suit cannot be relevant to the decision of an issue arising in that suit. When a question arises whether a contract was entered into between the parties, or whether it is supported by consideration, the character of the plaintiff or the defendant is certainly irrelevant to the issue whether there was a contract or whether it was supported by consideration. But there may be cases in which the character of a person may be relevant for the disposal of a suit such as actions for seduction, etc., but this section has no bearing on a case where the veracity of a witness is in question. That is governed by section 146, which says that when a witness is cross-examined, he may in addition to the questions hereinbefore referred to, be asked any questions which tend (1) to test his veracity, (2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life, or (3) to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to criminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. Under this section, a witness can be cross-examined to shake his credit by injuring his character. Character evidence may not be relevant to decide an issue in the case but a cross-examining counsel is given liberty under this section for the purpose of shaking the credit of a witness to put questions to him affecting his character. But the learned counsel says that the provisions of section 155 of the Act relate to the mode of impeaching the credit of a witness that the provisions of that section are exceptions to section 52 and that except in so far as those provisions permitted, character evidence is not admissible. The obvious answer is that sections 52 and 155 deal with different matters. Section 52 prohibits character evidence in regard to the subject-matter of the suit whereas section 155 prescribes the manner of impeaching the credit of a witness. Section 155 cannot, therefore, be construed as an exception to section 52. Further, sections 155 and 146 are not in conflict with each other. Sections 138, 140, 145, 148 and 154 provide for impeaching the credit of a witness by cross-examination. Section 155 cannot, therefore, be construed as an exception to section 52. Further, sections 155 and 146 are not in conflict with each other. Sections 138, 140, 145, 148 and 154 provide for impeaching the credit of a witness by cross-examination. In particular section 146 permits questions injuring the character of a witness to be put to him in cross-examination-Section 155 lays down a different method of discrediting a witness by allowing independent evidence to be adduced. I cannot, therefore, agree with the learned counsel that section 155 is an exception to section 52 and that, apart from section 155, his character cannot be impeached. If so, it follows that the learned Subordinate Judge was certainly justified in discrediting the plaintiff by answers elicited in his cross-examination to the effect that his antecedents were bad. Further, in this case, apart from P.W.1 who is obviously an interested witness, the plaintiff has examined two more witnesses. The learned Judge, for good reasons, disbelieved their evidence. I cannot, therefore, hold that the Judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is vitiated by any error of law. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------------ Appeal dismissed.