Judgement JUDGMENT :- Defendant 5 is the appellant. He represents the mortgagee, and this appeal arises in a suit for redemption of the suit properties mortgaged under Ex. A. 1, an arwar, dated 25-9-1954. (?) A and B schedule properties were the subject-matter of the said mortgage. In 1917 by reason of a suit O.S. No. 119 of 1917 instituted against the plaintiffs father and the mortgagee, the B schedule properties were declared not to belong to the plaintiffs father, who was the mortgagor, and as a result of the decree in that suit the B schedule properties were lost to the mortgagee. Exhibit A. 1 is a mortgage with possession, but there was a lease back in favour of the mortgagors of both the items of properties and they were paying the rent provided under the document of lease. After the decree in O.S. No. 119 of 1917 mortgagee obtained actual possession of the A schedule properties alone, since in the decree his right to possession of the B schedule properties was negatived. In the present suit for redemption the mortgagee claimed the loss sustained by reason of the B schedule properties not having been reduced to his possession, the loss being the income of the B schedule properties claimed to be reimbursed by the plaintiffs dispossession. The lower appellate Court following the decision in - Partab Bahadur Singh v. Gajadhar Bakhsh Singh, 24 All 521 (PC) (A) held that the loss having occurred more than 30 years prior to the institution of the present suit and the mortgagee not having taken any steps to recover the loss so sustained, he must be deemed to have acquiesced in the diminution of the security and as such he is not entitled to any relief on that account. The learned appellate Judge also observed that this being a breach of one of the covenants provided in favour of a mortgagee under S. 65, Transfer of Property Act his remedy was only to sue for the mortgage money under S. 68, Transfer of Property Act, and on that ground also he was not entitled to relief by way of possession on account of the loss of the B schedule properties. Section 65, Transfer of Property Act provides that in the absence of a contract to the contrary the mortgagor shall be deemed to contract with the mortgagee (a) that the interest which the mortgagor professes to transfer to the mortgagee subsists, and that the mortgagor has power to transfer the same, (b) that the mortgagor will defend, or if the mortgagee be in possession of the mortgaged property, enable him to defend the mortgagors title thereto. There can be no doubt that Cl. (a) is a covenant of title assured to the mortgagee so far as the interests of the mortgagor in the properties are concerned. The question is whether on a breach of this covenant the mortgagee would be entitled to damages, and, if so, in what manner. So far as Cl. (b) is concerned, it is incumbent on the mortgagor if the mortgagee is in possession a the mortgaged property, if it is a usufructuary mortgage, to defend his title to the property. In so far as the mortgagor in the present case is concerned, a perusal of the proceedings in O.S. No. 119 of 1917 would show that the mortgagor defended his title as against the plaintiff in that suit, but the court held against him by reason of which the possession by the mortgagee of the B schedule properties could not be retained. 2. The view taken by the lower appellate court that the only remedy for a, breach of a covenant of title assured in S. 65(a) is to sue for the mortgage money is contended to the not correct. Reference was made to the decision in - Ranjan v. Karnavan, AIR 1915 Mad 1215 (B), where in a suit for redemption the mortgagee claimed damages for breach of covenant of title by reason of his being dispossessed of certain properties, which were included in the mortgage, it was held that the mortgagee in the circumstances would be entitled to damages. Ramesam, J. in - Subramania v. Panchanada, AIR 1932 Mad 175 (C) took a similar view. Ramesam, J. in - Subramania v. Panchanada, AIR 1932 Mad 175 (C) took a similar view. In that case where the mortgagee with possession was not able to get possession of the property and the mortgagor was found guilty of the breach of the covenant to deliver possession, it was held that in the case of a mortgage with possession if the mortgagor is guilty of the breach of the covenant to deliver possession, the mortgagee did not lose his right to interest merely because he did not take steps to enforce possession and that he was entitled to fall back on the claim for interest, whether it was described as interest or described as damages for breach of the covenant to deliver possession. The mortgage in that case was of the year 1912 and the suit on the mortgage was filed in 1927. The damages which a mortgagee is entitled to get in the circumstances, in the view of Ramesam, J. is only a right to get interest. Section 68 only enumerates the conditions under which a mortgagee can sue for the mortgage money. Where the mortgagee being entitled to possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor fails to deliver the same to him, or to secure the possession thereof to him without disturbance by the mortgagor or any person claiming under a title superior to that of the mortgagor, he will be entitled to sue for the mortgage money. Section 68 does not in terms provide a remedy for any breach of the covenants prescribed in S. 65. Section 68 is therefore independent of S. 65, and the view taken by the lower appellate court that the only remedy of the mortgagee for breach of a covenant or for the breach of any other covenants under S. 65 is to sue for the mortgage money cannot be supported. The right to damages does certainly accrue to a mortgagee, who complains of a breach of the covenant; but whether these damages should be in the shape of interest or otherwise, however, need not be considered in this appeal, as this appeal could be disposed of on other grounds. 3. In the present case the conduct of the mortgagee after the decision in O.S. No. 119 of 1917 requires to be considered. 3. In the present case the conduct of the mortgagee after the decision in O.S. No. 119 of 1917 requires to be considered. He was not actually in possession of either A or B schedule properties until after the disposal of the suit in O.S. No. 119 of 1917, the properties having been leased back to the mortgagors, and after it was found that the mortgagors had no title to the B schedule properties and the mortgagee could not acquire any rights over them, the mortgagee recovered actual possession of the A schedule properties and continued in possession without any steps being taken by him for a period of 30 years to complain against the diminution of the security by reason of the B schedule properties having been excluded from the mortgage. This, in my view, is sufficient conduct on his part to show that he was satisfied with the income of the A schedule properties as sufficient compensation in lieu of interest on the mortgage money. He continued in possession of the A schedule properties and he could not get back the B schedule properties by reason of the decision in that suit, and it is common ground that until a suit for redemption was filed there was no whisper of any loss by reason of his being, deprived of the possession of the B schedule properties. The principle laid down in 24 All 521 (PC) (A) followed by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court in - Prosanna Kumar v. Girish Chandra, AIR 1934 Cal 149 (D) is directly applicable to the facts of the present case. In 24 All 521 (PC) (A), the mortgage was in respect of certain villages, the date of the mortgage being 15-6-1851. Between 1853 and 1864 the mortgagee lost possession of some of the villages, and a suit for redemption was filed in or about 1894. It was held that the mortgagee in the circumstances must be taken to have acquiesced in his dispossession. Between 1853 and 1864 the mortgagee lost possession of some of the villages, and a suit for redemption was filed in or about 1894. It was held that the mortgagee in the circumstances must be taken to have acquiesced in his dispossession. Here in this case the period of dispossession is much longer and the conduct of the mortgagee in accepting the actual possession of the A schedule properties must be deemed to be sufficient to hold that he was satisfied with the decree in O.S. No. 119 of 1917 as to the absence of any title in the mortgagors in respect of the B schedule properties, and that he was not entitled to anything more from the mortgagors apart from the fact that the mortgagors did their best to defend his title in the said suit. These circumstances, as already observed, are sufficient to hold that the mortgagee was satisfied with the diminished security, and he is not entitled to complain and try to recover any loss or possession 30 years later taking advantage of the suit filed for redemption. In the result I see no ground to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate court. The appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.