Judgment.- Plaintiff is the appellant. The father of the defendant executed a mortgage on 16th January, 1946, in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 4,000. The property mortgaged cons1sted of salt-pans situated in Kalingapatnam Salt Factory granted to the mortgagor by the Ass1stant Collector of Salt Revenue under a lease for the period from 1st January, 1943 to 31st December, 1967. The mortgagor died on 4th March, 1947 and the suit was instituted for recovery of the mortgage amount on 29th March, 1947. The defendant contended that the mortgage was unenforceable as it was prohibited by the terms of the lease deed and was opposed to public policy. Both the Courts below accepted the contention. of the defendant and held that the mortgage was unenforceable ; but, a money decree was, however, passed as against the assets of S. Audinarayana Naidu in the hands of the defendant. The plaintiff has preferred the second appeal in so far as the mortgage decree was not passed in his favour. The simple question that arises for consideration is as to the effect of clause 12 of the lease-deed, Exhibit B-1, which runs in the following terms: “The lessee/lessees shall not, except with the written consent of the lessor first had and obtained assign, underlet, or part with the possession of the demised premises or any portion thereof and shalB not transfer by sale, mortgage, exchange, gift or lease or otherwise the powers hereby granted to him/ them provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent the lessee/lessees at any time from taking any partner into the business carried on by him/them under the present lease who may be approved by the Collector.” There is no provision in the Madras Salt Act (Act IV of 1899) prohibiting the transfer of a lease. Section 11 only deals with the transfer of a licence granted under the terms of the Salt Act. Section 11 only deals with the transfer of a licence granted under the terms of the Salt Act. It provides: “Licences shall be transferable and may be relinquished: provided that no transfer or relinquishment shall have any effect against the Collector of Salt Revenue unless and until it shall have been reg1stered or accepted under such rules as he may from time to time prescribe.” Section 12 provides that “the licensee shall be taken to be the owner of the licence and of the salt-works specified therein.” The proviso to section 12 is to the effect that “nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of the licensee towards any person who may-have an interest in, or lien upon such licence or salt-works,” The contention which found favour with the Courts below was that clause 12 of the lease prohibited the lessee from mortgaging the demised premises without the written consent of the lessor. Is the mortgage created by the lessee void as contravening the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act ? The Bombay High Court held in Ismalji Yusufalli v. Raghunath Lachiram1, construing the provisions of the Bombay Salt Act (II of 1890) that the sub-lease created without obtaining the permission of the Collector was illegal. Mr. Chandavarkar, Acting Chief Justice, observed: “The real object and necessary effect of the agreement between the appellant and the respondent was to enable the latter to manufacture salt without a licence in the guise of a sub-lease, although that was forbidden by law by the terms of the licence” This decision was, ;no doubt, followed in Rabia Bibi v. Gangadhar Vishnu1. But Shah, J., however, observed that on principle he found it difficult to “hold that a breach of the condition of the licence as to the sub-letting in so far as the permission of the Collector in writing was not obtained would necessarily mean that the object of the provisions of the Salt Act was defeated thereby.” The decision in Ismalji r usufalli v. Raghunath Lachiram2 was considered by Kuppuswami Ayyar, J., in Sama Venkataratnam v. Teluri Venkataratnam3. The learned Judge held that the provisions of the Madras Salt Act were not in pari materia with the provisions of the Bombay Salt Act and held that under the provisions of the Madras Salt Act, the lessee or the licensee was entitled to transfer his interest or take in a partner with him. The point that arises for consideration in this appeal was recently considered by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar4. In the said decision, there is a full discussion of the provisions of the Madras Salt Act and the effect of a transfer made by the lessee. I follow that decision and adopt the reasoning therein. The Full Bench decision in Velu v. Sivasooriam5, based on the provisions of the Madras Abkari Act was rightly d1stinguished. The basis of this d1stinction is neatly set out by Govinda Menon, J., at page 463 in the following words: “Further it has to be considered that the scope and object of the Abkari Act are entirely different from those of the Salt Act. The Madras Salt Act, which got repealed by Central Act (I of 1944), was only a tax collecting statute. So is the Central Act (I of 1944) which deals not only with salt but with various other articles on which excise duty has to be levied. It deals in the first schedule with kerosene, matches, mechanical lighters, motor spirit, silver tobacco and various other things in addition to salt. It is therefore clear that the Act we have to consider is nothing but a fiscal one intended for collecting taxes, whereas the Madras Abkari Act had a public purpose and what is prohibited by the Madras Abkari Act is against public policy.” The learned Advocate for the respondent relied on the decision in Viswanadhan v. Namak Chand Gupta6. That case turned upon a construction of the provisions of the Cinematograph Act (II of 1918) which are similar to the provisions of Madras Abkari Act. At page 1026, the d1stinction is forcibly brought out in the following words: “There are provisions enacted for the purpose of revenue and in the interests of admin1stration. That case turned upon a construction of the provisions of the Cinematograph Act (II of 1918) which are similar to the provisions of Madras Abkari Act. At page 1026, the d1stinction is forcibly brought out in the following words: “There are provisions enacted for the purpose of revenue and in the interests of admin1stration. In such’ cases the matter is one between the Government and the licensee and no question of illegality will arise but when the provision is enacted in the interests of the public and for promotion of its -welfare a contravention thereof must be held to be illegal.” I agree with those observations and hold that as the provisions of the Salt Act are enacted only for the purpose of revenue, the matter is essentially one between the Government and the lessee and no question of public policy or illegality arises so as to attract the provisions of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. What is prohibited by the Salt Act is only that the transfer or mortgage of a licence shall have no effect against the Collector until it has been reg1stered or accepted by him. There is no prohibition against the transfer and no prohibition that the transferee will not acquire any right. Clause 12 of the lease only requires that the written consent of the lessor should be obtained if the lease is assigned or under-let. If the consent of the lessor or the order of the Collector is not obtained according to clause 12 of the lease-deed, the transfer will not be binding as against the lessor (i.e., the Government) or the Collector. But it would certainly be valid and binding as between the transferor and the transferee or the mortgagor and the mortgagee. That was the construction placed by Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J., in the unreported decisions in S.A. No. 1914 of 1944 which was confirmed on appeal in L.P. Appeal No. 3 of 1946 and which was followed in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar4. In construing the provisions of the Canals and Public Ferries Act (II of 1890 Madras), Bashyam Ayyangar, J., in Abdulla v. Mammood7 also took a similar view that though the transfer made without the previous! sanction of the Collector may be invalid against the Government, it will be valid as between renter and his assignee. In construing the provisions of the Canals and Public Ferries Act (II of 1890 Madras), Bashyam Ayyangar, J., in Abdulla v. Mammood7 also took a similar view that though the transfer made without the previous! sanction of the Collector may be invalid against the Government, it will be valid as between renter and his assignee. I, therefore, hold that the mortgage of the leasehold interest under Exhibit B-1 by the defendant’s father in favour of the appellant does not contravene any of the provisions of the Madras Salt Act and is not opposed to public policy and is valid and binding upon the mortgagee and his heir the defendant. ‘I do not agree with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ismalji Tusufalli v. Raghunath Lachiram1 and I prefer to follow the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Chockalingam Chettiar2. In this connection I may refer to an earlier decision in Sitharamamurthi Chetty v. Guruswami Cketty3 in which the learned Chief Justice assumed that the sale of the leasehold interest or the licence was not permitted by the Madras Salt Act. As the provisions of the Madras Salt Act and the decisions bearing thereon were not discussed, not much importance can be attached to the observations at page 411, which are in the following words: “Lastly, the learned Advocate-General strenuously relied upon the fact that neither the lease nor the licence could be sold as an asset of the partnership, as such a sale is not permitted by the Mad ras Salt Act. That may be so. But this circumstance does not present to us any insuperable diffi culty in moulding the decree properly and granting the proper relief to the appellants.” The next contention of the learned advocate for the respondent was that as the lease, Exhibit B-1 was granted by the Crown, the provisions of the Crown Grants Act (XV of 1895) apply to the case. I do not find any provision in the said Act-prohibiting the creation of a mortgage what section 2 provides is only that every grant and transfer shall be construed according to their tenor. Or, in other words, the lease-deed has to be construed as a whole and the effect of clause 12 considered. I am, therefore, unable to follow how the provisions of the Crown Grants Act ass1st the respondent. Or, in other words, the lease-deed has to be construed as a whole and the effect of clause 12 considered. I am, therefore, unable to follow how the provisions of the Crown Grants Act ass1st the respondent. In this connection the learned advocate invited my attention to a decision reported in Sundararajulu Naidu v. Papiah Naidu4. That case turned upon the construction of the particular grant and it was held therein that it was competent for the Crown to make a heritable grant or provide for succession of a limited interest, each grantee taking the estate for life. In the present case, there is no such grant. What we are concerned with is only a lease executed by the Government in favour of the defendant’s father. The lease deed provides that the lessee would be absolutely entitled to the leasehold interest for the period from 1st January, 1943 to 31st December, 1967. If the mortgage created by the lessee is binding as stated supra, it would certainly be binding upon his heir or successor, i.e., the defendant. It is not as though the lessee had only a life-interest and it had come to an end on his death as in the decision in Sundararajulu Naidu v. Papiah Naidu4. The last contention urged by the respondent’s advocate was that in any event the mortgagor having died and fresh licence having been granted under Exhibit B-2, dated 27th September, 1946, in favour of the respondent no mortgage decree could be passed. There is no force in this contention as well. The property mortgaged by the defendant’s father was only the leasehold interest and not the licence held by him. The decree which, the plaintiff seeks is only in respect of the leasehold interest which has devolved upon the defendant on the death of his father. So, the fact that the defendant obtained a licence on 26th September, 1946, in respect of the demised premises is immaterial and does not,, in any way, affect the enforceability of the mortgage as against the leasehold interest. In this connection, it is necessary that I should point out that the Courts, below as also the defendant did not keep in mind the d1stinction between a lease and a licence. The District Judge proceeded under the m1staken impression that Exhibit B-1 was only a licence. In this connection, it is necessary that I should point out that the Courts, below as also the defendant did not keep in mind the d1stinction between a lease and a licence. The District Judge proceeded under the m1staken impression that Exhibit B-1 was only a licence. The terms of clause 12 as set out by him in paragraph 8 of his judgment are not correct. Exhibit B-1 is only a lease-deed and clause 12 has been fully set out by me supra. It is really unnecessary in the present case to deal with the rights of the licensee or the effect of sections 11 and 12 of the Madras Salt Act, which deal with the transfer and relinquishment of the licences and the rights of the licensee or the effect of Exhibit B-2 in favour of the respondent. The plea taken in paragraph 5 of the written statement that the plaint schedule lands are not at all properties of late Audinarayana Rao and that the defendant did not inherit them as the son of late Audinarayana Rao is absolutely unsustainable. The fact that after the death of Audinarayana Rao a fresh licence was issued in favour of the defendant does not, in any way, affect the maintainability of the suit or the passing of a mortgage decree in respect of the leasehold interest in the salt-pans as aforesaid. In the result, the second appeal is allowed ; the decree of the trial Court as confirmed by the District Judge is modified ; and the appellant is entitled to a decree as prayed for in the plaint. The respondent will pay the costs of the appellant throughout. Leave granted. The appeal having been set down this day for further orders, the Court made the following further order: Time for the redemption is five months from the date of the decree and judgment. D.L.N. ----- Appeal allowed.