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1954 DIGILAW 364 (MAD)

Untitled judgment

1954-08-27

BALAKRISHNA AYYAR, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, RAJAGOPALAN

body1954
Rajagopalan, J.-On 4th September, 1953, the Government of Madras, in the exercise of powers vested in it under section 7(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947), constituted a Special Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the industrial disputes between the managements and workers of the Amalgamations Ltd., Madras, and its allied concerns, and appointed Mr. Justice Mack of the Madras High Court as the sole member of that Tribunal. The Tribunal gave its award on 8th February, 1954. By its order, dated 12th February, 1954, the Government of Madras directed the publication of that award, and the award was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 17th February, 1954. Under section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that award became enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. Section 20(3) of that Act provides: "Proceedings before a Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference of a dispute for adjudication and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17-A.". With reference to a publication in "The Mail" on 5th April, 1954, Mr. Justice Mack issued a notice to Mr. Hayles, the Editor of "The Mail," on 6th April, 1954, which runs "Proceedings of the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack, Industrial Tribunal, Madras. Dated 6th April, 1954. Subject.- Dispute between workers and managements of Amalgamations Limited, Madras, and its branches in the State. Reference.-"The Mail" editorial with caption "He is right" in the edition of "The Mail" of the 5th of April, 1954. Justice Mack, Industrial Tribunal, Madras. Dated 6th April, 1954. Subject.- Dispute between workers and managements of Amalgamations Limited, Madras, and its branches in the State. Reference.-"The Mail" editorial with caption "He is right" in the edition of "The Mail" of the 5th of April, 1954. A rule is issued against the Editor of "The Mail", Madras, to appear before the Tribunal, who adjudicated the dispute between the concerns of Amalgamations Limited (including "The Mail") and their workers, on Wednesday, the 14th April, 1954, sitting in the 4th Court at 10-45 A.M. and explain whether the portion of the Editorial in "The Mail" of the 5th April extracted infra related to the Tribunal’s adjudication of this dispute, and, if this be the case, to show cause why action should not be taken against the Editor of "The Mail" for such criticism in contempt of the Tribunal by a party to the dispute: ‘Occasionally, as happened recently in Madras, an adjudicator assumes that his task is to bring about some sort of mutual toleration in an industrial establishment, so he proceeds to seek evidence and opportunities that will assist him in his own conception of the sort of settlement he thinks desirable. In the end some sort of peace is patched up but it cannot endure. Neither side is satisfied and a new dispute begins brewing immediately the Tribunal has announced its finding however pacificatory the language thereof may be’. (Sd.) E.E. Mack, Industrial Tribunal. To the Editor, “The Mail”, Mount Road, Madras. Copy to: 1. The Chairman, Amalgamations Limited, Mount Road, Madras. 2. The Secretary, Simpson &38; Group Companies Workers’ Union, Mount, Road. Madras." In response to this notice, Mr. Hayles appeared before Mr. Justice Mack on 14th April, 1954, with Sri Govind Swaminathan as counsel. A written statement was filed that day on behalf of Mr. Hayles which ran: "Statement of Mr. A.A. Hayles, Editor of ‘Madras Mail.‘ I, A.A. Hayles, Director of Associated Publishers (Madras), Ltd., and Editor of ‘The Mail’, state as follows: 1. I have not committed contempt of any authority. I state with respect that the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack has no jurisdiction whatever to issue this rule and therefore it is illegal and incompetent. 2. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack was constituted as a Tribunal by G.O. Ms. I have not committed contempt of any authority. I state with respect that the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack has no jurisdiction whatever to issue this rule and therefore it is illegal and incompetent. 2. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack was constituted as a Tribunal by G.O. Ms. No. 4016 Development, dated 4th September, 1953, to adjudicate on disputes between the workers and Managements of various industrial concerns including ‘The Mail’. The said Tribunal delivered its award based on an agreement in respect of all the concerns on 8th February, 1954 and the award was published by G.O. Ms. No. 343, dated 12th February, 1954. After the date of the delivery of the award or at the latest after the publication of the award, the Special Industrial Tribunal has ceased to exist and no person can claim to represent such Tribunal. 3. Since the Special Industrial Tribunal does not exist, no individual can claim to represent it or take action on its behalf. 4. An Industrial Tribunal, whether special or otherwise only derives its powers under statute the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The powers of an Industrial Tribunal to deal with contempt are provided for in section 11(8) of the Act. Apart from this clause, there is no other provision . whereby an Industrial Tribunal can take action for contempt. Clause 11(8) does not apply to the facts stated in the Rule. 5. For the above mentioned and other reasons, I most respectfully state that I am not prepared to furnish any explanation that may be called for and pray that this Rule be discharged forthwith. Madras, (Sd.) A.A. Hayles.“ 14th April, 1954. The note recorded by Mr. Justice Mack on what happened next on 14th April, 1954 was: "Mr. Govind Swaminathan for Mr. Hayles declines to argue any question of law before me on the ground that I am functus officio as Industrial Tribunal. He also contends that I have therefore no jurisdiction even to make a report to the High Court for action under the Contempt of Courts Act. He is not even prepared to admit or deny that the passage extracted in the rule relates to my adjudication of the dispute between the concerns of Amalgamations Limited and its workers. Further orders on this rule reserved. (Sd.) E.E. Mack, 14-4-1954.“ On 21st April, 1954, Mr. He is not even prepared to admit or deny that the passage extracted in the rule relates to my adjudication of the dispute between the concerns of Amalgamations Limited and its workers. Further orders on this rule reserved. (Sd.) E.E. Mack, 14-4-1954.“ On 21st April, 1954, Mr. Justice Mack ordered the issue of a notice to Sri Govind Swaminathan in the following terms: ”Proceedings of the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mack, Industrial Tribunal, Madras, Wednesday the 21st April, 1954. Subject.-Disputes between workers and managements of Amalgamations Limited, Madras, and its branches in the State. Reference.-“The Mail” editorial with caption “He is right” in the edition of “The Mail” of the 5th April, 1954. Sri S. Govind Swaminathan appeared on the 14th of April, 1954, as counsel for the Editor of “The Mail” Mr. Hayles, who was asked to show cause on a rule issued why action should not be taken against him for criticism in contempt of the Tribunal who adjudicated the dispute. A rule is also issued against Sri S. Govind Swaminathan as counsel to show cause on Thursday, the 22nd April, 1954, at 10-45 A.M. why action should not be taken against him for ex facie contempt of Court in that when challenging Mr. Justice Mack’s jurisdiction to punish summarily for contempt as Industrial Tribunal, despite Article 215 of the Constitution, he flatly declined to address any argument to the Court on the matter of jurisdiction though asked to do so and furthermore refused to answer any question arising on the rule issued to Mr. Hayles, though appearing for him as counsel. (Sd.) E.E. Mack Judge, High Court. 21st April, 1954. To Sri S. Govind Swaminathan, State Prosecutor, High Court, Madras. Subsequent to the issue of this notice, the rule issued to Mr. Hayles was numbered as Contempt Application No. 5 of 1954 and that issued to Sri S. Govind Swaminathan as Contempt Application No. 6 of 1954. It may not be necessary for our present purposes to set out the course of proceedings between 22nd April, 1954 and 3rd May, 1954, with reference to the rules issued by Mr. Justice Mack to Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan. It may not be necessary for our present purposes to set out the course of proceedings between 22nd April, 1954 and 3rd May, 1954, with reference to the rules issued by Mr. Justice Mack to Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan. On 3rd May, 1954, our learned brother, Mack, J., pronounced his order of reference to a Full Bench wherein he recorded: “.....I would refer the two rules I have issued with my finding on jurisdiction to my Lord Chief Justice for placement before a Full Bench.” Thus, under the terms of the reference, the whole matter in relation to the two rules-was referred to a Full Bench. To dispose of that reference, which was placed before us under the orders of my Lord the Chief Justice, we formulated the following questions as those that arose for determination on the reference:- “1. Is the reference to the Full Bench competent? 2. When a Judge of a High Court is appointed as a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, has he all the powers of a High Court Judge to punish persons for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution? 3. With reference to notice, dated 21st April, 1954, issued to Sri S. Govind Swaminathan, which is the subject of Contempt Application No. 6 of 1954, had the learned Judge, E. E. Mack, J., jurisdiction to issue this notice as a Judge of this Court ? 4. Has any prima facie case of contempt been made to justify the issue of a notice: (a) in respect of the matter stated in the notice, dated 6th April, 1954, (b) in respect of the matter stated in the notice, dated 21st April, 1954?” Question 2.-The answer to this question should, we think, help to clear the ground to a considerable extent before we consider the other three questions. Though the fourth of the questions formulated by us specifically raises the issue, whether a prima facie case of contempt has been made out against (1) Mr. Hayles and (2) Sri Govind Swaminathan, we propose at this stage to assume without deciding that question, that with reference to what was published in “The Mail,” dated 5th April, 1954, Mr. Hayles was prima facie guilty of contempt, and with reference to what happened before Mr. Justice Mack on 14th April, 1954, Sri Govind Swami- nathan was prima facie guilty of contempt. Hayles was prima facie guilty of contempt, and with reference to what happened before Mr. Justice Mack on 14th April, 1954, Sri Govind Swami- nathan was prima facie guilty of contempt. We feel that the question of jurisdiction, which arises for our determination under question 2 can well be discussed and decided on this assumption without at this stage answering the fourth question. In his order of reference Mack, J., recorded his finding that as a Judge of this Court, he had jurisdiction to punish (1) Mr. Hayles and (2) Sri Govind Swaminathan for contempt of Court. With all respect we owe to our learned brother Mack, J., we have to consider the question of jurisdiction afresh. We have assumed for purposes of determining the question of jurisdiction that the publication made by Mr. Hayles on 5th April, 1954 and the conduct of Sri Govind Swaminathan on 14th April, 1954, prima facie constituted contempt. The next question is, did either or both constitute contempt of the High Court, or did either or both constitute contempt of the Industrial Tribunal, the sole member of which was a learned Judge of this Court ? Ex-facie, the publication of 5th April, 1954, made by Mr. Hayles, which is the subject-matter of the rule issued to him, it can only be in contempt of the proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal to which the passage referred. Here again we are assuming for the present that that passage referred to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal of which Mr. Justice Mack was the sole member. That has yet to be proved, and we are not deciding the question, whether that passage referred to the proceedings before that Tribunal. The passage complained of certainly did not refer to any proceedings of the High Court of Madras. The notice dated 6th April, 1954 directed Mr. Hayles, “......to appear be ore the Tribunal........to show cause why action should not be taken......for such criticism in contempt of the Tribunal..........”. It is no doubt true that our learned brother Mack, J., was all along of the view that it was contempt of the High Court, though the passage complained of referred to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. With all respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him. It is no doubt true that our learned brother Mack, J., was all along of the view that it was contempt of the High Court, though the passage complained of referred to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. With all respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with him. Whether the High Court has power to punish for contempt in this case is a question distinct from, whether it amounts prima facie to contempt of the High Court. In our opinion, the offending passage published by Mr. Hayles could only refer to the proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal. The notice issued to Sri Govind Swaminathan (Contempt Application No. 6 of 1954) arose out of the proceedings instituted by the issue of the rule to Mr. Hayles. The rule issued to Mr. Hayles to appear before the Industrial Tribunal on 14th April, 1954, was in relation to an alleged contempt of that Tribunal, and the proceedings on 14th April, 1954, were in pursuance of that notice to appear before that Industrial Tribunal. No doubt, all along, the respondents (Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan) contended that that Industrial Tribunal was functus officio long before 6th April, 1954. We reserve for discussion at a later stage the soundness or otherwise of the contention, that there could be no contempt of an Industrial Tribunal which had ceased to function as an Industrial Tribunal. To answer the limited question, whether the contempt alleged to have been committed by Sri Govind Swaminathan was of the High Court or of the Industrial Tribunal, a decision on the question, whether the Industrial Tribunal itself was functus officio on 21st April, 1954, may not be very material. If the test of provenance were to apply, and in our opinion it should, the proceedings on 14th April, 1954, before Mr. Justice Mack, which were the basis of the rule issued by him to Sri Govind Swaminathan on 21st April, 1954, were before the Industrial Tribunal before which Mr. Hayles had been asked to appear by the notice, dated 6th April, 1954, and before which Mr. Hayles and his counsel, Sri Govind Swaminathan, appeared. The terms of the notice issued by our learned brother Mack, J., to Sri Govind Swaminathan were “to show cause........why action should not be taken against him for ex-facie contempt of Court in that when challenging Mr. Hayles and his counsel, Sri Govind Swaminathan, appeared. The terms of the notice issued by our learned brother Mack, J., to Sri Govind Swaminathan were “to show cause........why action should not be taken against him for ex-facie contempt of Court in that when challenging Mr. Justice Mack’s jurisdiction to punish summarily for contempt as Industrial Tribunal despite Article 215 of the Constitution......” That itself even without reference to the terms of the notice issued on 6th April, 1954, makes it clear in our opinion that the proceedings on 14th April, 1954, were in an enquiry into the alleged contempt of the Industrial Tribunal. In our opinion the contempt with which Mr. Hayles was charged and the contempt with which Sri Govind Swaminathan was charged were both in relation to the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, of which, no doubt, a learned Judge of this Court had been the sole member. The next question is, did they constitute contempt of the High Court, or at least did they also, in addition to being contempt of the Industrial Tribunal, constitute contempt of the High Court, i.e., did the fact that a Judge of this Court adjudicated the industrial disputes as a duly constituted Industrial Tribunal, make the contempt complained of, contempt of the High Court? It should be fairly clear that adjudication of industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not within the jurisdiction of the High Court as such. That jurisdiction is only conferred on the special statutory tribunals created by that Act. Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with section 7 makes that clear. So it was not in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras that the learned Judge discharged his functions as an Industrial Tribunal duly constituted under section 7(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was not the office as a Judge of this High Court that our learned brother, Mack, J., held at the time of his appointment under section 7(i) of the Act, that conferred jurisdiction on him as Industrial Tribunal. That jurisdiction could only be traced to and founded on section 7(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That, as we pointed out before, did not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court as such. That jurisdiction could only be traced to and founded on section 7(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That, as we pointed out before, did not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court as such. It should follow that the proceedings before the learned Judge, who constituted the Industrial Tribunal, were not proceedings of the High Court, of which he was no doubt a Judge. It is not the office he holds that makes every act of his during his tenure of office as a Judge of the High Court, an act done or even purported to be done in the exercise of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The expression “actual service” of a Judge of a High Court has been defined in paragraph 11(b)(i) of the Second Schedule to the Constitution: “‘Actual service’ includes-(1) time spent by a Judge on duty as a Judge or in the performance of such other functions as he may at the request of the President undertake to discharge;” That definition envisages the possibility of a Judge of a High Court being entrusted with functions other than judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Quite obviously that definition was not intended to confer any jurisdiction on the High Court in relation to the performance of such other functions as a Judge of that High Court may, at the request of the President, undertake to discharge. In the definition of “actual service” of a Judge of a High Court, no distinction is drawn between the various classes of “such other functions” as a Judge may, at the request of the President, undertake to discharge, that is, between judicial functions, quasi-judicial functions and functions other than judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Even if it is judicial or quasi-judicial work that a Judge of a High Court undertakes, if that work is unconnected with the jurisdiction of the High Court, the fact that he holds the office of a Judge of that High Court cannot make that a work of that High Court and within its jurisdiction. It was contended before us that the Industrial Tribunal was not a “Court” and that the work it did was not judicial work either. The nature of the proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal and an adjudication by such a Tribunal has come up for consideration in the past before the Courts. It was contended before us that the Industrial Tribunal was not a “Court” and that the work it did was not judicial work either. The nature of the proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal and an adjudication by such a Tribunal has come up for consideration in the past before the Courts. In Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. v. State of Madras1, the learned Chief Justice referred with approval to the observations of the Privy Council in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, Ltd.1. “The jurisdiction of the Board (Labour Relations Board) .... is not invoked by the employee for the enforcement of his contractual rights; those, whatever they may be, he can assert elsewhere. But his reinstatement which the terms of his contract of employment might not by themselves justify, is the means by which labour practices regarded as unfair are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial peace is secured. It is in the light of this new conception of industrial relations that the question to be determined by the Board must be viewed.” The learned Chief Justice himself observed: “Many, if not all, of the so-called disputes between employers and employees in industrial concerns are not founded on contractual rights and obligations, but on considerations outside strict legal rights and obligations......The ultimate decisions of such Tribunals have to be determined not merely by the application of legal principles to ascertained facts, but by considerations of policy also.” In State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy2, Patanjali Sastri, C.J., observed: “The adjudication by the Tribunal is only an alternative form of settlement of the dispute on a fair and just basis having regard to the prevailing conditions in the industry and is by no means analogous to what an arbitrator has to do in determining ordinary civil disputes according to the legal rights of the parties.” The decision in Bharat Bank, Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank, Ltd.3, was earlier in point of time, and the principles laid down there were referred to in Sree Meenakshi Mills, Ltd. v. State of Madras4 and State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy2. The question that arose for determination in the Bharat Bank case3, was whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act was a Court within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. The question that arose for determination in the Bharat Bank case3, was whether an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act was a Court within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a Court. At page 461 Kania, C.J., observed: “In my opinion, the functions and duties of the Industrial Tribunal are very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions, although it is not a Court . . . . . While the powers of the Industrial Tribunal in some respects are different from those of an ordinary Civil Court and it has jurisdiction and powers to give reliefs which a Civil Court administering the law of the land (for instance, ordering reinstatement of a workman) does not possess in the discharge of its duties it is essentially working as a judicial body.” The view expressed by Fazl Ali, J., at page 463, was: “Now there can be no doubt that the Industrial Tribunal has, to use a well-known expression ‘all the trappings of a Court’ and performs functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial.” Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed at pages 481-482: “It is no doubt true that by reason of the nature of the dispute that they have to adjudicate, the law gives them wider powers than are possessed by ordinary Courts of law, but powers of such a nature do not affect the question that they are exercising judicial power.....That circumstance does not make them anything else but tribunals exercising judicial power of the State, though in a degree different from the ordinary Courts and to an extent which is also different from that enjoyed by an ordinary Court of law. They may rightly be described as quasi-judicial bodies because they are out of the hierarchy of the ordinary judicial system but that circumstances cannot affect the question of their being within the ambit of article 136.” Thus while the Industrial Tribunal is itself a quasi-judicial Tribunal, its functions are judicial. But they are judicial functions of the Tribunal and not of the High Court, even if a Judge of that High Court constituted the Industrial Tribunal. But they are judicial functions of the Tribunal and not of the High Court, even if a Judge of that High Court constituted the Industrial Tribunal. Even apart from the plain language of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the anomalies that one can envisage should bear an interpretation of that section by which the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal, the sole member of which is a Judge of a High Court, is equated to the jurisdiction of the High Court of which he is a Judge. Suppose a Tribunal is constituted under section 7 (i) of the Act consisting of a Judge of a High Court as the Chairman, a District Judge and an industrialist. Merely because the Chairman of such a Tribunal is a Judge of the High Court, the whole Tribunal does not become part of that High Court, and the jurisdiction vested in such a Tribunal does not merge in, or constitute an extension of the jurisdiction of that High Court. Nor obviously can it be an extension of the jurisdiction of a District Court, the Judge of which is the other member of the Tribunal. The industrialist member, of course, is not by himself a Court. The Tribunal itself is not a Court. The jurisdiction of such a Tribunal could not be that of a High Court while at the same time being that of a District Court and also of no Court at all. That was why we stated earlier, it is not the office which the member of a Tribunal held before his appointment to an Industrial Tribunal that can confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal, and the appointment of a Judge of a High Court either as Chairman or as the sole member of a Tribunal constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot by itself enlarge the jurisdiction of that High Court. In Ex parte Van Sandau1, Mr. Van Sandau was the solicitor on one side and Messrs. Turner and Hensman, on the other. Mr. Van Sandau, dissatisfied with a decision of the Court of Review wrote, printed and published a libel upon the Court of Review, upon the eminent Judge of that Court, and upon Messrs. Turner and Hensman with respect to this matter. Mr. Van Sandau was committed for contempt. He afterwards apologised and he was discharged. Mr. Van Sandau, dissatisfied with a decision of the Court of Review wrote, printed and published a libel upon the Court of Review, upon the eminent Judge of that Court, and upon Messrs. Turner and Hensman with respect to this matter. Mr. Van Sandau was committed for contempt. He afterwards apologised and he was discharged. The Lord Chancellor observed: “The next point urged was that the Court of Review possessed no authority to commit for contempt. But by the Act 5 &38; 6 W. 4 G. 29, S. 25, it is declared that the Court of Review shall be a Court of Record, and may have, use and exercise all the powers, rights and privileges of a Court of Record, as fully to all intents and purposes as the same are used by any of His Majesty’s Courts of law at Westminster; and the Court is in terms authorised to commit for contempt. But a distinction was taken. It was said that, under this clause, a judge sitting alone cannot commit for a contempt. This requires some explanation. The Court originally consisted of four judges; the number was afterwards reduced to three, and certain powers were given to them sitting as the Court of Review; but the Judges might also sit alone in performing the other duties prescribed by the Act. When, therefore, the Act says that a judge or commissioner sitting alone shall not commit for a contempt, it obviously means a judge sitting not as a Court of Review, but acting as a judge in the exercise of the other duties prescribed by the statute. By a subsequent Act, power is given to a single judge to constitute the Court of Review; but the judge so sitting as the Court of Review does not come within the exception as to commitments for contempt, which relates only to a single judge sitting in his individual character for the purposes already stated, and not as the Court of Review. The objection originates in a misapprehension of the meaning of the Act of Parliament and is obviously unfounded.” The Act itself, which conferred on the Court of Review powers of a Court of Record, which include the power to punish contempt of itself differentiated between the powers of a Judge of that Court as the Court of Review and the statutory powers he could exercise but not as the Court of Review. For contempt of proceedings before such a Judge, when he did not sit as a Court of Review, he had no power to punish as a Court of Review. A subsequent enactment gave power to a single judge of the Court to constitute the Court of Review, and he had the power to punish contempt of proceedings before such a Court as a duly constituted Court of Review. Whether the statutory powers be given by the same Act or by different Acts should make little difference to the application of the principles enunciated in Van Sandau’s case1. If a Judge of a High Court discharges statutory functions as an Industrial Tribunal, but those functions are not those of the High Court of which he is a Judge, such a Judge, though a Judge of a Court of Record within the meaning of Article 215 of the Constitution, cannot punish for contempt, because it is not a contempt of the High Court as such, but only a contempt of that Judge in relation to the statutory functions he discharges, which statutory functions are independent of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court. In Macartney v. Corry2, the facts were: During the pendency of an Election Petition before the Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, Mr. Carson, the proprietor of a newspaper, published in his journal a series of articles which were calculated to interfere with the due course of justice, intended to prejudice the public mind against the petitioner, to prevent witnesses affording him their evidence, to deter him from prosecuting his petition, and if he abandoned it, to deter any other qualified person from becoming petitioner in his stead. An application was made to the Judge in Chamber to punish Carson, the proprietor of the newspaper, for contempt. An application was made to the Judge in Chamber to punish Carson, the proprietor of the newspaper, for contempt. The learned Judge held that the publications were contempt of the Court of Common Pleas, and he also held that the Judge on the rota, sitting in Chamber, had no jurisdiction to commit for the contempt. At page 246 the learned Judge observed: “The Election Petition is a cause pending in the Court of Common Pleas, and it is not until the trial commences before the Election Judge that the full jurisdiction of the Court comes into operation. It is true that the petition in question became attached to me as Senior Judge on the rota before whom it was eventually to be tried, and that I had authority to entertain motions and make orders for carrying out the proceedings preliminary to the trial. I had such authority under the Statute and General Orders of the Election Judge, but until the trial commences I would act not as an independent Court, but in aid of the Court of Common Pleas. This application for an attachment is collateral to the cause, and the contempt was a contempt of the Court of Common Pleas, to be dealt with properly by that Court, and not by me.” The learned Judge left it open to the petitioner to renew the motion in the Court of Common Pleas, if he should think fit. If a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas acted, not as that Court, but acted only in aid of that Court, and therefore had no power to punish for contempt of the Court of Common Pleas, it is a difficult to hold that a Judge of a High Court, who acted not even in aid of the High Court, but exercised a jurisdiction independent of the High Court, could punish, as a High Court, contempt not of the High Court but of the Industrial Tribunal of which that learned Judge was the sole member. In the Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan1, the Privy Council had to consider the position of the Court of Mines of Victoria in relation to the Supreme Court of that State. The Court of Mines was first created by the Statute of 1857, which was subsequently replaced by the Mining Statute of 1865. In the Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan1, the Privy Council had to consider the position of the Court of Mines of Victoria in relation to the Supreme Court of that State. The Court of Mines was first created by the Statute of 1857, which was subsequently replaced by the Mining Statute of 1865. The Statute of 1865 created a Chief Judge of the Court of Mines, who was to be one’ of the Judges of the Supreme Court, and statutory provision was made for appeals to the Chief Judge against the decisions of the other Judges of the Court of Mines. Section 244 of the Mining Statute of 1865 provided that no proceedings under that Act should be removed or removable into the Supreme Court save and except as “hereinbefore provided”. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that in relation to the Supreme Court, the Courts of Mines stood on the footing of inferior Courts. Their Lordships further held that the power of the Supreme Court to issue a certiorari to the Court of Mines in respect of any proceeding under the Mining Statute of 1865 had been taken away by that Statute. But their Lordships also held at page 442: “It is, however, scarcely necessary to observe that the effect of this is not absolutely to deprive the Supreme Court of its power to issue a writ of certiorari to bring up the proceedings of the inferior Court, but to control and limit its action on such writ. There are numerous cases in the books which establish that, notwithstanding the private clause in a statute, the Court of Queen’s Bench will grant a certiorari; but some of those authorities establish, and none are inconsistent with the proposition, that in any such case that court will not quash the order removed, except upon the ground either of a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made it, or of manifest fraud in the party procuring it.” That one of the Judges of the Supreme Court was a member of the Court of Mines, the Chief Judge of that Court, in no way altered the status of the Court of Mines as an inferior Court. The Judge of the Supreme Court, who was appointed also a Judge of the Court of Mines, did not carry with him all the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court when he discharged his statutory functions as the Chief Judge of the Court of Mines. The application of the principle laid down in that case to the facts before us should show that the appointment of a Judge of the High Court to an Industrial Tribunal under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act would not alter the status of the Industrial Tribunal or equate it with the High Court itself. Considerable reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Goonesinha v. Hon. O.L. de Kretser1. In that case one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Ceylon was appointed the Election Judge to enquire into an election dispute under the Ceylon (State Council Elections) Order-in-Council, 1931. The main question that arose for decision in that case and in the appeal before the Privy Coucnil related to the power of the Supreme Court of Ceylon to issue a writ of certiorari directed to the Election Judge or Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, after examining the relevant provisions of the Order-in-Council observed at page 67: "While the Ordinance constituting the Supreme Court does not confer on it original, but only appellate, jurisdiction in civil cases, their Lordships are of opinion that cognizance of election petitions is a special jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by the Order-in-Council and that is abundantly clear from the provisions to which they have referred." Their Lordships also referred to the well-established principle, that a superior Court would not issue a writ of certiorari to another superior Court, and that an Election Judge constituted a superior Court. But it was not on that ground that the ultimate decision was rested. But it was not on that ground that the ultimate decision was rested. Their Lordships observed: "But their Lordships are of opinion that the true view is that cognizance of these petitions is an extension of, or addition to, the ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and consequently certiorari cannot be granted to bring up any order made in the exercise of that jurisdiction." It was another aspect of this problem that was decided by the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co., Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros., Ltd.2, where the learned Judges quoted with approval the rule laid down by Viscount Haldane, L.C., in National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General3, and observed: "The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court." As we have already pointed out, adjudication of an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be viewed as an extension of, or addition to the ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras. The decision in Goone-sinha’s case1, in no way supports the proposition, that if a Judge of a High Court is appointed the sole member of an Industrial Tribunal under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction he exercises as Industrial Tribunal is the jurisdiction of the High Court itself. We shall deal at less length with some of the other cases cited before us, because they do not bear directly on the limited question of jurisdiction, which we are considering at this stage. In The King v. Clement4, it was not a question of jurisdiction to punish contempt that was raised or decided, but the legality of the order of Lord Chief Justice Abbot sitting as Court of General Jail Delivery. In Ex parte Fernandez5, what was held was that a Court of Assize was a superior Court, and that the Judge had jurisdiction to commit for contempt. In Dale’s case6, one of the points for decision was the position of Lord Penzance as official principal of the Arches Court of Canterbury and his power to punish contempt for disobedience of his orders. Lord Coleridge, C.J., observed at page 403: "Lord Penzance was made by 37 and 38 Vict. In Dale’s case6, one of the points for decision was the position of Lord Penzance as official principal of the Arches Court of Canterbury and his power to punish contempt for disobedience of his orders. Lord Coleridge, C.J., observed at page 403: "Lord Penzance was made by 37 and 38 Vict. c. 85 as ecclesiastical judge in an ecclesiastical Court; there was a cause cognizable before him; there was a person duly cited; there was a lawful order made with which that person was required to comply; that person refused to pay obedience to such lawful order. It seems to follow that by the plain and direct enactment of 53 Geo. 3, this significant it properly issued. I think this would have been so if Lord Penzance had remained only judge of the Provincial Court of Canterbury; it is nonetheless so according to the view I have already expressed, because since the passing of the Act the events contemplated in the 7th section have happened and he has become official principal of the Court of Arches." Earlier at page 400 the learned Chief Justice pointed out: "Not that proceedings, though in the Court of Arches, ceased to be proceedings under and limited by the statute, but that proceedings under and limited by the statute became statutory proceedings in the Court of Arches." Such a claim cannot be made in the present case. The proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal did not become either under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or under any other statute, proceedings before the High Court of Madras. In Queen v. Lefroy1, the point actually decided was that the jurisdiction of the Judge of the County Court was confined by section 113 of 9 &38; 10 Vic., c. 95, to contempts committed in Court, and that he had no power to proceed against a person for a contempt committed out of Court. At page 137 Cockburn, C.J., observed: "The power to commit for contempt is fully gone into by Blackstone and Hawkins; but though this power is recognised in the superior Courts, it is nowhere said that an inferior Court of record has any power to proceed for contempt out of Court; and there is an obvious distinction between the superior Courts and other Courts of record. In the case of the superior courts at Westminster, which represent the one Supreme Court of the land, this power was coeval with their original constitution, and has always been exercised by them. These Courts were originally carved out of the one Supreme Court, and are all divisions of the aula regis, where it is said the king in person dispensed justice, and their power of committing for contempt was an emanation of the royal authority, for any contempt of the Court would be contempt of the sovereign. But it is a very different matter with respect to the country courts and similar inferior courts." In In re Johnson2, the actual point for decision was whether the conduct complained of amounted to contempt of Court. Lord Esher, M.R., held that that conduct was, and was intended to be, an insult to the administration of justice. After referring to the oft-quoted opinion of Wilmot, C.J., in The King v. Almou3, the learned Master of the Rolls observed at page 72: "If he (the Judge) is acting judicially in the office of a judge, he is acting as a judge of the High Court of Justice. It signifies not where he is sitting, or what he is doing in such judicial capacity. If any one attempts to interfere improperly with such judicial proceeding, provided it is done with sufficient nearness, it is a contempt; a contempt not of the Judge, but of the High Court as a judge of which he is acting." With reference to the facts of that case the learned Master of the Rolls held at page 73: "The Judge was acting for the Court judicially and in the administration of justice, and what the appellant did was an insult to the administration of justice." These observations have, however, to be construed with reference to the facts in issue in that case. The proceedings were before a Judge at Chambers in the Royal Courts of Justice in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of that Court. The observation of the learned Master of the Rolls, that the contempt was not of the Judge but of the High Court, as a Judge of which he was acting, should bar any application of the principle laid down by him even to judicial proceedings, if these proceedings are not in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court. The observation of the learned Master of the Rolls, that the contempt was not of the Judge but of the High Court, as a Judge of which he was acting, should bar any application of the principle laid down by him even to judicial proceedings, if these proceedings are not in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court. We have already pointed out in this case that the Industrial Tribunal was a quasi-judicial tribunal, though the proceedings before that Tribunal would come within the scope of judicial proceedings. But these proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal were not in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court. The discussion up to his point may be summed up thus: The proceedings before the learned Judge, who constituted the Industrial Tribunal, were not proceedings of the High Court, of which he was no doubt a Judge. Any contempt committed in relation to such proceedings would certainly be contempt of that Industrial Tribunal. True, it would also be in contempt of the learned Judge who presided over that Tribunal. But nonetheless it is only contempt of the Tribunal and not contempt of the High Court. In the view we have recorded above, that there was no contempt of the High Court as such, it may not be necessary to go into the origin and the extent of the undoubted inherent power of the High Court to punish contempt of itself, now enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. The next question is, has the High Court, as a superior Court of record, power to punish contempt of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947? Despite the fact that such a Tribunal was presided over by a Judge of the High Court, the Industrial Tribunal was, in relation to the High Court, an inferior Tribunal, subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Despite the fact that such a Tribunal was presided over by a Judge of the High Court, the Industrial Tribunal was, in relation to the High Court, an inferior Tribunal, subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The position in England under the Common Law was explained in 7 Halsbury’s Laws of England (Hailsham’s edition) at page 23, paragraph 36: “The King’s Bench Division has a general superintendence over all crimes whatsoever, and watches over the proceedings of inferior Courts, not only to prevent them from exceeding their jurisdiction or otherwise acting contrary to law, but also to prevent persons from interfering with the course of justice in such Courts.” The principles on which that jurisdiction was rested were explained in Rex v. Davies1, which were followed in Rex v. “Daily Mail”, Farnsworth, Ex parte2. After pointing out at page 42 of the report in Rex v. Davies1, the essential difference between the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of King’s Bench and that exercised by the other Courts, which possessed none of the relations with the inferior Courts which have always appertained to the King’s Bench, Wills, J., observed that it was the peculiar function of the King’s Bench, “to exercise superintendence over the inferior Courts and confine them to their proper duties This, however, as it seems to us, was only one exercise of the duty of seeing that they did impartial justice, and if and when the attainment of that end required that the misdeeds of others should be corrected as well as the misfeasances of the inferior Courts themselves, it seems to us that it is no departure from the principle, but only its legitimate application to a new state of things, if others whose conduct tends to prevent the due performance of their duties by those Courts have to be corrected as well as the Courts themselves.” The inherent power of the King’s Bench (now the Queen’s Bench) in England to punish contempt of the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to it was thus based on its duty to protect those Courts and Tribunals, which duty itself was correlated to the inherent power of the King’s Bench to exercise superintendence over the subordinate Courts and Tribunals. In India the power of a High Court as a superior Court of Record to exercise supervision over the Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction is now enacted by Article 227 of the Constitution which runs: “Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.” In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held: “The words ‘in relation to which’ obviously qualify the word ‘territories’ and not the words ‘Courts and Tribunals’.” The history of the statutory recognition accorded to this power of superintendence by section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861 and section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, was discussed by a Division Bench of this Court in Pattisam In re4, and by the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath3. At page 293 the learned Judges of the Supreme Court pointed out: “The material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals.” Neither section 15 of the High Courts Act of 1861 nor section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, nor Article 227 of the Constitution specifically vested in the High Court power to punish contempt of the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to it. Nor was there any statutory recognition in these enactments of such a power. The distinction between the statutory power of superintendence and the inherent power of the High Court to punish contempt of inferior Courts subordinate to it was brought out in sharp relief by a Full Bench of this Court in In re Venkata Rao1. In that case Mr. Venkata Rao was charged with contempt of a subordinate Court, based on the letter he had sent to the District Munsif of Bellary, a Court subordinate to the Madras High Court, charging the District Munsif with malicious and improper conduct in the course of a judicial enquiry before him. The High Court of Madras issued a rule calling upon Mr. Venkata Rao to show cause why he should not be dealt with according to law for contempt of Court. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish Mr. The High Court of Madras issued a rule calling upon Mr. Venkata Rao to show cause why he should not be dealt with according to law for contempt of Court. On the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish Mr. Venkata Rao for that contempt, the learned Chief Justice observed at page 838: "It seems to me that there are two questions for us to consider. First, have we inherent Common. Law jurisdiction in the matter? And, secondly, have we statutory jurisdiction under the powers conferred on this Court by section 15 of the High Courts Act?" In answering the first question in the affirmative, the learned Chief Justice referred to the principles laid down by Wills, J., in Rex v. Parke2 and Rex v. Davies3. The second question was answered in the negative. At page 842, the learned Chief Justice recorded: "I am not prepared to hold we have jurisdiction under section 15 of the Indian High Courts-Act which gives us powers of superintendence with regard to subordinate Courts." We are in respectful agreement with the principles laid down by the Full Bench in In re Venkata Rao1. While Article 227 of the Constitution, which replaced section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, extended the power of superintendence of the High Court to Tribunals also, Article 227 did not itself, vest in the High Court any power to punish contempt of subordinate Courts and Tribunals. The inherent power of the High Court to punish contempt of such Courts and Tribunals, was not, however, touched by Article 227 of the Constitution, even as section 15, of the High Courts Act left it untouched. To what extent, if any, that inherent power of the High Court to punish a contempt of a Tribunal duly constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, one of the Tribunals subordinate to the High Court, has been defined or taken away by statutory enactment, is the next question. To what extent, if any, that inherent power of the High Court to punish a contempt of a Tribunal duly constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, one of the Tribunals subordinate to the High Court, has been defined or taken away by statutory enactment, is the next question. Section 30 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) Act (XLVIII of 1950) runs: "80(1): Powers of the Appellate Tribunal in relation to contempts.-If any person, (a) when ordered by an Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal to produce or deliver up any document, being legally bound, intentionally omits to do so, or (b) when required by an Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal to’ bind himself by an oath or affirmation to state the truth, refuses to do so, or (c) being legally bound to state the truth of any subject to an Industrial Tribunal or the-Appellate Tribunal, refuses to answer any question put to him touching such subject by such Industrial) Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, or (d) refuses to sign any statement made by him when required to do so by an Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, or (e) intentionally offers any insult or causes any interruption to an Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal at any stage of its judicial proceedings, he shall be deemed to be guilty of contempt of such Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. (2) If any person commits any act or publishes any writing, which is calculated to improperly influence an Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal or to bring such Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal or any member thereof into disrepute or contempt or to lower its or his authority, or to interfere with the lawful process of any such Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, such person shall be deemed to be guilty of contempt of such Industrial Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. (3) The Appellate Tribunal shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of itself and of all the Industrial Tribunals as the High Courts have and exercise in respect of themselves and Courts subordinate to them under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XX of 1926)." Act XLVIII of 1950 defined contempts of Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Appellate Tribunals, and vested power to punish such contempt not in the High Court but in the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 30 (3) of the Act. No doubt that Act does not purport to deal with or affect the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to punish contempts of inferior Tribunals, which stems from the power of superintendence possessed by the High Court as its necessary concomitant; but nonetheless when the Indian Parliament has made specific statutory provision for the punishment of contempts of Industrial Tribunals, the High Court, in our opinion, should not thereafter invoke its inherent jurisdiction to punish any contempt of the Tribunals, created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even assuming that such a power exists. The next question that falls to be considered is whether the inherent power of the High Court to punish contempts of Industrial Tribunals survives after section 30 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950) came into force. The inherent power of the High Court to punish contempts of a Tribunal like the Industrial Tribunal subordinate to it was based on what was described as a correlative duty of the High Court, correlated to the power of superintendence which a High Court had over the Tribunal. In Rex v. Davies1, Wills, J., quoted the observations of Wilmot, C.J., in King v. Almon2, and observed at page 41 of the report: "With a few verbal alterations, those eloquent words will apply with at least equal force to writings, the direct tendency of which is to prevent a fair and impartial trial, or at least one that can be so considered, from being had in Courts of inferior jurisdiction which have not the power of protecting themselves from such encroachments upon their independence". After quoting again at page 41 the observations of Wilmot, C.J., in King v. Almon2, "the several parts of the system, he adds, act in combination together to attain the only end and object of all laws, the safety and security of the people.," Wills, J., observed at pages 41-42: "Words which, it appears to us, are as appropriate to the question we have in hand as they were in the case with which he was dealing, to the application under different circumstances of the same great principle, that Courts for the administration of justice exist for the benefit of the people, that for the benefit of the people their independence must be protected from unauthorised interference, and that the law provides effective means by which this end can be secured. If it is to be secured at all in the case of the inferior Courts, it can only be secured by the action of this Court, for they have not the power to protect themselves". We have already extracted above the passage at page 43 of the report in Rex v. Davies1, where, Wills, J., referred to the peculiar function of the King’s Bench to exercise superintendence over the inferior Courts and confine them to their proper duties and correlated the duty to punish contempt of the inferior Courts to that power of superintendence. We have also pointed out that the principles laid down by Wills, J., were approved of by a Full Bench of this Court in In re Venkata Rao3. The assumption and the exercise of the power to punish contempts of inferior Courts and Tribunals were based on the recognition of the fact, that the subordinate Tribunal had no power to protect itself, and that there was no Court other than the King’s Bench that could afford that protection. That was why contempts of other superior Courts did not come within the jurisdiction of the King’s Bench in England. When an inferior Court can protect itself, or when any other statutory provision is made for the protection of the Tribunal from contempt, the correlative duty of the superior Court like the King’s Bench in England and the High Court in India ceases. When that duty ends, the basis for the exercise of the inherent power to punish contempt of a subordinate Tribunal disappears. When that duty ends, the basis for the exercise of the inherent power to punish contempt of a subordinate Tribunal disappears. Statutory power is given to protect an Industrial Tribunal from contempt to the Industrial Tribunal itself under section 11(8) of Act XIV of 1947 and to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 30(3) of Act XLVIII of 1950. To that extent the correlative duty of the High Court to protect an inferior Tribunal, namely, the Industrial Tribunal, ended. It is not’that Act XLVIII of 1950 itself specifically extinguished that duty or the High Court’s power to punish contempt based on that duty. It is just a case of alteration in circumstances, an alteration resulting from Act XLVIII of 1950, which the High Court recognises. It is that recognition that bars further exercise of the inherent power of the High Court to protect an Industrial Tribunal from contempt, to the extent to which other and adequate statutory protection has been provided by section 30 of Act XLVIII of 1950. The principle on which contempt of Courts and Tribunals is punished, whatever be the authority that is empowered to punish, was explained thus by Wills, J. in Rex v. Davies1 at page 40: “What then is the principle which is the root of and underlies the cases in which persons have been punished for attacks upon Courts and interferences with the due execution of their orders ? It will be found to be, not the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual judges of the Court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the Tribunal be undermined or impaired.” The learned Judge also quoted with approval the observations of Bowen, L.J:, in Helmore v. Smith2 at page 455: “The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of Court is not to vindicate the dignity of the Court or the person of the judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice”. In its ultimate analysis, contempt of Court is contempt of the authority of the Sovereign State exercised through its Courts duly constituted for the administration of justice. In its ultimate analysis, contempt of Court is contempt of the authority of the Sovereign State exercised through its Courts duly constituted for the administration of justice. That the English jurists traced it back to the King of England dispensing justice in the aula regis does not affect the principle. The power which the King’s Bench exercised to punish contempt of itself and of the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to it was the power of the Sovereign State. It is a similar power that the High Courts in India exercise. It is obviously open to Parliament of India, which exercises the Sovereign authority of the State over this portion of the legislative field, to provide specifically for the exercise of the power of the Sovereign State to punish contempts of any specified classes of Courts or Tribunals. In relation to the Industrial Tribunals and the classes of contempts enumerated in sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 30 of the Act XLVIII of 1950, the State, acting through Parliament, has conferred that power on the Labour Appellate Tribunal by section 30 of that Act. The High Court is bound to respect that statutory provision, and it can no longer invoke its inherent power to punish contempts of an Industrial Tribunal to the extent that the requisite power has been conferred on an independent statutory Tribunal like the Labour Appellate Tribunal by section 30(3) of Act XLVIII of 1950. The contempts with which Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan were charged in the rules issued to them by our learned brother Mack, J., fall, in our opinion, without the scope of section 30(2) of Act XLVIII of 1950. In our opinion, after the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act XLVIII of 1950 specifically provided for punishments of contempts of Industrial Tribunals and vested that power in the Tribunals specified in section 30 of the Act, the High Court should no longer exercise its inherent power to punish the contempts specified in sub-sections 1 and 2 of section 30 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950). It is well settled that when a statute specifically provides for the exercise of a power by a named authority, the ambit and location of that power is thereafter to be sought within the limits prescribed by that statute itself without further recourse to any Common Law incidents. It is well settled that when a statute specifically provides for the exercise of a power by a named authority, the ambit and location of that power is thereafter to be sought within the limits prescribed by that statute itself without further recourse to any Common Law incidents. By way of analogy see Attorney-General v. De Kayser’s Royal Hotel1, where the limits of the prerogative power of the Crown were discussed. Up to the date on which Act XLVIII of 1950 came into force, the High Court had inherent power to punish contempt of an Industrial Tribunal, based on its correlative duty to protect such a Tribunal from contempt of it. It is not necessary for our present purpose to discuss the position in law at a time when the statutory power of correction of subordinate Courts was, so to speak, suspended, i.e., between 1937 and 1950 when the Government of India Act, 1935, was in force. Article 227 of the Constitution, as we have pointed out above, restored that power previously conferred on the High Court by section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Our conclusion on that aspect of the case is that for the contempts with which Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan were charged, the only competent authority that has the power to punish is the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 30(3) of Act XLVIII of 1950 and not the High Court of Madras. In view of what we have said above about the effect of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950) on the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court to punish contempts of an Industrial Tribunal, it may not be necessary to consider at any length the question, whether the Contempt of Courts Act XII of 1926 as amended by Act XII of 1937 and subsequently replaced by the Contempt of Courts Act XXXII of 1952 affected that inherent power, though the question was argued at considerable length before us. That the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was declaratory of the inherent power of a High Court to punish contempts of itself and of Courts Subordinate to it is now well settled. That the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was declaratory of the inherent power of a High Court to punish contempts of itself and of Courts Subordinate to it is now well settled. In Bathina Ramakrishna Reddi v. State of Madras2, Mukherjea, J. observed at page 429: “It may be pointed out in this connection that although the powers of the High Courts in India established under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted, it was a controversial point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court of King’s Bench in England, punish contenpt of Courts subordinate to it in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The doubt has been removed by Act Xll of 1926 which expressly declares the right of the High Court to protect subordinate Courts against contempt, but subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court. This seems to be the principle underlying section 2 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act.” There was also the further limitation on the quantum of punishment that could be inflicted by the High Court imposed by section 3 of Act XII of 1926. In State v. Brahma Prakash3, Mootham, J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench observed at page 558: “......he (the counsel) contended that although Article 215 of the Constitution of India gave power to a High Court as a Court of Record to punish for contempt of itself, it made no provision for punishment by a High Court of contempts of Courts subordinate to it, and that, therefore, after 26th January, 1950, it no longer had that power. We are of the view that there is no substance in this argument. Prior to 26th January, 1950, the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of Courts subordinate to it was not to be found in the Government of India Act, 1935, but in the Contempt of Courts Act; that Act has been preserved by the Constitution of India and in our opinion..... Prior to 26th January, 1950, the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of Courts subordinate to it was not to be found in the Government of India Act, 1935, but in the Contempt of Courts Act; that Act has been preserved by the Constitution of India and in our opinion..... the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of Courts subordinate to it remains intact.” Since that decision, of course, the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 was passed. We have pointed out above that an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a Court. Nonetheless we are expressing no opinion now on the question, whether the Contempt of Courts Act of 1952 applies or not to Tribunals which are not Courts. If the Act did not apply to Industrial Tribunals, the position would be that the inherent power of the High Court to punish congtempt of an Industrial Tribunal would have been left intact. But Act XLVIII of 1950 vested the power to punish contempts of Industrial Tribunal in that Tribunal and also in the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We have already pointed out that thereafter the High Court would not invoke or exercise its inherent power to punish contempts of Industrial Tribunals, though such Tribunals were subordinate to it. If the Contempt of Courts Act did apply to Industrial Tribunals also, the specific provision made in Act XLVIII of 1950 for punishment of contempts of Industrial Tribunals excluded the operation of the general provisions in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. In either view of the case, the High Court itself had no power after Act XLVIII of 1950 came into force, to punish contempts of Industrial Tribunals. Our answer to the second question is therefore in the negative. When a Judge of the High Court is appointed as Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, he has not the powers of a Judge of that Court to punish persons for contempt of the Industrial Tribunal under Article 215 of the Constitution. Question 3:-"With reference to the notice, dated 21st April, 1954, issued to Sri Govind Swaminathan which is the subject of Contempt Application No. 6 of 1954, had the learned Judge, Mr. Question 3:-"With reference to the notice, dated 21st April, 1954, issued to Sri Govind Swaminathan which is the subject of Contempt Application No. 6 of 1954, had the learned Judge, Mr. Justice E.E. Mack, jurisdiction to issue the rule as a Judge of this Court?" The real question is, whether the High Court had jurisdiction to issue the rule to Sri Govind Swaminathan to show cause against punishment for the contempt of Court committed by him on 14th April, 1954. In answering question 2, we have found (i) the proceedings, dated 14th April, 1954, were before the Industrial Tribunal, of which the learned Judge had been the sole member, and that they were not proceedings of the High Court, (ii) the High Court had no jurisdiction to punish the contempt alleged to have been committed on 14th April, 1954 and (iii) the Industrial Tribunal, of which the learned Judge had been the sole member, had no jurisdiction either to punish that contempt. These findings in our opinion, are sufficient to answer the third question before us in the negative. One other contention of Mr. Bhashyam, the learned counsel for the respondent Sri Govind Swaminathan, we can dispose of at this stage. He urged that the Industrial Tribunal had become functus officio when it gave its award, or at least on the date when the proceedings before that Tribunal should be deemed to have concluded under section 20(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. His further contentions were, that nothing said or done subsequent to that date, even if it amounted to contempt of that Tribunal, was punishable as contempt, and that, in any event, an Industrial Tribunal which had become functus officio had no power to punish such a contempt. It is unnecessary to deal with the second of these contentions, because we have held that under Act XLVIII of 1950 it was the Labour Appellate Tribunal and not the Industrial Tribunal that had jurisdiction to punish the class of contempts that fell within the scope of section 30(2) of that Act. The contempt alleged to have been committed by Sri Govind Swaminathan fell within the scope of section 30(2) of Act XLVIII of 1950, despite the charge, that the contempt committed by him on 14th April, 1954, was in facie curiae. We are unable to countenance the contention of Mr. The contempt alleged to have been committed by Sri Govind Swaminathan fell within the scope of section 30(2) of Act XLVIII of 1950, despite the charge, that the contempt committed by him on 14th April, 1954, was in facie curiae. We are unable to countenance the contention of Mr. Bhashyam, that there could be no contempt of Court punishable as such when the Court or Tribunal, in relation to the proceedings in which the contempt was committed, has ceased to exist, Whether it is a case envisaged by Mr. Bhashyam "the cause is dead; the Court lives", or it is a case of the cause being determined and the Court that determined it also ceasing to exist, anything in contempt of such a Court is punishable as contempt of Court. Whether that Court itself could punish that contempt does not affect the question. We need only refer again to the observations of Wills, J., in Rex v. Davies1, on what is the true concept of contempt of Court to reject the contention, that there can be no contempt of a Court or Tribunal which has ceased to exist. At page 40 of the report in Rex v. Davies1, Wills, J., observed: "What then is the principle which is the root of and underlies the cases in which persons have been punished for attacks upon Courts and interferences with the due execution of their orders? It will be found to be, not the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual judges of the Court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially those, who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the Tribunal is undermined or impaired“. The continuity contemplated, which has to be protected from attack, is of the administration of justice in accordance with the laws of the State and of the machinery devised by the State for that administration. Of that machinery, the Industrial Tribunal, of which the learned Judge had been the sole member, was an integrated part. That it was an ad hoc Tribunal over which he presided made no difference. In our opinion the power of a Court over a cause has no relevance to and does not determine its powers to deal with a contempt of itself. That it was an ad hoc Tribunal over which he presided made no difference. In our opinion the power of a Court over a cause has no relevance to and does not determine its powers to deal with a contempt of itself. Despite our rejection of the arguments based on the theory of functus officio, our answer to the third question is in the negative. Question 1.-”Is the reference to the Full Bench competent?“ Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to punish Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan for the contempt of Court alleged to have been committed by them was the question which our learned brother Mack, J., referred to a Full Bench, and about the competence of such a reference there can, in our opinion, be no doubt. That we answered the question of jurisdiction in the negative does not affect the validity of the reference, which was made by a learned Judge of this Court. Another objection which Mr. Bhashyam advanced to the validity of the reference was that the rules framed by this Court to regulate the proceedings for contempts of subordinate Courts and of the High Court, published in the Rules Supplement, Part II, page 28, of the Fort St. George Gazette, dated 17th March, 1954, had not been complied with before Mack, J., took cognizance of the contempt alleged to have been committed (1) by Mr. Hayles and (2) by Sri Govind Swaminathan. Rules 1 and 2 of these rules run: ”Rule 1: Cases of contempt of Subordinate Courts referred to the High Court by them, shall first be dealt with in the Administrative Side. They will be placed before the Judge in charge of the District in which the Subordinate Court making the reference is situated or before the Judge in respect of whom the contempt is alleged to have been committed as the case may be and the Chief Justice for directions to send the papers to the Advocate-General for taking appropriate action. “Rule 2: Applications for contempt filed by the Advocate-General shall be presented in the Sessions office and registered and numbered as contempt applications.” These rules, rules of practice, were not meant to be exhaustive. “Rule 2: Applications for contempt filed by the Advocate-General shall be presented in the Sessions office and registered and numbered as contempt applications.” These rules, rules of practice, were not meant to be exhaustive. The preamble to the rules themselves specifically recorded that they did not apply to the proceedings otherwise specifically provided for by Order 21 of the rules of the High Court, 1927, in relation to the Original Side. As the learned Advocate-General rightly pointed out, these rules could not obviously refer to cases of contempt in facie curiae. In the case of Sri Govind Swaminathan, the charge was that he committed contempt in facie curiae. It is no doubt true that before the rules were issued to Mr. Hayles and Sri Govind Swaminathan, the orders of the Chief Justice were not obtained and the papers were not sent to the Advocate-General under rule 1. The Advocate-General had no opportunity to comply with rule 2 to file applications for contempt. But non-compliance with these rules of practice could not affect the validity of the rules issued by Mack, J., if the High Court had jurisdiction to issue those rules to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of Court. In King v. Clement1, Bayley, J., observed at page 922: “Besides, the rule which requires personal service, is merely a rule of practice of which every Court judges for itself”. The jurisdiction invoked by the learned Judge to issue the rules was the jurisdiction of the High Court and non-compliance with the rules of practice by itself did not affect that jurisdiction. We answer question 1 in the affirmative, and we hold that the reference to the Full Bench was competent. Question 4.-In view of what we have held, that the High Court had no jurisdiction to punish either Mr. Hayles or Sri Govind Swaminathan upon proof, that the contempts with which they were charged had been committed, we find it unnecessary to answer this question. Should the question, whether even a prima facie case of contempt has been made out ever come up before the appropriate Tribunal which has jurisdiction to decide it, no discussion of ours on these points should embarrass them. We shall record again our answers to the questions which we set down for determination. Question 1.-The reference to the Full Bench is competent. We shall record again our answers to the questions which we set down for determination. Question 1.-The reference to the Full Bench is competent. Question 2.-When a Judge of the High Court is appointed as Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, he has not the powers of a Judge of that High Court to punish persons for contempt of the Industrial Tribunal under Article 215 of the Constitution. Question 3.-No learned Judge of this Court had the jurisdiction to issue the rule, dated 21st April, 1954, to Sri Govind Swaminathan to show cause why he should not be punished by the High Court for contempt of Court. Question 4.-We consider it unnecessary to answer this question. Basing our order principally on our findings under question 2, we direct that the rule, dated 6th April, 1954, issued to Mr. Hayles and the rule, dated 21st April, 1954, issued to Sri Govind Swaminathan be discharged. We thank the learned Advocate-General for his invaluable assistance. It was-in response to the notice issued to him by this Court he appeared before us to assist the Court. R.M. ----- Rules directed to be discharged.