Judgment. — The plaintiffs are the appellants. The suit was filed for recovery of possession of the property mentioned in the plaint schedule after ejecting the defendants therefrom and for recovery of mesne profits at Rs. 20 per mensem and for future mesne profits and costs. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit property belonged to Venkataratnam,, the father of the 1st plaintiff and the father-in-law of the 2nd plaintiff and that, on his death, it devolved upon the 1st plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff’s husband, Seetapatirao. They also contended that they were in adverse possession of the suit property and were entitled to recover possession on that footing. The defendants contended that the suit property was not the self-acquired property of Venkataratnam, as alleged in the plaint but belonged to the public of Tanuku, being the Town Hall and Reading Room, of which Venkataratnam was the President. The defendants stated that they got the property on lease from the Managing Committee of the Town Hall and Reading Room. They further alleged that the new committee was formed in 1939 and that the plaintiffs did not prescribe any title to the suit properties. The three main issues in the suit are: — (1) Whether the plaintiffs have title to and possession of the suit property within 12 years. before suit ? (2) Whether the plaintiffs have acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession? and (3) Whether the suit property is trust property and whether Venkataratnam was a trustee ; if so, whether the plaintiffs can claim title by adverse possession ? The Subordinate Judge of Eluru held that the plaintiffs did not establish that the suit property was the separate or the self-acquired property of Venkataratnam. He held that the site was granted by the Government for the construction of a Town Hall and Reading Room and that Venkataratnam, who collected subscriptions, from various persons and borrowed sums of money, constructed the Town Hall and Reading Room for the use of the public. He also held that the plaintiffs were not in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property for a period of 12 years and that they did not perfect their title by prescription. He also held that the plaintiffs were not in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property for a period of 12 years and that they did not perfect their title by prescription. He also held’ that as there was no committee, after the death of Venkataratnam and the new committee came into ex1stence only in 1939, adverse possession did not and could not commence till the formation of the new committee. In the result, he dismissed the suit with costs of defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiffs have preferred the above appeal. The learned advocate for the appellants faintly argued that the properties were the self-acquisitions of Venkataratnam and that on his death, they devolved upon the 1st plaintiff and his brother Seetapatirao. The 1st plaintiff who was examined as P.W.1 admitted that his father Venkataratnam divided all the properties into four shares and retained one share for himself and gave the other three-shares to his sons, the plaintiff, Seetapatirao and Sarveswararao. He admitted that a few properties were kept joint and that the suit property was not one of the properties kept joint. The plaintiffs denied that there was any Reading Room in the suit premises and that it was a Town Hall. From the evidence of the defendants’ witnesses, it is quite clear that it was both a Reading Room and a Town Hall. In Exhibit B-12 a certified copy of the deposition of Venkataratnam, he admitted that the suit property was a Town Hall. He deposed thus: “My godown and my wall is in line with the Western-end of the town hall.” In Exhibit B-11, the certified copy of the judgment dated 23rd December, 1904, it is stated that there was a public building, viz., the Tanuku Town Hall which was in a line with the defendants’ godown and compound wall, that the Town Hall had been in ex1stence for some years, and that if 2nd defendant’s (Venkata-ratnam’s) godowns and wall were encroachments, the Town Hall also would be an encroachment. The patta Exhibit B-15 was granted in favour of Sri Victoria Memorial High School which was run in the Town Hall. The patta was not in favour of Venkataratnam or his sons. The patta Exhibit B-15 was granted in favour of Sri Victoria Memorial High School which was run in the Town Hall. The patta was not in favour of Venkataratnam or his sons. The Court below has discussed this aspect of the matter in paragraphs 14 to 20 of its judgment and held that the plaintiffs have not established that the suit property was the private property of Venkataratnam. I agree with the finding of the Subordinate Judge. The positive case that was put forward by the defendants was that Venkataratnam constructed the Town Hall by borrowing and by collecting subscriptions from third parties. That is borne out by the accounts Exhibits B-1 to B-3. The plaintiff was not bold enough to deny that the accounts were not in the handwriting of his father, Venkataratnam. The handwriting and signature of Venkataratnam was proved by D.Ws.1 and 4. Those accounts establish beyond doubt that the Town Hall was constructed by Venkataratnam and that it was used as a public Reading Room. After the death of Venkataratnam, the eldest son, Sarves-wararao sent the original of Exhibit B-5 to the President, District Board and stated therein that a sum of Rs.1,500 was still due to his father. Several witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendants to prove that the Town Hall was used also as a public Reading Room. D.W.1 is the brother-in-law of Sarveswararao and D.W.11 is Sarveswararao’s widow. The Subordinate Judge has discussed the oral evidence in detail and has accepted their evidence and held that the Town Hall was not the separate property of Venkataratnam but belonged to the public of Tanuku and was used as a Reading Room. As the learned advocate for the appellants did not seriously question the title, I think it is unnecessary for me to refer to the oral evidence or the documents in detail. The main argument of the learned advocate for the appellants was that they acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. He contended that the plaintiffs were in adverse possession even during the lifetime of Venkataratnam and therefore acquired title at least fo the extent of 2/3rds. The learned advocate for the respondents immediately drew my attention to paragraph 4 of the plaint, wherein the case of adverse possession even during the lifetime of Venkataratnam was not put forward. He contended that the plaintiffs were in adverse possession even during the lifetime of Venkataratnam and therefore acquired title at least fo the extent of 2/3rds. The learned advocate for the respondents immediately drew my attention to paragraph 4 of the plaint, wherein the case of adverse possession even during the lifetime of Venkataratnam was not put forward. It was clearly stated therein that Venkataratnam was in sole, exclusive and continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit property in his personal and individual right and that only on his death, the said property devolved on the 1st plaintiff and the husband of the 2nd plaintiff. It is therefore not open to the plaintiffs to contend that they were in adverse possession of at least a 2/3rd share during the lifetime of Venkataratnam. The decision that was referred to in that connection was Anianeya Sastri v. Rajagopala Chettiar1. Having regard to the pleadings and the facts of this case, the decision relied on by the learned advocate for the appellants has really no application at all. The evidence discloses that Venkataratnam was a public-spirited gentleman and with the co-operation of the public, wanted to establish a school and a Reading Room in Tanuku. The site was acquired from the Government and a Town Hall was constructed. The subscriptions collected not being enough, he not only advanced moneys but also borrowed from third parties. The school that was being run was later on taken over by the Taluk Board and finally by the District Board of West Godavari. The rent paid by the District Board was being appropriated by Venkataratnam towards his dues or for the payment of the loans contracted by him. The accounts maintained by him Exhibits B-1 to B-3 show that when he died in 1928 a sum of Rs.1,847-0-0 was due to him. The debts due to third parties were not completely paid off. After the death of Venkataratnam, Sarveswararao wrote to the Tahsildar that a sum of Rs.1,500 was still due. It is therefore clear that Venkataratnam who was the President of the Committee was only in permissive possession appropriating the rents towards his dues. From the terms of Exhibit B-5, the possession of Venkataratnam’s sons should also be regarded as being permissive. There is no evidence placed on behalf of the plaintiffs as to when the dues were completely discharged and the possession became adverse. From the terms of Exhibit B-5, the possession of Venkataratnam’s sons should also be regarded as being permissive. There is no evidence placed on behalf of the plaintiffs as to when the dues were completely discharged and the possession became adverse. D.W. 3, an advocate, examined on behalf of the defendants stated that the debts were outstanding-till 1935. So on the evidence on record, I am inclined to take the view that the possession of Venkataratnam, and his sons, even after his death, must have been permissive at least till 1935 and adverse, if at all, only thereafter. Moreover, Venkataratnam, the President of the Committee, being in the position of a trustee, his possession, till his death, cannot at all be regarded as adverse to the Committee. At the most, adverse possession of his sons must have commenced only after his death in January, 1928. The next question is, whether the plaintiffs have proved that they have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the properties from January, 1928, for the full period of 12 years and perfected title by prescription. The Subordinate Judge accepted the d1stinterested and independent evidence of D.W. 4 and held that as he took possession of the Town Hall and Reading Room as the newly elected Secretary in December, 1939, the plaintiffs have not made out their prescriptive title. I accept the evidence of D.W.4 and the other witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants and agree with his conclusion. The plaintiff who was examined as P.W.1 however stated that he was in possession till 1944. He is not able to place any documentary evidence to show that he collected rents up to 1944. His brother, Seetapatirao who was at Tanuku till 1944, has not been examined. The 2nd plaintiff who claims under a settlement deed executed by her husband Seetapatirao, has also not entered the witness box. As the 1st plaintiff was employed in Secunderabad, it is only Seetapatirao and the 2nd plaintiff who stayed at Tanuku that must have knowledge of the actual possession of the suit property or collected rents therefrom. From the non-examination of Seetapatirao and his wife, I infer-that the plaintiffs were not in actual possession of the property upto 1944 as alleged by them. In this connection, the notices that passed between the parties were referred to. From the non-examination of Seetapatirao and his wife, I infer-that the plaintiffs were not in actual possession of the property upto 1944 as alleged by them. In this connection, the notices that passed between the parties were referred to. Exhibit A-91 was a notice issued by D.W. 4 on 13th October, 1939, to the 1st plaintiff stating that if the suit property was not delivered to him he would take legal proceedings. The learned advocate for the appellants strongly relied upon the terms in the notice for showing that they were at least in possession till the date of the notice. Even assuming that they were in possession till the date of the notice it does not establish that the plaintiffs have acquired title by adverse possession as full period of 12 years had not run out. It is surprising that no reply was sent to this notice. A copy marked as Exhibit A-92 was produced by the plaintiff as being the reply sent by him. The Court below rightly held that this document is not true. I have also examined the document and the evidence bearing thereon and I am satisfied that it is not a true document. That is also made clear by the terms of Exhibit A-94. The plaintiffs who had lost possession in December, 1939, apparently sought the ass1stance of one Krishnamurty for getting back possession and executed a rent deed in his favour marked as Exhibit A-93, to achieve that purpose. When Krishnamurty attempted to dismantle portions of the suit property, a notice marked as Exhibit A-94 was issued by D.W. 4. In that notice it is clearly stated that no reply was sent to the notice dated 13th October, 1939. P.W. 1 admitted that Krishnamurty handed over this notice to him and also gave up possession. It is surprising that the 1st plaintiff did not choose to send a reply even to Exhibit A-94. Not only does the omission establish that the plaintiffs had no title to the suit property but also that Exhibit A-92 is not true. So, it is clear from both the oral and documentary evidence that the plaintiffs were not in continuous or exclusive possession of the suit properties after the death of their father in 1928 for a period of 12 years so as to acquire title under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. So, it is clear from both the oral and documentary evidence that the plaintiffs were not in continuous or exclusive possession of the suit properties after the death of their father in 1928 for a period of 12 years so as to acquire title under Article 144 of the Limitation Act. I therefore confirm the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiffs have not made out their prescriptive title. The learned advocate for the respondents contended that as the Committee was formed only in December, 1939, there could be no adverse possession as against the Committee, till it was formed and the president and Secretary thereof elected. Article 134-B of the Limitation Act runs in the following terms: Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run By the Manager of a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been sold by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. 12 years. The death, resignation or removal of the transferor. As the plaintiffs now claim title by adverse possession they must show that their possession was adverse to the Committee and that they were in uninterrupted and continuous possession for a period of 12 years. The Subordinate Judge accepted this contention and found in paragraphs 36 to 39 that as the Committee was not formed till December, 1939, the adverse possession did not at all start. The learned advocate for the respondents relied on Palaniyandi Malavarayan v. Vadamalal Odayan1. The head-note sets out the legal position correctly and is in the following terms: “The right to trusteeship of a temple cannot be acquired by adverse possession so long as there is no lawful trustee who could claim to recover the office from the person who claims to hold it adversely to him.” Sundara Ayyar, J., had carefully and elaborately reviewed all the Indian and English authorities bearing on this question and held that even on principle, there are good reasons for holding that it would be contrary to the public interests that a person should acquire the office of a trustee by mere possession when there is no one competent to recover it from him. This decision was followed in Manikkam Filial v. Thanikachalam Pillal2. This decision was followed in Manikkam Filial v. Thanikachalam Pillal2. The relevant observations are as follows: “Since howver, there were no properly constituted trustees of the plaintiff temple there was no person with knowledge of the acts of the defendants or capable of taking proceedings necessary for the protection of the suit property and, therefore, possession was not adverse until the appointment of trustees in 1900.” In Seeti Kutti v. Kunhi Pathumma3, Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., followed the two decisions referred to above. The decision in Murray v. The East India, Co.4, referred to and relied on by Sundara Ayyar, J., in Palaniyandi Malavarayan v. Vadamalai Odayan , was followed in Annamalal Desikar v. Govinda Rao5 in support of the proposition that, when there is no one competent to sue, there can be no cause of action and consequently limitation cannot run because there is no one against whom it can run. In Subbiah Thevar v. Semiappa Mudaliar6, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court followed the decision in Murray v. The East India Co.4, and held that “there can be no cause of action until there is a party capable of suing and until there is a cause of action mere can be no question of the law of limitation coming into operation.” It was further held that, if a sole trustee of a public trust committed a breach of trust, the loss could not be made good, without voluntary action on the trustee’s part, until there was a new trustee and that the right to sue in such a case lay in abeyance until a new trustee was appointed and that under Article 120 of the Limitation Act the period of six years’ limitation would not commence until the new trustee was appointed. It was further pointed out that if the co-trustees had also made themselves liable for the breach of trust, the position would be the same as in the case of a defaulting sole trustee while if there were other trustees who were themselves not liable, the period of limitation started running immediately the loss was occasioned because those other trustees had in themselves the right to sue their co-trustees for the loss occasioned by him. In Venkateswara v. Venkatesa1, the question arose whether Article 134-B of the Limitation Act applies to the case of an alienation of the property of a Hindu religious institution by the manager for valuable consideration and the succeeding manager sought to impeach that alienation by suit when there was an interval of time between the death, resignation or removal of the previous manager and the election or appointment of the subsequent manager. The third question that was referred to the Full Bench was, whether “if Article 144 of the Limitation Act be held applicable to the case, adverse possession under that article must be deemed to have commenced from the date of the death of the previous mathadhipati who effected the alienation and not from the date of the election or appointment of the plaintiff.” Though in the order of reference Venkataramana Rao, J., referred to the provisions of the several English statutes, the case of Murray v. The East India Co.2 and the earlier decisions of the Madras High Court in Palaniyandi Malavarayan v. Vadamalal Odayan3, Manikkam Pillal v. Thanikachalam Pillal4 and Subbiah Thevar v. Semiappa Mudaliar5. I find that in the opinion delivered by the Full Bench by Leach, C.J., there is no discussion whatsoever or reference made to those cases while answering the third question referred to it. The only case that was referred to in that connection was the Privy Council decision in Mahanth Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi lal6. It was held that the starting point of limitation under both Article 134-B and Article 144 was the date of the death, resignation or removal of the manager who effected the alienation and not the date of the election or the appointment of his successor. While Venkataramana Rao, J. and Horwill, J., agreed with Leach, C.J., Abdul Rahman, J. and Krishnaswamy Ayyangar, J., dissented and delivered separate judgments. Abdur Rahman, J., d1stinguished the Privy Council case in Mahanth Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal6 and held as follows: “It has no bearing to a case like the present where there was no manager in ex1stence to challenge the action taken by the previous manager. Abdur Rahman, J., d1stinguished the Privy Council case in Mahanth Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal6 and held as follows: “It has no bearing to a case like the present where there was no manager in ex1stence to challenge the action taken by the previous manager. If the Math is unable to sue without the intervention of the human agency of its own manager, limitation cannot be, in my opinion held to run against the Math either.” Krishnaswamy Ayyangar, J., also took the view that the aforesaid Privy Council decision was clearly inapplicable. Both the dissenting Judges held that adverse possession must be held to have commenced from the date of the plaintiff’s election or appointment and not earlier. I have carefully perused the dissenting judgments as also the opinion of Leach, C.J., and, in my opinion, the majority view as to the starting point of limitation under Article 144 is, with great respect, not correct. I prefer to adopt the view taken by the dissenting Judges and my reasons are as follows: Column 3 of Article 144 clearly sets out that the time from which period begins to run is when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff which postulates that the plaintiff against whom adverse possession commences must be capable of suing. Section 17 of the Limitation Act also embodies the same principle. In the Privy Council decision in Secretary of State for India v. Debendralal Khan7 Lord Macmillan laid down what constitutes adverse possession in the following terms: “As to what constitutes adverse possession, a subject which formed the topic of some discussion in the case, their Lordships adopt the language of Lord Robertson in delivering the Judgment of the the Board in Radhamoni Devi v. The Collector of Khulna1 where His Lordship said that the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent, to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. The classical requirement is that the possession should be Nee vi, nee clam, nee precario. Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown, but in Their Lordships’ opinion, there is no authority for this requirement. The classical requirement is that the possession should be Nee vi, nee clam, nee precario. Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown, but in Their Lordships’ opinion, there is no authority for this requirement. It is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the person, against whom time is running, ought, if he exercise due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening.” This decision was followed in Maharaj Srischandra Nandy v. Baijnath Jugal Kishore2 wherein Lord Thankerton adopted the aforesaid observations of Lord Macmillan. From those observations it appears to me to be quite clear that in order that possession should be adverse, there must be “a competitor” capable of suing and exercising due diligence to take steps to oust the adverse possessor. So, if in respect of the Town Hall and Reading Room belonging to the public of Tanuku there was no duly elected Committee, Secretary and President in ex1stence, it is impossible to conceive how any adverse possession would commence or limitation start running. I therefore prefer to follow the two Privy Council decisions referred to supra and the earlier Madras decisions already discussed and the dissenting Judgments of Abdur Rahman, J. and Krishnaswamy Ayyangar, J., in preference to the majority opinion in Venkateswara v. Venkatesa3 and hold that the adverse possession did not start till the Committee was formed in December, 1939 and the Secretary and President were duly elected, for taking action and recovering the property from the plaintiffs. In a recent decision in Padmanabha Bhatta v. Ramachandra Rao4, Govinda Menon, J., delivering the judgment of the Bench observed as follows: “By mere assertion it is impossible to prescribe a hostile title against the trust because the assertion must be against a person who would be entitled to face the opposition and get rid of that assertion.” So I agree with the finding of the trial Court that even on that footing, the plea of adverse possession has not been made out by the appellants. The learned advocate for the appellants sought to contend that there was no proper election of the Committee and the Secretary and President. I am unable to appreciate how that contention supports him. The learned advocate for the appellants sought to contend that there was no proper election of the Committee and the Secretary and President. I am unable to appreciate how that contention supports him. If really no proper Committee had been constituted or if no Secretary or President had been duly elected, there is no one to represent the Town Hall and Reading Room and so no scope for the running of adverse possession for reasons stated supra. I accept the evidence of D.W. 4 and the other witnesses and hold that a proper meeting of the public of Tanuku was convened and the Committee duly formed and the President and Secretary duly elected. I agree with the finding of the Subordinate Judge on this question. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of respondents 1 to 4. D.L.N. ------- Appeal dismissed.