Judgment This is an appeal by the State against the acquittal of the Respondent who was charged before the Second Class Magistrate of Chowghat for offences under section 4(1)(a) and (g) of the Madras Prohibition Act. The main point on which the Magistrate acquitted the Respondent is that the Prohibition Officer has not complied with the provisions of section 165(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The officer undoubtedly acted under section 29 of the Madras Prohibition Act. The Magistrate seems to think that by virtue of section 34 of the Madras Prohibition Act, the, provisions of section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been attracted and the Prohibition Officer should, even in cases where there is a search without a warrant, submit to the nearest Magistrate the records as per the provisions of section 165(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In cases of search without a warrant under the Prohibition Act, there is a provision made in section 29 of the Act. Under the provisions of that section he has only to record the reasons and the grounds of his belief for searching without a warrant under section 28 of the Act. As pointed out by the Full Bench of our Court in Krishna v. State1, the Criminal Procedure Code has not completely occupied the field of Criminal Procedure in the matter of search warrants. Apart from this, when there is a special provision like section 29 in the Madras Prohibition Act which governs searches without warrant it is this that must apply and not the general provision which is contained in section 34 of the Act. The principle that is applicable in such cases is generalia specialibus non derogant. On that principle, it is section 29 that applies and not section 165(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the provisions of section 29 of the Madras Prohibition Act, there is no obligation cast on the Prohibition Officer to send the records to the Magistrate. The reasons given for the acquittal are, therefore, not sustainable. But the offence is said to have been committed on 1st September, 1952. It is now nearly two years since the offence was committed and the ends of justice do not require that this acquittal should be reversed and the accused convicted. The acquittal is therefore not set aside. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations. But the offence is said to have been committed on 1st September, 1952. It is now nearly two years since the offence was committed and the ends of justice do not require that this acquittal should be reversed and the accused convicted. The acquittal is therefore not set aside. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.