Judgment This appeal arises in a suit for redemption in which the appellant was the plaintiff. The plaintiff and his father usufructuarily mortgaged in favour of the defendant the! two suit items of properties together with another item of property for securing a loan of Rs.400 by a deed Exhibit A-1, dated 12th October, 1934. There is no dispute as regards the third item as it has been allowed to be redeemed. But in so far as the suit items are concerned the defence is that they belonged to the Rajah of Ramnad from whom the defendant took an assignment and that consequently the plaintiff had no title to the properties to entitle him to claim recovery of the properties by way of redemption. The suit items are situated in the Ramnad Samasthanam and originally belonged to the plaintiff’s father and in execution of a Rent decree the landholder himself purchased the property under two sale certificates, dated 5th December, 1933 and 23rd January, 1934 Exhibits B-11 and B-12. Notwithstanding these purchases subsequently patta appears to have been issued in favour of the plaintiff’s father for faslis 1343 and 1345, Exhibits A-2 and A-3, dated 20th June, 1934 and 28th June, 1933 and the plaintiff’s father continued to pay the kist till 1937, Exhibit A-8 being the last kist receipt in favour of the plaintiff, dated 18th July, 1937. In August 1938, the plaintiff claimed the suit items as belonging to his sister Karuppayi stating that he held the same under a lease and preferred a criminal complaint against the defendant that he trespassed into the said items. His sister’s (Karuppayi’s) title is said to have arisen by assignment of the suit properties by the landholder on receipt of a nazarana from her. The attitude the plaintiff took in those proceedings was that the title to the properties vested in his sister and that he was a lessee and therefore entitled to be in possession, and that the defendant, though he was in possession as a usufructuary mortgagee, was not entitled, to be in possessor, in effect taking the position that he had no title to the property and that the title vested in his sister. There is evidence to show that Karuppayi made payment of a nazar amount of Rs.76-6-0, as per Exhibit B-4 the receipt granted by the estate dated 1st June, 1938. There is evidence to show that Karuppayi made payment of a nazar amount of Rs.76-6-0, as per Exhibit B-4 the receipt granted by the estate dated 1st June, 1938. Earlier, on 4th June, 1937, the plaintiff made an application for the grant of a patta offering to pay a sum of Rs.76-6-0 as nazarana but expressed his inability later as can be seen from Exhibit B-6, dated 21st November, 1937. Probably after the statement Exhibit B-6, his sister paid the nazarana and claimed an assignment of the lands. The defendant also applied to the landholder for an assignment of the suit land and orders were passed on 1st December, 1938, granting the assignment to the defendant if he paid a sum of Rs.100 besides the arrears of Rs.36-6-0 outstanding on the said date. The said amount having been paid an order was passed by the estate manager assigning the suit lands to the defendant (Vide Exhibit B-10, dated 16th November, 1939). Exhibits B-13 and B-14 dated 24th June, 1940 and 25th June, 1945, respectively are the pattas issued by the estate in favour of the defendant. As regards payment of kist, there is one payment of kist made by Karuppayi on 10th July, 1938, Exhibit A-9 and after the issue of the pattas kist was invariably paid by the defendant. The main contention of the appellant is that the defendant having taken possession of the property as usufructuary mortgagee from the plaintiff and his father is estopped from denying the title of the mortgagors that the defendant having obtained possession on the assumption that the mortgagors had title it would not be open to him to resist delivery of possession and that any right which he claims he could establish only after surrendering possession. Reliance is therefore placed on the rule of estoppel that the mortgagee cannot deny the title of his mortgagor having obtained the property from the mortgagor. It is well established that no Court will suffer a mortgagor to set up the, title of a third person against his mortgagee ; nor can the mortgagee deny the title of his mortgagor. The mortgagee having obtained possession of the property from the mortgagor cannot plead that the mortgagor had no title to the property. It is well established that no Court will suffer a mortgagor to set up the, title of a third person against his mortgagee ; nor can the mortgagee deny the title of his mortgagor. The mortgagee having obtained possession of the property from the mortgagor cannot plead that the mortgagor had no title to the property. But the position in the present case is that the plaintiff and his father as mortgagors had no title on the date of the mortgage, the property having already been purchased by the estate. Notwithstanding that the plaintiff’s father was in possession and subsequently pattas were granted to him Exhibits A-2 and A-3, it might be contended that the plaintiff’s father has a possessory title and the defendant having obtained the mortgage on the strength of such title cannot resist the plaintiff’s claim to take possession as the representative of the mortgagor. But the events that have happened subsequently do not warrant the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the present case. The plaintiff by setting up title in his sister on the strength of an alleged assignment by the estate in her favour denied title in himself admitting title to a third party. Not only did his consent imply an absence of title in himself, but he applied to the estate for assignment of the lands on payment of a nazarana along with the defendant. The estate eventually granted the land to the defendant. The principle of estoppel cannot therefore be invoked, the plaintiff himself having admitted that he had no title and title as such vested in a third party and passed on to the defendant by the date of the suit for redemption. Neither party therefore had any title, but the title was in a third person, but the defendant acquired title after the mortgage from the third person in the present case. Neither party therefore had any title, but the title was in a third person, but the defendant acquired title after the mortgage from the third person in the present case. In Jasoda Bai v. Mangal Chand1, 470 it was observed that: “Though a mortgagee cannot dispute the mortgagor’s title to the mortgaged property, yet if a person on whose behalf, among others, the mortgage deed was signed tries to get out of the mortgage on the plea that he was not a mortgagor and the mortgagee accepts the position, the latter is not prevented thereafter from disputing such person’s title, nor can such person turn round and assert: for a different purpose that he is a mortgagor.” At page 474 it was observed as follows: “It is a well-recognised doctrine that neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee can deny the title of the other at the time of the mortgage. They can only show that the title had ceased after the mortgage. This doctrine of estoppel has for its basis the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee and is based on the principle that one who derives a benefit from the other cannot deny the other’s title. The mortgagor having obtained money from the mortgagee on the representation that he has the title which he conveys to the mortgagee by way of security cannot turn round and say that he had no title in opposition to a claim founded on the mortgage, and thereby defeat the mortgagee’s rights. The mortgagee having obtained a transfer of an interest in the property from the mortgager cannot also turn round and say that his mortgagor had no title.” Not only the mortgagor had no title on the date of the mortgage; but the plaintiff took up the position that he had no title and that title was with a third person and that position was accepted by both the parties, who applied to the person having title for grant of the land. In Bigelow’s “Law of Estoppel” it is observed at page 376 as follows: “Between the grantor and the grantee the recitals of the deed will doubtless be conclusive evidence in a proper case; but the instrument will not for all purposes prevent the grantee from asserting a paramount title which he has acquired from a third person. In Bigelow’s “Law of Estoppel” it is observed at page 376 as follows: “Between the grantor and the grantee the recitals of the deed will doubtless be conclusive evidence in a proper case; but the instrument will not for all purposes prevent the grantee from asserting a paramount title which he has acquired from a third person. And this being the case between grantor and grantee, it follows that the grantee may assert a title which he has acquired paramount to that of such grantor in a contest with one who claims under the same grantor and it is not broadly true to say, as is sometimes said, that when two persons trace title to the same grantor each is estopped against the other.” It will therefore be seen that the present is not a case where the plaintiff can rely on the rule of estoppel as not only he had no title on the date of the mortgage, but he admitted that he had no title and tried to acquire the same from a third person in whom the title vested. The view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the defendant is not prevented by the rule of estoppel from setting up his title obtained by assignment from the Ramnad Samasthanam is correct. The contention raised under section 90 of the Trusts Act cannot also avail the plaintiff since there is nothing to show that the defendant utilised his position as mortgagee for obtaining the assignment. Reliance is placed on his evidence when he says that he applied for the lands stating that he got othi of the lands from the plaintiff. This is not sufficient to establish that the grant of the land by the landholder to the defendant was by virtue of his having been in possession as othidar. There Were applications from Karuppayi, from the plaintiff and from the defendant. The defendant apparently paid the largest amount as nazarana and secured an assignment in preference to others merely for the reason that the amount which he paid was more than the others. There is no indication in the order granting the assignment that he was preferred for the reason that he was the othidar. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.