Judgment :- 1. The defendant in O.S. No. 113 of 1118 of the Court of the District Munsiff of Shencottah, one of the two surviving wives of the plaintiff, is the appellant before us. At the time of her marriage her husband's first wife was issueless and his second wife had died without issue. Subsequent to her marriage her husband had two sons by the first wife, quarrels commenced in the household and they culminated in Ext. I, a vituthalapathrom, dated 28.8.1103. Ext. I was executed by the plaintiff and Ext. B is its counterpart signed by the defendant and dated 29.8.1103. 2. The pleadings in the case are summarised as follows in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the judgment of the court below: 1. Defendant is plaintiff's 3rd wife. From the year 1101, quarrels and misunderstandings arose between them as a result of which a permanent separation was effected between them by registered releases Exts. B and I. Defendant thereby released and extinguished all her rights and status as a wife except the right to get 5 Kottas of paddy for her maintenance per annum. From 1105, plaintiff shifted to Shencottah permanently and is living there with his first wife. Till the date of suit all dues under Exts. B and I have been duly paid to the defendant. After Exts. B and I there had been no access between the plaintiff and defendant at all. Plaintiff comes to understand that defendant has brought forth a girl child by her unchaste life. Thus, defendant has forfeited her claim to maintenance. On these allegations, plaintiff sues for a declaration that he is not liable to maintain the defendant in future and for consequential reliefs. 2. Defendant admits execution of Ext. B release but contends:- The said deed effected a release only of the civil rights of defendant except maintenance but did not terminate the conjugal relationship between the parties. Even after the release, there has been conjugal relationship on many occasions whenever plaintiff went to Puliyara to his Kalam. The child was born to the plaintiff. The allegations of unchastity are all false. The suit ought to be dismissed with costs. 3. In the replication plaintiff alleges that the release deeds once and for all put an end to all rights between the parties inclusive of the conjugal relationship and that the conjugal relationship was never reviewed thereafter. The child was born to the plaintiff. The allegations of unchastity are all false. The suit ought to be dismissed with costs. 3. In the replication plaintiff alleges that the release deeds once and for all put an end to all rights between the parties inclusive of the conjugal relationship and that the conjugal relationship was never reviewed thereafter. There had been no access at any time as alleged in the written statement." and it is evident from the summary that the plaintiff's case, briefly put, is that the defendant has been living an unchaste life that the child born to her in Meenom 1118 is the proof and result of her adultery and that her way of life has exonerated him from the liability for her maintenance. 3. Under S. 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: "The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred any eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten." In spite of the vituthalapathrom the defendant should still be deemed to be the wife of the plaintiff in a community in which divorce is not sanctioned by law and it has not been disputed that the case must be dealt with in the light of the presumption embodied in S. 112. 4. The plaintiff has sought to prove that he had no access to the defendant at any time when the child could have been begotten by trying to establish that he was a paraletic patient confined to his room in Shencottah from Medom 1117 to Makaram 1118 and that he was in no condition during that period to visit the defendant at Puliyara much less to have any sexual connection with her or anybody else. The oral testimony on the subject consists of the evidence of PW.1, his physician, PW. 2, a neighbour, and his own testimony as PW. 3. The oral testimony on the subject consists of the evidence of PW.1, his physician, PW. 2, a neighbour, and his own testimony as PW. 3. The learned District Munsiff who had the advantage of seeing these and the other witnesses depose from the box has come to the conclusion that their evidence should be believed: "On an anxious and careful consideration of the entire evidence oral and documentary, in the light of the broad probabilities of the case, I believe plaintiff and his witnesses and disbelieve, DW.1 to 4 and 6 and find that the child was not born to the plaintiff and that it was a result of defendant's unchaste life". 5. The probabilities he had in mind are dealt with in paragraph 7 of his judgment:? " the Exhibits on the defence side show that there could not have been even an approach to anything like even friendship not to speak of cordiality between plaintiff and defendant. In 1103 and some time before that, there was no love lost between plaintiff and defendant and the releases were a result thereof showing the extent of the bitterness and disagreement that existed between them. From 1930 till 1931, Exts. C to C(5) and D and D(1) show that the feelings continued without any abatement. Exts. C to C(5) are the money order receipts and acknowledgement receipts for the value of the 21/2 kottas of paddy every crop in the months of Purattasi and Panguni of every year. All these acknowledgements show that those Money Orders were accepted by the defendant at Surandai in Tinnevelly District. They bear the Post Office seal of Surandai as the "Date stamp of the office of the payment". Sunandai is the place of defendant's father. It is there that defendant was staying with her father ever since the disagreement in 1102 and in 1103. In 1930 and 1931 also (ie., in 1105 & 1106 also) defendant stays in Surandai and accepts the money orders from that Post Office. In Ext. C(5) defendant begins to put her signature for the first time. Before that she was putting 4 strokes as her signature as seen from the previous acknowledgment receipts Ext. C(1), C(3) and also from Ext. B. Defendant as DW. In Ext. C(5) defendant begins to put her signature for the first time. Before that she was putting 4 strokes as her signature as seen from the previous acknowledgment receipts Ext. C(1), C(3) and also from Ext. B. Defendant as DW. 6 says that she learned to put her signature at about that time because she feared that plaintiff might undo her rights probably suggesting that plaintiff might concoct receipts with 4 strikes for the signature of the defendants. On finding that defendant has not put 4 strikes as before, plaintiff gets suspicions and prefers a complaint to the Post-master, Shencottah. Thereupon, the Post-master, Shencottah sends Ext. D letter to the plaintiff forwarding also Ext. D(1) statement given by defendant before the Post-master at Surandai, with the signature of the defendant attested by a retired Karanam (Village Accountant) as well as Surandai Post-master. These suggest that there could have been no abatement of the strained feelings between plaintiff and defendant". 6. It has been said over and over again that on questions of pure fact the opinion of a trial judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses is of paramount importance. "Face to face with living witnesses" said the New York Court of Appeals in a passage quoted with approval in 343 U.S. 326: "The original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth". 7. On appeal the whole case, including the facts, is no doubt within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. "But generally speaking", as pointed out by the Privy Council in ILR 39 Bombay 386: "It is undesirable to interfere with the findings of fact of the Trial Judge who sees and hears the witnesses and has an opportunity of noting their demeanour especially in cases where the issue is simple and depends on the credit which attached to one or other of conflicting witnesses." These are observations broad based on experience and common sense and on going through the evidence adduced in this case we see no reason to differ from the conclusion reached by the court below. 8. According to Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar, learned counsel for the appellant, even on the assumption of unchastity his client is entitled to her rights under Ext. 8. According to Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar, learned counsel for the appellant, even on the assumption of unchastity his client is entitled to her rights under Ext. I. We are unable to agree. The document is nothing but a deed of maintenance and as to a Hindu wife's right to receive maintenance the normal rule of Hindu Law must apply. It is well settled that a Hindu wife who leads a vicious life forfeits her right to maintenance even in cases where the right is secured by a decree, (Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, Eleventh Edition, P. 642). 9. Learned counsel for the appellant also invited our attention to Parami v. Mahadevi, 34 Bombay 278 wherein Chandavarkar, J. has said that the general rule to be gathered from the texts is "that a Hindu wife cannot be absolutely abandoned by her husband" and that "if she is living an unchaste life, he is bound to keep her in the house under restraint and provide her with food and raiment just sufficient to support life". We are not prepared to accept this view. As stated in Mayne's Hindu Law, Eleventh Edition, Page 865:? "The view taken by Chandavarkar, J. in 34 Bombay 278 that a wife living an unchaste life is entitled to some maintenance cannot be regarded as correct". 10. The commentary goes on to say: "But there can be no doubt that if she repents, returns to purity and performs expiatory rites, she will be entitled to maintenance. Accordingly the Madras, Bombay and Allahabad High Courts have held that a Hindu widow who after living an immoral life reforms her ways is entitled to starving maintenance." We are not dealing in this case with an erring wife who has returned to purity and as to what, if any, will be her rights, if and when that happens, is not a matter for present determination. 11. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we shall make no order as to costs. Dismissed.