Order The lands in question measuring 11 acres and 67 cents belonged to Sri Purushothamaswami Temple represented by its trustees. The petitioner took the lands on lease. He applied to the Conciliation Officer under section 13(1) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952) to fix the fair rent for these lands. Against the order of the Conciliation Officer, the owner, i.e., the Devasthanam appealed to the Revenue Court. The Revenue Court held that the petitioner Samabasiva Mudaliar was not a cultivating tenant within the meaning of section 2(d) of Madras Act (XIV of 1952) allowed the appeal and directed that the petitioner’s application be dismissed. It is the correctness of that order that is challenged in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the Revenue Court. That the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal presented to it against the order of the Conciliation Officer, which was in favour of the petitioner! could not admit of any doubt. The question is, was there anything irregular in the exercise of that jurisdiction on the part of the Revenue Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Revenue Court acted with material irregularity and even without jurisdiction when it called for further evidence and a report from the Conciliation Officer for deciding whether the petitioner was cultivating tenant or not The Revenue Court observed that the evidence placed before the Conciliation Officer was not sufficient. It, therefore, directed the Conciliation Officer to make further enquiries and record, further evidence and submit with a report. It was on the consideration of that further evidence and the report of the Conciliation Officer that the Revenue Court came to the conclusion, that the petitioner was not a cultivating tenant, in that he did not himself or through any member of his family contribute any physical labour for the cultivation of the lands in question. No doubt, rule 5 of the Rules framed under the Act made applicable only some provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 to proceedings before a Revenue Court. No doubt, rule 5 of the Rules framed under the Act made applicable only some provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 to proceedings before a Revenue Court. Rule 5 runs: “The proceedings of the Revenue Court and the Conciliation Officer shall be summary and snail be governed, as far as possible, by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, having regard to (a) the issue and service of summons; (b) the examination of parties and witnesses; (c) the production of documents.” Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the provisions of Order 41, for instance of the Civil Procedure Code had not been specifically extended to proceedings of the Revenue Court, and therefore, the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction at all to take further evidence. Rule 4 of the Rules puts the Revenue Court and the Conciliation Officer into one category and gives them both power to summon witnesses and call for, the production of documents. There is nothing either in rule 4 or in rule 5 to indicate that the power to summon witnesses given to the Revenue Court was confined to original proceedings before the Revenue Court independent of appeals, which also the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to dispose of. Provision for appeals against orders under section 13(1) made by a Conciliation Officer was made in section 13(2) of the Act, and there is nothing in section 13(2) to circumscribe in any way the powers of the Revenue Court sitting in appeal over the orders of a Conciliation Officer. I have already pointed out that rule 5 directs that the proceedings before the Revenue Court shall be summary. No separate power has been given to the Revenue Court to take additional evidence in appeals as such but then there is no specific prohibition either. The Act and the Rules framed thereunder left the question of procedure of the Revenue Court without any defined limits; and I am really unable to see anything in the scheme of the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder to deny the Revenue Court the power to take additional evidence, should it consider necessary before disposing of the appeal Section 13(2) of the Act only refers to the decision of the Revenue Court on such an appeal, but on what material such an appeal should be decided, neither section 13(2) nor the Rules framed under the Act defined. One of the grounds on which learned counsel for the petitioner attacked the order of the Revenue Court was that the further enquiry ordered by the Revenue Court was without notice to the petitioner, and that, therefore, such an enquiry violated the principles of natural justice. On a reference to the record I find that, whether or not the Conciliation Officer gave specific notice to the petitioner of the further enquiry, he did participate in the enquiry, conducted by the Conciliation Officer in the village. One of the witnesses examined was the petitioner’s son, and he was apparently cross-examined by the other side. Witnesses produced by the other side were cross-examined, apparently by the petitioner. When the petitioner was given ample opportunity, which he availed himself of to participate in the further enquiry ordered by the Revenue Court and held by the Conciliation Officer, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the order directing that further evidence be taken violated principles of natural justice. Even apart from the question of jurisdiction, whether the Revenue Court could call for further evidence and act upon that evidence in disposing of the appeal the decision in Lachmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner, Corporation of Madras1should suffice to hold that in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the fact that the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court and availed himself of the opportunity of participating in the enquiry, should bar the grant of any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. But I have already pointed out that there is nothing in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder to indicate that when the Revenue Court called for further evidence and had that evidence recorded by the Conciliation Officer, the Revenue Court acted without jurisdiction. The learned Government Pleader contended that even under rule 5(b), the powers given to Civil Courts for the examination of parties and witnesses would be sufficient to clothe the Revenue Court as an appellate Court with power to provide for the examination of witnesses by the Tribunal inferior to it. That contention also I accept as correct. As the Revenue Court is not shown to have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of that jurisdiction in calling for additional evidence on which it acted, this application must fail. That contention also I accept as correct. As the Revenue Court is not shown to have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of that jurisdiction in calling for additional evidence on which it acted, this application must fail. It is dismissed with costs of respondents 1 to 3. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100. R.M. ----- Application dismissed.