Judgment.- Defendant is the appellant. The respondent herein filed O.S. No. 230 of 1948 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court Tenali for recovery of possession of the suit property on the ground that it belonged to his maternal grandfather, Bhavanam Venkata Reddy and after the death of his last daughter, Bhusamma, he succeeded to the property as the next reversioner. The defendant contended that the suit property was gifted to Subbamma, one of the daughters of Venkata Reddy by her mother, Konamma as per the oral directions of her father, Venkata Reddy, that there was a family arrangement under which Subbamma’s absolute rights in the suit properties were recognised and that in any event the plaintiff who brought about and attested the Dakhal deed dated 14th October, 1906 Exhibit B-7 executed by Konamma in favour of Subbamma was estopped from challenging the validity of the Dakhal deed. The defendant claimed as the donee, under Exhibit B-8 from Bakki Reddy who claimed title from Subbamma under a settlement deed executed by her on 3rd April, 1930 and marked as Exhibit B-9. Both the Courts below concurrently found that the defendant did not establish the family arrangement as well as the oral gift set up by them. On the question of estoppel, the District Munsif held in paragraph 22 of his judgment that it was impossible to hold that the plaintiff was estopped from questioning Subbamma’s absolute title to the suit land. He also observed that “the defendant’s learned pleader too has not gone the length of contending that the bar of estoppel can be raised against the plaintiff based on his connection with the original of Exhibit B-7 alone.” Though no specific ground of appeal was raised by the defendant in regard to estoppel in his memorandum of appeal filed before the Subordinate Judge of Tenali the Subordinate Judge raised the question of estoppel as the 4th point for consideration and disposed it of in paragraph 8 in a single sentence that he was not able to see how plaintiff was estopped on account of his being a party attestor in the gift deed Exhibit B-7. The defendant has filed the Second Appeal and the main point urged by his Advocate was that the plea of estoppel ought to have been found in his favour on the strength of the Full Bench decision in Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya 1 . The defendant has filed the Second Appeal and the main point urged by his Advocate was that the plea of estoppel ought to have been found in his favour on the strength of the Full Bench decision in Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya 1 . For that purpose, he relied upon the following facts found in his favour by both the Courts below: — (1) The plaintiff, the daughter’s son of Konamma was living with her at the time of the execution of the Dakhal deed, Exhibit B-7. (2) The Stamp papers for Exhibit B-7 were purchased in his name. (3) He attested the document Exhibit B-7 and was an identifying witness at the time of its registration. The simple question that arises for consideration is whether these admitted facts are sufficient to found an estoppel and debar the plaintiff from recovering possession of the suit property when succession opened on the death of the last daughter, Busamma on 16th October, 1945. The Dakhal deed executed by Konamma in favour of her daughter, Subbamma, runs as follows: — “Dakhal Deed (Conveyance deed) in respect of seri wet land worth Rs. 300 executed on 14th October, 1906. Dakhal deed executed in favour of Appi Reddi’s wife Subbamma by Bhavanam Venkata Reddi’s wife Konamma. As the property, soon after the death of your father, passed into your possession towards (your) share and as there was no public document, you required me to execute a Dakhal deed (conveyance deed). Therefore you shall henceforth be paying Government Cist etc., from now onwards and enjoy the property from now onwards and enjoy the property from son to grandson with powers of sale, gift, mortgage, and exchange. Neither myself nor my successors will question neither you nor your heirs. When you demand I am prepared to relinquish the patta, in my name and transfer it to your name. If in respect of this Dakhal deed any disputes etc., arise from gnatis, samantas and others, I shall see that this Dakhal deed is given effect to”. Though the Courts below described the document dated 14th October, 1906 as a deed of gift, it is styled as a Dakhal deed. It sets out that after the death of her father, Venkata Reddy, it fell to her share and had been in her possession and enjoyment though the patta stood in the name of her mother Konamma and others. It sets out that after the death of her father, Venkata Reddy, it fell to her share and had been in her possession and enjoyment though the patta stood in the name of her mother Konamma and others. As Subbamma did not have any public document to evidence her title and wanted a Dakhal deed to be executed in her favour, the mother executed Exhibit B-7. It provided that thereafter Subbamma alone should pay Government cist and enjoy the property from son to grandson with powers of sale, gift, mortgage and exchange and that neither she nor her heirs would question the transaction. To this document, the plaintiff who had no immediate right in the property but only a spes successions was an attestor. Does his conduct in purchasing the stamp papers in his own name, being an attestor of the document and an identifying witness before the Registrar estop him from challenging the validity of the document and recovering possession, when succession opened and the estate vested in him as the nearest reversioner? The learned advocate for’ the appellant invited my attention to the Full Bench decision in Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya1, as also the passages in Mulla’s “Hindu Law” nth edition, page 207 and Mayne’s “Hindu Law” at pages 792 and 793 respectively which are as follows: “A reversioner, whether a male or female, who consents to an alienation by a widow or other limited heir made without legal necessity, or to an invalid surrender, and transferees from him are precluded from disputing the validity of the alienation, though he may have received no consideration for his consent. It is immaterial that the alienation is by way of gift”. “The reversioner whether male or female consenting to or joining in an alienation by the widow or other limited owner, even before reversion has fallen into possession must be taken to elect to hold the transaction valid and cannot afterwards challenge it, and it is immaterial whether the consenting reversioner receives consideration or not and whether the alienation is for value or is in form or in-substance a gift”. In Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya1, the widow Seetamma executed a gift deed on 2nd October, 1918, in respect of some of the properties that came to her from her husband in favour of her own brother on 19th October, 1918. In Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya1, the widow Seetamma executed a gift deed on 2nd October, 1918, in respect of some of the properties that came to her from her husband in favour of her own brother on 19th October, 1918. The plaintiff, the presumptive reversioner, executed a document completely relinquishing all his rights as prospective reversioner and giving full consent to the transaction of 2nd October, 1918. Coutts-Trotter, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench held that the doctrine of estoppel did not apply, as no representation of fact was made by the plaintiff, to the widow’s brother and the donee did not act on the faith of that representation and was not damnified. The next ground based on the doctrine of election was also repelled as no benefit of any kind was received by the plaintiff. At page 562, following the Allahabad and Bombay High Courts, he held that a third case ex1sts, namely where although no one has been damnified so as to call into operation the doctrine of estoppel and the reversioner has taken no pecuniary benefit to bring himself within the meaning of the strict doctrine of election, he has nevertheless positively and definitively chosen to announce his intention and in fact agreed to abide by the act of the widow. The Full Benches of Allahabad and Bombay have decided that he can do so even while he only occupies the character of presumptive reversioner. We agree with the Allahabad and Bombay Courts in thinking that if he takes such a step he is personally debarred from resiling from it afterwards. Indeed it is so obviously desirable that the Courts of India should speak with one voice on a matter of such constant recurrence as this that we should not dissent from those decisions unless we were convinced that they were contrary to the decision of the Privy Council in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan2. In my opinion, the facts of this case do not warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff positively and definitely announced his intention that the donee Subbamma should take an absolute estate in the suit property or that he agreed to his grandmother Konamma conveying an absolute estate to her daughter so as to enure beyond her life-time and bind the estate. The recitals of Exhibit B-7 clearly show that after the death of Venkata Reddy, Subbamma was in possession of the suit property and the Dakhal-deed was executed as she required a public document to evidence her possession. It does not show that Konamma intended to convey a larger or higher estate than she possessed, viz-, a widow’s estate. As the alienation was not effected for legal necessity, or benefit to the estate, the alienee was not entitled to an absolute estate. Viewed as a gift, not having been executed for purposes sanctioned by Hindu Law, it would not impart an absolute title to the donee. There is no indication in the document that the widow Konamma wanted to enlarge the estate of her daughter. The words that Subbamma might enjoy the property from son to grandson with powers of sale, gift, mortgage and exchange do not per se establish that she intended to convey an absolute estate to her daughter. A transferee of a widow’s estate is certainly entitled to continue in possession during the life-time of the widow unless other contingencies like re-marriage, adoption, etc., take place. The interest conveyed to the transferee is not only transmissible to’ his heirs-at-law but may also be sold, mortgaged, exchanged or gifted during the life-time of the widow. Even assuming that the plaintiff, by attesting the document was fully aware of all its terms, it does not, in my opinion, amount to an unequivocal announcement of his intention to hold the deed good and that he would not recover the property from the donee or his successors after the death of the widow. Apart from the attestation, there is no document in the present case, as in Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya1, under which the plaintiff relinquished his interest in the suit property and consented to the widow conveying an absolute estate to the transferee. In the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj2, the presumptive reversioner executed a deed of relinquishment in the properties gifted by the widow in favour of tutelary deity of the family on 19th April, 1905. It was held that by reason of the execution of that document, dated 12th May, 1905, Singh was bound “whether his action be spoken of as a ratification of the transfer or as an election to hold good the deed of 19th April, 1905”. It was held that by reason of the execution of that document, dated 12th May, 1905, Singh was bound “whether his action be spoken of as a ratification of the transfer or as an election to hold good the deed of 19th April, 1905”. In Akkawa v. Sayad Khan Mithekhan3, the presumptive reversioner joined the widow in the execution of the deed and it was held that it amounted to a clear election to hold the transaction as valid. In the present already pointed out by me, the plaintiff did not execute any document in favour of the donee. , The decision in Virayya v. Bapayya4, is more akin to the facts of the present case. The terms of the Dakhal-deed which were construed in that case are similar to the terms of Exhibit B-7. The words that the transferee should enjoy the property with rights of gift, exchange and sale from son to grandson and so on in succession, are also to be found in that document. The only difference is that in that document, Butchayya made arrangements to the effect that the widow should enjoy during her life-time and a vested remainder was created in a half in favour of his daughter Subbamma and in the other half, to his grand-daughter Venkatasubbamma. Patanjali Sastri, J., in delivering the judgment of the Bench held at page 283 that the Dakhal-deed did not purport, propria vigore to transfer any absolute interest in the properties to the donees and that the Full Bench decisions of the Madras, Bombay and Allahabad High Courts did not govern the case. I adopt the reasoning of that decision and hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit property. In this connection I may also refer to the decision in Bindesh-wari Singh v. Harnarain Singh5, which closely resembles this case. I have carefully perused the Full Bench judgments of Allahabad, Bombay, and Madras High Courts but I am still unable to understand on what legal basis, the presumptive reversioner who assented to the alienation of the widow without receiving any consideration, is bound by the alienation, apart from the doctrine of estoppel or election. All the Full Bench judgments rest on the interpretation of a passage in Lord Dunedin’s judgment in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan6. All the Full Bench judgments rest on the interpretation of a passage in Lord Dunedin’s judgment in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan6. The question that arose for consideration in the Privy Council case was whether a prospective reversioner, who took a mortgage of a portion of a property from an alienee, in whose favour the property was transferred by a widow, was estopped from disputing the validity of the alienation on the death of the widow. Lord Dunedin summarised the result of the consideration of the decided cases in the following terms: — (i) An alienation by a widow of her deceasd husband’s estate held by her may be validated if it can be shown to be a surrender of her whole interest in the whole estate in favour of the nearest reversioner or reversioners at the time of the alienation. In such circumstances the question of necessity does not fall to be considered. But the surrender must be a bona fide surrender, not device to divide the estate with the reversioner. (2) When the alienation of the whole or part of the estate is to be supported on the ground of necessity, then, if such necessity is not proved aliunde and the alienee does not prove inquiry on his part and honest belief in the necessity, the consent of such reversioners as might fairly be expected to be interested to quarrel with the transaction will be held to afford a presumptive proof which if not rebutted by contrary proof will validate the transaction as a right and proper one. At page 537 in discussing the character of the deed executed by Marakammal in favour of Ramaswamy Gounden he held: “Being a deed of gift it cannot possibly be held to be evidence of alienation for value f or pur-poses of necessity. It follows, therefore, that the deed taken by itself cannot stand.” Dealing with the question of estoppel, at page 538, he observed: “How can it be said that the plaintiff, by any act of his, led the respondents to think that something was true and then to act on that belief?..........Here the plaintiff never consented to the deed nor is his claim traced through Ramaswamy even in the matter of descent”. On the question of ratification, the following observations were made: “No doubt there is another view which is not estoppel, but is expressed by one learned Judge as ratification. It is scarcely that, though it might be hypercriticism to object to the use of the word. What it is based on is this. An alienation by a widow is not a void contract; it is only voidable. Bijoy Gopal Mukherji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi1. Now in all cases of voidable contracts there is a general equitable doctrine common to all systems that he who has the right to complaln must do so when the right of action is properly open to him and he knows the facts. If, therefore, a reversioner after he became in titulo to reduce the estate to possession and knew of the alienation, did something which showed that he treated the alienation as good he would lose his right of complaint. This may be spoken of, though scarcely accurately, as ratification. In some cases it has been expressed as an election to hold the deed good. Modhu Sudan Singh v. Rooke2. But it is well settled that though he who may be termed a presumptive reversionary heir has a title to challenge an alienation at its inception, he need not do so, but is entitled to wait till the death of the widow has affirmed his character, a character which up to that date might be defeated by birth or by adoption. The present plaintiff raised these proceedings immediately after his title was confirmed. Of course something might be done before that time which amounted to an actual election to hold the deed good. In that view what was done here ? The learned Appeal Judges dismiss as inadequate the fact of the purchase of the two small pieces of ground. But they attach great weight to the taking of the mortgage. Here they have made a slip as to the facts. The mortgage did not cons1st, as they think, of only the share of the mitta which had come through the deed of gift. It cons1sted also of two fourteenths of the mitta which had come to the mortgagors in right of their own succession. The value of this share was more than the sum secured by it. The mortgage did not cons1st, as they think, of only the share of the mitta which had come through the deed of gift. It cons1sted also of two fourteenths of the mitta which had come to the mortgagors in right of their own succession. The value of this share was more than the sum secured by it. Now at the time of the mortgage the plaintiff did not know whether he would ever be such a reversioner in fact as he would give him a practical interest to quarrel with the deed of gift. Why should he not take all that the mortgagors could give or propose to give ? To hold that by so doing he barred himself from asserting his own title to part of what was mortgaged, seems to their Lordships, a quite unwarrantable proposition”. Before proceeding to discuss the Full Bench decisions, I wish to observe that in the present case there is no act on the part of the plaintiff which would amount to an actual election to hold the deed good. The observations of Lord Dunedin, in the last paragraph quoted above, are equally applicable to this case as the “plaintiff herein who attested the gift deed did not know whether he would ever be such a reversioner in fact as would give him a practical interest to quarrel with the deed of gift”. To hold that by mere attestation he debarred himself from asserting his own title to the suit property would be, in my opinion " a quite unwarrantable proposition " adopting the language of Lord Dunedin. To construe the passage at 539 " of course something might be done even before that time which amounted to an actual election’ to hold the deed good ". as a vedic text or a statutory provision and to hold that the reversioner who has only a spes successionis and no present or immediate interest in the property alienated is bound by his consent, even though it may not amount to estoppel or election is, in my opinion, not legally justifiable. To sustain the alienation, on principles of public morality, justice, equity, or good conscience is only to add to or misinterpret and strain the observations of Lord Dunedin. In Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj1, the majority opinion was based on ratification or election. To sustain the alienation, on principles of public morality, justice, equity, or good conscience is only to add to or misinterpret and strain the observations of Lord Dunedin. In Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj1, the majority opinion was based on ratification or election. But according to Lord Dunedin in Rangaswamy Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan2, those principles would mainly apply to a reversioner who " after he became in titulo to reduce the estate to possession and in view of the alienation, did something which showed that he treated the alienation as good". Walsh, J., based his judgment on still wider grounds and observed: "It does not matter whether it is called an estoppel, an election or an equitable bar; we have to give effect to the acts and intentions of parties as evidenced by their conduct, unless prevented by some statute, or by some rule of law or equity ". In Akkawa v. Say ad Khan Mithekhan3, the Full Bench held that the conduct of the reversioner in joining the widow in executing the deed of alienation amounted to a clear election to hold the transaction as valid. In Ramakotayya v. Viraraghavayya4, Coutts-Trotter, C.J., found it difficult to rest his opinion either on the. doctrine of estoppel or on the doctrine of election. For the sake of uniformity, however, he preferred to follow the Full Benches of Allahabad and Bombay Higb Courts and evolved a third doctrine or formulae on grounds of equity and expressed himself as follows: "Where although no one has been damnified so as to call into operation the doctrine of estoppel and the reversioner has taken no pecuniary benefit to bring himself within the meaning of the strict doctrine of election, he has nevertheless positively and definitively chosen to announce his intention and in fact agreed to abide by the act of the widow." With great respect, I am unable to persuade myself that there is any legal basis for this third doctrine or formulae based on equity. It is established beyond doubt that during the life-time of the widow, the reversioner has no interest in praesenti in the suit property. His right is only a spes successionis or a mere chance of succession within the meaning of section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not a vested interest but only an interest expectant on the death of a limited heir. His right is only a spes successionis or a mere chance of succession within the meaning of section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not a vested interest but only an interest expectant on the death of a limited heir. It cannot therefore be sold, mortgaged or assigned nor can it be relinquished. That a transfer of a spes successionis is a nullity and has no effect in law, has been repeatedly lald down by their Lordships of the Privy, Council — Vide Mulla’s " Hindu Law " (nth edition) page 169. If so, how can’ his conduct before succession opens,, debar him from suing for recovery of possession, unless it be on the basis of election or estoppel ? In Ramagowda Annagowda v. Bhau Saheb5, Lord Sinha discussed this question and the observations at page 7 explaln the basis of the rule as follows: " The three deeds appear thus to be inseparably connected together and in that view Annagowda not only consented to the sale to Shivgouda and the gift to Basappa but these dispositions formed parts of the same transaction by which he himself acquired a part of the estate. It was argued that Annagouda’s contingent interest as a remote reversioner could not be validly sold by him, as it was a mere spes successionis, and an agreement to sell such interest would also be void in law. It is not necessary to consider that question, because he did not in fact either sell or agree to sell his reversionary interest. It is settled law that an alienation by a widow in excess of her powers-is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners, who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or by acts which treat it as valid or binding. If some person other than Annagouda had been at the death of Tayava the nearest heir of her husband it might have been open to him to question all or any of the three deeds, but Annagouda himself being a party to and benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was precluded from questioning any part of it. If some person other than Annagouda had been at the death of Tayava the nearest heir of her husband it might have been open to him to question all or any of the three deeds, but Annagouda himself being a party to and benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was precluded from questioning any part of it. Nor is it other dian a most notable circumstance that he did not, after Tayeva’s death." It was by the application of the doctrine of election that Lord Sinha held that Annagouda was bound. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Dhiyan Singh and another v. Jugal Kishore and another1. In this connection I may refer to the decision in Bindeswari Singh v. Harnarain Singh2, which in my opinion correctly sets out the law and the effect of the Privy Council in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan3, (vide also Debi Dayal v. Radhakrishna4). The consent of the reversioner does not validate the alienation and does not operate propria vigore but is only of evidentiary value. Even in the passage at page 539 in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan3, the actual expression used by Lord Dunedin is, whether the conduct of the presumptive reversioner amounted to an actual election to hold the deed good. What amounts to election is clearly lald down by CouttsTrotter, C.J., in Ramakotayya v.Viraraghavayya5, by-referring to the leading case of Streatfield v. Streatfield6. Lord Sinha also reiterates the same principle in Ramagowda Annagowda v. Bhau Saheb7. So I think there is no warrant or justification for placing a wider construction on the passage of Lord Dunedin and importing equitable principles and enunciating a third doctrine as is sought to be done by the Full Bench decisions of the Allahabad, Bombay and Madras High Courts already referred to. The observations in the recent, decision of the Supreme Court in Kali Shankar Das v. Dhewendranath8, throw great light on this question. At page 782, Mukherjea, J., held that " consent of the reversioner may raise a presumption that the transaction was for legal necessity or that the mortgagee had acted therein after proper and bona fide enquiry and has satisfied himself as to the ex1stence of such necessity — Vide Debi Prasad v Golap Bhagat’, approved of by the Judicial Committee in Rangaswami Goundan v Nachiappa Goundan’. But this presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the actual reversioner to establish that there was in fact no legal necessity and there has been no proper and bona fide enquiry by the mortgagee". In column 2 of page 782 referring to Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan9, he further observed: " It was held that the words referred to above should not be construed to lay down the proposition, that such consent on the part of the father would operate propria vigore and would be binding on the sons This proposition, their Lordships observed, was opposed both to principle and authority, it being a settled doctrine of Hindu Law that nobody has a vested right so long as the widow is alive any one who went before him. As the sons of Ramanaram claim as heirs of Hanpada and not of their father, the admissions, if any made by the latter could not in any way bind them." At page 783, the nature of the widow’s estate and the effect of transfer made by the widow is discussed. It was ultimately held that, as the mortgagee did not establish legal necessity or that he made any bona fide enquiries, the mortgage was valid and binding. I must, however, point out that the question as to whether the consenting presumptive reversioner would have been bound or not, did not arise and was not discussed by the Supreme Court. To sum up, my conclusions are as follows: — (1) The observations of Lord Dunedin in Rangaswami Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan3, do not warrant the construction based upon it by the Full Benches of Allahabad, Bombay and Madras High Courts and no third doctrine based on equity can be spelt out of those observations. (2) If the observations of Lord Dune-din are susceptible of that construction, as lald down by the Full Benches, I wish to respectfully differ from them. In Shrinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango1, Venkatarama Iyer, J., discussing the Privy Council decision in Anant Bhikappa Patil (minor) v. Shankar Ramchandra Patil2, observed as follows: — “As it was an authority binding on the Indian Courts, they could not refuse to follow it and were obliged to discover a d1stinction. This Court, however, is not hampered by any such limitation, and is free to consider the question on its own merits”. This Court, however, is not hampered by any such limitation, and is free to consider the question on its own merits”. Adopting those observations, I hold that after India was constituted into a Sovereign Democratic Republic, the Courts in India are not bound by the decisions of the Privy Council and are free to consider the question on its own merits. The Andhra High Court which was inaugurated in July, 1954, is not bound by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court or other High Courts and is at liberty to examine the question in the light of well-established legal principles and arrive at a proper conclusion. So, in my opinion, a presumptive reversioner who gave his consent to a gift made by a widow without receiving any consideration whatsoever, is entitled to recover the property so gifted when he succeeds to the estate on the death of the widow. The appellant in this case is only a donee from a donee from Subbamma who claims title under Exhibit B-7. There are therefore no equitable considerations applicable to the facts of the present case which compel me to uphold the title of the appellant. Before concluding the judgment, I wish to make the following observations: This case has caused me a great deal of vacillation in view of the large body of authority referred to supra. I am really surprised that the Courts below summarily dealt with the question of estoppel and regarded the matter so simple that they did not even refer to the decisions of the Privy Council or the Full Benches of the Allahabad, Bombay and Madras High Courts or even the passages from the leading textbooks. I wish to condemn the practice of the subordinate judiciary in not referring to the decisions which are binding upon them. By a casual reference to the leading text-books, the Courts below should have discovered that the Full Bench case in 52 Madras3 has at least an important bearing in deciding the question of estoppel. It is the bounden duty of the members of the Bar and the Judges who admin1ster the law, to keep themselves informed of the march and progress of law, i.e., statutory and case-law. It is the bounden duty of the members of the Bar and the Judges who admin1ster the law, to keep themselves informed of the march and progress of law, i.e., statutory and case-law. If every illiterate man is presumed to know law and ignorance of law is no excuse, it is all the more important that those who are concerned in the admin1stration of law, namely the members of the Bar and the Judges, should read the Law Reports regularly and be aware not only of the latest reports but also decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. I strongly feel that the Courts below erred in overlooking or not referring to the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court. Feeling doubtful, as to whether the members of the Bar did not discharge their duty properly, I asked the counsel for the appellant as to whether the notes made by the lawyers who appeared in the Courts below made reference to the Full Bench decisions. I felt happy to note that the notes did contain references to those decisions of the Full Benches. If those decisions were referred to during the course of the arguments in the Courts below, it was incumbent upon them to have referred to those decisions and d1stinguished or followed them. Not to refer to those decisions or not to meet the arguments addressed before them, is not an honest or proper way of disposal of cases. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. So far as. the memo of cross-objections are concerned, I see no reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion in regard to costs. Leave granted. D.L.N. ------. Appeal dismissed.