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1954 DIGILAW 398 (MAD)

Mahajunnisa v. Rajah Venkataramachandra Appa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu

1954-09-10

K.SUBBA RAO

body1954
Judgment.- The second appeal arises out of the Summary Suit No.23 of 1944 filed by the respondent in the Court of the Deputy Collector, Narasapur Division, for recovery of rent amounting to Rs.55-15-0 for faslis 1351 to 1353 in respect of R. S. No. 3122 (2 acres 88 cents,) and R. S. No. 3123 (0.12 cents.) covered by Patta No. 748 of Relangi village. The plaintiff is the zamindar of the said village. The plaintiff’s case is that the plaint schedule property is ryoti land and that the defendants being the occupancy ryots, are liable to pay rent for the aforesaid period. The defendants contended that the said survey numbers were Government porambokes and that they acquired pattas undr the Government. They also pleaded that the order of the Collector under section 20-A of the Madras Estates Land Act was a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The Deputy Collector accepted the contentions of the defendants and. dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned District Judge disagreed with him and decreed the suit. Hence the appeal. As the respondent was not represented, I requested Mr. T. Lakshmiah to help the Court as amicus curiae. I am grateful to him for the help rendered by him to enable me to come to a decision in this case. The learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Krishnamurthi argued that the Collector of West Godavari in an application filed by the respondent held that the plaint schedule land was ryotwari land and that the respondent not having preferred any appeal against that order to the Revenue Board, is precluded from questioning the same in a Civil Court. This argument would depend upon the scope of section 20-A of the Madras Estates Land Act. This argument would depend upon the scope of section 20-A of the Madras Estates Land Act. Section 20-A reads: (1) Subject to such rules as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, the District Collector may, on the application of the landholder, a ryot or any person interested; (a) declare that any land or any portion of any land which is set apart for any of the purposes referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (6) of clause 16 of section 3 is no longer required for its original purpose; and (b) by order in writing direct; (i) that any such land or portion in respect of which such declaration is made be used for any other specified communal purpose; or (ii) if such land or portion is not required for any communal purpose, that it be converted into ryotwari land or landholder’s ryoti land according as the reversionary rights in such land vest under the terms, express or implied, of the sanad, title-deed or other grant in the Government or in the landholder. Item 5 of Part B of the schedule annexed to the Act says that, against suah an order of the Collector, an appeal would lie to the Revenue Board. If it is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to decide whether a particular land lis a ryoti land or a ryotwari land it may follow that the procedure pointed out by the Statute should be followed. But, I have held in The Province of Madras-v. Arunachalam Chettiar1, that questions of title are within the exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts and there is nothing in the Estates Land Act, which ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in respect of such matters. At page 256 I observed: "The general scheme of the Act indicates that the Legislature conferred jurisdiction on revenue officers for speedy disposals of specified matters, as being men on the spot they were assumed to be better qualified to dispose of them expeditiously. But it cannot be the intention of the Legislature to confer on the revenue officers the jurisdiction to decide questions affecting title to properties.......................... But it cannot be the intention of the Legislature to confer on the revenue officers the jurisdiction to decide questions affecting title to properties.......................... For the purpose of ascertaining the ownership of the land, he may incidentally look into the title-deeds, but it is not intended, nor is it to be expected of him that he should decide any dispute inter se between the landholder and the ryot which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and I do not find any provision in the Madras Estates Land Act which expressly or by necessary implication ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts.‘‘ It follows that section 20-A is not a bar to the maintainability of the present suit. Even so, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the plaintiff must fail, as according to him, he did not establish title to the suit property. The land in question is admittedly within the geographical limits of zamindari. The defendants and their predecessors in interest for forty years dealt with the property as ryoti land and paid rent to the zamindar on that basis. The zamindar obtained decrees for rent on the ground that they were ryoti. lands and the defendants were liable to pay rent. In A. S. No. 168 of 1937, an appeal arising out of a suit filed by a zamindar against the defendants, it was held that the suit land was ryoti land and the defendants were liable to pay rent. So too, in Summary Suit No. 64 of 1939, the Zamindar obtained a decree against the defendant for rent after the Collector made an order under section. 20-A of the Madras Estates Land Act. It is not disputed that there were previous decrees for rent against the defendants. The assertions of title by the plaintiff and the admissions made by the defendants for a long period of timer are sufficient proof of the plaintiff’s title. The conclusion of the lower court is, right. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. No leave. D.L.N. -------- Second Appeal dismissed.