SABJOO PROSAD C. J.: The petitioners in this case have moved against an order of the learned District Judge, Upper Assami Districts, setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and remanding the case to that Court for re-hearing according to law. It relates to a suit for declaration of title and re­covery of possession instituted by the petitioners, in which they also claimed mesne profits. (2) The plaintiffs alleged that they had pur­chased the disputed property from one Ram Ajodhya under a deed of sale, dated 12-6-45, - Ram Ajodhya himself having purchased it from one Mahabir under another deed of sale, dated 22-6-43. On the basis of their purchase, the peti­tioners were mutated in November, 1945. The defendant No. 1, who is the contesting defendant, on the, other hand claimed that Ram Ajodhya had no title to the property and that they had already purchased the land from the owner, Mahabir, some­time in May, 1943, that is, prior to the date of sale in favour of the petitioners. He stated that no registered document of sale was executed by the vendor in his favour, but he was in possession of the property and continued to be in possession by virtue of the sale. (3) It appears that the case was fixed for hear­ing on 31-8-50. On that date, the plaintiffs filed certain documents, but no steps were taken by the defendant, and the case was ordered to be kept on the ready list. Thereafter on 10-10-50, certain documents were filed by the defendant, including a document which, according to the defendant, purports to be a sale-deed executed by Mahabir in favour of the defendant No. 1. The actual hearing of the case started on 15-5-52 and on 17-5-52, Mr. G. N. Barua, Advocate appearing on behalf of the contesting defendant, while examining one of the witnesses, Bhola Tewari, who purported to be the scribe of the documents, wanted to prove the documents which had been filed on 10-10-50. The Lower Court, for reasons assigned in its order of that date, refused to admit those docu­ments in evidence. It pointed out that the paper which was claimed to be a document executed by Mahabir in favour of the defendant No. 1, was an unstamped piece of paper without any signa­ture of the executant and the writer. The Lower Court, for reasons assigned in its order of that date, refused to admit those docu­ments in evidence. It pointed out that the paper which was claimed to be a document executed by Mahabir in favour of the defendant No. 1, was an unstamped piece of paper without any signa­ture of the executant and the writer. For the defendant, it was contended that the paper in question bore the signature of Mahabir the executant and the signature of the scribe, but the lower portion of the paper appeared to have been torn away. There were also certain transliterated copies of those documents filed along with the originals, which bore the seal of the Court, on that date, that is, on 10-10-50. But the trial Court observed that the transliteration also could not be admitted in evidence as secondary evidence, in view of the fact that there was nothing to show that these transliterated copies had been compared with the original. The Court also observed that the parties were given time to file their documents on 29-5-50 but no such documents were filed on that date, nor any steps taken to produce those documents at a subsequent stage. But these papers seem to have been put in on the record without the permission of the Court on 10-10-50 after the suit was ready for hearing, and no satisfactory reason had been given by the defendant as to why the provisions of O. 13, R. 1, C. P. Code, had not been complied with in not filing these documents earlier. On these grounds, the trial Court rejected the appli­cation of the defendant to have those documents exhibited. (4) The lower Appellate Court appears to have I taken a different view of the matter. That Court thought that an opportunity should have been given to the defendant to prove the document in question and to lead secondary evidence on the point as to who was the executant of the docu­ment, and whether it did contain any signature of the executant and the scribe. On these grounds, the Court, without deciding any of the issues in­volved in the suit, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which was in favour of the petitioners, and directed the suit to be remand­ed to the trial Court for hearing according to law after giving an opportunity to the defendant to prove those documents. On these grounds, the Court, without deciding any of the issues in­volved in the suit, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which was in favour of the petitioners, and directed the suit to be remand­ed to the trial Court for hearing according to law after giving an opportunity to the defendant to prove those documents. (5) The Court, in passing the order, appears to have lost sight of the provisions of O. 41, R. 27, wherein it is laid down that the Appellate Court itself, if the Court was satisfied that the evidence given by the defendant had been wrongly rejected, could allow such evidence or document to be pro­duced or other witnesses to be examined. After all, it is quite obvious from the pleadings of the parties and the nature of the case that the main point in dispute was whether the defendant, if at all, could resist the claim of the plaintiffs on the ground of part-performance under Section 53 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. In the circum­stances, it appears to us quite unnecessary that the decree of the trial Court should have been set aside and the case remanded to that Court for a 'fresh hearing of the suit itself. The lower Appellate Court which had seisin of .the case, could itself act under O. 41, R. 27, C. P. [code, but before doing so, the Court had to be satisfied that the trial Court was unjustified in i refusing to admit evidence which the defendant 'intended to adduce. Prima facie, it appears to us I that the trial Court had given substantial reasons [for rejecting the prayer of the defendant to take those papers or documents into evidence, and the appellate Court had to see whether the discretion 'exercised by the trial Court had not been judicially exercised before interfering with the order. In refusing to act under O. 41, R. 27, C. P. Code, the Court of appeal below has not duly discharged its responsibilities, and the mere fact that the issues arising in the case were inter-dependent, did not very much alter the legal position. Much time and money could be saved by adopting the right pro­cedure laid down by the law. Much time and money could be saved by adopting the right pro­cedure laid down by the law. Courts of Appeal in the Districts cannot place themselves in the same position as this Court, where ordinarily additional evidence is not enter­tained and they have to abide by the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27, C. P. Code, in disposing of appeals pending before them, wherever the provi­sions of that Rule are, in their opinion, attracted. In view of these circumstances, we think that the procedure adopted by the lower Appellate Court is erroneous and that it has failed to exercise jurisdic­tion duly vested in it by law in not hearing the appeal itself and, if necessary, acting under the pro­visions of O. 41, R. 27, C. P. Code, to dispose of the matter. (6) The application is accordingly allowed. The order of the learned District Judge is set aside, and the appeal will now go back to that Court for re-hearing and disposal according to law. If the District Judge feels, after a fresh examination of the matter, that the order passed by the trial Court refusing to take those documents into evidence, was entirely wrong, the lower appellate Court may it­self take evidence on the point and then dispose of the appeal. (7) The trial Court had refused a decree for mesne profits claimed by the plaintiffs petitioners. It is pointed out to us that there was a cross-objection filed by the petitioners against that part of the decree. The appellate Court will now dis­pose of both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The costs will abide the result. (8) DEKA J. : I agree. Order accordingly.