JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. By this petition under Art.226, Constitution of India, the applicant moves for a writ of mandamus or a direction to the Public Service Commission to allow him to appear at the competitive examination for recruitment to the Madhya Bharat Subordinate Judicial Service to be held on 9-8-1954 and the following days, and to issue him the necessary certificate for admission. 2. The circumstances in which this petition has been filed are as follows: The petitioner is an employee of the State of Madhya Bharat and is at present working as a Head Master of a school at Kukshi. He applied for liberty to present himself for the competitive examination for admission to the Madhya Bharat Subordinate Judicial Service which was to have been held on 18-11-1953, supporting his application with certificates of age, character and educational qualifications. The application was entertained by the Commission and a certificate for admission to that examination was issued to the applicant. This examination was, however, stayed by an order of injunction passed by a Division Bench of this Court in a petition (Misc. Case No.41 of 1953) filed by one Ramwallabh Nagar who had been excluded from that examination. The petitioner states that during the pendency of Nagar's application, the Public Service Commission returned to him by money-order the fees he had deposited for the examination which was to have been held on 18-11-1953 and the following days; but that he returned the money-order and informed the Commission that the admission card issued to him for the aforesaid examination and the fees paid by him would enure for the other examination which may be held by the commission. Nagar's petition was decided by this Court on 17-12-1953. Thereafter the Public Service Commission notified in the Government Gazette dated 3-6-1954 that a competitive examination for admission to the Madhya Bharat Subordinate Judicial Service would be held simultaneously at Gwalior and Indore, commencing from 9-8-1954 and that the last date for the submission of applications to this examination would be 7-7-1954. The Commission also published detailed instructions to candidates regarding the filling up and submission of applications for admission to the examination. The Commission also published detailed instructions to candidates regarding the filling up and submission of applications for admission to the examination. By a letter dated 9-6-1954, the Commission drew the attention of the petitioner Rajnath Bajaj to the notice published by it in the Government Gazette dated 3-6-1954 and informed him that if he intended to take the examination, he should submit a fresh application in the prescribed form and manner and that the fees remitted by him for the last examination and held in deposit by the Commission, would be credited towards the fees for the examination commencing on 9-8-1954. The applicant says that he did, however, submit a fresh application on 22-6-1954 to the Director of Education in accordance with para 2 of "Instructions to candidates" published by the Commission. The petitioner then proceeds to aver that when he found that the Commission was despatching admission cards to several candidates and had not sent one to him, he sent a telegram on 28-7-1954 to the Commission saying that the admission card issued to him for the last examination would enure for the ensuing examination; that he was not bound to make a fresh application and that in fact as a measure of caution, he had sent on 22-6-1954 a fresh application through the Director of Education, and expressing his surprise that he had not received any admission card. In reply the Commission wrote back to the petitioner saying that they had not received his application and consequently the question of admitting him to the examination did not arise; that his admission to the examination which was to have been held in 1953, did not ipso facto entitle him to appear at the examination to be held in August 1954 and that if he liked he could enquire from the Director of Education about the application said to have been submitted by him. The petitioner then again sent a telegram to the Commission reiterating the stand taken by him in his previous telegram, and adding that it was the duty of the Commission and not of the petitioner, to make proper inquiries about the application which he had submitted to the Director of Education on 22-6-1954. Thereafter the applicant filed this petition on 2-8-1954. 3. Thereafter the applicant filed this petition on 2-8-1954. 3. The petitioner claims that the examination which was to have been held on 18-11-1953, having been stayed and 'adjourned', the examination now to be held from 9-8-1954 is the same examination to which the petitioner had been admitted in 1953 and that, therefore he is, as of right, entitled to appear at the examination without making a fresh application and that the Director of Education being the nominee and agent of the Public Service Commission for the purpose of receiving applications the application submitted by him on 22-6-1954 to the Director of Education should be deemed to have been received by the Commission on that date and that if that application did not reach the Commission, it was the bounden duty of the Commission "to make proper enquiries into the acts of the agent." On these allegations the applicant says that he having fulfilled the conditions necessary under the M.B. Judicial Service Rules 1951 and under the instructions issued by the Public Service Commission to qualify him to appear at the ensuing examination, he is entitled to receive a certificate of admission to the said examination. In this application, the State of Madhya Bharat has also been made a party. But the petitioner has not sought any relief against the State. Nor has he made any grievance in the petition of any act or omission on the part of the State. 4. Mr. Waghmare, learned counsel for the petitioner presented before us the case of the petitioner in two aspects. First of all, it was said that as the number of vacancies to be filled on the result of the examination to be held is the same as the number of vacancies intended to be filled on the result of the examination which was to have been held in November 1953, and that as in Ramvallabh Nagar's case this Court directed the Commission to issue a certificate of admission to Nagar, the examination which is to commence on 9-8-1954 is the same examination to which the petitioner and Nagar had been admitted and that, therefore, it was not necessary for the petitioner to make a fresh application for presenting himself at the ensuing examination. On an examination of the material provisions of the Madhya Bharat Judicial Service Rules, 1951 issued by the Rajpramukh under Art.234, Constitution of India, it will be seen that this contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is altogether untenable. Under R.6 of the M.B. Judicial Service Rules 1951, candidates seeking admission to the examination, besides possessing other qualifications, must have attained the age of 24 years and must not have attained the age of 30 years on the first day of January next following the date of the commencement of the examination, and must also be an advocate or pleader having practised at the Bar for not less than three years. The first proviso to R.6 raises the maximum age limit to 35 years in the case of persons in the service of the Madhya Bharat Government who have rendered not less than three years service. Rule 7 lays down that candidates must produce certificates of good character from the authorities mentioned therein. This rule clearly contemplates that certificates of good character must be of the present fitness of the candidate, i.e. of fitness at the time of offering as a candidate at the examination. Rule 9 gives the Commission the power to prescribe by notification the time and date of the examination. The next rule requires that applications for permission to sit for competitive examination shall be invited by the Commission and shall be made in the prescribed form, and that the number of vacancies shall be notified by the Commission. Rule 11 provides that every candidate "selected in accordance with the preceding rules for admission to the written test", shall be given a certificate of admission. Under R.12 no candidate be admitted to the examination unless he holds a certificate of admission. Rule 13, inter alia, prescribes that no claim for the refund of fees paid for the examination will be entertained. The effect of these rules is that when an examination is to be held the Commission must notify the time and the date of the commencement of the examination, the number of vacancies to be filled on the result of the examination and invite applications from intending candidates. The effect of these rules is that when an examination is to be held the Commission must notify the time and the date of the commencement of the examination, the number of vacancies to be filled on the result of the examination and invite applications from intending candidates. The notification of the date of the commencement of the examination is absolutely essential so as to enable persons who would be within the prescribed age limits on the first day of January next following the date of the commencement of the examination, to apply and present themselves for the examination. It is only when a person fulfilling all the conditions in respect of age, character and educational qualifications, applies in the form and manner prescribed by the Commission that he can claim to be admitted to the examination. If R.6 is read together with Rr.9 and 10, as it must be, it is plain that if an examination scheduled to be held on certain dates in any year, has for some reason or other to be postponed to some other dates in another year, the Commission cannot hold the examination without inviting fresh applications in accordance with Rr.9 and 10. This follows directly from the age limits laid down in R.6 with reference to the "the first day of January next following the date of the commencement of the examination." If in the above circumstances the Commission were to hold the examination without inviting fresh applications, and with the candidates who had been admitted at the previous intended examination, all persons who were not qualified under R.6 to take the examination in the previous year but who become qualified in the year in which the examination is to be held, would be debarred from taking the examination and this would be contrary to the provisions of Rr.6, 9 and 10. It is thus not the number of vacancies to be filled on the result of the examination, but the year in which it is to be held that determines the real denomination of the examination for purposes of Rr.6, 9, 10, 11 and 12. It is not necessary for me to consider here whether fresh applications would be necessary if the examination is adjourned to some other dates in the same year. It is not necessary for me to consider here whether fresh applications would be necessary if the examination is adjourned to some other dates in the same year. Suffice to say that the answer to the question would depend on the reasons necessitating the postponement of the examination. Here, we are concerned with the case of an examination which was to have been held in 1953 but which on account of the petition filed by Nagar had to be postponed and could not be held while the year 1953 was in. As I have endeavoured to point out above, a fresh notification under R.9 and fresh applications under R.10 are necessary for holding the examination in the current year. The applicant's claim that he is entitled to appear at the ensuing examination without a fresh application and on the strength of his admission at the previous examination of 1953, cannot, therefore, be accepted. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant was not inclined to dispute that it was necessary for the Commission to invite applications from candidates who did not fulfil the age requirements laid down in R.6 for taking the examination that was intended to be held in 1953 but who have now become qualified under the said rule for the ensuing examination. He, however, argued that while the Commission should invite applications for such candidates, it was wholly unnecessary to ask persons who had been admitted to the examination which was to have been held in November 1953, to submit fresh applications. I am unable to agree with this view. The Madhya Bharat Judicial Service Rules, 1951 do not permit such a course being taken. The reason is obvious. I am unable to agree with this view. The Madhya Bharat Judicial Service Rules, 1951 do not permit such a course being taken. The reason is obvious. If the Commission had adpoted the course suggested by the learned counsel for the applicant, it would have deprived candidates, who had been admitted to the last examination and who do not now intend to take the examination in 1954, of the amount of fees paid by them which they would be entitled to receive back on being required to make fresh applications and on their choosing not to take the examination and apply for admission; the commission would have also accepted as candidates, persons found by them fit and proper by character for the last examination, but who by reason of some change in their character in the intervening period, cannot today be accepted as persons fit for a post in the Judicial Service. By following that course the Commission would have also denied to the persons whose applications they had rejected in 1953 on the ground of delay or on the ground of not having been made in the prescribed form and manner, a chance to make fresh applications. If the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is accepted, it would in effect mean drawing an unreasonable distinction between candidates who had applied for appearing at the examination which was to have been held in 1953 and those from whom applications are invited in 1954. In my view, the Commission adopted the right course in asking candidates who had been admitted to the last examination to apply afresh for seeking liberty to present themselves for the ensuing examination. 6. I find it difficult to understand the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of this Court in Ramwallabh Nagar's case contemplated the holding of the same examination which had been stayed, and the Commission was ordered to admit Ramwallabh Nagar to that examination, and that by inviting fresh applications, the Commission had 'flouted' the order of this Court. As I read the decision in Nagar's case, it seems to me that it has not the meaning and effect attributed to it by the learned counsel for the applicant. In that case, this Court no doubt directed the Commission to issue a certificate of admission to Nagar to the written test. As I read the decision in Nagar's case, it seems to me that it has not the meaning and effect attributed to it by the learned counsel for the applicant. In that case, this Court no doubt directed the Commission to issue a certificate of admission to Nagar to the written test. But the written test spoken of by the order clearly means a written test which the Commission might hold in accordance with the Judicial Service Rules 1951, and not a written test contrary to the rules with only those candidates who had been admitted to the examination in 1953 before it was stayed. It is worthy of note that in Nagar's case the main controversy centred round the question whether for applying the second proviso to R.6 the qualification in respect of age should be the qualification in respect of age in force in 1951 and 1952 of which the benefit of exemption was claimed or whether it should be the age qualification as amended in 1953. The Commission had excluded Nagar from the examination on the view that for applying the proviso the relevant age limits were those in force-in the years 1951 and 1952 and not the amended raised age limit in force in 1953. This view of the Commission was not accepted by the Court and it was held that the amendment made in 1953 in age limit was effective also for the years of which the benefit was claimed under the proviso. It was on this construction of the proviso that Nagar was held to be entitled to be admitted to the examination. It is plain that the Commission could not give full effect to the decision of this Court in Nagar's case without inviting fresh applications so as to give the intending candidates the benefit of the construction put by this Court on the second proviso to R.6. In issuing a fresh notification for the examination and inviting fresh applications the Commission has, therefore, far from 'flouting' the decision of this Court in Nagar's case, only given effect to it. 7. In issuing a fresh notification for the examination and inviting fresh applications the Commission has, therefore, far from 'flouting' the decision of this Court in Nagar's case, only given effect to it. 7. The second way in which the case is submitted before us is that in accordance with the notification and the 'Instructions' issued by the Commission the petitioner did in fact submit an application to the Director of Education on 22-6-54; that the Director of Education was an agent and nominee of the Commission for receiving the petitioner's application; and that, therefore the application presented to the Director of Education on 22-6-54 would be deemed to have been presented to the Commission itself and it was the duty of the Commission to trace the application and see that the agent forwards it. Mr. Waghmare sought to build up the contention that the Director of Education was an agent of the Commission on the word 'through' which occurs in the direction given by the Commission in para 2 of the 'Instructions' that "candidates in Government service must submit their application form through the Head of the Department or office concerned". The untenability of the contention becomes obvious when regard is had to the correct meaning of the word 'through' as used in the direction and to the object of the direction. In common parlance the word 'through' no doubt connotes 'medium', 'agency' or 'instrument'. But the use of the word by itself cannot clearly create a relationship of a principal and an agent. The word is also used to express 'direction' or to indicate and emphasise intervening or intermediate stage. It is in this latter sense that the word has been used in the direction contained in para 2 of the "Instructions" issued by the Commission. The said direction does not import any 'agency' as understood in law. Nor does it mean that the physical act of transmitting the applications should be done by the Head of the Department or office concerned. All that it means is that a candidate in Government service must first put up the application before the Head of the Department or office concerned. This is in accord with the well-accepted rule of conduct of Government servants that they cannot seek employment elsewhere unless permitted by the Head of the Department or office concerned. All that it means is that a candidate in Government service must first put up the application before the Head of the Department or office concerned. This is in accord with the well-accepted rule of conduct of Government servants that they cannot seek employment elsewhere unless permitted by the Head of the Department or office concerned. The direction given by the Commission that candidates in Government service must submit their applications through the Head of the Department or office concerned cannot, therefore, be taken as relieving such candidates of the duty, or as casting any obligation on the Commission of seeing that their applications with the necessary endorsement of the Head of the Department or office concerned reach the Commission before the closing date for receipt of applications. Clearly by giving such a direction to the candidates, the Commission cannot appropriate to itself the discretion and the power of the Head of the Department in the matter of applications by its employees and to compel the Department to forward the application to the Commission. 8. I do not, therefore, see any substance in the contention of the petitioner's learned counsel that the application, said to have been presented to the Director of Education on 22-6-54, should be deemed to be an application submitted to the Commission itself on 22-6-54 or that it lay on the Commission to trace the application or ask the Director of Education to forward it. 9. Article 16 (1) of the Constitution was also invoked by the learned counsel for the applicant. That provision guarantees to all citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. I fail to understand how it is necessary here to consider this Article. There has been in the present case no restriction of the applicant's right under Art.16 (1) by any act or omission of the Commission. The Commission has not prohibited the petitioner from making an application in accordance with the prescribed manner and form, for being allowed to appear at the examination. As I have pointed out above the Commission has confined itself within the exercise of those duties which are confined to it by the Madhya Bharat Judicial Service Rules, 1951. The commission has not departed from that power which the law has vested in it. As I have pointed out above the Commission has confined itself within the exercise of those duties which are confined to it by the Madhya Bharat Judicial Service Rules, 1951. The commission has not departed from that power which the law has vested in it. There is thus no question of the Commission having declined to perform a legal duty and of a writ of mandamus prayed for being issued against the Commission. 10. Learned counsel suggested that as the Public Service Commission was working under the Government in the matter of holding competitive examinations for recruitment to services, a writ could be issued to the State, though none has been sought in the petition. The suggestion altogether overlooks the position of the Public Service Commission vis-a-vis the State, under the Constitution. Besides the applicant has not been able to make out a case for the issue of a writ to the Commission and has not complained in the petition about any action or inaction of the State. 11. For the above reasons, this petition must be and is rejected. 12. SAMVATSAR, J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.