Judgment.- The question in this second appeal is whether section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act (Act III of 1895) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The facts found by the Courts below may be stated. The plaint schedule property bearing old Survey No. 182 and Resurvey No. 231 of the extent of 2 acres 14 cents is situated in Magam village and is a potter service inam. Palakollu Subbanna was the original service holder and enjoyed the said inam during his lifetime. After his death, the plaintiff’s father Maridi became the service-holder and was in enjoyment of the said land. As Maridi had service inams in Inavalli also, he appointed the defendant’s father Narasayya as Deputy for him to do service on his behalf in Magam. Narasayya died on 15th September, 1948. After his death the plaintiffs’ father continued the defendants as deputies. When Maridi died on 9th November, 1945, the authority conferred by Maridi on the defendants came to an end. Though the plaintiffs asked the defendants to deliver possession of the suit land they refused to do so. In the circumstances, the plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 199 of 1948 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff, Amalapuram, for recovery of possession of the property mentioned in schedule A annexed to the plaint and for profits. Both the Courts found that, after the death of Maridi, the authority conferred on the defendants to deputise for him ceased and therefore, the plaintiffs would be entitled to possession. The contention raised by the defendants that section 21 of the Act would be a bar to the maintainability of the suit was negatived. Hence the second appeal. The only question raised in the second appeal is whether section 21 of the Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The relevant provisions of the Act may now be read. Hence the second appeal. The only question raised in the second appeal is whether section 21 of the Act is a bar to the maintainability of the suit. The relevant provisions of the Act may now be read. Section 13: “Any person may sue before the Collector for any of the village offices specified in section 3 or for recovery of the emoluments of any such office, on the ground that he is entitled under sub-section 2 or 3 of section 10 of the Madras Proprietary Estates Village Service Act, 1894 or under sub-section (2) or (3) of section 10 or sub-section(2) or (3) of section 11 or section 12 of this Act, as the case may be to hold such office and enjoy such emoluments.” Section 21: “No civil Court shall have authority to take into consideration or decide any claim to succeed to any of the offices specified in section 3 or any question as to the rate or amount of the emoluments of any such office or except as provided in proviso (ii) to sub-section (1) of section 13, any claim to recover the emoluments of any such office.” These two sections were the subject of judicial scrutiny. Some of the decisions, which may throw some light on the scope of the sections, may be noticed. In Kesiram Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu Patnailu1, a Bench of three Judges held that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is excluded by section 21 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act in cases in which the plaintiff sues for recovery of the land as emoluments of his office and the defendant res1sts the claim on the ground that the land is not the emolument of the office. At page 120, Sir Arnold White, C.J., defines the scope of section 21 as follows: “Section 13, subject to the proviso, gives the Collector jurisdiction to decide such a claim, whilst section 21, subject to the exception takes away the jurisdiction of the civil Courts.” At page 127 the learned Chief Justice observed: “The plaintiff’s sole ground of action is that the lands sued for are the emoluments of his office and it seems to me the claim is none the less a claim for the emoluments within the meaning of the section because the defendant denies that the lands in question constitute the emoluments.” It may be observed that, in that case, the suit was filed on the basis that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the land as emoluments of his office, and therefore, it was a clear case coming within the scope of section 13. Muvvula Seetham Naidu v. Doddi Rami Naidu2 was a decision arising out of a suit filed for the recovery of a village officer’s, inam land on the expiry of a lease granted by the village officer to the defendant. The learned Judge Benson, Officiating Chief Justice and Krishnaswami Ayyar, J., held that such a suit was maintainable in a civil Court. The learned Judges accepted the following observations of Subrahmania Ayyar, J., in Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu3: “According to the general law the landlord can eject the tenant without showing more than the letting and the expiry of the term as he is not called upon to allege or prove his right to the land or to the office, the tenant being estopped in such a case from raising any question as to the title of theparty,etc.” This decision was based upon the principle that the plaintiff’s title to the land as emoluments annexed to his office was not the basis for the recovery of the land. As a landlord, whatever might be the nature of the land held by him, he was entitled to recover the same as lessor after the expiry of the lease. As a landlord, whatever might be the nature of the land held by him, he was entitled to recover the same as lessor after the expiry of the lease. Devadoss and Wallace, JJ., held in Yandluri Yellamanda v. Kunchala Chidambaram1 that a suit for possession of service inam lands, not based on the facts that the plaintiff is the holder of an office and that the land is attached as emolument to that office, but on the allegations that the defendants were tenants holding over, after the expiry of a lease, is cognisable by a Civil Court. At page 269, Devadoss, J., observed: “But where a person sues for the possession of land which is his, whether it be against trespasser or against a co-sharer he does not base his claim on his being the holder of the office but he bases his claim on his right to the land. The mere fact that it is inam land does not mean that the cause of action is based on his being the holder of the Office. * * * In this case the plaintiff does not come into Court for recovery of land on the strength of his being an office-holder and that the lands being the emoluments of the office. He seeks the Court’s aid for recovering possession of the property which has been unlawfully taken from him.” Later on, the learned Judge proceeded to state that section 21 does not take a way the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain a suit for the recovery of possession of an inam land from a trespasser, or a tenant holding over or from a co-sharer, who in order to defeat the plaintiff, sets up a title in himself and denies the title of the plaintiff. Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Putta Veeramma v. Yellapalli Mocharamma2, with his usual clarity, brought out the principles underlying sections 9, 13 and 21 of the Act in bold relief. There, a village blacksmith alienated to various persons, portions of his service inam lands and was dismissed. His widow was appointed to the office. She brought a suit against the defendant, an alienee of one of the portions. Both the Deputy Collector and, on appeal the Collector gave her a decree. In a writ of certiorari, the question was raised whether they had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. His widow was appointed to the office. She brought a suit against the defendant, an alienee of one of the portions. Both the Deputy Collector and, on appeal the Collector gave her a decree. In a writ of certiorari, the question was raised whether they had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The learned Judges Venkatasubba Rao and Abdul Rahman, JJ., held that section 21 barred the suit. At page 408, Venkatasubba Rao, J., laid down the tests for ascertaining whether a particular suit comes within the mischief of section 21 of the Act. The learned Judge said: “The test for deciding whether the Revenue or the Civil Court has jurisdiction has been laid down in several cases. Where it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege in order to maintain his action that the land in suit is an emolument of a service inam, the jurisdiction will remain with the Revenue Court under section 13 of the Act.” “Where the plaintiff sues on the ground of a trespass or on the ground that the land is his property or upon the footing of a lease that has expired, there is no need for him to rely upon the fact of the land being an emolument of a service inam”. The simple test laid down by the learned Judge may be put thus. Is it necessary to rely upon the fact of the land being an emolument of a service inam in order to get relief in the suit ? To summarise, section 21 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts only in regard to matters in respect whereof jurisdiction is conferred under section 13 on the Revenue Court. A suit by a service-holder claiming a right to succeed or in actual possession of the office for recovery of the emoluments is cognisable by a Revenue Court. The denial of the character of the property by the defendants does not affect its jurisdiction. But the essential requisite is that the plaintiff shall allege and rely upon the fact that the land is an emolument attached to the office and make that a foundation for the relief claimed. But, if his cause of action and his right to possession do not depend upon his title to the emoluments as a service holder, but on a collateral fact, section 21 is not a bar. But, if his cause of action and his right to possession do not depend upon his title to the emoluments as a service holder, but on a collateral fact, section 21 is not a bar. If he is dispossessed by a trespasser, if his lessee refuses to deliver possession after the expiry of the term if a person holding a derivative title under him does not give possession after the termination of the derivative title either on the expiry of the term or otherwise, in all these cases, his cause of action and his right to relief do not depend upon his title as a service holder to the emoluments but only on his right to possession. If the aforesaid principles are applied, what will be the result in the present case? The plaintiff’s father permitted the defendants to enjoy the suit property doing service during his life-time. After his death, instead of returning the land to his heirs, they continued in possession as trespassers. The plaintiffs are entitled to succeed if they establish that their father permitted the defendants to enjoy the land for a purpose and that the permission given was revoked by his death. It is not necessary for them to prove that they are service holders and that the lands are emoluments annexed to the service. If so, it follows that section 21 is not a bar to the maintainability of the suit in a Civil Court. The conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ------------- Appeal dismissed.