Judgment.-This Second Appeal arises out of A.S. No. 70 of 1951 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tellicherry, which was an appeal against the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 79 of 1948 on the file of the Principal District Munsif’s Court, Tellicherry, by which the plaintiffs were refused recovery of possession of the suit property on the ground that they do not need the holding bona fide for the purpose of raising crops or other produce for their maintenance. The lower appellate Court held, reversing the decision of the trial Court, that the plaintiffs needed the holding bona fide for raising crops for their maintenance and that there are grounds for the eviction of the first defendant. It is against this finding of the lower appellate Court that the first defendant has preferred the present Second Appeal. The subject-matter of the suit was leased under a marapat, dated 14th November, 1927, to the first defendant by one Mammad, the then karnavan of the plaintiffs’ tarwad. But subsequently under a decree of the District Court of North Malabar in O.S. No. 9 of 1944 the tarwad became partitioned and the suit item among others was allotted to the tavazhi of the plaintiffs of which the first plaintiff is the karnavan. At the time of the filing of the suit the plaintiffs were 28 in number and their claim was based upon the fact that the income which the tavazhi derived from the properties allotted to them under the partition decree was not sufficient for their ordinary maintenance and as such they invoked the previsions of subsections 5 and 6 of section 20 of the Malabar Tenancy Act (XIV of 1930) for evicting the first defendant from the holding. The lower appellate Court has, as already stated, found that the provisions of sub-section 5 of section 20 of the Act will apply but that the other relief claimed, namely, that they needed the holding for the purpose of constructing a building for their residence cannot be allowed. In the Second Appeal before me Mr. Achuthan Nambiai for the appellant contends that according to the amendment effected to sub-section 5 of section 20 of the Act by the Madras Act VII of 1954 it cannot be said that the requirements of the plaintiffs for maintenance are justified. It is necessary for understanding this argument to trace the history of the section itself. Achuthan Nambiai for the appellant contends that according to the amendment effected to sub-section 5 of section 20 of the Act by the Madras Act VII of 1954 it cannot be said that the requirements of the plaintiffs for maintenance are justified. It is necessary for understanding this argument to trace the history of the section itself. As the Act originally stood sub-section 5 of section 20 was in pari materia with sub-section 5 of section 14 of the Malabar Tenancy Act which is in the following terms:- “That the period the verumpattam, kanam, kanam-kuzhikanam or kuzhikanam as the case may be has expired and there has been no renewal and the landlord requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation or for that of any member of his family or tarwad or tavazhi who has a proprie tary and beneficial interest therein.” The important words in the sub-section were “Requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation.” In Second Appeal No. 42 of 1938 Venkataramana Rao, J., held that a mere desire on the part of the landlord to have the land for his own cultivation even if bona fide is not enough. It must be shown that the landlord really needed the land for his own cultivation. The question to be decided was whether without evicting the tenant and getting possession of the land it would be impossible for the landlord or the member of his tavazhi or tarwad to sustain themselves. Though the words used were “requires” “bona fide” the same were interpreted to mean necessity or need to the landlord. This view of Venkataramana Rao, J., was not accepted by King, J. in Second Appeal No. 538 of 1939 wherein he held that the expression “bona fide ” cannot apply to a state of circumstances but only to statements or intentions or actions of a human being. Therefore all that is necessary for the Court is to decide whether when the landlord demands or asks for or sues for any land on the ground that he wishes to cultivate it himself is a statement made bona fide. In the view of King, J., the need or necessity of the landlord does not arise for consideration in construing the expression “requires the holding bona fide”. In the view of King, J., the need or necessity of the landlord does not arise for consideration in construing the expression “requires the holding bona fide”. In this state of conflict of decisions a bench of this Court in Narikkal Chathan v. Kesavan Nambudri 1held that the words “requires the holding bona fide” mean only a genuine intention on the part of the landlord to cultivate and that it is not necessary that he should show the real need to do so. The learned Judges went further and held that the fact that the landlord has sufficient land under cultivation elsewhere to provide for the needs of himself and his family does not matter. In this state of case law the legislature intervened and sub-sections 5 and 6 of section 20 along with sub-sections 5 and 6 of section 14 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1930, were amended and for the words which stood in the Act XIV of 1930, namely: “The landlord requires the holding bona fide for his own cultivation or for that of any member of his family or tarwad or tavazhi who has a proprietary and beneficial interest therein” the following words came to be substituted:- “The landlord needs the holding bona fide for the purpose of raising crops or other produce for his own maintenance or for that of any other member of his tarwad or tavazhi who has a proprietary and beneficial interest in the holding.” The result of this amendment war, that the need or necessity which Venkataramana Rao, J., held was essential, was restored and the view expressed in Narikkal Chathan v. Kesavan Nambudiri1 was negatived. By Act VII of 1954 to sub-clause 5 of sections 14 and 20 an explanation was added in the following terms: “In considering requirements for maintenance regard shall be had only to primary needs.” So, as the section now stands, unless it is seen that the landlord needs the holding for maintenance of himself or any member of his tarwad or tavazhi which must mean the primary needs of himself or the members of his tavazhi the tenant cannot be evicted from his holding. The term “maintenance” under the Marumakkathayam Law has been defined to include not only bare necessities of life but other reasonable and legitimate expenses of the members consistent with their position and dignity to keep themselves in comfort. The term “maintenance” under the Marumakkathayam Law has been defined to include not only bare necessities of life but other reasonable and legitimate expenses of the members consistent with their position and dignity to keep themselves in comfort. It is stated to include also meldalavu. It is stated to designate a part of what is required for the support of persons as distinguished from what is strictly necessary for food and raiment and such a thing would differ with the status of the family. Therefore, the term maintenance as it is understood in Malabar includes not only bare necessities of life but all that is required as essential for a comfortable life consistent with the income and status of the family. In these circumstances but for the Explanation added to sub-clause 5 of sections 14 and 20 of the Act Courts would be justified in holding that if the landlord needs the holding for meeting the expenses necessary for maintenance as is understood in the manner referred to above he is entitled to evict the tenant. The Explanation added under the amendment has now altered the situation. The Courts have to see what the primary needs of the landlord are. By primary needs one has to understand those which are necessary for a person or a group of persons to keep himself or themselves in normal health and go about as free men. It certainly does not mean luxuries. The primary needs of the different individuals cannot be the same. A sick person should have medicine to sustain himself and his primary needs would be different from those of a normal healthy person who sustains himself by taking proper food and nourishment. It cannot therefore be said that the primary needs of different individuals would be the same but ordinarily the expression “primary needs” must be understood to mean food and raiment as well as other necessaries sufficient for a person to lead a life which is not uncomfortable or penurious. The finding of the lower appellate Court is that the net income of the tavazhi is only Rs. 156 and 735 seers of paddy and the plaintiffs were 28 in number at the time of the filing of the suit and one of them died during the pendency of the appeal. The finding of the lower appellate Court is that the net income of the tavazhi is only Rs. 156 and 735 seers of paddy and the plaintiffs were 28 in number at the time of the filing of the suit and one of them died during the pendency of the appeal. If the total net income is divided among the 27 persons and the price of paddy is computed at Rs. 30 per 100 seers it works out at the rate of Rs. 14 per year per head or at Re. 1-3-0 per month. It need hardly be said that this Re. 1-3-0 per head per month would not be sufficient for keeping body and soul together and, therefore, it cannot be said that this would be sufficient for meeting the primary needs of the members of the tavazhi of the plaintiff. But it is argued by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar that the first plaintiff as karnavan has only the duty of distributing whatever net income is available to the members of the family and that he need not concern himself with finding out whether the amount distributed per head is sufficient for bare necessaries or primary needs. It is also urged that there is evidence in the case to show that some of the major male members of the family have avocations of their own and that some of the female members have been married and they are living with their husbands. A perusal of the evidence of P.W. 1 shows that there are three married woman who do not live with their husbands. Though he had stated that there are major male members who have avocations of their own he has not been cross-examined to state whether the avocations of those persons would bring them sufficient funds for meeting their primary needs. The first defendant as D.W. 1 has deposed that the plaintiffs have separate avocations and that the female plaintiffs have husbands. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that it is the duty of the plaintiffs, landlords, to prove affirmatively that apart from the income derived from the family properties the individual members have no other private source of income from which their primary needs could be met. I do not think that this method of approach is a correct one. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that it is the duty of the plaintiffs, landlords, to prove affirmatively that apart from the income derived from the family properties the individual members have no other private source of income from which their primary needs could be met. I do not think that this method of approach is a correct one. If the landlord is able to show that the tarwad or tavazhi income is not sufficient to meet the primary needs of the members without getting possession of the property which is sought to be recovered from the tenant, then the onus is shifted on to the tenant who contends contra that the members of the tarwad have private means other than the tarwad property which would be sufficient to provide them with the primary needs. In the present case there is no such evidence. All that the first defendant has been able to show is that female plaintiffs have husbands and that some of the male plaintiffs have separate avocations. That would not be enough to show that the means of the individual members of the tavazhi would be sufficient for meeting their primary needs. In S.A. No. 1939 of 1948 Chandra Reddi, J., held that the expression “needs the holding bona fide for his own maintenance” means the actual necessity of the landlord and that in the case where the plaintiff is being maintained by her husband and she does not require the family property for eking out her livelihood by resorting to direct cultivation of the holding the requirements of the section have not been satisfied. But as I have already stated, in the present case the onus of proving that separate means existed to meet the primary needs of the members of the tavazhi is on the tenant and he has not discharged that. I may also add here that there are decisions of this Court to the effect that the existence of private means of income of a junior member of a tarwad or tavazhi would not affect claim to be maintained out of the family properties when the family income is sufficient to provide suitable subsistence for the members of the tarwad. I may also add here that there are decisions of this Court to the effect that the existence of private means of income of a junior member of a tarwad or tavazhi would not affect claim to be maintained out of the family properties when the family income is sufficient to provide suitable subsistence for the members of the tarwad. The possession of separate properties by a junior member of a tarwad by itself will not prevent him from claiming maintenance from the tarwad properties when the family income is sufficient to provide suitable subsistence for all the members of the tarwad, unless it is shown that the members of the tarwad or tavazhi are in possession of funds and properties or are employed so that they can maintain themselves from out of such sources of income their primary needs will have to be met only from the tarwad income. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the lower Court that the plaintiffs are entitled to evict the first defendant from his holding. In the result the C.M.A. fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. No leave. C.M.S.A. No. 107 of 1951 is also dismissed. No leave. K.C. ----- Appeals dismissed.