Order: The two questions raised in this Revision Case bear on the interpretation of section 145(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In respect of some lands with regard to the possession of which there had been a dispute, proceedings were started by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kurnool, under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the basis of an apprehension of a breach of the peace. As required by the preliminary order under section 145(i), Criminal Procedure Code, written statements were put in by the parties concerned, each of them claiming to be in possession thereof, and the Magistrate proceeded to record evidence adduced by one of the parties. In the course of this enquiry he found that there was no dispute likely to give rise to a breach of the peace and dropped the proceedings under section 145(5), Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Chinnappa Reddy appearing in support of this Revision Petition against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dropping the proceedings, raised two questions: (i). Whether once the written statements were filed and evidence was recorded, it was within the competence of the Magistrate to drop the proceedings ? and (2) whether he could do it suo motu without being asked to do so by one of the parties to the proceedings or someone interested therein? As regards the first point, what is urged by the learned counsel is that the expression " any party so required to attend " in sub-section(5) denotes the stage at which the proceedings could be dropped. In other words, it is argued by him that it is only after the preliminary order is issued and before the Magistrate enters upon an enquiry into the possession of either of the parties that the proceedings -could be dropped. The learned Counsel contends that otherwise there is no meaning in using the words " so required " and the Legislature could as well have used the words "any party", the expression "so required" being redundant and instead would have said " at any stage of the proceedings ". Though this argument appears , to be apparently attractive, it looks to me that it is not susceptible of that construc-‘ tion. In my opinion, the expression " so required ". cannot have that denotation. It only referes to a party who has been required under sub-section (1) to appear in Court. Though this argument appears , to be apparently attractive, it looks to me that it is not susceptible of that construc-‘ tion. In my opinion, the expression " so required ". cannot have that denotation. It only referes to a party who has been required under sub-section (1) to appear in Court. The interpretation sought to be placed by the counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted especially having regard to the juxtaposition of the sub-section to the sub-section(4) which deals with inquiry as to possession. In considering whether a Magistrate can drop proceedings at any stage of the enquiry it is well to remember that the foundation of jurisdiction for proceedings under section 145 is the apprehension of a breach of the peace and when once the Magistrate feels that there is no continuance of this apprehension, it is open to him to drop the proceedings. In this context the remarks of a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1, may usefully be noted. "The procedure provided by section 145 is intended solely for the purpose of preventing a breach of the peace where a dispute ex1sts concerning any land, or water, or the boundaries thereof, which dispute, if no proceedings were taken, would be likely to cause a breach of the peace. The institution of such proceedings is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Magistrate. The existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is a condition precedent absolutely necessary to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to enter upon an inquiry as to possession. There is a current of rulings of this Court by which it has been held that it is a necessary preliminary condition to proceedings under section 145, that a Magistrate, acting under the provisions of that section, shall record an order stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace in fact ex1sts. Any enquiry as to possession that is made under the provisions of the section is made, not for the purpose of strengthening the position of one party or of the other party in the dispute between them....". Any enquiry as to possession that is made under the provisions of the section is made, not for the purpose of strengthening the position of one party or of the other party in the dispute between them....". It follows from the passage that as the object of the section is mainly to avoid a breach of the peace, the moment the Magistrate feels that the likelihood of a breach of the peace does not ex1st, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to terminate the inquiry once started and a party is not entitled to call upon the Court to give a finding on the question of possession. A criminal Court acting under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is not expected to discharge the functions of a civil Court, which is the proper forum for adjudicating upon the rights of the parties either as to possession or title. Therefore a party cannot compel a Magistrate under section 145 to go into the question of possession irrespective of whether there is a continuance of the apprehension of a breach of the peace or not, merely because the proceedings were initiated. In this context the observations of the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in the same decision at page 117 are apposite: " We think it clear that a party to a proceeding under section 145 is not in the position of a plain-tiffin a civil suit who has set the Court in motion and has a right to require a decision upon the questions raised by him. If a Magistrate either refuses to make an order, under sub-section (i) of section 145 or having made such an order subsequently cancels it on the ground that a dispute does not ex1st likely to cause a breach of the peace, no private person has any status in our opinion to contes t the propriety of his refusal to make an enquiry into the question of possession ". The view taken by me as regards the stage at which a Magistrate can drop the proceedings under section 145(5) is thus supported by the decision in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1. This ruling was followed by the Madras High Court in a number of rulings beginning from Suryanarayana v. Ankineed Prasad Bahadur2. Mr. The view taken by me as regards the stage at which a Magistrate can drop the proceedings under section 145(5) is thus supported by the decision in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1. This ruling was followed by the Madras High Court in a number of rulings beginning from Suryanarayana v. Ankineed Prasad Bahadur2. Mr. Justice Spencer following the decision in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1, observed that a Magistrate had power to drop the proceedings at any stage. Mr. Justice Krishnan in Narasayya v. Venkiah3, stated that it was not open to a party to come up to the High Court and say that the Magistrate. had no business to drop proceedings on the ground that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace without giving him an opportunity to show that there was such likelihood. In the opinion of the learned Judge it is the duty of the Magistrate to be satisfied that there is no breach of the peace in his District and if he is so satisfied, it is not for a private party to object. Recently Mr. Justice Ramaswamy of the same High Court has followed it in Velur Devasthanam v. Sambandamurthi Nainar4. Another Bench of the Calcutta High Court, placing reliance on the decision in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1, decided in Abdur Rahman Bhuia v. Dinesh Haldar5, that it was competent for a Magistrate under section 145 (5), Criminal Procedure Code, to cancel the preliminary order under sub-section (1) at any stage of the proceedings. The learned Judges stated that the Magistrate was entitled to do this, — " though these words are not expressly used in the section but the sense is conveyed by the use of the word ‘exist’ in it ". This view seems to be shared by the Allahabad High Court also. In Dulla v. State6, Beg, J., decided that the absence of danger of a breach of the peace ousts the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to continue the proceedings initiated under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. When once the Magistrate learns that there is no danger of a breach of the peace, the foundation for action under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, disappears and it is not competent for him to proceed further and must immediately stay his hand. It is unnecessary for me to multiply authority. When once the Magistrate learns that there is no danger of a breach of the peace, the foundation for action under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, disappears and it is not competent for him to proceed further and must immediately stay his hand. It is unnecessary for me to multiply authority. Suffice it to say, that I express, my respectful accord with authorities cited above and hold the expression "so-required " referred to above does not give any indication as to the stage at which the Magistrate can drop proceedings and it is competent for him to do so, at any stage of the proceedings provided, he is satisfied that no dispute ex1sts that is likely to cause a breach of the peace. This leads me to the other points, whether the jurisdiction to drop the proceedings, exists only at the instance of one of the parties or whether a Court can do it suo motu. Here again, the learned Counsel relies on the language of sub-section (5). In my opinion that is only an enabling provision with regard to qne of the parties and that does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to drop proceedings suo motu especially when it has a power to start proceedings suo motu. It would be anomalous to hold that a Court has power to start proceedings suo motu but it has no power to drop it. It is not necessary to pursue this any further having regard to the overwhelming authority in support of the proposition that a Court has power to do such things of its own accord. This view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry1, Abdur Rahman Bhuia v. Dinesh Haldar5 and also in Narasayya v. Venkiah3, referred to above. Mr. Chinnappa Reddy relied on a ruling of a single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Sri Chand v. Bashambar Nath7, as supporting the opposite view. But I do not think that there is anything in the decision to substantiate that proposition. What happened there was a Mag1st ate passed an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 requiring the attendance of parties in Court on a certain day. This was not complied with by the parties concerned with the result that the Magistrate consigned the case to the record room. What happened there was a Mag1st ate passed an order under sub-section (1) of section 145 requiring the attendance of parties in Court on a certain day. This was not complied with by the parties concerned with the result that the Magistrate consigned the case to the record room. One of the parties moved District Magistrate, who regarded the order of the trial Magistrate as one under sub-section (5) and dismissed the petition. In revision against that order of the District Magistrate, the learned Judge expressed the opinion that sub-section(5) applied only to those cases where any of the parties concerned in the dispute or any other person interested appeared before him and denied the ex1stence of the dispute. The question whether it was competent for a Magistrate to drop proceedings suo motu was not raised before him nor argued. The learned Judge merely repeated the provisions of sub-section(5) because in his opirion the order under revision did not fall within the terms of that sub-section. Even assuming it can lend support to such an argument, I cannot follow it having regard to the abundance of authority in favour of the contrary view. It follows both the contentions have to be repelled. On the merits, the learned Advocate contended that there was no basis for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that there was no likelihood, of a breach of the peace. There seems to be some substance in this argument having regard to the discussion of the evidence. But as the evidence is not placed before me, I am unable to say the conclusion of the Magistrate is unsustainable. Even otherwise I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Magistrate dropping the proceedings. It is open to the aggrieved party to seek a proper remedy in a civil Court, and I am reluctant to reopen the proceedings and start the inquiry afresh. In the result, the petition is dismissed. V.P.S. ----- Petition dismissed.