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1954 DIGILAW 423 (MAD)

Pisupati Rama Rao (Since deceased) (Plaintiffs) v. Tadepalli Papayya (Defendants).

1954-09-22

K.SUBBA RAO

body1954
Judgment: The question on this Second Appeal is whether the suit partnership is illegal. The facts found by the Courts below may be stated. The plaintiff and the defendants formed a partnership in the name and style of Tadepalli Papayya and Co., for running rice ration shop business from 3rd September, 1944, at Bezwada. The said business was conducted on the basis of ration shop licence issued in the name of the 1st defendant. The suit was filed for a declaration that the firm Tadepalli Papayya & Co., had been dissolved on 1st September, 1945, for settlement of accounts and for directing the 1st defendant to" pay such amount as may be found due to the plaintiff. Both the Courts held that the alleged partnership was illegal and unenforceable and, on that finding, dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred the above Second Appeal. The only question in the Second Appeal is whether the said partnership is illegal. The answer to the question depends upon the provisions of the Defence of India Rules and that of the Madras Rationing order, 1943. It will be convenient to read the relevant provisions at this stage. Rule 81(2): The Central Government or the Provincial Government so far as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of Britsh India or the effecient prosecution of the war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community may by order provide (a) for regulating or prohibiting the production, treatment, keeping, storage, movement, transport, d1stribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of articles of any description whatsoever and in particular for prohibiting the withholding from sale either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons of articles or things kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or classes of persons or in specified circumstances. (b) for controlling the prices or rates at which articles or things of any description whatsoever may be sold or hired and for relaxing any maximum or minimum limits otherwise imposed on such prices or rates. Rule 81(4): If any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. Rule 81(4): If any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. Under section 2(9) of the Madras Rationing Order of 1943, a " rationing document " includes a rationing book, a ration card or any part of any ration book or ration card or any coupon or any declaration authority, permit or other document issued or made by or under the provisions of this order. Section 13: "A ration document shall not be used for obtaining any rationed article except by or on behalf of the person to whom such document was issued." Section 16: " No person shall transfer to any other........person a ration document issued to himself". It is seen from the aforesaid provisions that the ration order was passed for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. It was intended to ensure an equitable distribution of rice to the members of the public at controlled rates. To achieve that object, it was necessary that the person, who buys and sells rice, should be under the control of the authorities concerned and subject to the regulations made to prevent abuse. The order, therefore, enabled the authorities concerned to issue an authorisation to a retail dealer to buy and sell rice subject to the conditions laid down in the said order. Under section 13, the authorisation cannot be used by any person other than the person to whom it was issued. Under section 16, such a person is prohibited from transferring a ration document to any other person. Under the Defence of India Rules, any contravention of an order made in exercise of the powers conferred under that rule was made an offence punishable as such. It is, therefore, obvious that any contract involving the transfer of a ration document not only contravenes the express prohibition contained in section 13 of the Order but also relates to an act which is, made an offence punishable under the Defence of India Rules. Such a contract would be void under section 23 of the Contract Act as the object of that contract involves something illegal or contrary to public policy. There are innumerable cases on the analogous provisions in different statutes such as the Opium Act, the Abkari Act, etc. Such a contract would be void under section 23 of the Contract Act as the object of that contract involves something illegal or contrary to public policy. There are innumerable cases on the analogous provisions in different statutes such as the Opium Act, the Abkari Act, etc. It would be enough if two of the relevant cases laying down the principles are noticed. Nalain Padmanabhan v. Salt Badrinadh Sarda1, deals with a question arising under the Opium Act. There two persons were farmers of opium revenue under Government. They obtained a licence from the Collector for the sale of opium subject to the condition among others that they should not sell, transfer, or sub-rent their privileges without the permission of the Collector. They, without the sanction of the Collector, entered into an agreement with C by which they admitted him as a partner in the opium business. The third party admitted as partner brought a suit for dissolution and winding up of the business. Benson and Sundara Iyer, JJ., held that the agreement was void and the suit was not maintainable. At page 586, the learned Judges observed: " It is well established that the provisions of the Abkari and Opium Acts are not intended merely to protect the public revenue and that the prohibitions contained therein are based on public policy ". The learned Judges proceeded to state: " We are also of opinion that the partnership in this case was illegal for another reason as it contravened the provisions of clause 26 of the licence which prohibits the transfer of the right of sale granted to the defendants." As regards the meaning to be attributed to word ‘transfer’ the learned Judges observed: "But if one person carrying on a trade and possessing stock and capital, admits another into partnership with himself, making the stock and capital, the joint property of both, it is impossible to contend that there is not a transfer in such a case. The word ‘transfer’ says James, L.J. in Gathercole v. Smith2, is " one of the widest terms that can be used " and according to Lush, L.J. in the same case, the word ‘transferable’ is a word of the widest import and includes every means by which the property may be passed from one person to another". The word ‘transfer’ says James, L.J. in Gathercole v. Smith2, is " one of the widest terms that can be used " and according to Lush, L.J. in the same case, the word ‘transferable’ is a word of the widest import and includes every means by which the property may be passed from one person to another". We are not concerned in construing a statute like the Opium Act with the mere form of the transaction but with the substance of it ". It will be seen from the aforesaid decision that the learned Judges held that the partnership was illegal for two reasons (1) that it offended the rule of public policy and (2) that it contravened an express statutory prohibition. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court elaborately considered the question arising under the Madras Abkari Act in Vela Padayachi v. Sivasooriam Pillai3. The facts there are: The parties to the partnership agreement sokl arrack themselves or through the other partners as their agents on a licence granted to the defendant alone in which there was a term prohibiting him from transferring his rights. The partnership agreement was entered into prior to the issue of the licence to the defendant. The suit was filed by one of the partners for recovery of the amount due to him under a settlement of account in respect of the said partnership. The defence was that the suit partnership was illegal and, therefore the suit was riot maintainable. At page.320 Horwill, J., who delivered the judgment, observed: “When a licence, which is a personal privilege to vend, is acquired by one partner, it is certainly his licence and not the licence of the partnership. Since it was granted to him on the express understanding that it was to be used by him and by him alone, its use by the partnership would involve a transfer in precisely the same way as it would if the partnership were entered into after the licence was issued. On the question of public policy,........it is difficult to see any difference between the object of the partnership entered into before the licence was granted and one entered into after it was granted. On the question of public policy,........it is difficult to see any difference between the object of the partnership entered into before the licence was granted and one entered into after it was granted. In either case, the partnership would be entered into for the purpose of bringing about a result prohibited by law, i.e., the vending of arrack by a person who had no licence to do so.” At page 324, the learned Judge concluded his discussion in the following words: “From the above discussion, it is evident that there is a long and cons1stent body of opinion of this High Court from Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangaswami Moopan1, onwards, with which we agree, that a partnership entered into for the purpose of conducting a business in arrack or toddy or a licence granted or to be granted to only one of them is void ab initio, whether the contract was entered into before the licence was granted or afterwards, in that it either involves a transfer of the licence, which is Prohibited under rule 27 and punishable under section 56 or a breach of section 15 of the Abkari Act punishable under section 55, because the unlicensed partner by himself or through his agent, the other partner sells without a licence.” In my view, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions equally apply to the facts of the instant case. The partnership business of buying rice and selling the same in the retail shop was carried on with the aid of a licence in favour of the 1st defendant. When the licence was issued to the 1st defendant it was intended that he should and none else use that for doing business. Instead, the plaintiff and other partners, who had no ration card along with the 1st defendant bought and sold rice. It certainly was a user of the ration card by persons other than the one to whom it was issued in contravention of section 13 of the Rationing Order. It also involved the transfer of a ration document prohibited by section 16 of the Rationing Order. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to make a d1stinction between the Opium and Abkari Acts and the Rationing Order and argued that no principle of public policy underlay the provisions of the Rationing Order. I cannot agree. It also involved the transfer of a ration document prohibited by section 16 of the Rationing Order. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to make a d1stinction between the Opium and Abkari Acts and the Rationing Order and argued that no principle of public policy underlay the provisions of the Rationing Order. I cannot agree. As I have already stated, the Rationing Order was introduced in the interests of the public for the equitable distribution of rice during those days of scarcity. If there was a question of public policy in enacting the Abkari and Opium Acts, I do not see how the Rationing Order of 1943 could be put in a different category. It was not issued in the interests of public revenue. It was essentially intended to protect the public interests and, to effectuate that purpose, certain acts deleterious to the public interests were prohibited and the breach thereof was made punishable. The suit partnership entered into between the plaintiff and his partners in direct contravention of the statutory prohibition is illegal and unenforceable. The Judgment of the lower Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. D.L.N. ----- Appeal dismissed. No leave.